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This book is inspired by the theme session “Intersubjectivity and Language: The Inter-
play of Cognition and Emotion” held at the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics 
Conference in Krakow, Poland, in July 2007. As organizers of the session, we felt 
that an interdisciplinary volume on this matter would be an appropriate follow-up. 
In addition to contributors from the theme session, we invited authors who are 
well known in the field. Their positive response led to a total of 16 papers, which 
we grouped into 3 Parts: I Consciousness, II Intersubjectivity, and III Language. We 
asked each of the contributors to discuss these ‘higher functions’ of the human mind 
from the foundational perspective of motion and/or emotion (See Figure 1 in the 
Prologue). The polyphonous result contains, we think, many harmonizing but also 
some disharmonizing tones. As such, the volume constitutes a relevant contribution 
to the actual discussions in the humanities with respect to the human mind. The 16 
papers are framed by a Prologue and an Epilogue. Jordan Zlatev, one of the editors 
and also co-author of one of the papers in Part III, wrote the Prologue in which he 
introduces each paper in the overarching perspective of motion and emotion. Colwyn 
Trevarthen, co-author of one of the papers in Part II, followed our request to write an 
Epilogue, in which he reflects on the contributions of the volume and places them in 
a historical perspective.
Editing a voluminous collection as the present one does not involve much 
motion, besides moving fingers and hand on keyboard and mouse. A good deal of 
emotion was and is involved, however. Above all feelings of thankfulness. First of 
all, our gratitude goes to the authors for their work and patient cooperation over 
the years that the volume took shape. Secondly, we thank the colleagues who were 
willing to act as anonymous reviewers for the different papers. Special thanks go to 
Ralph Ellis, co-editor of the Consciousness & Emotion Book Series in which this 
volume is being published. Ralph has given us useful support along the way and even 
felt inspired to contribute, with Natika Newton, with a chapter. Thanks are also due 
to Hanneke Bruintjes and Els van Dongen, Acquisition Editors at Benjamins, who 
guided us through a time plan that we broke more than once. Finally, we thank Wes-
sel Stoop, student assistant to Ad Foolen, who took care of formatting the contribu-
tions and uploading them on a website, so that authors and editors always had access 
to the latest versions of the texts.
After completion of the volume, hope and confidence are the dominant feelings 
on our side. Confidence that there is an interesting path before us, on which it will be 
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pleasant and exciting to move forward to a science of the mind. We hope that this 






Bodily motion, emotion and mind science
Jordan Zlatev
Lund University
1.  Why ‘motion’ and ‘emotion’?
This book emerged as a happy coincidence. Or was it perhaps a matter of unplanned, 
but non-accidental “distributed cognition”? In retrospect it seems that it was some-
thing that was just waiting to happen. Based on our edited volume The Shared Mind 
(Zlatev et  al. 2008), Tim Racine, Chris Sinha, Esa Itkonen and myself proposed a 
theme session with the title “Intersubjectivity and Language” to the 10th International 
Cognitive Linguistics Conference, held in Krakow, Poland, in July 2007. At the same 
time, Ad Foolen and Ulrike Lüdtke independently proposed a session on “ Language 
and Emotion”. Both proposals were accepted, but we were urged to  combine them, 
and the outcome was the stimulating whole-day workshop “Intersubjectivity and 
Language: The Interplay of Cognition and Emotion”.
The first fruit of this, at first glance coerced, synthesis was the linking of the 
topics of intersubjectivity and emotion. While Zlatev et al. (2008: 1, 3) had defined 
the first of these notions as “the sharing of experiential content (e.g. feelings, percep-
tions, thoughts, linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects” and had stated 
that such “sharing of experiences is not only, and not primarily, on a cognitive level, 
but also (and more basically) on the level of affect, perceptual processes and cona-
tive (action-oriented) engagements” – emotion was not explicitly thematized in that 
predecessor to the present volume. This was clearly a blind spot in the programmatic 
attempt to frame the concept of intersubjectivity as an alternative to the cognitivist 
perspective of “theory of mind”, which still dominates large parts of the field of social 
cognition.
A second, and equally important, insight that emerged from the workshop was 
the close link between (inter)subjectivity and bodily motion, or movement. Again, 
it is not that Zlatev et al. (2008: 3) had neglected the essential role of the body and 
its various forms of “movements” for the understanding of self and others: “Such 
 sharing and understanding are based on embodied interaction (e.g. empathic per-
ception, imitation, gesture and practical collaboration).” Similarly, various traditions 
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(all reflected in the present volume) can be seen as converging on this theme: from the 
phenomenological analyses of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the developmental psy-
chology of Piaget, the social interactionism of Mead – to more modern discussions of 
the “embodied mind” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991) and “mind as motion” (Port & 
van Gelder 1995).
Still, what arguably remains underexplored is the degree to which movement 
is intimately linked to “the passions”, the “movements of the souls”, the emotions, 
feelings… – or to use a common recent term, affectivity. One might reconsider 
this under-exploration quite surprising, given the close etymological and  semantic 
relations between the terms ‘motion’ and ‘emotion’ (Bloem this volume; Zlatev 
et al. this volume).
On the one hand, affectivity both motivates bodily movement, and is expressed in 
it. But as William James (1884: 197) already pointed out, the causal relation between 
affectivity and bodily motion, and thus between “mind” and “body”, goes both ways: 
“Everyone knows how panic is induced by flight, and how giving way to the symptom 
of grief increases those passions themselves. Each fit of sobbing makes the sorrow 
more acute, and calls forth another fit stronger still…”
Such an “emotion complex” is public, and affects others, at various levels of aware-
ness. In moving ourselves, we move others; in observing others move – we are moved 
ourselves. The fundamental importance of this (at first glance) simple observation for 
our phenomenal experience of the world and of ourselves (i.e. consciousness), our 
connectedness with and understanding of others (intersubjectivity) and for language 





Figure 1. A schematic representation of the relations between the major concepts  
of the volume
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2.  Bringing motion and emotion back together again
It is characteristic that in the “first generation” of cognitive science, labeled “cogni-
tivism” by Varela et al. (1991), emotions, along with the body in general, as well as 
intersubjectivity (and sociality and culture more generally), were neglected. In the 
mind-as-computer paradigm, emotions appeared, if at all – as a special cognitive 
sub-routine that could be added to, or detached from the cognitive system at will.1 
When the central role of emotions for basic cognitive processes such as learning and 
choosing among alternative actions, was realized, this was still a very disembodied, 
functionalist view, “defining emotions in terms of their role in the mental economy” 
(Evans 2001: 146). Even when, after advances in neuroscience, it was recognized that 
practically every cognitive process was also emotionally “valenced” (as e.g. shown by 
activations in the limbic system), the centrality of emotional experience, i.e. feelings, 
was denied in an influential book on the subject:
Emotions evolved not as conscious feelings, linguistically differentiated or 
otherwise, but as brain states and bodily responses. The brain states and bodily 
responses are the fundamental facts of an emotion, and the conscious feelings are 
the frills that have added icing to the emotional cake.
 (LeDoux 1996: 302 our emphasis)
In “second generation” cognitive science, involving neuroscience and “embodied” 
robots rather than just software, such a view is still prevalent:
… many people seem to regard feelings as the essence of emotion, but this is not 
the view of most contemporary scientists and philosophers who study emotion. 
From the viewpoint of modern science, it would be as foolish to deny that a 
computer can have emotions just because it lacked conscious feelings as to deny 
that a paralyzed person could have emotions because he could not make the 
relevant facial expressions. (Evans 2001: 171)
Such general pronouncements on behalf of “contemporary scientists and philoso-
phers”, as well as the analogy between the machine and the paralyzed person, should, 
however, be questioned. With the turn of the millennium, if not earlier, consciousness 
has been “re-habilitated” as a subject worthy of science, and a growing number of sci-
entists (and not just philosophers) admit that whatever other aspects the English word 
‘mind’ includes (function, behavior, language), if it were divorced from subjectivity, 
or “first-person” experience, it would be vacuous. The expression ‘mindless’ indicates 
1.  The super-intelligent android Commander Data in the TV-series Star Trek, Second Gen-
eration in the late 1980s was in one episode given an “emotion chip”, with nearly disastrous 
consequences.
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this fact: we say that something is done mindlessly precisely because it lacks subjec-
tivity.2 In this respect the work of Damasio (1999, 2003), which has an explicit focus 
on consciousness as phenomenal awareness, on the complex interrelations between 
emotions as “brain states and bodily responses”, feelings and selfhood needs to be 
acknowledged.
But especially from the standpoint of the present volume, Damasio’s view of 
emotions/feelings as above all concerned with evaluation of “in-coming” sensations, 
and the body’s state in general, is insufficient. First, it is not active enough and misses 
the link between emotion and self-motion (see Ellis and Newton this volume). Sec-
ond, it is not intersubjective enough. A fairly established classification of emotions 
distinguishes between “basic” (Ekman) or “primary” (Damasio) emotions: joy/plea-
sure, distress, anger, fear, surprise, distress – and “higher cognitive” or “secondary” 
emotions such as love, guilt, pride, shame, embarrassment, envy. While the second 
set are acknowledged to be “social”, since they are directed to, or otherwise presup-
pose relations to others, the “basic” emotions are claimed to be object-directed, auto-
matic (involuntary) and universal, with both (facial) expressions and bodily/brain 
reactions built in through evolution. But clearly the expressions of the basic emo-
tions would be superfluous if not involved in communication, and it is obvious that 
they play an important role for empathy, the capacity for “feeling in” (Einfühlung) or 
sympathy, “feeling with” someone else. In evolutionary terms, basic emotions must 
have been selected for due to their contribution to survival and reproduction through 
their “social functions”. The neuroscience of empathy, as well as intersubjectivity in 
general, received a big boost with the introduction of the notion of “mirror neurons” 
in the early 1990s (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992), especially since the original discovery 
of neurons in the pre-motor cortex of macaques responding to performed as well as 
observed actions was extended and generalized to human beings, and to other brain 
areas, including the amygdala, which was shown to be active in a similar way both 
when people experience certain emotions, and when they observe others doing so 
(e.g. Adolphs 2003).
But if at its most basic level, empathy involves processes of “bodily resonance” 
(Gallagher, this volume), or “the passive or involuntary coupling or pairing of my 
living body with your living body in perception and action” (Thompson 2007: 392), 
then it is not just the specialized (facial) expressions manifest in basic emotions, but 
the perception of bodily movements in general, including postures, hand movements, 
gaits, involuntary movements like yawns and scratches etc. that become relevant. 
Indeed, the edited volume On Being Moved (Bråten 2007), which like the present 
book utilized the polysemy of the English verb ‘move’ (cf. Reddy this volume), made 
2.  I am grateful to Tim Racine for pointing out this observation in English usage.
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this generalization, linking the work from developmental psychology by Colwyn 
Trevarthen, Daniel Stern and others on infant intersubjectivity and the development 
of a sense of self to “mirror neuron” neuroscience.
Still, this synthesis did not go far enough. For one thing, the debates on the proper 
interpretation of the empirical evidence concerning “mirror neurons” continues (see 
Gallagher this volume; Racine et al. this volume). But perhaps more relevantly, as the 
passive construction in the title of Bråten (2007) implies: the focus is on the “pas-
sive and involuntary” aspects of interpersonal emotion, not on the active, “animate” 
(Sheets-Johnstone this volume) or “enactive” (Ellis & Newton this volume) nature of 
the mind – where motion, emotion and (inter)subjectivity can be argued to meet most 
intimately.
Ellis and Newton (this volume) suggest that proponents of the concept of enac-
tion, originally defined as “a history of structural coupling that brings forth a world… 
[t]hrough a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, sensorimotor sub-
networks” by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991: 206) have “emphasized the impor-
tance of action as a necessary grounding of consciousness, but without stressing that 
the difference between action and mere reaction is interconnected with the difference 
that emotion makes.” This is so, in particular with respect to the work of some “enac-
tivists” such as Noë (2004). However, in another recent book, Mind in Life: Biology, 
Phenomenology and The Sciences of Mind, Thompson (2007) has made a commendable 
effort in performing what the title of the present section states: bringing motion and 
emotion back together again. Based on a (re-)reading of the classics of phenomenology 
(above all Husserl, but also Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka and Stein), lifting up their 
arguments for the relevance of the “lower” emotional and bodily aspects of conscious-
ness and intersubjectivity, and connecting this to the recent literature on enaction 
and “neurophenomenology” (e.g. Freeman 2000), Thompson provides a substantial 
contribution to articulating a coherent and productive program for a new science of 
the mind – one that embraces consciousness, in its various manifestations, unlike 
the reductionist program(s) of cognitive science mentioned earlier. In Chapter 12, 
devoted to “valence and emotion”, Thompson (2007: 364) writes:
There is thus a close resemblance between the etymological sense of emotion – 
an impulse moving outward – and the etymological sense of intentionality – an 
arrow directed to a target, and by extension the mind’s aiming outward or beyond 
itself toward the world. Both ideas connote movement. This image of movement 
remains discernable in the abstract, cognitive characterization of intentionality 
in phenomenology. […] intentionality is no mere static aboutness, but rather 
it is a dynamic striving for intentional fulfillment. In genetic phenomenology, 
this intentional striving is traced back to its roots in “original instinctive, drive 
related preferences” of the lived body (Husserl 2001: 198). Husserl calls this 
type of intentionality drive-intentionality” (Triebintentionalität) [...]. Patočka 
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calls it “e-motion.” This term connotes movement, its instigation by “impersonal 
affectivity”, and the dynamic of “constant attraction and repulsion”
 (Patočka 1998: 139)
Thus, the present volume can be seen as a further contribution to the elaboration 
of such a dynamical, active view of emotion (cf. Lüdtke this volume), along with an 
affect-laden view of motion – and to explore their significance for consciousness 
(phenomenal awareness as such), intersubjectivity, and language – as well as the close 
links between them.
In this respect, it is an instance of an emerging field, which following Evan 
Thompson can be called mind science. As with cognitive science, the perspective is 
interdisciplinary: the authors of the chapters here included are philosophers, neurosci-
entists, psychologists, primatologists and linguists who – alone, or in collaboration – 
“transgress” the boundaries of their respective fields. But while cognitive science, in 
both “first generation” and “second generation” (cf. Gallese & Lakoff 2005) forms, 
was and continues to be centered on notions such as “computation”, “information-
processing” and “symbolic representation”, mind science focuses explicitly on what is 
most intrinsic to the mind: phenomenal experience, consciousness. Unsurprisingly, 
the influence of phenomenology is acknowledged in most of the contributions in this 
volume (Sheets-Johnstone; Ellis & Newton; Overgaard; Reddy; Gallagher; Fultner; 
Racine et al.; Zlatev et al.), though as mentioned, other theoretical traditions are impor-
tant as well: the work of Habermas (Fultner; Frank and Trevarthen), Wittgenstein 
(Racine et al.), Mead (Carpendale & Lewis), Piaget (Carpendale & Lewis, Günther & 
Hennies), among others.
Therefore, the chapters are ordered not in terms of the disciplines represented, 
but in terms of where the primary relevance of their discussion of (e)motion lies: 
Consciousness, Intersubjectivity or Language. Of course, a meta-theme of the book, 
as reflected in the title of the workshop from which it emerged, is the interrelations 
between these three notions, so this division should be taken as approximate. Further-
more, the reader should note that while all authors consider both bodily motion and 
emotion, and most do so to an equal extent, some place their focus more on one than 
the other.
In the remainder of this prologue, I briefly summarize the chapters of the volume 
in relation to the themes of the book, and point out some connections, as well as (pos-
sible) disagreements between the authors. I also provide brief comments, with which 
the reader should feel free to disagree. My intention with this somewhat unorthodox 
approach for a co-editor is to open up the discussion, rather than to place myself in 
the position of “objective” referee, which of course would be self-defeating. Summaries 
from the authors’ own viewpoints are provided in the abstracts that precede each chap-
ter, and Colwyn Trevarthen’s Epilogue offers a somewhat different, and no less valid 
perspective on the themes of the chapters, and on the book as a whole. My conviction 
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is that such “polyphony” is an inherent part of any dialogical (or multi-logical) enter-
prise, and not in any way as detrimental for the coherence of the book.
3.  Part I: Consciousness
‘Consciousness’ is a proverbially difficult concept, but as with the near-synonym 
‘mind’, it’s most central aspect is that of subjectivity, or sentience: the experience of 
‘being’ – something more basic than being a ‘self ’, which in phenomenological par-
lance is something constituted through experience, in interaction with things and with 
others: subjectivity and inter-subjectivity are, as already pointed out, closely related.
Sheets-Johnstone is a prominent “mind scientist” in the sense given in the previ-
ous section, combining phenomenology, evolutionary theory and empirical research 
on the theme of this book in the influential monograph The Primacy of Movement 
(1999). Her text in the present volume, summarizing previous work and going beyond 
it, is perhaps the most radical one. This makes it, along with the author’s contribu-
tions to the field, appropriate to serve as a beginning to the part devoted to conscious-
ness. Sheets-Johnstone finds even notions such as enaction and embodiment to be 
“band-aids”, meant to mend the gaps left by dualistic conceptions rather than genuine 
solutions. Instead she defends, conceptually and empirically, a fundamentally non-
dualistic notion, animation, boldly stating from the onset that “we are essentially and 
fundamentally animate beings. In more specifically dynamic terms, we are animate 
forms who are alive to and in the world, and who, in being alive to and in the world 
make sense of it. We do so most fundamentally through movement.” On the basis of 
evidence from evolutionary theory and ethology (with multiple references to Darwin), 
developmental psychology, dance, and experiments with hypnosis she furthermore 
argues for a “dynamic congruency of emotion and movement” – in both (external) 
expression and (internal) generation processes.
One may, however, ask whether some of Sheets-Johnstone’s claims are not some-
what too radical and her critiques towards alternatives – too sharp. For example, one 
kind of “received ignorance” that is rejected in the chapter – the dictionary definition 
of motion as “change of position” – is rather interpreted by Zlatev, Blomberg and 
Magnusson (in Part III), as a different, but equally valid perspective on motion: a third- 
person, observational one. Furthermore, by rejecting any “evolutionary discontinuities” 
Sheets-Johnstone implies degrees of consciousness and emotion in even the simplest 
organisms, such as motile bacteria (cf. Thompson 2007: 161), thereby equating mind 
and (animate) life.
In comparison, Ellis and Newton’s theoretical proposal, summarizing their 
recent book (Ellis & Newton 2010), is considerably more cautious. In fact, the 
authors explicitly guard against what they view as a number of related “pitfalls” in the 
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current literature on motion, emotion and consciousness. One such is to regard self-
movement as sufficient for consciousness, which would imply consciousness not only 
for amoebas, but for certain self-organizing systems such as traffic-patterns. Another 
is not to distinguish between movements as externally induced reactions and self- 
initiated actions. Emotion, in the sense of motivational processes, they argue, is essen-
tial for this distinction, and this in turn implies a more active role of emotion for con-
sciousness than that expressed by Damasio (see Section 2). Finally, Ellis and Newton 
argue that even the combination of movement and emotion inherent in actions is 
not necessary for consciousness, or else a completely paralyzed person would not 
be fully conscious, which is clearly not the case. Based on a combination of empiri-
cal evidence and a notion of “subliminal” action-imagery, the authors instead state 
their thesis “that possible actions must be imagined by the subject (usually implicitly) 
in order for that subject to have intentional consciousness of objects.” Hence, they 
come to a notion of enactive representations subserving (visual) consciousness, unlike 
“enactivists [who] all too often eschew any role for representations of the environ-
ment, and therefore reject action imagery as opposed to overt action in providing a 
grounding for the understanding of objects.”
Ellis and Newton thus present a cogent argument for the necessary linking of 
emotion, (imaginary) movement and consciousness. What one might wish to know 
more about, though, is the phenomenological status of the central concept of (uncon-
scious) “action imagery”. It is clearly not the same as the Husserl-based analysis of 
imagery discussed by Thompson (2007: 209): “Visualizing is rather the activity of 
mentally representing an object or scene by way of mentally enacting or entertain-
ing a possible perceptual experience of that object or scene”. Rather, it seems to be 
similar to the phenomenological notion of protention, the forward-looking, aspect of 
time-consciousness, discussed in the following chapter.
Overgaard’s chapter is in several respects complementary to that of Ellis and 
Newton – and interestingly, reaches conclusions that are in part similar, and in part 
different. I would suggest that the difference has to do with the fact that Overgaard 
(implicitly) decides to treat “the problem of perceptual presence” as being independent 
of emotion/motivation. This problem is a central one for an account of perceptual, and 
more specifically visual, consciousness: when we observe (opaque) three-dimensional 
objects, we observe them from one side only: we see what is sometimes called profiles, 
which may even be in part occluded by other objects. So how is it that we can see three-
dimensional objects, rather than just disconnected profiles (or parts)? As Overgaard 
summarizes in his exceptionally clear phenomenological exposition (even for readers 
unfamiliar with the literature): “The proposal is marvellously simple. According to 
both Husserl and the enactive account, the basis of the availability of absent profiles 
is found in what Husserl calls our “kinaesthetic capacity” and Noë refers to as “senso-
rimotor skills” (Noë 2004: 63). It is, in other words, because we are able to move and 
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thereby change our perspective on things that we have a perceptual sense of the co-
presence of absent profiles.”
The “enactive account” of perception is thus that it is based on self-movement. 
Furthermore, Overgaard explains that this does not imply actual self-movement, but 
that “a subject has some (implicit) understanding of how visual appearances would 
change if such-and-such kinaesthetic capacities were exercised”. Thus at least for 
Husserl, if not for Nöe, this would not imply falling in one of the “pitfalls” discussed 
by Ellis and Newton – the claim that perceptual consciousness is based on actual 
movement. Nevertheless, Overgaard shows that there is ambiguity in interpreting 
the enactive thesis: that the condition of perceiving external objects is (a) “having 
an implicit understanding of oneself as potentially moving or being moved…” or 
(b) “having had experience of active self-movement…” Overgaard defends (a) from 
philosophical critiques, both outside and inside phenomenology – but concludes 
that (b) is too strong. This is so since even experience of passive movement, of being 
moved around in a wheel-chair as it were, would be sufficient to grant a hypothetical 
creature the implicit understanding necessary for linking certain movements with 
certain perceptual changes: “When one such creature is moved, say in a linear fash-
ion, it will surely form implicit expectations (what Husserl calls “protentions”) as to 
what is coming next.”
This conclusion seems to be in opposition to that of Ellis and Newton – at least 
with respect to visual consciousness. Overgaard’s argumentation is (as mentioned) 
meticulous, and indeed, from a purely philosophical (phenomenological) basis, where 
the goal is to make experience “fully intelligible” it seems as though the strong version 
of the “enactive account” does not stand up to closer scrutiny. But while the experience 
of the “passively moved” creatures envisioned by Overgaard is closer to our experience 
(and thus more imaginable, and thus “intelligible”) than that of the completely immov-
able “Weather Watchers” (rejected as counterexamples to (a) on that ground), it is 
also importantly different. As the author states toward the end: “To be sure, the visual 
experiences of such creatures would generally be marred by ambiguities. It would be 
only very occasionally that such ambiguities were resolved for them, and when this 
happened it would be nothing but a pure stroke of luck. Here we may catch a first 
glimpse of the enormous difference between their life-world and ours.” So, even if the 
argument holds, in principle, it should not be taken as carrying over to actual living 
creatures, and to human beings in particular – which is what Ellis and Newton’s pro-
posal concerns. On a final point: Overgaard’s treatment of protention seems somewhat 
too passive and lacking in emotion. In contrast, Thompson (2007: 362) writes that “the 
protentional “not yet” is always suffused with affect and conditioned by the emotional 
disposition (motivation, appraisal, affective tone, and action tendency) accompanying 
the flow.” If this is necessarily (or essentially) so, or only for “empirical creatures” like 
ourselves, is open for discussion.
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Shanker’s chapter “Emotion-regulation through the ages” elegantly weaves 
together the two, at first glance very different, temporal dimensions implied in the 
title: the historical and the developmental. The Illiad, and particularly the character 
of Achilles, has been used by Plato as an illustration of how disastrous unregulated 
emotions can be. But as Shanker points out, the reasons behind this breakdown are 
not to be found in “destiny” (corresponding to our present popular conception of 
being determined by our “genes”), but lie in the interaction of our biological unique-
ness (“temperament”) and educational experiences. The “modern Achilles” is to be 
found in the many children in the Western world who are given one or another diag-
nosis such as ADHD, related to a deficit in emotion-regulation or “self-control” – 
in Sweden popularly called bokstavsbaren, ‘the letters children’. And while an often 
fruitless debate between accounts in terms of “nature” (biology) and “nurture” (social 
interaction) rages, the number of “letters children” and their problems, steadily 
increase. In other words, the issue at stake is the interaction between biology and 
experience in the formation of a “subjective emotional world.” As Shanker states: 
“Emotion-regulation affords – and indeed, has afforded from the very moment that 
Western thinkers started thinking about the mind-body problem – a critical area in 
which to explore this issue.”
In criticism to the historical metaphor of emotions as “wild horses” that need to 
be “reined in” by Reason, which has dominated Western thinking up to the present, 
Shanker emphasizes the indispensable positive role of emotions for the formation of 
the triangle Self-Other-World. According to the author, few have grasped the signifi-
cance of the fact that Achilles is finally brought back to sanity not by a “herculean 
act of rational self-control”, but by a strong positive emotion of compassion. Perhaps, 
our current predicament would be different “…if it were recognized that emotions 
are not simply an aspect of the mind that need to be controlled, or worse still, sup-
pressed: that cultivating a child’s positive and prosocial emotions is as important an 
aspect of emotion-regulation as learning how to control her negative ones”, as the 
author implores.
More specifically, Shanker summarizes the four-stage model of “emotional trans-
formation” over the first years of life put forward by himself and Stanley Greenspan in 
The First Idea (Greenspan & Shanker 2004). Being based on increased differentiation 
from more global states on the basis of physical and social interaction, this model is 
reminiscent of that of Piaget. But unlike in the latter, affect/emotion is given a piv-
otal role, and the “schemas” formed are sensory-affect-response, i.e. “affect” serves as 
a mediator. Furthermore, positive emotions are those that drive development, while 
negative ones are (mostly) regressive (“If the experience is unpleasant, primitive neu-
ral systems trigger an automatic response to avoid the experience”). After a number 
of such “transformations”, based on interactions with sensitive caregivers, the child 
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becomes increasingly active and purposeful, beginning “in affective interactions to 
form high-level cognitive, communicative and social skills”.
Shanker thus clearly represents one of the central themes of the volume: the pri-
macy of emotions, not opposed to, but in consort with cognition. Concerning the 
second theme, the link between self-motion and emotion, however, it seems that 
the Shanker-Greenspan infant is somewhat passive: what he/she learns in the first 
months of life are basically “associations” between sensory stimulation and emotional 
reactions.
In comparison, Reddy views infants in more active terms, implying rather diversi-
fied conscious lives more or less from birth. As the title of the chapter, “Moving others 
matters”, suggests, Reddy focuses on how ‘moving’ (in the most general sense: “with 
your being, your actions, your thoughts”) other persons is essential for the constitu-
tion of the self: “it matters because it shows us to have been known by others”. As she 
states toward the end of the chapter, this is not the only source for self-consciousness: 
movement in the world and moving things is (at least) as important, but “the feel of 
another consciousness engaging with you” gives rise to mutuality. Distortions of such 
mutuality result in psychopathology, or in behavior that at least seems to resemble it: 
cruelty with animals or war prisoners.
Without implying a developmental progression, Reddy reviews a diverse sample of 
evidence (behavioural, neural, experiential) on infants’ “engaging, expecting, explor-
ing” others: still-face, neonatal imitation, imitation recognition, ‘clowning’, showing 
off, teasing and others. Her argumentation is often directed against explanations in 
terms of “contingency learning” or other forms of non-experiential mechanisms. On 
her account, what is essential is rather the “emotional responsiveness” of another sub-
ject, serving as the anticipated outcome of one’s acts.
In emphasizing “the response of the other” and mutuality, Reddy’s chapter 
bridges over to the central topic of the next section: intersubjectvity. The reader may 
also discern a certain view, approaching consensus among the authors represented in 
the volume: a view of development as piecemeal and gradual. Reddy makes it clear 
that she is skeptical of “stages” in the development of (inter)subjectivity. By emphasiz-
ing early onset and continuity the implication is that the basic interpersonal aspects 
of our consciousness, and the ‘social emotions’ related to these, run very deep. The 
case for this is indeed persuasive. Still, the evidence reviewed, here and in the chap-
ters in Part II, shows multiple differences between infants at different ages, and one 
naturally inquires how novel aspects of consciousness emerge. A second point worth 
remarking on is that Reddy’s use of the verb ‘move’ is in a sense highly metaphori-
cal (extended), not only from the (literal) physical motion to emotion, but to any 
kind of action with respect to another subject, with the goal, explicit or not, to elicit 
a response.
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4.  Part II: Intersubjectivity
In the opening chapter of this part, Gallagher provides a welcome historical perspec-
tive on the recurrent question: “How are we able to understand other people – their 
intentions, their behaviors, their mental processes?” Much terminological (and trans-
lational) confusion is shown to be in the way, but Gallagher opts for the term empathy, 
albeit as a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” concept. Two current debates on the 
nature of empathy are reviewed. In neuroscience, this concerns the role of “mirror 
neurons” (or more generally, self-other matching neural circuits). For Gallese, one of 
the discoverers of mirror neurons, these circuits are (more or less) sufficient for empa-
thy: “I submit that the neural matching mechanism… is crucial to establish an empa-
thetic link between different individuals.” (Gallese 2001: 44). For Decety, and others, 
“something more” is necessary for fully understanding the other, especially when the 
perspectives of self and other differ.
The second debate is on what more precisely this “something more” can consist of: 
a theory-theory (TT) of mind, a simulation-theory (ST) of mind, or Gallagher’s own 
proposal: an interaction theory (IT). The standard type of evidence in favor of  TT have 
been results from “false-belief ” tasks, but in the author’s interpretation, these may tell 
us when children develop a concept of belief, but not much about the implicit kind 
of understanding involved in empathy. The problem for ST, which is currently usu-
ally combined with “mirror neuron neuroscience”, is the notion of simulation itself – 
while there may be corresponding neural patterns involving actions and emotions 
in the primary experiencer and the observer, it is not clear what would provide 
the “as if ”, pretense character of these for the observer. The argument is that “the 
mirror neuron data suggests that rather than simulation, mirror neuron activation 
is part of the neuronal processes that underlie a form of intersubjective enactive 
perception”, and Gallagher links this to the notion of primary intersubjectivity of 
Trevarthen. “Secondary intersubjectivity” involving objects and “contexts of shared 
attention” is seen as a natural developmental out-growth of this process, rather than 
a separate stage.
Nevertheless, Gallagher maintains that there is also a more qualitative transition 
in the development of empathy: this happens around the age of two, and is manifested 
in pro-social behaviors like consolation, in mirror self-recognition, autobiographical 
memory and in language. Gallagher follows proposals of J. Bruner, K. Nelson and 
D. Hutto in attempting to explain the “something more” aspect of empathy as a matter 
of narrative competence.
Concerning the recurrent issue of stages/levels of other-understanding, we 
may note that, consolation and self-recognition are present at least in the great 
apes, and in their often quoted article in the topic, Preston and de Waal (2002) 
distinguish between a simpler process of perception-action matching and a higher 
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level of “cognitive” empathy, quite independently of language and narrative. Hence, 
narrative-based understanding of others would seem to correspond (at least) to a 
third, rather than to a second level of intersubjective perception (cf. the distinction 
between secondary and tertiary intersubjectivity made by Bråten and Trevarthen 
(2007)). Gallagher also does not make it explicit to what extent narratives are based on 
language; this seems to be assumed by e.g. Hutto (2008), but narrative is conceivably a 
more general skill that emerges around the end of the second year of life. Finally, while 
Gallagher writes of “empathy”, the deeply emotional aspect of understanding others is 
not particularly emphasized in his presentation.
Fultner pays considerably more attention to affective interaction. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, she departs from the pragmatic philosophy of Habermas, and criticizes phe-
nomenology for bringing in “the Other” relatively late into the picture. For Habermas 
linguistic meaning is fundamentally social: language is essentially communicative 
action, which on its part is embedded in the lifeworld, at the same time as it con-
stitutes it. The three poles of the lifeworld (a concept that Habermas appropriated 
from Husserl) consist of background knowledge concerning (a) the (physical) world, 
(b) the other and (c) the self. In relation to each of these, in any act of communication 
a speaker makes three kinds of “validity claims”: (a′) to truth, (b′) to appropriateness/
normative rightness and (c′) to sincerity.
Fultner finds, however, this model to display a strong “cognitive bias”: “[Habermas] 
conceives the lifeworld in overly epistemic terms and pays insufficient attention to 
the structures of personality and society”. Without stating this explicitly, her further 
efforts to remedy this show that this cognitive bias is clearly related to a linguistic bias: 
what the Habermasian lifeworld lacks are precisely embodiment and affect. Relying 
on the work of Tomasello, Fultner emphasizes pre-linguistic aspects of intersubjectiv-
ity such as joint attention. More importantly, and of higher relevance for the present 
volume, she turns to Bråten’s notions of “altero-centric participation” and “e-motional 
memory” present according to Bråten more or less from the beginning of life. An 
indisputably early form of attachment, illustrating the reciprocal nature of primary 
intersubjectivity, is that which results from the universal practice of nursing a baby. 
Through this, Fultner illustrates clearly what she means by a claim to attachment, 
a fourth kind of validity claim, complementing Habermas’s rationalist (and language-
centered) conception of the lifeworld. (Reddy’s analysis, summarized above, could 
analogously be seen as a “claim to attention”). In a sense, the argumentation re-
validates the phenomenological emphasis on the body, perhaps most clearly repre-
sented by Merleau-Ponty, quoted in the final sections of the chapter. Thus, Fultner 
turns full circle to phenomenology and combines diverse philosophical reasoning and 
empirical justification in a productive synthetic manner, illustrating nicely the point 
that “understanding intersubjectivity requires a multi-pronged and multi-disciplinary 
approach such as the one fostered in this volume”.
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In their contribution, Racine, Wereha and Leavens ask “To what extent are non-
human primates intersubjective and why?” For answering this double question they 
consider comparative evidence from social neuroscience (“mirror neurons”, once 
more) and behavioural evidence related to (secondary) intersubjectivity, and above 
all pointing. They argue for overwhelming similarities rather than differences between 
human beings and apes, and above all against any (non-Darwinian) discontinuity, par-
ticularly with respect to intersubjectivity. In the final pages the authors conclude that 
“the inner life of a great ape is not radically different from our own”.
This is a minority position in the field, as the authors remind us. But they argue 
for it cogently, on the basis of three composite arguments, all related to bodily motion 
and emotion. The first is the Wittgensteinian conception that “understanding is not 
an experience”, but is rather something manifest in behaviour, i.e. goal-directed bodily 
movement. The second is that one cannot compare the intersubjective skills of chil-
dren and great apes without considering their “rearing histories”, where two impor-
tant differences in the latter are singled out. First, children become self-mobile later 
than apes in ontogeny. While in natural conditions apes can “simply retrieve a desired 
object … infants learn that they must manipulate the attention of their caregivers in 
order to retrieve objects”. This gives rise to what is known as “imperative pointing”, and 
there is indeed evidence that when captive apes face a “problem space” similar to that 
of human infants, they spontaneously develop the skill. More controversial is “declara-
tive pointing”, in which children point to objects for the sake of others, or for the sake 
of establishing joint reference to something interesting. While no apes who have not 
been trained in language (and the referential pointing skills related to it) display this, 
Racine et al. argue that we cannot conclude from this that children have an innate 
motivation to collaborate or a more developed understanding of others (as e.g. is done 
by e.g. Tomasello et al. 2005), since the learning histories of the groups are radically 
different: children have abundant emotionally rewarding feedback from caregivers in 
performing such behaviors, while captive apes do not. Finally, the authors bring up 
currently influential arguments for interaction between evolution and development 
(many of which are summarized by Thompson (2007, Chapter 7)), which favor multi-
factor causality rather than genetic determinism and too much emphasis on adapta-
tions, and they suggest that such arguments square in well with the previous two: that 
understanding as manifest in behaviour, and that differences between children and 
apes are due to “nurture” rather than “nature”, to put it simply.
Since I have introduced the practice of adding comments for the other chap-
ters, I should also in this case, when one of the authors is a co-editor, note that the 
reader may have some reservations. One concerns the Wittgensteinian analysis: even 
if understanding and intentions are not a matter of “private” mental states, they do 
involve, irreducibly, subjective experience – especially from the phenomenological 
perspective, referred to in this introductory chapter, as well as in most of the other 
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chapters in this volume. But even accepting that “to speak about mental capacities is to 
speak about behavioral capacities and forms of life”, one cannot help but notice major 
differences in the intersubjective “forms of life” of human and ape infants, even prior 
to the development of language. Some of these are reasonably due to motoric and con-
textual differences, but is it not likely that during the 6 million years of evolution since 
our species split there has been at least some adaptations in our evolutionary history 
(related to bipedalism, larger groups, brain size, prolonged childhood etc – all favor-
ing higher dependence on sociality), expressed in infants, caregivers or perhaps both? 
This would be consistent with “evo-devo”, but also with the conjecture put forward 
in the introduction to The Shared Mind, that human beings are the quintessentially 
“intersubjective species”.
Carpendale and Lewis review some of the same evidence as Racine et al. and 
Reddy, and have a similar, though not completely identical theoretical perspective. 
Interestingly, they attempt to reconcile Piaget, often taken (mistakenly, I believe) as a 
cognitivist, and G.H. Mead, a canonical representative of the view that mentality origi-
nates in social interaction: “Mental processes are fragments of the complex conduct 
of the individual in and on his environment”, as quoted by the authors. The synthesis 
is approximately as follows: body (motion) and emotions are “necessary for setting 
up forms of interaction and routines in which communication can emerge”, but it is 
the latter through which intersubjectivity, meaning and self-consciousness are consti-
tuted. Relevant for human forms of interaction are factors such as infant immaturity, 
initial short-sightedness, and emotional reactivity. Piagetian “schemes” usually con-
cern interaction with the physical environment, but Carpendale and Lewis treat pat-
terns of social interaction, linked with emotional experience, as “personal or affective 
schemas”. From initially dyadic, such schemas gradually start involving aspects of the 
environment, thereby becoming triadic. The ability to take the perspective of the other 
is also described as a gradual achievement.
With respect to the nature/nurture issue, discussed in relation to the chapter by 
Racine et al. in the earlier chapter, the authors also emphasize the role of the envi-
ronment, acknowledging the influence of a “Pan/Homo culture” in forming more 
human-like intersubjective skills in non-human primates. However, they consider that 
“a second group of neurological facts may be required for a species to fully profit from 
such forms of interaction to take them to another level.” Thus, a “history of interaction” 
seems to be necessary but not sufficient for this higher level of intersubjectivity, itself 
a precondition for language. The distinction is made in terms of Mead’s notion of con-
versation of gestures, which are automatic and not intentionally communicative, and 
significant gestures in which there is anticipation on how the other will respond. Or in 
terms of the title: from reaching to requesting. But what about the third level: “reflect-
ing and thinking”? Carpendale and Lewis suggest, but do not argue for it explicitly, 
that this would require language. If so, they would need to part theoretical company 
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with Piaget (as well as with phenomenology), who rather viewed mental imagery, 
emerging from interactions and above all imitation, as a precondition for learning lin-
guistic signs (Piaget 1962; Zlatev 2007). Unfortunately, the authors do not state clearly 
what they mean by “thinking” and “reflecting” in order to decide on where they stand 
on this theoretically important crossroads.
The extensive chapter by Frank and Trevarthen constitutes a good example of the 
kind of “multi-pronged approach” to intersubjectivity endorsed by Fultner. Inititially, 
the authors provide a comprehensive review of research on infant intersubjectivity, 
from Trevarthen’s now classic writings in the late 1970s, to recent behavioral and neuro-
scientific studies concerning “rhythmic prospective control”. Emotion and movement 
are tightly interwoven: development is guided by “innate impulses to move as coherent 
intentional and conscious selves in emotional engagement with the sensitive responses 
to the intentions of other persons”. It is emphasized that the infant’s responses are not 
“simple reactions to stimulation”, but, as argued also by Reddy, intended to provoke 
further engagement in others. The transition to secondary intersubjectivity around 9 
months is described as the formation of a triangle (between subject, object and other) 
of “emotional appraisals”.
In the second section, Frank and Trevarthen extend child-caregiver intersub-
jectivity to relations within society, by adopting Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and 
Habermas’s distinction between lifeworld and system. While the first two concepts are 
closely related to intersubjectivity, covering notions such as “life-styles”, “embodied 
attitude” and providing a “sense of belonging”, system institutionalizes these into rigid 
forms, with the risk of empting them of spontaneity and intimacy. Further, the authors 
deal with Lotman’s notion of semiosphere connecting it to Halliday’s functional per-
spective on language. Here too, they see at the core of the phenomena “the mastery of 
meanings by interpersonal symbiosis, regulated by feelings of affection”, rather than 
(institutional) rules and norms. Finally, they consider different cases in which, for dif-
ferent (exogenous and endogenous) reasons, the development of intersubjectivity fal-
ters: for immigrant mothers disconnected from a community, for mothers diagnosed 
with borderline personality disorder, and for persons with autism. The most common 
methods of intervention, Frank and Trevarthen argue, do not get at the heart of the 
problem, since they aim to constrain the environment, or to provide “system”-like, 
institutional solutions, rather than emotional engagement.
The chapter is a highly original synthesis of perspectives, making a strong case 
for the centrality of intersubjectivity in human consciousness, interaction and soci-
ety. It contains a wealth of ideas and references that I cannot hope to summarize 
here. However, one thing that is not explained is the manner in which the human 
potential for intersubjectivty is “innate”, and, indeed, whether it is uniquely human. 
In the first section, the authors write: “Animal intentions evolve and grow, from 
the start, with potentialities for intersubjective social collaboration, making their 
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intelligence communal.” On another point, when Frank and Trevarthen turn to 
societal factors in later sections, “rules and norms” tend to be portrayed only in 
negative terms (on analogy with Habermas’s “system”), without making a distinction 
between intuitive (implicit) and explicit norms. The two are commonly conflated by 
 opponents, but can (and arguably, should) be distinguished (Coseriu 2000; Itkonen 
2003; Zlatev 2011).
Lüdtke focuses on the role of emotionally-valenced intersubjectivity in language 
development, and thus serves as a bridge to the chapters in Part III. Beginning with 
a brief review of the classical theories of language acquisition, she finds that neither 
those which emphasize individual cognition (in nativist and non-nativist varieties), 
nor those which focus on interpersonal relations pay proper dues to “the importance 
of emotions in language or in prelinguistic and linguistic development”. Rather, Lüdtke 
finds inspiration and suggestive ideas for a truly intersubjective theory of development 
in the work of Kristeva, with its emphasis on notions such as “desire”, and “body-based 
materiality”. A further source is the even less-known for the general reader model of 
emotional regulation of Simonov. A third pillar is semiotics, above all in the Peircian 
tradition (since unlike Saussure, Peirce was deeply concerned with “feelings”). On this 
basis, the author proposes an original sign concept, and the outlines of a model of 
semiotic development, implying “decreasing semiogenetic impact of relational emo-
tions during language acquisition”: from the “iconic mode”, through the “indexical 
mode” to the “symbolic mode”. Along psychoanalytical (Kristeva and Stern) and 
Peircian conceptions, such a development, however, does not discard earlier stages/
modes, but rather incorporates them.
Turning to more empirical research, Lüdtke, finds support in the neuroscience of 
emotion (Damasio, Panskepp), mirror-neuron research, and above all, in Trevarthen’s 
theory of “innate intersubjectivity as psychophysiological anticipation of an emotion-
ally responding other”, discussed also in the chapter by Frank and Trevarthen and the 
Epilogue. Based on this concept of intersubjectivity and the earlier theoretical pro-
posals, development is divided in four stages: (1) prenatal primordial intersubjectivity, 
in which “the foetus appears to have the capacity and motivation to ‘communicate’ 
with the mother actively by means of body movements that can stimulate her and 
with growing proprioceptive awareness by self-touching and posture changes that may 
engage with the actions and feelings of her body”, (2) primary intersubjectivity (in the 
first year of life), (3) secondary intersubjectivity (the “toddler” years) – both relatively 
familiar notions, but now interpreted semiogenetically – and (4) tertiary intersubjec-
tivity (in primary school children) “which requires the construction of complete lin-
guistic enunciations constituted to describe a shared abstract object of reference”. As 
the author explains, the novelty of the model is that it sees the roots of both semiosis 
and intersubjectivity in prenatal development, and does not posit that the “symbolic 
order” of language removes emotionality, but rather “subdues” it. Finally, the author 
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presents the outlines of a form of therapy consistent with the model, Relational Lan-
guage Therapy, which seeks to explain and treat certain disorders which though not 
linguistic per se affect it negatively by focusing on the transitions between the innate 
“virtual other” to a “significant other”, and (supposedly) to a “generalized other” with 
full symbolic competence.
As a truly synthetic approach, Lüdtke’s model has the advantage of bringing 
together concepts which are usually kept separate by disciplinary borders. At the same 
time, as with any synthesis, it may be questioned from the proponents of these differ-
ent “components”. Peircian semiotics is notoriously full of conflicting interpretations, 
so the author’s linking of the classical triad of icon/index/symbol to corresponding 
(decreasing) levels of relational emotions will probably raise objections among some 
semioticians. From a developmental psychology perspective “primordial intersub-
jectivity” may similarly be hard to accept. Nevertheless, such unusually early devel-
opment is a more palatable interpretation of “innate intersubjectvity” than what is 
usually understood by the term “innate”: genetically specified. Finally, the validity of 
the approach can be defended through its attested value in therapy. And as suggested 
in the final section, “paradigm shifts” can make what was unthinkable yesterday and 
difficult to accept today into “revolutionary science” tomorrow.
5.  Part III: Language
Foolen’s chapter provides a comprehensive review of current research on the relation-
ship between language and emotions. As he points out, linguistics (and even more: 
philosophy of language, I may add) has traditionally underestimated the affective 
dimension of language, focusing on the “denotational” or “propositional” one. Even 
with the advent of cognitive linguistics (Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987), with its empha-
sis on embodiment and a view of “cognition… as being grounded in motion and 
action” this was not really rectified. To the extent that emotion has been systematically 
considered in cognitive linguistics, it has been as “conceptualized” emotion, reflected 
above all in metaphorical expressions (Kövecses 1990). Foolen accepts that in one 
respect “cognition serves as intermediate between language and emotion”. However, 
he points out that emotions are also reflected in the lexicon and grammar more or less 
directly, “resulting in expressive (also called emotive or affective) language”, as in inter-
jections and other emotion-laden words, in morphology (some uses of diminutives), 
and in exclamative sentence types and other expressive constructions. As most of the 
authors in Part III, Foolen addresses the question of why we often speak of emotions 
“figuratively”. He questions the standard explanation offered by Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999): that emotions are “abstract” while physical 
phenomena are “concrete”, and the latter are used metaphorically or  metonymically 
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for understanding the first – that is, for the sake of cognition. His  proposal is rather 
that the motivation for figurative expressions of emotion is itself expressive: images 
related to explosions or dropping hearts are likely to evoke emotions in the addressee. 
The predominant form of figurative “emotion language” is suggested to be metonymi-
cal: in expressions such as my heart sank in my shoes “the physiological effect stands 
metonymically for the emotional cause”. We should note, however, that such a proposal 
is controversial, even for the authors in this volume. Racine et al. (this volume) would 
presumably regard such separation between physiology and emotion to be reflective 
of a dualistic conception of the mind. Weigand (see below) similarly rejects the literal 
vs. figurative distinction with respect to mental terms. Zlatev et al. on the other hand, 
consider both metonymical (contiguity-based) and metaphorical (similarity-based) 
relations between the “physical” and the “emotional”, while taking a phenomenological 
take on both: it is a matter of relations between different experiential and not ontologi-
cal domains.
Foolen concludes by addressing the acquisition and evolution of language, where 
emotion is increasingly considered to be of paramount importance, as reflected 
in the chapters by Frank & Trevarthen and Lüdtke in Part II. He lists a number of 
example fields where insights in emotive language use can have important practical 
implications.
Günther & Hennies take up one such “real world” phenomenon, and offer what 
in the present context may be taken as a case study for the importance of emotionally-
laden bodily communication: the problems that deaf and hard-of-hearing children 
face when their parents are instructed to avoid “gestures or signs” and to solely focus 
on spoken language. Based on a review of recent studies, the authors show that even 
when such children have been provided with cochlear implants, a large proportion 
display delayed language acquisition, in both the spoken and written modalities. Even 
more, such “communication problems lead to equally severe emotional consequences”, 
and “it is not the diagnosis shock of hearing parents alone which leads to the social 
and emotional difficulties in a deaf child’s upbringing, but rather the way intervention 
programs deal with these initial emotions.”
To support their argument for the importance of bodily interaction in languages 
acquisition, even in the case of hearing children, Günther and Hennies refer to Piaget’s 
developmental model, according to which at the end of the sensorimotor period in 
the second year of life, sign use emerges through gestures and action imitation. As 
pointed out in the discussion of Carpendale and Lewis (this volume), however, Piaget 
did not attribute any special importance to emotion in this process. Without address-
ing this lack explicitly, the authors complement it, stating that “pre-linguistic gestures 
are part of the natural development towards language, especially since they cannot 
be conceptualized without addressing the emotional binding between mother and 
child”. The conclusions are consistent with those made by Lüdtke and Foolen in earlier 
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chapters, namely that by unwittingly compromising the emotional dimension latent 
in spontaneous gestural and linguistic communication between parents and hearing 
impaired children, purely “oralist” intervention programs affect negatively both the 
children’s process of language acquisition and their emotional and social development. 
The implications for the need of interventions based on a multimodal and emotion-
laden conception of linguistic communication are clear. While the chapter may not be 
the most profound one in the volume in terms of “theory”, it is perhaps the clearest in 
terms of practical applications.
Weigand’s contribution can be seen as an argument for re-thinking the notion of 
language along the line suggested by E.O. Wilson’s (1999) proposal for a “consilience” 
between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, with implica-
tions going beyond language and concerning human nature as such: “The ‘New Sci-
ence’ starts from the natural object, living beings, and tries to describe their behaviour 
and actions by means of goal-directed observation.” The author considers some recent 
attempts in this direction: the “selfish gene” doctrine of Dawkins (2006), the natural-
ized semiotics of Deacon (1997), and “the shared mind” approaches of Trevarthen and 
Zlatev et al. (2008) emphasizing intersubjectivity, but finds them lacking. Her alterna-
tive proposal is that human beings are fundamentally “social individuals who act in 
their own interests but inevitably have to take account of social concerns. In this sense, 
it is not the dialogic mind but dialogic interaction that characterizes human beings as 
the dialogic species”.
Weigand presents some of the basic tenets of her specific theory, the Mixed Game 
Model, and focuses on how it implies a close “interaction of body, emotion, mind, 
and language”. She emphasizes that notions such as (shared) meaning and under-
standing are insufficient to account for human interaction: they are always partial 
and context-bound, and somehow underdetermined. The essence of interaction is 
rather “reacting, in general by accepting or objecting, i.e. basically evaluating the 
speaker’s position.”
On Weigand’s account, traditional linguistics, with notions such as “competence” 
and “performance” are inadequate and “reductionist”, since they distort that object 
of study: “we have to change our traditional view of language and speaking. There 
is no separate object ‘language’, only the ability to speak which is an integrated part 
of human competence-in-performance”. Similarly, “the notion of text must be ques-
tioned”, she argues, “as a consequence of the intrinsic interaction of language, emotion 
and body”. What is central is rather “linguistic action”, and linguistics is not capable of 
analyzing this alone, without the help of the biological and social sciences. Indeed, in 
the abstract, she describes her general perspective as that of socio-biology.
More specifically related to the topic of motion and emotion (in language), 
Weigand argues that to treat expressions such as German gerührt sein (‘to be moved’) 
as “figurative or metaphorical” would be “an artificial manoeuvre which contradicts 
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language use. Traditional views … separate the field of perception from cognition and 
explain diachronic change by a change from concrete perception to figurative cogni-
tion or from body to mind. They are based on methodological hypotheses which ‘dam-
age’ the natural object.”
To the extent that theories, linguistic or otherwise, construct strict boundaries 
between what Weigand calls the “components” of holistic phenomena, and worse: 
neglect vital aspects, they are indeed open to criticism such as that of the author. 
However, the reader may have doubts on whether E.O. Wilson’s take on “consilience” 
is indeed the right path, or even fully consistent with the author’s purposes. In his 
final book, Gould (2003) criticizes Wilson for misappropriating a concept used by the 
English philosopher of science William Whewell in 1840. For example, when Wilson 
(1999: 221) writes: “The central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible 
phenomena, from the birth of the stars to the workings of social institutions, are based 
on material processes that are ultimately reducible however long and tortuous the 
sequences, to the laws of physics”, it is clear that what Wilson has in mind is clear and 
simple reductionism. I return to this at the end of this Prologue.
Bloem’s chapter, like that of Günther & Hennies, presents another specific “case 
study”, this time using the methods of historical linguistics. The topic is one of central 
relevance for the volume: what is the origin of the English term “emotion”, which so 
many of the authors of the volume seek to define? It is well-known that it derives from 
Old French, and earlier from Latin, but Bloem shows on the basis of both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of texts from Old French and texts from the XVII century 
that initially the terms mouvoir and émouvoir were used more or less synonymously, 
referring either to physical motion, or to the “movements of the soul”, the latter under 
the influence of the “humoural theory” dating back to Ancient Greece. This changed 
during the XVII century, and from them on “mouvoir is almost exclusively used as a 
verb of movement whereas émouvoir has become a real psychological verb. The evo-
lution of the verb émouvoir can be considered a delitteralisation process”. The author 
argues that the influence of the dualistic philosophy of Descartes played a key role in 
this process – while mouvement de l’âme was earlier taken to be a literal character-
ization of the movements of the “four humours” according to the classical theory, it 
became eventually seen as a metaphorical expression, since emotions were to be seen 
as part of the mental part of our being. Hence, the expression with the prefix e(s)- (with 
somewhat unclear etymology, and not necessarily as interpreted by Thompson in the 
quotation in Section 2 as an “impulse moving outward”) became reserved for the men-
tal counterpart to (psycho)physical movement.
Concerning the controversial issue of nature of metaphor, in general and with 
respect to the “motion-emotion” metaphors discussed by Zlatev et al. in the follow-
ing chapter, Bloem takes an intermediary stance: “the impact of supposedly universal 
and ahistorical metaphors needs to be put in a cultural perspective”, an important 
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corrective to universalist models such as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT). It is 
thus important not to misinterpret the author’s argument as a purely “linguistic con-
structivist” account, or even worse, as one putting the blame on “Descartes the Dualist” 
for more or less inventing the sphere of the mental, a claim commonly encountered in 
social constructivist circles.
Zlatev, Blomberg and Magnusson, as already pointed out, regard motion and 
emotion as closely related, but separate experiential domains, and thus analyse expres-
sions such as my heart dropped as “motion-emotion metaphors”. My co-authors and 
I distinguish three possible answers to the question why such expressions are cross-
linguistically common, if not universal. According to the first, stemming from theories 
such as CMT, the “mappings” between the domains are determined by pre-linguistic, 
bodily experience. The anti-thesis, “social constructivist” answer would be that lin-
guistic and cultural practices determine such metaphors. The (dialectical) synthesis, 
which we endorse, is “consciousness-language interactionism”: non-linguistic expe-
rience channeled through language-and-culture specific conventions (similar to the 
proposal of Bloem, mentioned above). We offer empirical support for this thesis by 
analyzing “115 motion-emotion metaphors in English, Swedish, Bulgarian and Thai”, 
showing both overlap and differences, the latter correlating with the distance between 
the languages/cultures.
The study and its conclusions are suggestive of the potential of the “emotion turn” 
in mind science, witnessed by the present volume, but also actualize a number of 
unresolved issues. As many of the other chapters, we appeal to phenomenology, and 
in particular to its “founding father” Husserl for an analysis of motion/ movement. 
However, in contrast to Sheets-Johnstone (this volume), as already mentioned, we 
come to the conclusion that motion can be experienced both “internally” as quali-
tative movement, and “externally” as change-of-location – and argue that languages 
reflect this difference in the much discussed semantic categories Manner-of-motion 
and Path-of-motion (Talmy 2000). Also, similar to Foolen, but unlike Weigand, for our 
analysis of the expressions in question as metaphorical (and metonymical) to hold, it is 
important that motion and emotion are at some level distinct. Our proposal is that “in 
historical time some speakers could creatively use expressions referring to such analo-
gous or contiguous (motion) events in the “external world” in order to describe their 
“inner worlds”, and hearers could understand them, due to the motivated nature of the 
expressions.” However, Bloem’s historical analysis, summarized above, seems rather 
to suggest the reverse tendency: with mouvoir and émouvoir being initially conflated, 
and only subsequently distinguished, in part due to patterns of language use under the 
(partial) influence of Descartes. Thus, our analysis is likely to be regarded as “dualistic” 
by those who, in the manner of Sheets-Johnstone, argue that movement and affect are 
so to say, intermixed, from the start.
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6.  Conclusions
Given his important contributions to the topics of this volume – above all on the 
relationships between intersubjectivity and movement in human development – the 
editors of this volume found it appropriate to conclude with an epilogue by Colwyn 
Trevarthen. After having read the final drafts of all the chapters, and a preliminary 
version of this Prologue, Trevarthen reflects on historical predecessors to the general 
approach represented here, his own contribution to the field, and offers comments on 
the chapters, in a way that is quite independent from the summaries provided in the 
previous three sections. This adds considerably to what at the end of Section 2 was 
referred to as “the polyphony” of the book. There is an inevitable difference in focus 
and perspective in the interpretations offered in this Prologue, the authors’ own sum-
maries in the abstracts, and Trevarthen’s final comments. To hide these differences 
would be to engage in “manufacturing consent”, or to take too literally the notion of 
intersubjectivity as a “shared mind”, where individual minds and voices are coerced 
into an anonymous collectivity. While it should be up to the reader to make the final 
pronouncement in this, I believe that the different voices in this volume complement 
rather than contradict one another, at least on most issues. To the extent that there 
are disagreements – including on the definitions of the fundamental notions of “con-
sciousness”, “intersubjectivity”, “language”, “emotion” and “motion” – this reflects the 
fact that these are all huge notions, with traditions, literatures and in some cases whole 
disciplines dedicated to them. What all of the authors clearly agree on is that for these 
concepts to be comprehensively understood, they need to be interrelated, as reflected in 
Figure 1.
I wish to conclude by expressing my hope that the volume may contribute not 
only to the already prevalent “emotion turn” in cognitive science, but to the establish-
ment of a true mind science. As stated in Section 2, this can be envisioned as the non-
reductive study of the (human) mind, taking account of the richness of experience, 
uniting its bodily and social aspects in a methodologically pluralistic enterprise: unit-
ing the first-person (“subjective”) perspective of phenomenology, the second-person 
(“intersubjective”) perspective of (empathetic) observation involved in e.g. interaction 
studies, and the third-person (“objective”) perspective of the natural sciences. For it to 
validate itself as a truly new paradigm, it would need to contribute to resolving per-
sistent “anomalies” inherited from the past. Such anomalies are most clearly reflected 
in dichotomies like “individual-social”, “conscious-unconscious”, “mental-physical”, 
“reason-emotion”, “literal-metaphorical” etc. Previous attempts to resolve these have 
typically sought to reduce one of the poles in these dichotomies to the other, typically 
the more “subjective” to the more “objective” side of the opposition, in the manner 
of E.O. Wilson’s (misguided) interpretation of “consilience”. The challenge is exactly 
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not to strive at such a reduction, but to acknowledge the existence of these divisions, 
not as polar opposites but rather as sides standing in dynamic inter-dependence, as 
in the well-known yin-yang diagram. This would be a science, in the broad sense of 
the word, which would indeed live up to the original meaning of ‘consilience’, and – 
in Stephen Jay Gould’s terms – provide a major step to “mending the gap between 
[natural] science and the humanities”.
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This paper shows in detailed ways how animation is the evolutionary and 
existential ground floor of our being alive in the world and making sense of 
it, and thus how animation is the proper point of departure not only for basic 
understandings of perception, affectivity, cognition, meaning, movement, 
and world, but for basic understandings of the natural interrelationship of 
these dimensions of life. In the process of doing so, it takes a critical look at 
certain conceptual approaches that deflect us from a proper recognition and 
understanding of these multi-faceted realities of animation, or in other words, 
from being true to the truths of experience.
Keywords: species-specific kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants; meaning; 
movement; synergies of meaningful movement; qualitative structure of 
movement; embodied/embodiment; motorology; semantic congruency; dynamic 
congruency
1.  Introduction
Given the current practice of applying lexical band-aids in an attempt to marry mind 
and body, subject and world, third-person and first-person accounts of subjectivity, 
time, and other topics – lexical band-aids on the order of embodied action, senso-
rimotor subjectivity, embedded cognition, enactive emotions, and so on – the task of 
this paper is to recognize and address the need for a concept that embraces all aspects 
of life and thereby constitutes a key to understanding how all aspects of life – move-
ment, emotion, cognition, sociality, intersubjectivity, communication, language, and 
more – are inherently interrelated. That key concept is animation: we are essentially 
and fundamentally animate beings. In more specifically dynamic terms, we are ani-
mate forms who are alive to and in the world, and who, in being alive to and in the 
world make sense of it. We do so most fundamentally through movement, unfolding 
a temporal-spatial-energic dynamic, a kinetic aliveness that is in play throughout the 
course of our everyday lives from the time we are born to the time we die. Our kinetic 
30 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
aliveness and sense-making are apparent in our initial explorations of the world and in 
our curiosity about it to begin with. They are apparent, in other words, in the dynamic 
congruency of movement and emotion (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a): we move in ways 
coincident with our feelings, which is to say that our bodily attitudes are affectively 
as well as kinetically resonant. That resonance and sense-making are singularly and 
centrally apparent in our initial and ongoing attunements and disattunements with 
those about us and in the developing new attunements and disattunements we forge 
throughout our lives – with parents, caregivers, playmates, friends, lovers, spouses, 
neighbors,  colleagues, employers, and more.
We make sense of ourselves as well. Again, we do so most fundamentally through 
movement, through our tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses and their invariants as real-
ized in basic if/then relationships; for example: if I close my eyes, it will be dark. 
 Consciousness is thus a central aspect of animation, a tactile-kinesthetic built-in of 
life, a dimension of Nature through and through. Nature is indeed “a principle of 
movement and change,” as Aristotle lucidly and succinctly observed. Moreover as he 
went on logically and astutely to observe, “We must therefore see that we understand 
what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown” (Aristotle 
 Physics 2001: 12–14).
Aristotle’s observations validate the fact that animate creatures grow and move 
about in the world: they navigate with respect to their particular surrounding world, 
they nourish themselves, they avoid what is noxious, and so on. Science fiction sce-
narios and philosophical conceivability tales might incline one to think that animate 
life could exist without consciousness, but the point is that here on earth, that is, here 
in the real-life, real-time realities of earthly life, animate forms are by nature cogni-
zant of themselves and the world about them (Sheets-Johnstone 1998). Proprioception 
and affectivity attest emphatically to this reality. Consciousness is thus not something 
apart from Nature any more than cognition is something apart from Nature. Both are 
through and through aspects of animation and hence of animate life (for a thorough-
going empirical vindication of this claim, see Sheets-Johnstone 1998, 1999b/expanded 
2nd ed. 2011, especially Chapters 1, 2, 8, and 12; see also Sheets-Johnstone 1990).
The bases on which this chapter will spell out fundamental and inherently 
interrelated realities of animation will span evolutionary biology, phenomenology, 
 coordination dynamics, cognitive science, and psychology.
2.  Morphology
Morphology in the broad evolutionary sense of species-specific and species-
overlapping kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants provides precisely the stable 
 foundation that Darwin specified as necessary to a veridical understanding of 
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mind: “. . . the  problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself. – 
the mind is function of body. – we must bring some stable foundation to argue from” 
(Darwin 1987 [1838–1839]: 564). Bodies are indeed the ground floor of animate life. 
Their kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants – and corollaries thereof, e.g. the proprio-
ceptive slit sensilla of spiders, the campaniform sensilla of insects – undergird the dis-
tinctive everyday kinetic dispositions and capacities of each species of animate form. 
The invariants are, in other words, synergies of meaningful movement. The primate 
invariants of presenting and mounting, for example, are definitive of two interani-
mate kinetic relationships that are differentially meaningful, and moreover differen-
tially meaningful according to their agonistic or sexual context. The invariants of the 
Tanzsprache – the honey bee dance – are similarly meaningful and differentially so 
according not to social context but to variables within the dance, that is, to distinct 
qualitative variables inherent in movement that communicate to others the distance, 
direction, and value, i.e. richness, of a nectar source. In short, meaningful movement 
is a built-in of all animate life, including all forms of intersubjective life.1
Evolutionary biologist Stuart Altmann’s concept of comsigns attests at an objective, 
i.e. behavioral, level to the presence of kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants. Comsigns are 
in essence kinetic ways of relating to others that virtually all in the species are capable of 
both performing and understanding (Altmann 1967). They are thus species-specific syn-
ergies of meaningful movement. Without such commonly understood synergies – in the 
common but less exacting terms of animal biologists, without such ‘displays’ or ‘signs’ – 
there would be no basic coherence or order among conspecifics. Indeed, there would 
be no social animals to begin with since interanimate capacities and understandings 
would lack all foundation. An absence of comsigns would in fact be a sizable hazard to 
individual survival within any putative social group since not only would a threatening 
gesture or movement go unrecognized as would any appeasing gesture or movement, for 
example, but so also would any courtship and mating gestures or movements.
Species-specific kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants are qualitatively perturb-
able coalescing patterns of movement, feeling, thought, and awarenesses of the 
world, thus malleable invariants. The speed of one’s walk, for example, and its ampli-
tude may vary according to intensities of feeling, train of thought, changing climatic 
conditions, encroaching or receding others, the surrounding world generally, and 
so on. The kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic invariants that constitute walking remain basi-
cally the same, but the dynamic patterning that constitutes the actual synergy of 
walking at any particular time or place is qualitatively variable. For example, if I 
want to avoid someone, I might quicken my step and move along an erratic path; if 
1.  For more detailed discussions of the relationship of consciousness to movement, see 
Sheets-Johnstone (1998, 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
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I am tired or feeling in a reflective mood, I might amble soberly and slowly down the 
street. In effect, meaning motivates movement and movement generates and articu-
lates that meaning. A semantically congruent relationship is evident. The semantically 
congruent relationship is moreover evident in if/then or consequential relationships: 
if I want to examine something more closely or get within better hearing range, for 
example, then I move in ways concordant with that desire. Whatever my particular 
bodily-kinetic dynamic might be, it is meaningfully motivated and my movement 
articulates that meaning.
It is important to recognize that while motivations are fundamentally and essen-
tially affective in nature, they are commonly conditioned by cognitional awarenesses, 
precisely as in the above examples. In this context, it is of moment to underscore the 
difference between experientially-anchored descriptions of the relationship between 
movement and meaning, as in the above examples, and behavioral accounts of action 
and purpose. A preoccupation with purpose is at cross-purposes with fine-grained 
understandings of the experiential realities of animation; a verbal fixation on action is 
likewise. Both are preeminently third-person, objective translations of experience that 
fall short of elucidating the affective-kinetic-cognitional complexities and richness of 
experience. In the course of everyday life, we – like other forms of animate life – ordi-
narily think not in terms of purpose or action but in terms of movement: looking for 
and finding something to eat; writing a letter; waving at a passing friend; driving fast 
but carefully through traffic; mowing the lawn; standing up to address a meeting; and 
so on. Purpose is indeed a third-person way of understanding animate movement, a 
way that fastens on the need to explain or even to justify a mover’s action and that is 
epitomized in one human querying another: “what is the point of your doing that?”–
i.e. “what is your purpose?” In short, to speak of movement in terms of purpose or 
action puts us at a distance from the very affective-cognitional bodily-kinetic dynam-
ics that are at the heart of animate life, and, in effect, from the meaning that motivates 
the dynamics and from the meaning the living dynamics generate and articulate.
Among her extensively detailed studies of plovers, ethologist Carolyn Ristau’s 
article “Before Mindreading: Attention, Purposes and Deception in Birds?” focuses 
on “broken wing display or ‘injury feigning’” (Ristau 1991: 212). It exemplifies just the 
kind of thinking that distances us from the living dynamics of animate movement. In 
the opening sentence of her first section titled “Purposes”, Ristau suggests that “[a]
mong those attributes prior to an organism’s having the capacity to attribute inten-
tions in others,. . . the species in question should itself have intentions; its behaviours 
should be describable in terms of purposes” (ibid: 209). After noting her affirma-
tion of the purposiveness of the plover’s feigning behavior in other research publica-
tions, but affirming too that “there are no unassailable criteria connecting observable 
behaviours to specific accompanying mental states” (ibid), she goes on to describe 
the behavior:
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Broken wing displays are so called because the bird’s appearance very much 
resembles one with a broken wing. The full display consists in arching one or both 
wings and dragging them, quivering, along the ground. Sometimes the behaviour 
is accompanied by a raucous call. Both parents make the display, usually singly, 
but occasionally simultaneously. The behaviour occurs on some, but not all 
approaches of an intruder toward the region of the eggs or young chicks”.
 (ibid: 210)
She subsequently points out that “[i]njury feigning “is among the most intense of a 
repertoire of anti-predator behaviours” (ibid).
In her following section titled “Deception”, Ristau raises the question of whether, 
by behaving in such a way, the plover wants the predator or intruder to believe she 
is injured, and analogously, whether the plover “‘believes she is pretending to have a 
broken wing’” (ibid: 213). She calls attention to the fact that though a plover may have 
used the display once with a particular intruder – “‘lured’ it away from the young,” 
then flown away – the plover will use “the same trick again if the predator return[s].” 
This evidence, she states, seems to indicate that “the plover could not be attempting 
to deceive the predator/intruder.” She remarks, however, that “given that the ‘trick’ 
continues to work, the question must be raised as to the predator’s cognitive abilities. 
Despite the fact that the predator has observed that the plover flies away ably, it contin-
ues to follow the “broken wing displays” (ibid). While acknowledging that her experi-
mental studies with dogs as predators are incomplete, she states: “[T]he plovers which 
I have observed do not behave in ways that require an interpretation of purposefully 
‘deceiving’ the predator/intruder. The cognitive prowess of the intruder must not be 
assumed to be like that of a human. The broken wing display ‘works’ for the plover; 
the intruder follows it and gets farther away from the plover’s vulnerable eggs/young” 
(ibid: 214). After considering gaze and gaze experiments in subsequent sections and 
urging more studies of the behavior, she concludes:
It is unlikely that ‘injury feigning’ is deceptive in the sense of the plover consciously 
pretending to have a broken wing; it is a behaviour at the disposal of the plover. 
Using it is pragmatic in getting an intruder away from the region of nest/young. 
The behaviour can be construed as deceptive from Mother Nature’s point of view, 
i.e. from an evolutionary perspective. Injured animals are selectively preyed 
upon by predators. It is adaptive, therefore, for a distractive behaviour to give 
an appearance of vulnerability, as the ‘injury feigning’ does. However, it is very 
possible that other avian behaviours are deceptive as accumulating evidence 
strongly suggests. (ibid: 221)
Ristau’s description of “the behavior” and her conclusion about it are as problematic 
as they are significant, and at multiple levels with respect to synergies of meaningful 
movement. To begin with, the idea that the behavior is not consciously chosen by the 
plover but is simply at its “disposal” – one behaviour among others in its repertoire – is 
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curious. Other avian behaviours may well be deceptive, but that does not make injury 
 feigning something other than what it is, namely, and as its label specifically indicates, 
a pretense behavior. Such behavior articulates a complex kinetic dynamic, precisely as 
Ristau implicitly indicates: a plover does not normally arch its wings, drag them on the 
ground, and quiver them as it moves forward – any more than a wolf in the throes of an 
actual fight normally mutes its bite. In each instance, an intentionality is evident, not in 
the pragmatic sense of purpose but in the phenomenological sense of meaning. Injury 
feigning is indeed a synergy of meaningful movements, movements that fall outside the 
normal and have an intentional scope all their own. Moreover with respect to purpose 
in a pragmatic sense, i.e. if injury feigning is indeed of practical value, a behavior that 
effectively distracts intruders or predators from eggs and young, then it cannot be a 
capricious choice among possible behaviors in the species’ repertoire but is necessarily 
one that proves itself – and has proved itself – not merely efficacious but meaningful to 
both plover and intruder, precisely as indicated by the fact that a plover will success-
fully repeat its injury feigning to the same predator or intruder, and this even if it flies 
away after its first success. Finally, if “the behavior” is distractive, then there must be 
something about it that makes it distractive; and further, if its distractiveness is indica-
tive of vulnerability, then clearly there must be something about its nature that gives 
it the appearance of vulnerability. These latter points direct us straightaway to a more 
focused consideration of movement and in particular to a more detailed consideration 
of kinetic dynamics and their affective-cognitive motivations.
3.    Dynamics: At the qualitative heart of synergies  
of meaningful movement
Human parents who witness their infant flailing its arms and uttering a cry do not 
wonder what its purpose is, what it is coping with (see further below), or what is going 
on in its brain. The parents see and hear it as being moved to move, which is to say 
they see and hear it as being motivated: they do not attend to its flailings or cry as 
mechanical kinetic phenomena. Indeed, animate beings do not simply move in an 
 epiphenomenal sense: they are born to move; they are moved to move; they move 
meaningfully on behalf of their survival; and some – notably avians and  mammalians – 
move meaningfully on behalf of their progeny as well. That humans do not typi-
cally look at plovers and other animate forms of life in this way, i.e. morphologically 
and dynamically in the manner of Darwin rather than mechanically as being driven 
unconsciously by “Mother Nature”, is not only puzzling but runs against a basic evo-
lutionary fact, notably, “descent with modification”, and hence against an appreciation 
of evolutionary continuities. As empirically substantiated and discussed elsewhere 
(Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011), a kinetic intelligence informs 
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 animation – all the way “down” to “lower  animals”, e.g. paramecia, amoeba, fan worms. 
Psychologist Max Velmans substantiates this very point when he notes in more general 
terms that “continuity in the evolution of consciousness favours continuity in the dis-
tribution of consciousness” (Velmans 2007: 280). In short, to adjudge the movement of 
animate beings mere adaptively pragmatic or mechanical acts is to discredit evolution-
ary facts of life and, in effect, to deny built-in dynamically lived realities of animation.
When we duly observe animate creatures as the morphological and dynamic 
forms they are, we cease insisting they prove themselves to us. We give them due 
and proper credit from the beginning for their natural kinetic/proprioceptive and 
 tactile-kinesthetic capacities. At the most fundamental level, these capacities endow 
them with surface recognition sensitivities in relation to their surrounding world 
and with an awareness of their own movement in relation to those sensitivities 
( Sheets-Johnstone 1998, 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). Indeed, animate creatures 
are not foreigners on this earth but forms of life empowered with all the sensitivi-
ties and capacities that their particular animation engenders and implies. Surely when 
we observe an animal controlling its own bodily movement, as in arching, dragging, 
and quivering its wings, and when we thus recognize that it is moving both within its 
morphological capacities for movement and as it sees fit within its situation, we real-
ize that it is thinking intelligently and effectively in movement and is at the same time 
kinesthetically and/or proprioceptively, i.e. dynamically, attuned to its own movement 
(Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). We realize, in other words, that it 
is not simply reacting visually, auditorily, or olfactorily in a robotic sense to aspects of 
its surrounding world, but is quintessentially alive to a world that is in fact never the 
same from one moment to the next, and in being so alive, is affectively and cognitively 
attuned to its ever-changing world, and morphologically and dynamically aware of its 
capacity to move and to move in synergies of meaningful movement in relation to it: 
in this direction or that, for example, slow or fast, with abandon or cautiously, and so 
on, and thus notably, in a normal or feigned manner. In sum, it has a kinetic repertoire 
of possible movements in a changing world and a kinetic intelligence readily cognizant 
of that changing world, a kinetic intelligence that motivates and informs its movement 
(Sheets-Johnstone 1998; 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
In conjunction with a recognition of that intelligence, we should note that when 
essential realities of evolutionary biology and corollary realities of animate life are over-
taken by “theories of mind” or by hypothetical reductive neurologies on the order of 
brain modules, for example, that follow the idea “a place for everything, and everything 
in its place” – to appropriate the words of 19th century writer Samuel Smiles2 – the 
2.  Samuel Smiles wrote these words in his 1875 book Thrift, but Captain Frederick Marryat 
wrote in his 1842 book Masterman Ready, “In a well-conducted man-of-war . . . everything is 
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inherent kinetic dynamics that define animate life disappear from view and along 
with them, the experientially grounded affective-cognitional-proprioceptive/tactile- 
kinesthetic foundations of those dynamics. Animation is not a theory or ideology: it is 
a fact of life, the most fundamental and comprehensive fact of life, and a fact in need 
of assiduous and painstaking examination. Given the unequivocal realities of anima-
tion, primatologists Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten’s comment on nonhuman 
animal intentionality is odd if not disturbing. They write, “if some animals are capable 
of attributing intentionality we need to know – perhaps most importantly because 
it would completely change our standards of ethics as applied to them” (Byrne & 
Whiten 1991: 140). In truth, such cognitive human concerns and seeming conceits, 
wrapped up as they are in justifying theory – and more recently in privilegings of the 
human brain – are impediments to the achievement of a bona fide evolutionary ethics 
(cf. Sheets-Johnstone 2008). Indeed, the concern to know in some experimentally-
devised empirical way whether a nonhuman animal is “attributing intentionality” and 
knows what it is doing overlooks the fact that, like we humans, nonhuman animals 
experience their particular Umwelt (von Uexküll 1928), other individuals and their 
movement within it.3 We would do well in this context to recall Darwin’s comment 
regarding insects in general and ants in particular, a comment based not on theory or 
ideology, but on observation:
It is certain that there may be extraordinary mental activity with an extremely 
small absolute mass of nervous matter: thus the wonderfully diversified instincts, 
mental powers, and affections of ants are generally known, yet their cerebral 
ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a small pin’s head .… the brain of an 
ant is one of the most marvellous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more 
marvellous than the brain of man. (Darwin 1981 [1871], vol. 1: 145)
The “real-life”, “real-time” (to use dynamic systems language)4 kinetic dynamics 
of animation can be analyzed in concrete ways: we can bring the dynamics to self- 
evidence because they are experientially evident, in others as in ourselves. To high-
light this fact and appreciate its far-reaching significance, consider first neurophysi-
ologists Barbara Gowitzke and Morris Milner’s (1988) remarks concerning voluntary 
movement in their chapter on “The Proprioceptors and Their Associated Reflexes”, 
a chapter in The Scientific Bases of Human Movement. After acknowledging that 
in its place, and there is a place for everything,” and Isabella Mary Beeton wrote in her 1861 
book The Book of Household Management, “A place for everything and everything in its place.”
3.  Philosopher Ernst Cassirer’s concise explanation of why there are Umwelts is eloquent in 
the depths of its simplicity and warrants citation: “Every organism . . . has a world of its own 
because it has an experience of its own” (Cassirer 1970: 25).
4.  For more on “real-time” investigations, see van Gelder and Port (1995).
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“[v]oluntary movement requires a foundation of automatic responses which assure 
a proper combination of mobility and stability of body parts”, they state: “The volun-
tary contribution to movement is almost entirely limited to initiation, regulation of 
speed, force, range, and direction, and termination of the movement” (Gowitzke & 
Milner 1988: 256). Granted their focus is on neurophysiology, the seemingly minor 
role attributed to volition is nonetheless astonishing: “limitations” are not only inte-
gral to the very nature of voluntary movement but of indisputably sizable import to 
the mover. A phenomenological analysis of movement sets forth the spatio-temporal- 
energic structures that constitute the qualitative dynamics of movement and in so 
doing implicitly demonstrates the experiential import of the “voluntary contribution” 
(Sheets-Johnstone 1966; 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). What will become evident 
through a summary of that analysis is not just a realization of the complex qualita-
tive structure of movement, but seminal realizations of received ignorance about 
movement that deflect us from an awareness of its qualitative structure, or, in other 
words, that awaken us to an awareness of what movement is not. It should be noted 
that the charge of received ignorance is meant pejoratively not toward individuals but 
toward habits of thought that pass for received wisdom. In particular, it is meant to 
call attention to the habit of not questioning common understandings of movement 
and common ways of thinking about movement, understandings and ways that fail to 
recognize much less capture the dynamics of the phenomenon and that indeed perse-
verate misconceptions about the very foundation of animate life.
Four primary qualities – tensional, linear, areal, and projectional qualities – are 
apparent in any movement we make (Sheets-Johnstone 1966 [1979/1980]; 1999b/
expanded 2nd ed. 2011). These qualities are inherent in movement. They define the 
spatial, temporal, and energic qualities of movement, none of which exists separately 
but each of which can be spelled out analytically in finer detail. Their particular char-
acter in any movement is created by the movement itself. Suppose, for example, that we 
are trudging up a steep hill: our bodies may be bent forward, our steps may be small, 
slow, and effortful but at the same time even-paced and smooth. Tensional  quality 
defines the intensity of our movement, the effort or force we experience in trudging 
upward. As with any quality of movement, the tensional quality may vary in the course 
of our moving: we spontaneously move with less effort as the incline decreases, for 
example. The linear quality of our movement has two components: the linear design 
of our moving bodies and the linear pattern of our movement. As suggested by the 
trudging character of our walk, the overall linear design of our body is likely inclined 
diagonally from the hips, thus tilted forward. In terms of the overall bodily direction of 
our movement, the linear pattern of our walk likely proceeds in a straight line forward, 
linear pattern specifying the path traced by our movement. We should note, how-
ever, that not only do our feet trace out a particular linear pattern, but so also do our 
arms if we are swinging them forward and back, and further, that if instead of looking 
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 continuously down at the ground, we look alternately to one side then the other, or up 
ahead and then again down, our head would trace yet another linear pattern. Again, 
it is important to note that qualities may vary. We might, for instance, come up from 
time to time to a vertical alignment or move sideways to avoid large boulders, and thus 
change the linear design of our moving bodies or the linear pattern of our movement.
Areal quality, like linear quality, has two components: the areal design of our mov-
ing bodies and the areal pattern of our movement. We may be not only tilted forward 
but hunched over as we trudge forward, for example, but then too, as we come to the 
top of the hill, we may stretch to the full. In short, the areal design our moving bod-
ies may be anywhere from contractive to expansive. The areal pattern of movement 
may be correlatively anywhere from intensive to extensive. Small, trudging steps make 
the areal pattern of our movement intensive; large, striding steps make it extensive. 
Amplitude is clearly a spatial dimension of any movement and areal quality specifies 
amplitude in terms of both the moving body and movement itself.
Projectional quality describes the manner in which effort or force is manifest: basi-
cally in an abrupt, sustained, or ballistic manner. In trudging up a steep hill, we ordi-
narily move in a sustained manner, plodding upward in an even, smooth gait. But we 
might also move sharply, for instance, in avoiding an unexpected overhanging branch 
or begin swinging our arms in a ballistic manner, i.e. with an initial impulse that car-
ries the movement forward and back through its initially generated momentum. Our 
movement may indeed be a combination of different projectional qualities.
As the above quite summary analysis indicates, the qualitative structure of any 
movement generates a particular dynamic, a dynamic that itself has a particular qual-
ity or constellation of qualities: it flows forth with a certain kinetic energy that may rise 
and fall in intensity, waxing and waning at the same time spatializing and temporal-
izing itself in ways that contour the dynamic, making it explosive, attenuated, smooth, 
jagged, restrained, impulsive, magnified, narrowed, and so on, and in any combination 
thereof. In short, the qualitative nature of any particular dynamic is formally created 
by the qualities of movement itself.
It is notable, then, that contrary to the dictionary definition of movement and to 
popular thought, movement is not “a change of position”. To begin with, movement 
does not have a “position”, so it cannot possibly change it. Furthermore, we clearly 
improperly define ourselves-in-movement as “changing position”. While in moving 
about in our everyday world – in writing our name, washing our face, sweeping the 
floor, or getting into a car – we indeed change “positions”, we do so only from a third-
person, analytical, object-in-motion perspective. We ourselves are involved not in 
anonymous happenings taking place between two – or even more – different positions 
as we move in distinctive and innumerable ways throughout the day, but in rich and 
complex qualitative kinetic dynamics. In the course of everyday life, our dynamics are 
in fact commonly familiar, which is what allows them to flow forth effortlessly in the 
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sense that we do not have to concentrate attention on our movement. Our familiar 
dynamics are in the background; they are not, however, on that account outside con-
sciousness (Sheets-Johnstone 2003; 2006; 2011; forthcoming 2012). While we recog-
nize familiar dynamics in the form of style in others – the way a person walks, laughs, 
and drives, for example – we do not commonly focus on the character or style of our 
own dynamics. Yet we have all developed habits of moving in the course of learn-
ing our bodies and learning to move ourselves, ways of moving that are at bottom 
coordinated dynamic patterns that run off in consistent ways and that, being familiar 
and easily carried out, are commonly experienced at the margins of awareness as we 
focally attend to other things (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011; 2011). 
Habitual movement patterns can, however, be made focally present: we can become 
aware of the dynamics of brushing our teeth, for example. In fact, were someone else 
to brush our teeth, we would immediately recognize that someone else was brushing 
our teeth, not just because we were not holding the tooth brush, and not only because 
we could actually see someone in front of us holding and moving our toothbrush, 
but because we would feel a foreign dynamics inside our mouth. In short, when we 
turn attention to habitual movement patterns, to our own coordinated dynamics (Kelso 
1995), we recognize kinesthetic melodies (Luria 1966; 1973; see further below); they 
bear the recognizable stamp of our own qualitatively felt movement patterns, our own 
familiar coordination dynamics, our own familiar synergies of meaningful movement.
That movement is “a change of position” is only one piece of received ignorance 
about movement. A further piece concerns space and time, notably, the belief or adage 
that movement takes place in space and in time. From a purely objective point of view, 
we have no quarrel with the claim and thus no difficulty assenting to its truth. But 
purely objective conceptions of movement belie its experiential realities, which, as 
even an abbreviated phenomenological analysis shows, constitute a rich and complex 
qualitative spatio-temporal kinetic dynamic created by movement itself. Interestingly 
enough, the notion of movement taking place in space and in time is conceptually 
tied to the dictionary definition of movement as “a change of position” (cf. Zlatev, 
Blomberg & Magnusson this volume). In fact, given that definition, it is no surprise 
that movement is conceived as taking place in space and in time. After all, one can 
chart objects in motion: they go from a certain place here to a certain place there over 
a certain period of time, much as an airplane flies from New York to London, or as 
we see someone slip and fall. As the phenomenological analysis makes clear, however, 
movement differs from objects in motion in creating its own time and space and in 
thereby creating a particular spatio-temporal kinetic qualitative dynamic. We might 
all the same readily observe objects in motion as having a particular dynamic, as when 
we see a plane flying smoothly across the sky, or diving down swiftly, or circling pon-
derously overhead, or climbing slowly, our attention being diverted precisely from an 
object changing position and moving in space and in time to movement itself. We might 
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furthermore pay attention to our own moving body as an object in motion, attending 
to its dynamics from a third-person viewpoint, as when we are learning a new skill – 
how to serve in tennis, how to make a surgical abdominal incision, how to articulate 
words in a foreign language. In regarding ourselves and parts of ourselves as objects in 
motion, we experience ourselves – and conceive and speak of our moving bodies – in 
terms of the speed, range, force, and direction of movement, of initiating this move-
ment “now” at this moment, and of terminating this movement “now” at this moment. 
We readily take up the objective vocabulary of Gowitzke and Miller. When we observe 
our own movement in this way, we precisely perceive it, perceive it as a force or effort 
put forth in time and in space, a force or effort we are controlling or trying to control 
every step of the way. We do not feel our movement as an unfolding dynamic, a kinetic 
form-in-the-making; that is, we are not kinesthetically aware of the flowing qualitative 
spatio-temporal kinetic dynamics of movement.
The difference between experiencing the dynamics of movement itself and those 
of an object in motion is well exemplified, even epitomized, by an experience most 
Western adults have had at some time in the course of their lives. When a fully blown 
balloon is purposefully untied and allowed to splutter about, it creates a particular 
qualitative kinetic dynamic. While the balloon is clearly an object in motion, what we 
experience in attending to what we verbally label “spluttering” is a vigorous, erratic, 
highly punctuated, wholly capricious flow of movement that ends in a sudden col-
lapsing stillness. What captures our attention and is at the heart of our experience 
is movement, not a balloon in motion. In effect, we have a felt sense of a qualitative 
kinetic dynamic.
A third piece of received ignorance about movement lurks within the distinc-
tion between movement and objects in motion (for further analysis of the distinction, 
see Sheets-Johnstone 1979). That third piece may in fact be already apparent in the 
distinction drawn between perceiving one’s movement as an objective happening and 
feeling one’s movement as a qualitative kinetic dynamic – what famed neuropsycholo-
gist Aleksandr Luria in his studies of “the working brain” termed “integral kinaesthetic 
structures or kinetic melodies” and which he described in painstaking detail (Luria 
1973: 176). Contrary to the way in which people commonly speak and write of the 
experience of movement, we do not have sensations of movement. We do not experi-
ence movement in the way we experience a twitch or an itch, a darting pain, a flash of 
light, a chill, or a peppery taste. As I have pointed out elsewhere, sensations are tem-
porally punctual and spatially pointillist phenomena (Sheets-Johnstone 2003; 2005; 
2006). They are discrete bodily-sensed events, momentary here-now bodily experi-
ences.5 In light of the experiential nature of sensations, the problem with  “kinesthetic 
5.  Sensations may, however, in some instances coalesce to form either a kinetic perception or 
an affective feeling; see Sheets-Johnstone (2006: 366–367).
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sensations” becomes obvious. We do not experience our everyday movement – reach-
ing for a glass, opening our arms to hug a friend, and so on, movements that are indeed 
voluntary – as a series of discrete moment-by-moment, place-by-place kinetic happen-
ings, now-here, now-here kinetic events. What we experience is the kinesthetic feeling 
of a qualitative kinetic dynamic. As we have seen, the experience of that dynamic is 
amenable to phenomenological analysis, that is, it can be formally elucidated. More-
over, as we will proceed to show, it can be shown to coincide formally with emotions, 
with feelings in an affective sense.
4.  Dynamic congruency
The bodily nature of emotions has been a subject of controversy as well as interdisci-
plinary discussion, the controversy and discussion being perhaps most prominently 
centered on, and exemplified by the writings of William James and Carl Lange on the 
one hand and the writings of Walter Cannon on the other. The purpose here is not to 
review aspects of the controversy or the contrasting theses driving it, nor is it to pres-
ent arguments for sustaining a belief in the bodily nature of emotion to begin with. It 
is to set forth empirical evidence substantiating the intimate bond between emotions 
and movement, to point out the concordance of this evidence with the phenomeno-
logical analysis of movement, and on these grounds to document the dynamic congru-
ency of emotion and movement (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a). The import of recognizing 
the dynamic congruency will become apparent not only with respect to the need to 
recognize animation in the sense of a whole-body dynamic – a dynamic that goes 
beyond facial expression, for example – but with respect to the need to recognize 
that talk of ourselves as “embodied” beings distracts from, if not elides altogether the 
foundational animation that undergirds all facets of our being and thus provides the 
proper point of departure for examining the full spectrum of our human faculties and 
dispositions.
It is notable that in his Introduction to The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals, Darwin voices concern that his analysis has a sound foundation and in 
this context calls attention straightaway to infants. He states: “In order to acquire as 
good a foundation as possible, and to ascertain, independently of common opinion, 
how far particular movements. . . are really expressive of certain states of the mind, 
I have found the following means the most serviceable. In the first place, to observe 
infants; for they exhibit many emotions, as Sir C. Bell remarks, ‘with extraordinary 
force’; whereas, in after life, some of our expressions ‘cease to have the pure and 
simple source from which they spring in infancy’” (Darwin 1965 [1872]: 13). The 
“after life,” adult shift away from the “pure and simple source” of infancy can surely 
be described as a shift away from the animate body, in more precise terms, as an 
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espousal of measured intellect over spontaneous feeling, a definitive predilection for 
mind over body. A provocative observation made in a panel discussion on “Expres-
sion” during a conference on “Emotions Inside Out: 130 Years after Darwin’s The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals” (Ekman, Campos, Davidson & de 
Waal 2003) aptly captures the muted kinetic character of adult emotion remarked 
on by both Darwin and Bell. An unidentified audience member comments, “I’ve 
been so excited by this whole presentation of this session because everybody is coor-
dinated into one unit, but what has fascinated me is the absence of the body below 
the neck [laughter]” (ibid: 273). He or she goes on to explain: “I was fascinated by 
hearing the words, by seeing the faces, but I did not see the talking by the fingers, 
by the hands, by the movement, poise, and pattern of the people that were moving, 
sitting, or shifting.” He/she then asks “if there is any further matter going on with 
the body as a Gestalt when you are communicating with your voice and your face” 
(ibid). Psychologist Paul Ekman responds first by citing the “pioneering work” of 
David Efron on gestures – what Efron referred to as “emblems”– and comments, 
“They are the only body language” (ibid: 273). He mentions Efron’s specification 
of “speech illustrator movements”, and then alludes to his own research on “bodily 
movements that we called self-manipulative movements,” movements such as playing 
with one’s hands or scratching one’s face (ibid: 274). He concludes his response by 
stating, “There are other approaches that aren’t looking in this formalistic way, but 
are looking at the flow, or quality, of movement,” and goes on to remark, “These are 
people who primarily come out of dance. It doesn’t appear that these body move-
ments are as direct a signal source for emotion, in humans at least, as the face and 
voice. That’s why we couldn’t have found someone able to give a scientific talk on the 
body movements of emotion” (ibid).
The “absence of the body below the neck” might well be characterized as a chronic 
metaphysics of absence in “scientific talk on the body movements of emotion”, and 
the absence of “flow, or quality, of movement” as a chronic absence of both dynamics 
and first-person experience in “scientific talk on the body movements of emotion.” 
The absences conceal “the pure and simple source” of emotions that infants enjoy, a 
source that is quintessentially defined by animation and that is not only typically lost 
in the “after life” of adults but typically unrecognized in the qualitatively blinkered 
life of most scientists and philosophers if not academic and non-academic people 
generally. The deficiency of our “after life” and of a blinkered science notwithstand-
ing, we can nonetheless clearly recognize that the absences constitute an absence of 
whole-body qualitative dynamics. Our voices and faces are part and parcel of those 
dynamics, part of the qualitative affective-kinetic dynamics created by otherwise 
spontaneously whole moving bodies. Animate bodies are indeed ones from which 
movement flows, and in flowing, creates a qualitative dynamic that, as we have seen, 
can be elucidated in fine phenomenological detail, a detailing that in truth is far 
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more kinetically elucidating and exacting than scientific disquisitions on emblematic 
gestures, illustrator movements, and self-manipulative movement. It is pertinent to 
recall in this regard that phenomenological analyses are open to verification within 
a methodology no less demanding than that of Western science, which means they 
can be brought to self-evidence by anyone caring to examine experience. Emotions 
do indeed “spring” from the body and in their own distinctive qualitative kinetic 
dynamics as both Darwin and Bell demonstrate graphically as well as descriptively 
(Darwin 1965 [1872]; Bell 1844). Infant psychiatrist and clinical psychologist Dan-
iel Stern aptly terms these kinetically-charged affective dynamics “vitality affects” 
(Stern 1985; 1993). Obviously, to appreciate them, we need to regain touch with 
our primordial animation by affectively and kinetically interrogating our “after life” 
as adults.
In “Concluding Remarks and Summary”, his final chapter on the expression of 
emotions, Darwin emphasizes “the intimate relation which exists between almost all 
the emotions and their outward manifestations” (Darwin 1965 [1872]: 365). Indeed, 
both implicitly and explicitly throughout his text he has validated the intimate bond. 
With respect to rage, for example, he observes:
[R]espiration is laboured, the chest heaves, and the dilated nostrils quiver. The 
whole body often trembles. The voice is affected. The teeth are clenched or 
ground together, and the muscular system is commonly stimulated to violent, 
almost frantic action. But the gestures of a man in this state usually differ from 
the purposeless writhings and struggles of one suffering from an agony of pain; 
for they represent more or less plainly the act of striking or fighting with an 
enemy. (ibid: 74)
Even as concerns speech, he observes, “The movements of expression give vividness 
and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others 
more truly than do words, which may be falsified” (ibid: 364)
Darwin’s observations on the intimate bond between movement and emotion are 
consonant with the lifelong experimental studies of medical doctor and neuropsy-
chiatrist Edmund Jacobson, who developed and honed a form of introspection that 
he called “auto-sensory observation”.6 The introspectional practice allowed patients 
to monitor and ultimately dissipate excessive, unproductive bodily tensions and in 
consequence to decrease their anxieties and other debilitating feelings. The self-
observational technique centers essentially on tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses of one’s 
6.  For a more detailed exposition of the work of Jacobson and of the work of Bull and of de 
Rivera that follow, see Sheets-Johnstone (1999a).
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specific and overall tensional levels. Of seminal interest is Jacobson’s description of 
the holistic nature of a trained observer’s awareness. He states:
The trained observer (not the tyro) identifies and locates signals of neuromuscular 
activity as integral parts of the mental act [of ‘attention, imagination, recall, 
fantasy, emotion, or any other mental phenomena’]. He does not discern two acts, 
one  so-called ‘mental’ and the other ‘neuromuscular’, but one act only.
 (Jacobson 1970: 35)
As if prescient of the direction in which his neuropsychiatric profession will go, he 
comments that “those who would do homage to the brain with its ten billion cell-
amplifiers can well continue to do so,” but they must also not overlook empirical evi-
dence: that “muscles and brain proceed together in one effort-circuit, active or relaxed” 
(ibid: 36, 34). Jacobson’s empirical evidence of a singular muscle-brain ‘effort-circuit’ 
accords with Darwin’s basic insight that movement and emotion go hand in hand.
The innovative research of psychiatrist Nina Bull delineates the intimate bond in 
further, strikingly revealing experiential ways that demonstrate to begin with that there 
is a generative as well as expressive dimension inherent in the relation between move-
ment and emotion; that is, “a basic neuromuscular sequence is essential to the produc-
tion of affect” (Bull 1951: 79). Using a methodology based on hypnosis, Bull elicits 
reports from subjects experiencing one of six specified emotions: fear, anger, disgust, 
depression, joy, triumph. With respect to fear, one subject reports, for example: “First 
my jaws tightened, and then my legs and feet. . . my toes bunched up until it hurt. . . 
and. . . well, I was just afraid of something” (ibid: 59). With respect to anger, subjects 
report “wanting to throw, pound, tear, smash and hit” and what restrains them, Bull 
reports, is “always the same, clenching the hands” or making some similar restraining 
movement (ibid: 65). Of particular interest is her locking subjects hypnotically into a 
particular emotion – the subjects were first read a particular description from their 
own experiential reports and told to adopt the specific bodily attitude they themselves 
had described – and were to remain in that locked position until specifically unlocked. 
Without unlocking them, however, Bull told the subjects they were to feel an entirely 
different, contrasting emotion. That they were unable to do so is indicative of the 
fact that a change in affect requires a change in postural tensions and general bodily 
attitude. As one subject responded: “I reached for joy – but couldn’t get it–so tense”; 
another responded: “I feel light – can’t feel depression” (ibid: 84, 85). What Bull’s gen-
erative study shows indisputably is that affective and tactile-kinesthetic feelings are 
experientially intertwined. Moreover that subjects did not distinguish between the two 
feelings is testimony to the fact that they are experienced holistically and integrally, not 
as causally sequenced phenomena.
Further empirical evidence of the intimate bond is set forth by psychologist 
Joseph de Rivera in his “geometry of emotions,” which shows that emotions move 
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us, “transforming” our relation to the world (de Rivera 1977: 35). In delineating “The 
Movements of the Emotions,” de Rivera singles out and illustrates four fundamental 
kinetic-affective relations, that is, four basic modes of bodily extension and  contraction 
with respect to four basic emotions: anger, fear, affection, and desire. “If the arms are 
held out in a circle so that the fingertips almost touch, they may either be brought 
toward the body (a movement of contraction) or moved out in extension. The entire 
trunk may follow these movements” (and so, we should add, might also one’s legs and 
thus one’s whole body). De Rivera then states that “if the palms are facing in, the exten-
sion movement corresponds to a moving toward the other – a giving – as in tenderness, 
while the contraction movement suggests a movement toward the self – a getting – 
as in longing. If the palms are rotated out, the extension movement corresponds to 
the thrusting against of anger, while the contraction intimates the withdrawal away of 
fear.” He points out: “If one allows oneself to become involved in the movement and 
imagines an object, one may experience the corresponding emotion” (ibid: 40).
De Rivera actually elaborates a complex structure of emotions based on these 
“four basic emotional movements” (ibid: 41). In addition to demonstrating the inti-
mate bond between movement and emotion, the further point of moment here is pre-
cisely the basic one of an animated subject-world relationship: de Rivera demonstrates 
kinetically that emotions resolve themselves dynamically into extensional or contrac-
tive movements that go either toward, against, or away from something in one’s sur-
rounding world and correlatively away from or toward oneself. In sum, and as the 
previously cited research studies from Darwin onward show, emotions are affectively-
charged kinetic forms of the tactile-kinesthetic body. To appreciate the dynamic congru-
ency of emotions and movement thus requires recognition of a holistic whole-body 
qualitative dynamics.
5.    Semantic congruency and dynamic congruency: Cornerstones 
of animation
As we have seen, animate beings are not objects in motion but subjects of a world who 
move in distinctive morphological and qualitatively dynamic ways and who initiate and 
terminate their own movement. Regarded as objects in motion, their innate and funda-
mental animateness goes unrecognized; their subject-world relationship is annulled. In 
consequence, fundamental concepts generated in and through the experience of moving 
oneself, corporeal concepts (Sheets-Johnstone 1990; 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011), go 
unrecognized. However stark their difference in kinetic form and evolutionary heritage, 
the Tanzsprache of a honeybee, for example, and the coordinated hunting manoeuvres 
of two lionesses testify equally to corporeal concepts, that is, to the empirical reality of 
nonlinguistic concepts in animate life (Sheets-Johnstone 1990; 2010). It is thus not just 
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the everyday movements of humans but the everyday  movements of animate creatures 
as a whole that are generative of concepts, concepts that are tied to specific morpholo-
gies and ways of life, that are integral to survival and, with respect to social animals, to 
social communication. In short, fundamental  concepts of space, time, and force – of 
distance, direction, tempo, duration, effort, and so on –  originate in self-movement. 
In effect – and to use human examples for  brevity’s sake (see  Sheets-Johnstone 1990; 
2010, 2011 and further below for examples of and references to nonhuman animals) 
– it is not just that everyday human movements such as reaching and grasping, stand-
ing and sitting, pushing and pulling, bending and stretching, and so on, are depen-
dent on, and a measure of, human movement capabilities and dispositions, but that 
they are and have been from the beginning generative of concepts: of near and far, up 
and down, weak and strong, straight and curved, slow and fast, abrupt and attenuated. 
As shown at length in earlier analyses of thinking and of the primacy of movement 
( Sheets-Johnstone 1990; 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011), cognition is not separate from 
perception, perception from movement, nor movement from an environment or sur-
rounding world. These inherently inter-related aspects of animation commonly pass 
unnoticed in talk of “behavior”: they constitute the complex and often subtle whole of 
any actual “real-time,” “real-life” self-movement as it unfolds. Synergies of meaningful 
movement are indeed consistently informed by spatio-temporal-energic concepts.
Ethological studies utilizing a movement analysis system7– John Fentress’s stud-
ies of mice (Fentress 1989), for example, and Moran, Fentress, and Golani’s studies of 
ritualized fighting in wolves (Moran, Fentress & Golani 1981) – readily demonstrate the 
far richer significance of analyzing and understanding the kinetic dynamics of animal 
movement over standard reports of animal behavior precisely because they distinguish 
and specify the spatial, temporal, and energic complexities of everyday animate life. 
In doing so, they provide gateways to understanding synergies of meaningful move-
ment in the animate world. Neurophysiologist Gerald Edelman’s experimental studies 
of automatons, particularly “Darwin III” that demonstrates how cognitive determina-
tions of an object are based on freely-varied movement (Edelman 1992: 93), implicitly 
underscore a further dimension of that richer significance, namely, that animation is 
first and foremost a subject-world relationship and being such is naturally an integrated 
affective-kinetic-cognitive phenomenon: animate beings are impelled to move on the 
basis of their interest in, or aversion to, what they perceive, what they recognize, and so 
on, and in turn, to move in ways semantically congruent with their experience. Finally, 
7.  The ethological studies cited use the Eshkol-Wachmann system (Eshkol-Wachmann 
1958). For sources on Labanotation, see, for example, Laban (1975) and Hutchinson (1970). 
For sources on Effort/Shape, see, for example, Bartenieff and Lewis (1980) and Bartenieff et al. 
(1970). For sources on Benesh notation, see Benesh and Benesh (1969).
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the meticulously detailed analyses of the relationship of movement to perception set 
forth in methodologically different but highly complementary ways by Edmund  Husserl 
and Hermann von Helmholtz (see Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011) 
show indisputably that the relationship, far from being a matter of “behavior,” is a 
movement-perceptual-cognitional relationship motivated by and articulated within 
an affective framework of some kind: interest, curiosity, or play, for instance.
The above-cited analyses, observations, field studies, and experimental programs 
point to the need to recognize the multi-faceted realities of animation, and correlatively 
to recognize not only that behavior is not en par with animation, but that conceiving 
cognition or affectivity a “state” of the organism is as misguided as conceiving move-
ment a “motor” phenomenon. The two misconceptions are in fact not distant from 
each other: in the one instance, there is an inattention to dynamics; in the other, an 
inattention to kinesthesia and proprioception. The inattentions are conceptually akin 
to the three pieces of received ignorance discussed earlier and impediments in their 
own right to a recognition of the foundational reality of animation. For these reasons 
and because they pervade diverse current literatures, they warrant finer specification.
The inattention to dynamics is not relieved by the all-encompassing lexical 
band-aid of “embodiment” (e.g. “embodied experience”, “embodied metaphor”, Gibbs 
2006; “embodied self-awareness”, Zahavi 2002; “embodied subjectivity”, Hanna  & 
 Thompson 2003; Zahavi 2005) or what might be considered its Heideggerian-spawned 
existential surrogate, “coping” (e.g. Dreyfus & Spinosa 1999; Dreyfus 2000; see fur-
ther below). Correlatively, the inattention to kinesthesia and proprioception is not 
relieved by the variable lexical band-aids of “enaction” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 
1991), “neurophenomenology” (Varela 1999a; 1999b), “sensorimotor  subjectivity” 
(Thompson 2007), and the like. That meaningful ways of moving are meaning-
fully motivated – finding something noxious and moving away from it, for example 
– can hardly be denied: life-enhancing capacities and dispositions are foundational 
to animate life. In light of this evolutionary fact of life, it is astonishing if not regret-
table that the living dynamics of affectivity and cognition are sidelined in present- 
day pursuits of a consummate cognitive neuroscience of the brain and that they are 
unthinkingly and no less emphatically marginalized when parsed as it were and treated 
under the aegis of “coping” behavior (Varela 1999a; 1999b; Varela & Depraz 2005; 
Thompson 2007). In the former circumstance, dynamics are commonly sacrificed to a 
microphrenology intent on spatializing functions and even experience by giving them 
discrete locations in the brain, precisely as in hypothetical brain modules and in experi-
mentally located mirror neurons. Certainly neuroscientific studies of the brain are of 
value, and indeed, instrumental in understanding pathologies and in treating patho-
logically impaired individuals. However, as noted neuropsychologist Roger Sperry long 
ago affirmed on the basis of his studies of its neurophysiology, the brain is an organ of 
and for movement that functions as an integrated whole on behalf of a “preparation to 
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respond” (Sperry 1952: 301), that is, on behalf of what biologists term a defining feature 
of life: responsivity (Curtis 1975). As such, the brain is a dynamic organ. Research stud-
ies in coordination dynamics address the brain in just such terms, producing findings 
that show it works in both localized and integrated ways (Kelso & Engstrøm 2006). The 
field of coordination dynamics, an elemental and critically significant domain within 
dynamic systems research, in fact aims not at reductionism but at an illumination of 
the complementary nature of Nature, indeed, the complementary nature of brain and 
behavior as complex dynamic systems (Kelso 1995; Kelso & Engstrøm 2006): “In coor-
dination dynamics, the real-life coordination of neurons in the brain and the real-life 
coordinated actions of animals are cut, fundamentally, from the same dynamic cloth. 
Integrity is in turn preserved because it is never threatened. Psychophysical unity is 
undergirded at all levels by coordination dynamics” (Sheets-Johnstone 2004; quoted in 
Kelso & Engstrøm 2006: 9). Coordination dynamics is thus not just a necessary but a 
foundational correction to reductionist microphrenological thinking.
In the latter circumstance – that of “coping” behavior – coping is taken as the 
basic landscape on which emotion “occurs,” ostensibly because, as Varela describes 
it, coping defines a break in transparency, that is, a break in our “unreflected absorp-
tion” in the world as we go about our everyday business – of “hammering,” for 
instance, as in Heidegger’s classic example (Heidegger 1962: 98), the example taken 
up by Varela (Varela 1999a: 299). “This standard Heideggerian vignette,” Varela avers, 
“can be extended to all embodied actions, that is, actions in a fluid context where 
there is always a mixture of immediate coping and concurrent secondary activities 
of  language and mental life” (ibid.). Whatever might be the specified meaning of 
“embodied actions”– the idea of disembodied ones is difficult to imagine – coping is 
attributed to all human actions “in a fluid context,” which means along with hammer-
ing not only reaching, pushing, throwing, walking, greeting, and so on, all of which 
take place in a literally fluid context, i.e. in movement, but gasping, moaning, laugh-
ing, and even whistling: all are “embodied actions” within our “unreflected absorp-
tion” in the world. The idea that emotion is simply an “affective tonality” concomitant 
with a break in our absorption, in essence that emotion and coping are existential 
bedfellows, the break precipitating an emotion of some kind – “fear, jealousy, anger, 
anxiety, self-assurance, and so on” (ibid: 299–230) –8 deprives emotion of its living 
dynamics. Elation is not an epiphenomenon of coping; neither are disappointment, 
8.  “The loss of transparency is never distant from a dispositional affective tone . . . and that 
different degrees of breakdown in transparency and the multiple manners in which it happens 
opens a panoply of affective tonalities: fear, jealousy, anger, anxiety, self-assurance, and so on. 
Accordingly, the word ‘emotion’ is used here in its specific sense: the tonality of the affect that 
accompanies a shift in transparency. Affect, on the other hand, is a broader dispositional orien-
tation which will precondition the emotional tone that may appear” (Varela 1999a: 299–300; 
italics in original).
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pride, delight, jealousy, or grief. Whatever the emotion, it has its own affectively-felt 
dynamic contours. “Coping” removes these dynamics from view. It focuses attention 
on what to do about the break: when “the hammer slips and lands on the finger”, for 
example, “[the] breakdown brings the transparent equipment into view, and a new 
set of action-assessments begins” (ibid: 299). Philosopher Evan Thompson focuses 
on emotion in ways similar to Varela in exploring “the link between emotion and the 
protentional aspects of temporality”. Thus, he too distances himself from a recogni-
tion of the inherently distinctive qualitative dynamics of emotion. Analyzing emo-
tion in terms of “an action tendency or readiness for action” and of “skillful coping” 
(Thompson 2007: 361, 374–375), he validates Varela’s dual leads: on the one hand, 
“Coping is a readiness or dispositional tendency for action in a larger field, an onto-
logical readiness, that is, an expectation as to the way the world will show up” (Varela 
1999b: 132); on the other hand, “The loss of fluidity in coping is never distant from a 
dispositional affective tone” (ibid).
An equally basic and critical oversight exists on the cognitive side and con-
cerns the fact that “transparency acquisition” (ibid; Varela 1999a: 299) is taken for 
granted; it is nowhere recognized as the animate engagement with the world that it is, 
an engagement that has a particular cognitional dynamic. In effect, the very attain-
ment of “transparency”– of familiarity – is nowhere accounted for. It obviously rests 
on animation, on a kinetic-affective-cognitive engagement with the world such that 
learning takes place to begin with, the learning that grounds “transparency”. How 
indeed do “doings” become familiar, so familiar that we are “unreflectively absorbed” 
in them? The answer is clearly rooted in dynamics, in the qualitative tactile-kines-
thetically felt kinetic dynamics of tying a knot, sweeping, brushing one’s teeth, typing, 
playing a Bach prelude, and so on. Familiar dynamics are woven into our bodies and 
are played out along the lines of our bodies; they are kinesthetic/kinetic melodies in 
both a neurological and experiential sense (Luria 1966, 1973).9 In writing one’s name, 
or pulling out weeds, or skipping down stairs, one’s creation and constitution of a 
kinesthetic/kinetic melody are phenomenologically concurrent (see  Sheets-Johnstone 
1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011, Chapter III; 2006: 371ff.). The melody is kinestheti-
cally felt and has a cognitive aura generated in and by the very movement that pro-
duces it at the same time that the very movement that produces it is kinesthetically 
and cognitively constituted as an ongoing qualitative kinetic dynamic. It has, to para-
phrase Stern (Stern 1985; 1993), “vitality cognates” or “vitality cognitive affects”: 
cognitive-kinetic shifts in momentum, for example, and cognitive-kinetic crescendos 
9.  It is worth noting that melodies are to begin with qualitative phenomena, qualitative in 
virtue of their spatio-temporal-energic character. Varela’s description of his “exaltation” at a 
concert is testimony to the fundamentally qualitative character of melody and its qualitatively 
experienced dynamics (Varela & Depraz 2005: 67–68).
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and  diminuendos. Indeed, the qualitative dynamic of a melody might at times be felt 
not only affectively as rushed, attenuated, awkward, abrupt, delicate, jagged, fluent, 
and so on, but cognitively as limpid, transformable, assured, problematic, flawless, 
questionable, and so on. All such felt cognitive-kinetic qualities enter into the overall 
dynamic, the cognitive tonalities of the melody modulating the kinetic patterning 
throughout and the kinetic patterning modulating the cognitive tonalities through-
out. It is surely clear then that familiar dynamics are not embodied; like emotion and 
movement, they are through and through already a bodily phenomenon. They are 
preeminently cognitive forms of animation.
The dynamics of cognition and affectivity involve us in the world, which means 
they animate us and are foundational to our being the animate forms we are, leading 
us to explore, to doubt, to fear, to come to know, to wonder, to delight, and so on. 
J.A. Scott Kelso’s pivotal and extensive work in coordination dynamics readily exem-
plifies not only the foundational import of dynamics, but the dynamic concordance of 
affectivity and cognition – what he later terms their “complementary nature” (Kelso & 
Engstrøm 2006). In the course of wondering how to demonstrate spontaneously self-
organizing dynamic patternings, Kelso came upon spontaneous phase transitions. His 
account warrants full quotation, for his discovery actually reveals two different but 
intertwined spontaneous phase transitions:
It is the winter of 1980 and I’m sitting at my desk in my solitary cubicle late at 
night. Suddenly from the dark recesses of the mind an image from an ad for 
the Yellow Pages crops up: ‘Let your fingers do the walking’. To my amazement 
I was able to create a ‘quadruped’ composed of the index and middle fingers of 
each hand. By alternating the fingers of my hands and synchronizing the middle 
and index fingers between my hands, I was able to generate a ‘gait’ that shifted 
involuntarily to another ‘gait’ when the overall motion was speeded up.… On 
hindsight, the emergence of this idea was itself a kind of phase transition.
 (Kelso 1995: 46)
The idea of letting his fingers do the walking was a spontaneous breakthrough into 
a new mode of thinking about spontaneously self-organized movement. It was, in 
other words, an ideational phase transition that aptly and finely exemplifies  thinking 
in movement (Sheets-Johnstone 1981; 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011; see also 
 Sheets-Johnstone 2004; 2011). The result of such thinking eventuated for Kelso in 
a sophisticated cognitive achievement. At the most fundamental level, cognitive 
achievements are consistently the result of thinking in movement, that is, the result of 
what Husserl and von Helmholtz are both at pains to describe in relation to the inte-
gral connection of movement and perception and what Edelman’s Darwin III experi-
ments exemplify. Synergies of meaningful movement are thus experienced not only 
in everyday animate life, but in ideational pursuits, in highly sophisticated cognitive 
ventures and achievements.
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Affectivity and cognition are dynamic phenomena in a historical sense as well. It is 
readily evident that we mature affectively over the course of our lives – or at least have 
the possibility of maturing affectively over the course of our lives – and that we mature 
cognitively, most significantly in learning our bodies and learning to move ourselves to 
begin with (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). That  affectivity and cog-
nition are naturally developing and evolving phenomena in animate forms of life is not 
commonly acknowledged. Evidence presented in support of the fundamental and all-
embracing reality of animation, however, shows clearly that the realities of morphology 
and dynamics exist not in a privileged human vacuum but across animate life generally.
With respect to the reduction of movement to a motorology and the corollary 
omission of kinesthesia and proprioception, we may briefly and straightaway note 
the ubiquitousness of the reductionist practice. It is not just neurophysiologists who 
write of motor behavior, motor control, motor learning, motor skills, and so on, but 
philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, linguists – people in vir-
tually all academic disciplines, though likely excluding altogether the department of 
dance, which, as Ekman reminds us with respect to the lack of research on emotions 
below the neck, is concerned with flow and quality. In short, motorology is a rampant 
and conceptually pernicious orthodoxy bordering on an unexamined idée fixe. (See 
for example, Donald 2000: 105–109 on “The Primacy of Motor Evolution”; Merleau-
Ponty 1962 on “motor intentionality”). Contrary to being puppets in a motorology 
drama, animate beings in their everyday lives create particular movement dynamics 
and straightaway know kinesthetically and/or proprioceptively that kinetic dynamic 
and its possible variations. Not only a slip of the hammer but a slip of the tongue dis-
closes an unfamiliar dynamic, a lapse in semantic congruency, a lapse in an everyday 
synergy of meaningful movement. Indeed, human tongues are waggable, not in the 
same way that dogs’ tails are waggable – human tongues are waggable in far more 
complex ways, including being mis-waggable and disingenuously waggable – but their 
dynamic patternings, their synergies of meaningful movement, are articulations on 
par with comsigns in the animate world at large: synergies of meaningful movement 
articulate “signs”– including signs in the form of words – that virtually all in the spe-
cies are capable of performing and understanding.
In sum, dynamic congruency and semantic congruency are integrally linked. 
In the context of insisting on reference over meaning, philosopher Hilary Putnam 
exclaimed, “meaning ain’t in the head.” Indeed, it is not in the head: it is in moving 
bodies. Meanings are constituted; they involve a putting together in which “the kin-
estheses” (Husserl e.g. 1970; 1980; 1989) are paramount, and paramount affectively as 
well as perceptually, conceptually as well as environmentally, which is why synergies of 
meaningful movement anchor our animate presence in the world. They are what learn-
ing our bodies and learning to move ourselves are all about. They are what survival is 
all about. They are what social communication is all about.
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Could moving ourselves be the link  
between emotion and consciousness?
Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton
Clark Atlanta University / Nassau Community College
The idea that emotion is an indispensable ingredient of consciousness in all 
modalities is not new. Panksepp and Damasio, for example, show that we can 
gradually eliminate cortical areas without eliminating “core consciousness,” 
whereas knocking out emotional areas renders all types of consciousness 
impossible. However, opponents insist that “emotional” areas also release 
neurotransmitters to the cortex having nothing to do with emotion, and are 
merely necessary in the way that electrical current is necessary for a radio. They 
insist that the radio (the cortex) is what makes the music (consciousness). The 
subcortex is only a way to get power to the radio.
What is needed is a coherent story about the specific way in which emotion 
grounds other conscious states. We suggest that the brain activities involved 
in self-initiated action subserve consciousness, and that these action-initiating 
circuits are crucially dependent on motivational processes. The emotional system 
sets up a three-way connection between motivation, action, and consciousness. To 
elucidate this connection, we focus here on evidence from event related potential 
(ERP) studies, perceptual priming studies (e.g. inattentional blindness), motor 
imagery research, the role of the “mirror neuron” system in understanding others’ 
actions, and electrodes that access action commands in the brains of animals, 
allowing them to move computer cursors with their minds. Thus, we argue that 
consciousness can occur only in beings that can initiate motivated action, that 
action commands create action imagery covertly as well as overtly, and that action 
imagery allows conscious representation of action affordances of objects.
Keywords: Enactive; emotion; consciousness; action; event related potential; 
perceptual priming; inattentional blindness; motor imagery; mirror neurons
1.  Introduction
Much of the recently renewed interest in the relationship between consciousness and 
emotion is inspired by the idea that emotion may play a central role in all conscious-
ness, not just in emotional feeling states themselves. Emotion itself may be defined 
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without reference to consciousness, as a system that motivates the organism to act in 
certain ways (e.g. Damasio 2003; Ellis 2005). Thus emotion could constitute one of 
the crucial ingredients of all conscious processes if the difference between conscious 
and non-conscious information processing hinges on the role of emotion in motivat-
ing action commands in terms of which the action affordances of environmental situ-
ations can be understood (Newton 1982; 1993; 1996; Ellis 1986; 1995; 2005; Ciompi & 
Panksepp 2005). Emotions, while not necessarily conscious per se, would then be one 
of the building blocks of consciousness because consciousness requires (among other 
things) a capacity for motivated action. Digital computers and our current (non- 
living) robots, on this analysis, may process information, yet are not conscious 
because they are not capable of motivated action. At the same time, motivated action 
by itself is not necessarily conscious, for reasons that are complicated and will be 
discussed below.
The thesis that the lack of motivation for action is the reason emotionless entities 
like computers cannot have consciousness brings together two loosely interconnected 
traditions. Some consciousness theorists, dubbed “enactivists” by Varela et al. (1991), 
have emphasized the importance of action as a necessary grounding of conscious-
ness, but without stressing that the difference between action and mere reaction is 
interconnected with the difference that emotion makes. This tradition includes Neis-
ser (1976), James and Eleanor Gibson (see E.J. Gibson 1988), Clark (1997), Gallagher 
(2005), Humphrey (2000), Kelso (1995), Thelen and Smith (1994), Thompson (2007), 
and Varela et al (1991). Others have observed either empirically or phenomenologi-
cally the correlations between emotion and consciousness, but without emphasiz-
ing as much as the enactivists do the capacity for action as the missing element in 
non-conscious information processing (e.g. Cytowic 1993; Damasio 1999; Gendlin 
1962/1998; Giorgi 1973; Panksepp 2000; Watt 1998). Both traditions have roots in 
both phenomenology and neurophysiology, and both are prefigured by Merleau-
Ponty (1941, 1942), who was ahead of his time in integrating phenomenological 
philosophy with neuropsychology.
In our view, both streams are needed. Action cannot be understood without moti-
vation, and the way in which emotion is necessary for consciousness seems to be in 
terms of its role in motivating actions, which then allow for an understanding of the 
action affordances of environmental situations.
To suggest that emotion may be necessary for consciousness in this way is not 
to say that it is a sufficient condition for consciousness. Emotions, actions, and in our 
view even motor imagery can occur on an unconscious basis.
Nor do we mean to imply that the object of consciousness is necessarily the same 
as the object of the accompanying emotion. I may be conscious of the texture of a tree 
bark because I can imagine performing such actions as running my hand over the 
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bark. Paradoxically, I may not be conscious of my motivation to run my hand over the 
bark, or even of my motivation to direct attention to the bark’s texture. And I may also 
be unconscious of the actions that I performed in focusing and redirecting my eyes, 
and all the other nervous system activities that were necessary to focus attention on 
the bark. I may not consciously know whether the motivation was a need to orient 
myself in the environment, or mere curiosity, or a desire to remember the tree under 
which I professed undying love to a high school sweetheart, or any number of other 
motives.
Our thesis, then, is that some system of motivations is necessary for an ability to 
perform actions relative to an object or situation, and that we are conscious of objects 
and situations by (usually subliminally) imagining how we could act relative to them. 
The ability to imagine ourselves acting is the difference between us and a passive-
receiving system such as an electric eye, which merely registers “perceptual” inputs 
and then automatically re-acts to those inputs by causing a door to swing open – all 
without any consciousness. Since we are speaking here of the difference between con-
scious and non-conscious information processing, we shall confine ourselves in this 
paper to states of intentional consciousness – states in which there is some real or 
imaginary object or situation that the consciousness is about or toward which it is 
directed.
In order to say what we have said so far, we have already used the term “under-
standing.” We have posited that motivated action is necessary for consciousness 
because we understand objects and situations by imagining how we could act relative 
to them, and that we understand the actions in turn by imagining ourselves perform-
ing the actions. The sense of “understanding” meant here is the one used by Newton 
(1996) in distinguishing between conscious information processing and the processing 
executed by Searle’s “Chinese room,” which merely contains translations of Chinese 
words and spits out the equivalent words, but without “understanding” Chinese. What 
the Chinese room is doing is similar to what a digital computer can do, and what the 
Chinese room is missing is also something that we conscious beings have that distin-
guishes us from non-conscious information processors. In this sense, “understanding” 
is closely interrelated to conscious as opposed to non-conscious information process-
ing. Understanding is not equivalent to consciousness, but it plays a role in enabling 
consciousness.
The relevant sense of “understanding” here also has to do with the fact that the 
Chinese room cannot act. We understand an action when we can voluntarily execute 
the action, or at least imagine ourselves doing so. Before that, it is not an action, but 
only a random movement of an infant’s limbs as they flail around indiscriminately. To 
understand an action is to be able to form an image of ourselves performing the action 
that is rich enough to serve as a guide to performing the action. We know that this has 
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occurred when we can deliberately repeat an action; infants quickly begin learning 
rudimentary control of some of their actions, notably eye movements, within days of 
birth. Our hypothesis is that we understand objects by (either consciously or uncon-
sciously) imagining actions that we could execute in relation to them. To be sure, this 
leaves room for non-conscious understanding, but in our view the converse is not true: 
there is no intentional consciousness without some kind of understanding (in which 
we include mis-understanding).
The meaning of “understanding” crucially hinges on the meaning of “imagina-
tion.” If understanding an action consists in forming an image of ourselves performing 
the action that is rich enough to serve as a guide to action, and if understanding can 
be non-conscious, then certainly the action imagery that subserves it must also be able 
to occur on an unconscious basis. Moreover, it seems obvious that we do not always 
consciously imagine actions when being conscious of objects. So in what sense does 
imagining an action figure into our consciousness of a (real or imaginary) object or 
situation?
It may initially sound circular to say that imagination of action affordances is 
required for consciousness of objects, because imagining is traditionally thought of as 
already a form of consciousness in its own right, and therefore we might be assuming 
what we purport to be “explaining.” Here again, to avoid circularity requires the notion 
that the imagining presupposed here can be either conscious or unconscious, and it 
will usually be the latter.
Avoiding circularity also requires that to imagine an action is not the same thing 
as imagining an object. We can imagine moving our left foot without imagining some 
object there to kick. So our thesis is that imagining actions, either consciously or non-
consciously, is a more primitive precondition that is required for being conscious of 
an object.
That there is unconscious action imagery seems to be a phenomenological obser-
vation. A musician often imagines moving the fingers to finger an instrument while 
listening to music, and is not conscious of having done so until someone calls attention 
to it. Someone watching a boxing match may unconsciously move the fists, or simply 
imagine doing so. Those who study the mirror neuron system in the brain (e.g. Gallese 
et al. 1996; Gallese et al. 1998) show that, when we observe someone else performing 
an action, parts of the motor cortex activate in the same way as if we were to perform 
the same movements ourselves. And these activations are also similar to the ones that 
occur when we consciously imagine performing an action without overtly doing so 
(Jeannerod 1997). How there can be preconscious or non-conscious action imagery 
is a more complicated question, and to give a full accounting would be beyond our 
scope, but we will offer some remarks on this issue and some further examples as we 
proceed.
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Another crucial problem to be addressed with regard to unconscious action imag-
ery is whether it refers only to physiological processes that somehow are causally and/
or isomorphically related to a “represented” object, or whether it refers to a more fully 
developed process that potentially would be conscious if combined with certain other 
physiological conditions. Action imagery in the former sense would be a very weak 
sense of the term, and would raise innumerable problems about how to define “imag-
ery” without any reference to an intentional meaning. What we are referring to, by 
contrast, is a non-conscious state that is mental and intentional even though it may 
not be conscious. Here again, the musician’s fingering the instrument is more than just 
an isomorphic physical process in the brain; when the musician’s attention is called to 
what she is doing, she at least in some cases acknowledges that the action imagery was 
already there prior to becoming conscious of it.
In this paper, we need to be careful to avoid two additional pitfalls in pursuing the 
understanding of consciousness in terms of motivated action. On the one hand, there 
is the danger of under-emphasizing the role of self-movement, by treating emotion as 
a response to a stimulus input. The danger here is that we lose the distinction between 
action and mere reaction. If the working hypothesis is that conscious and non- 
conscious information processing are different because of the role of motivated action 
in the former, then it is important not to construe motivated action as just another 
type of reaction. In that case, one would wonder why a motivated organism should 
be any more conscious than a sophisticated digital computer or a robot that merely 
receives and transforms information.
On the other hand, there is also a contrary danger. To be sure, we can distinguish 
self-organizing systems from systems that merely are moved by external forces. Living 
organisms are capable of action because of their self-organizing structure. But we must 
also remember that there seem to be self-organizing systems that are capable of gener-
ating the structures of their own movement, as opposed to merely reacting to external 
stimuli, and yet are still not conscious. Traffic patterns, ice crystals, and ecosystems 
are self-organizing, but probably are not conscious. The same may be true for uni-
cellular organisms or organisms lacking nervous systems. So if we make the mistake 
of treating self-organized action as a sufficient rather than only a necessary condition 
for consciousness, then we may end up leaving out the ingredient that distinguishes 
conscious actors from non-conscious self-organizing systems like ecosystems, traffic 
patterns, and amoebas.
A classic example of the first danger – a too-passive account of emotional con-
sciousness, with a resulting over-emphasis on passive receiving of interoceptive infor-
mation – is found in Damasio’s recent work (Damasio 2003). In his description of 
“feelings,” which consist of conscious awareness of emotions, Damasio states boldly, 
“My view is that feelings are functionally distinctive because their essence consists of 
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the thoughts that represent the body involved in a reactive process” (2003: 86). Further 
on, he approvingly credits A.D. Craig with
the idea that we are privy to a sense of the body’s interior, an interoceptive 
sense. In other words, the very same region that both theoretical proposals and 
functional imaging studies relate to feelings turns out to be the recipient of the 
class of signals most likely to represent the content of feelings: signals related to 
pain states; body temperature.... (Damasio 2003: 106)
For Damasio, feeling an emotion is a result of receiving an interoceptive afferent signal 
which, he emphasizes, is not different in principle from receiving an afferent signal 
when perceiving an external object. In both cases, the signal is afferent, which means it 
travels toward the central nervous system from more remote areas – either the body’s 
extremities, or the viscera. In Damasio’s account, the conscious feeling results from 
a receiving of interoceptive information, not from the initiating of an action com-
mand. So in his view, introducing feeling and emotion into the traditional perceptual 
model of consciousness adds no further participation on the part of the subject, who 
still remains a passive recipient of interoceptive signals. This view, then, provides no 
account of how conscious information processing is different from a robot’s passive 
receiving of inputs and then transforming them into behavioral outputs.
On the contrary, the notion that action, rather than passive perception, is the basis 
of consciousness has recently acquired many advocates. But here again, there is a pit-
fall that we believe needs to be avoided in this approach: if we insist that action must 
undergird all conscious states, then, as Aizawa (2006) points out, it becomes mysteri-
ous how a totally paralyzed person can still be completely conscious. The action-based 
account must make room for the imaging of action to play the same kind of role that 
overt action can play. And in our view, this means that an account of representation 
is needed in which the representation of the goals of actions, and also the representa-
tion of imaginary actions themselves can play an important part in making cognitive 
contents conscious.
Furthermore, we need an account of how these imaginary action representations 
can take place on an implicit or unconscious basis when our attention is directed 
outward to the external world. Jeannerod (1997) has been a source of major insights 
about the role of action imagery, and it is commonly accepted that intentional activity 
requires some sort of internal modelling of the external environment (Grush 2004). 
Ironically, those who call themselves enactivists all too often eschew any role for repre-
sentations of the environment, and therefore reject action imagery as opposed to overt 
action in providing a grounding for the understanding of objects.
What is needed to reconcile these two streams of work on consciousness into 
a coherent story, and thus also to avoid the two contrary dangers of either under-
emphasizing the role of action or failing to account for the paralysis example is a story 
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about the specific way in which both emotion and motivated action can ground con-
scious states other than emotional feelings and the imagination of actions – especially 
how they can ground perception and perceptual imagery. We suggest that the brain 
activities involved in self-initiated action are indeed crucial to subserve consciousness, 
but also that these action-initiating circuits are crucially dependent on motivational 
processes grounded in the emotional brain.
We have been assuming up to this point a fundamental difference between action 
and merely complicated systems of reactions. This distinction has often been regarded 
as an outmoded and untenable Medieval teleology. But in recent years there has devel-
oped a scientific account of the difference between action and mere reaction in terms 
of self-organization. To be sure, action in this rudimentary sense does not require rep-
resentation of the goals of action. It requires only that a system’s own self-maintaining 
structures determine the contours of its movement in a way that is robust relative to 
environmental inputs. The system seeks out, appropriates, and replaces the environ-
mental substratum elements that it can use to subserve its own patterns of activity. The 
patterns of activity remain relatively constant while its micro-constituents are continu-
ally replaced. This simpler notion of action, however, is an important component of 
the fuller concept of action.
The fuller kind of action includes not only the ability to move ourselves, but also 
the ability to plan a movement by imaging the action and the achievement of the goals 
of the action. This imaging of an imagined action as a goal is what we mean by suggest-
ing that consciousness must include some kind of representation. Can there be action 
(in this fuller sense) without representation of some kind? We don’t think so.
So on the one hand, we should not conflate these two senses of “action” with each 
other and assert that only self-organization is necessary for consciousness. The cau-
tion at the other extreme, of course, is that we should not reduce emotion to a mere 
re-action, which would under-emphasize the role of action in the more basic sense.
The thrust of our argument is that the motivation to activate motor imagery rela-
tive to environmental situations is an important ingredient in all forms of conscious-
ness, including perceptual consciousness. Because initiating motor processes is an 
action rather than a mere reaction, we can clearly see that the sum total of afferent 
nervous processes – processes in which we receive information which then gets pro-
cessed in a sequence of reactions – can never produce consciousness, not even per-
ceptual consciousness. A significant amount of motivated action-initiating activation 
is needed for consciousness. The modality and qualitative content of the consciousness 
may vary depending on what kind of afferent input is present, but the existence of the 
underlying conscious state is not a result of the afferent inputs.
Those who would like to minimize the role of emotion in consciousness and 
cognition counter this point by insisting that emotion is merely a power switch 
for the cortical processes that actually subserve consciousness (for example, Bickle 
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1998; 2003). But the evidence just mentioned (which will be discussed further 
below) suggests that a significant amount of motivation toward self-organized action 
is necessary for consciousness, whereas afferent input may actually be necessary for 
conscious perceptions only in the way that the perceived object is necessary. That is, 
afferent input affects the what-content of consciousness, but may be as little a part of 
the substrate of the consciousness as the perceptual object itself is. Afference partly 
determines the content of consciousness, but is not sufficient, at least not by itself, to 
serve as the process that does or executes the consciousness. The self-initiated action 
commands, which ground the action imagery needed for consciousness, are an indis-
pensable part of the actual substrates of consciousness.
2.  The enactivist approach and the problem of action imagery
Our proposal can be characterized as a version of “enactivism” (Varela et al. 1991). 
Enactivism holds that cognition is structured by sensorimotor patterns of the inter-
action of an organism with its environment. This claim entails that conceptual 
understanding is rooted in the understanding of our own actions, which in turn are 
understood in virtue of our ability to represent them in sensorimotor images. Thus 
all types of general and abstract concepts are grounded in sensorimotor experience. 
For example, I understand the abstract logical concept of conjunction because I am 
familiar with the activities of collecting, gathering, and grouping physical objects. 
One might say that all cognition is an activity of constructing metaphors for the con-
crete simple actions we performed as infants. The idea of concepts as metaphors was 
explored by Lakoff and Johnson (1987). An earlier version was proposed by the cogni-
tive scientist Margaret Boden, who argued that the angel Gabriel, as a disembodied 
being, could not have learned the abstract terms he used to “talk of abstract matters to 
a human woman” (Boden 1982: 130).
More recent enactivist accounts of cognition and consciousness start from the 
same idea: no explanation of these phenomena can ignore the fact that the subject 
is an embodied being – that our bodies as they interact with the world essentially 
shape our concepts and our experience. The Cartesian notion of the incorporeal 
subject is a dead end. After this recognition, however, accounts diverge. Some take 
the idea so literally as to view the conscious thinking subject as an entity extend-
ing beyond the brain, into the physical environment with which it interacts (Clark 
2008). Others go in the opposite direction, and understand embodiment to refer to 
bodily events at a microscopic level. Noë (2004), for example, grounds conceptual 
understanding in the physical adjustments of the sensory organs when processing 
and focusing on incoming stimuli.
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The earliest pioneers of the current enactivist movement adopted neither 
extreme. Lakoff and Johnson (1987) located the grounding of concepts in overt phys-
ical actions, and identified human conceptual structures with metaphors for basic 
actions and bodily orientations. For example, in multiplying long numbers in the 
head, we imagine ourselves performing the act of moving numbers around, “carrying 
the nine,” etc. Johnson-Laird (1983) pointed to the central role in reasoning of “men-
tal models” based on sensorimotor experiences. Glenberg (1997) and Barsalou (1999) 
took this idea further: all concepts, abstract and concrete, are experientially grounded 
in common bodily activities.
We adopt this middle position in our interpretation of enactivism. Conscious expe-
rience is structured by sensorimotor activity; concepts used in cognition are grounded 
in self-world interactions; and preconceptual grounding of these concepts is found in 
primitive sensorimotor experience. All of these types of mental activity are located 
in the brain, in what Jackendoff (1987) has called, after Marr (1982), “intermediate- 
level” processing. Low-level processing handles local feature detection, and high-level 
processing abstracts away from the details to identify general categories. Intermediate 
level brain events provide the contents of experience. This means that while they may 
be unconscious, they may also be conscious, and either way they may help form the 
content of conscious experience.
We have proposed a model (see also Ellis & Newton 2010) in which early motor 
movements in infancy lay down experiential patterns that become the basis for action 
representations. These, in turn, ground all higher-level concepts. We say that all these 
concepts are based on action images.
2.1  Imagery and representation
It is a tricky matter to use the term “image,” as a noun or as a verb, because traditionally 
it has referred to images in the sensory modalities only, and even more narrowly (and 
more commonly) to just visual images. I can image the sight, and also, independently, 
the taste of an orange lollypop. In the same way I can imagine myself lifting a book 
off a shelf. Note that in this case the image need have no sensory components except 
those of the way the action would feel to me. Action images in this sense are not visual 
images of what I would look like doing the action; they represent the way my body 
would feel when doing it.
We wish to speak of action images in a way that will both allow them to be con-
scious or unconscious, and correspond to the sense of action image in Jeannerod’s 
usage. Jeannerod argues that action images that are initiated in the cerebellum and the 
motor cortices precede implementation of overt actions and that these images repre-
sent what it would feel like for the subject to perform the action. Since many volun-
tary actions are not consciously planned in advance – for example, the complicated 
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individual body movements I must make to walk across the room – some early rep-
resentation of the actions must be formed preconsciously in order to set the activity 
in motion. We prefer to use the terms “images” and “representations” interchangeably 
because, just like sensory images, they are reproductions of earlier experiential traces 
of performing the actions, and they represent the actions in that they can be used 
in planning, initiating, and evaluating the action. These representations are about the 
actions of which they are traces.
We argue that very primitive forms of these images are laid down during the origi-
nal thrashings and flailings of the infant even before voluntary movement becomes 
possible. They are the results not only of sensory input produced by the action, but 
also of the “efferent copy” – the action pattern that the motor system saves in issu-
ing a motor command, and the memory of the emotional valence of the action – was 
it successful or frustrating in trying to reach the toy? The infant produces an initial 
repertoire of these action images, which it can then draw upon, consciously or uncon-
sciously, when it is ready for volitional action. Involuntarily reaching for a desired toy 
provides imagery of all the arm’s motions, as well as of the desirable toy; when more 
control is gained, the infant can select from that repertoire the movements that were 
most successful in attaining the goal.
We also argue that it is in terms of these initial movements that the desired object – 
the toy – is initially understood: as something attainable by means of those actions, in 
particular the individual actions and hand positions appropriate to that toy. The toy, in 
other words, is an early “affordance” in the infant’s environment. That we understand 
objects in terms of the uses we can make of them explains phenomena like “utiliza-
tion behavior” in certain kinds of brain damage: the patient can’t name or describe 
the toothbrush but can grab it and use it appropriately. An important aspect of this 
account of action images is that it can include an explanation of intersubjectivity– our 
ability to share intentions, emotions, etc. with other observed subjects. The “mirror 
neuron” hypothesis (Rizzolati et al. 1996) fits neatly into the theory that action images 
ground the earliest concepts. Mirror neurons allow the subject to recognize and rep-
resent the intentional actions of others by means of the same neural activity that is 
active when the subject herself performs similar actions. These neural groups, when 
activated both by the subject’s proprioceptive sensations when performing an action 
and by the sight of another person performing the same action, provide a grounding 
for the concept of the other as a subject who has the same kinds of intentions and expe-
riences as the viewer. Because these neuronal responses appear to be hardwired and 
not a result of learning, subjects naturally acquire concepts of other persons at an early 
stage in infancy. Thus, as Jordan Zlatev (2007) argues, self-movement does not develop 
in solipsistic isolation, but rather evolves in a context that includes others capable of 
the same intentional actions.
Is the account of action imagery and consciousness that we are proposing circular? 
Many assume that it must be, and hence that we are invoking a regress in claiming that 
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imaging precedes consciousness of objects. It is not circular, because the original for-
mation of the motor image was an automatic product of the infant’s random motion, 
and becomes conscious only when voluntary motivated action becomes possible. 
Eventually, motivated goal-seeking actions require a selection from the stored and 
growing repertoire of motor patterns. In planning a voluntary action, one activates the 
various images and simultaneously inhibits them from triggering actual movements. 
Images are necessary for conscious action because the subject must “try out” the vari-
ous hypothetical experiences that will result from the various choices, and compare 
them with others. Thus the subject is paying attention to the feelings aroused by the 
various images, and this motivated attention brings them to consciousness. Thus 
images themselves are necessary but not sufficient for consciousness.
3.  Emotion, self-organization, and consciousness
The idea that emotion is an indispensable ingredient of consciousness in all modalities 
is not new. Cytowic (1993), Damasio (1999), and many others have shown that we can 
gradually eliminate cortical areas without eliminating “core consciousness,” whereas if we 
knock out emotional areas, all types of consciousness become impossible. Even the recent 
“enactivist” accounts of consciousness – which in our view need to elaborate much fur-
ther on the role of emotion – at least in principle do acknowledge that emotion is insepa-
rable from self-motivated, consciousness-producing activity on the part of the subject.
However, even some who recognize the centrality of emotion insist that the role 
of “emotional” areas is that, in addition to subserving emotion, those same brain areas 
also release neurotransmitters to the cortex that have nothing to do with emotion or 
self-initiated activity, and thus are merely necessary in the way that supplying electrical 
current is necessary for a radio to work. Many of those who stress the importance of 
emotion in consciousness nonetheless seem, in spite of this emphasis, willing to accept 
the view that the radio (the cortex) is still what makes the music (consciousness). They 
grant, or at least allow the possibility, that the subcortex is only a way of getting the 
power to the radio.
This view treats emotional states as mere afferent stimuli on a par with external 
sensory input, although in the case of emotion the afferent “input” comes from the 
viscera of the body rather than from external perception. Such a view therefore tends 
to reduce conscious cognition to a passive reception and subsequent processing of 
exteroceptive and interoceptive data. As we argued in Section 1, Damasio’s recent work 
is an example of this overly-afferent and thus corticocentric view of the consciousness 
of feelings. Such a view does not further an enactivist account of motivated conscious-
ness as tied up with action affordances.
What evidence is there to suggest that action is really necessary to consciousness? 
It is true that we need not overtly perform any action in order to be conscious. Even a 
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totally paralyzed person may sometimes be conscious (Aizawa 2006). Our thesis is not 
that action is necessary for consciousness, but only that possible actions must be imag-
ined by the subject (usually implicitly) in order for that subject to have intentional con-
sciousness of objects. We “understand” objects, in Newton’s (1996) sense, by imagining 
how we might act relative to them. This means that we initiate the brain processes that 
would normally lead to the corresponding overt action, but then we may inhibit the 
action command before the efferent signal reaches as far as the body’s extremities. 
This can happen either deliberately, as when the motor, premotor or supplementary 
motor areas release inhibitory neurotransmitters to the cortex, even while the action 
is still being imagined; or it may happen involuntarily, as when paralysis results from 
a deficiency of efferent pathways.
3.1  Phantom limbs
In cases of “phantom limb” experience, the subject may imagine moving a limb that 
has been amputated. In such cases, even in spite of the lack of the corresponding affer-
ent feedback, the subject still feels as if the limb were actually there. Many researchers 
find evidence for the hypothesis that the sense of the phantom limb movement occurs 
because the movement has been imagined by means of sending the efferent signals to 
the limb. “A preserved sense of agency provided by intact premotor processes translat-
ing intention into action may lead to the vivid feeling of movement in a paralyzed limb, 
similar to kinesthetic illusions in amputees. The interruption of thalamic afferences 
may explain the persistence and stability of the phantom by preventing any correction 
of the mismatch between expected and effective movement” (Staub et al. 2006: 2141). 
“The results suggest that the presence of a phantom limb, whether painful or painless, 
is related to the sympathetic-efferent outflow of cutaneous vasoconstrictor fibres in the 
stump and stump neuromas” (Katz 1992: 811). “Our data suggest that the experience 
of phantom hand movement involves the activation of hand motor commands. We 
propose that preserved hand movement representations re-target the stump muscles 
to express themselves and that when these representations are voluntarily accessible 
they can instruct the remaining muscles to move in such a way as if the limb is still 
there” (Reilly et al. 2006: 2211)
We should remain cautious in proposing implications of phantom limb experi-
ences, because some of the underlying physiological facts remain controversial. Some 
maintain that efferent processes alone can cause the phantom limb experience (Katz 
1992; Levine 2007; Staub et al. 2006), without much in the way of afferent feedback. 
Others (for example Gandevial 2006; Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998) believe that 
phantom limb experience and phantom limb pain (if not phantom limb movement) 
may result from afferent feedback from pathways that grow into the now-defunct 
part of the parietal lobe. Also, the explanation of phantom limb movement may be 
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very different from the explanation of phantom limb pain. The pain per se may result 
from the fact that no afferent feedback is received to cause corollary discharge of the 
electrical potential built up in the efferent system – the system that sends the action 
command outward to the body parts to be moved; or it may be caused by afferent 
feedback that is mismatched to those efferent action commands. But clearly, efferent 
processes play an important if not determinative role in either case. Ramachandran 
(see Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998), even though he believes that afferent processes 
play a role in phantom limb pain, still emphasizes that the pain involves a mismatch 
between efferent signals and afferent feedback.1
What the phantom limb experience means for our purposes – especially the expe-
rience of phantom limb movement – is that efferent processes can play a crucial role 
in creating our conscious experiences. The phantom limb movement studies even 
suggest that, at least in some cases, we may sometimes consciously experience things 
primarily by means of efferent processes. We shall not argue this stronger claim here, 
because it is sufficient for our purposes to note that efferent processes are an important 
part of conscious experiences. Just by trying to move a phantom limb, the subject may 
consciously feel as if the limb were there. Other examples below will make a similar 
point about conscious experiences in other modalities – vision, for example.
It is also important for our purposes to note that in the case of phantom limb move-
ment consciousness can occur not because the subject actually does move anything, but 
because the subject is imagining moving. This imagining of self-movement is subserved 
by brain processes similar to those in actual movement, all the way up to the point 
where the process may be interrupted, either by a deliberate inhibition coming from the 
frontal cortex, or a severing or sedating of nerves in the efferent pathway. So movement 
is by no means necessary for consciousness, as paralyzed patients show, but efferent 
processes that gear us up to imagine moving are an important part of understanding 
the action affordances of objects, and therefore play a role in our consciousness of them.
3.2  Inattentional blindness and utilization behavior
A similar conclusion is suggested with regard to visual consciousness if we carefully 
consider the Mack and Rock (1998) “inattentional blindness” findings. As long as the 
1.  This is the basis of one of Ramachandran’s treatment methods for phantom limb pain. The 
pain can be reduced by artificially supplying some afferent feedback – for example, by having 
the subject “move” the missing phantom limb simultaneously with the remaining real one, 
and rigging mirrors so that the subject can “see” the limb moving, and thus receive afferent 
feedback through the visual system that is a better match for the efferent signals being sent 
through the motor system. Ramachandran believes that this procedure reduces the imbalance 
between the efferent action command and the afferent feedback from it.
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subject’s attention is pre-occupied, the subject fails to see a stimulus even when it is 
presented at or near the center of the visual field for up to 250 ms. Mack and Rock do 
not discuss the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying their behavioral observa-
tions, but we know from other sources (e.g. Aurell 1989) that 250 ms. is about how 
long it takes for the occipital area to be fully activated and to perform all the trans-
formative functions on the incoming afferent signal. This means that, in the case of 
vision, all afferent processes can take place without any visual consciousness. I.e. all 
the relevant afferent information has been received within the first 250 ms., yet there 
is still no consciousness of the object, nor any conscious memory of it afterward. 
Consciousness of an unexpected object does not occur until a P300 electrical poten-
tial is observed in the parietal area. (In event related potential studies, the numbers, 
e.g.“P300,” refer to the number of milliseconds after presentation of the stimulus.) So 
the parietal P300 occurs at the point when efferent activities affecting the parietal area 
come into play.
When we say “efferent,” we mean nervous activity that normally would lead 
to some bodily movement, unless inhibited to form action imagery. Those effer-
ent activities in turn seem to be preceded by an action-initiating circuit that in 
normal subjects interconnects the cerebellum with the thalamus and hypothala-
mus (Haines et al. 1997), beginning as early as 18 ms. after presentation of the 
stimulus, and then involving frontal areas, which are activated as early as 100 ms. 
(Damasio et al. 2000).
In event related potential studies, during the first 200–250 ms. of perceptual pro-
cessing, there is a spreading of activation that is essentially afferent – i.e. a signal that 
results from receiving and transformation of incoming perceptual information. The 
afferent activity spreads from the stimulation of the optic nerve to transmission of 
signals to the thalamus, and from there to the occipital lobe. The studies show that 
all of these afferent processes can reach their full activation with no consciousness 
of the object. The occipital lobe has performed all its duties of interpreting the lines, 
shapes and colors of the object, but with no consciousness of the object. Only when 
a P300 event related potential occurs in the area of the parietal lobe does conscious-
ness of the object result. Moreover, this parietal P300 does not occur merely as a result 
of spreading of activation from the occipital lobe. The speed at which neural signals 
travel would allow spreading of activation to occur much faster than the 100 ms. delay 
from occipital to parietal activation. The story must involve the fact that early hippo-
campal (18 ms) and cerebellar (20 ms.) activation (Woodruff-Pak 1997) – both brain 
areas involved in developing motivated action routines – then lead to a 100 ms. frontal 
ERP (Damasio et al. 2000). The frontal ERP would correspond to the inhibition of an 
action command. So it is very likely that brain processes associated with action com-
mands – the early cerebellar and hippocampal activities – activate the P300 parietal 
ERP, and when this parietal activity resonates with occipital activity, that is when we 
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become conscious of the object, because we have now understood some of the object’s 
action affordances, even though we have not overtly executed an action.
The implication, then, is that even afferent visual processing does not become 
conscious until it is combined with motoric and efference action-initiating processes 
that correspond with the motivated imagining of how we could interact with the object 
through bodily movement. Granted, this motor imagery occurs at a minimally con-
scious or even unconscious level. But it is still an intentional process in the sense that it 
potentially could be available to our conscious awareness in certain kinds of reflection, 
and normally occurs just beneath the surface. And it is fine-tuned to our experience, 
as when we find that complicated calculations of social situations have unconsciously 
affected the way we felt like acting, all at an unconscious or pre-conscious level. The 
implicit motor imagery is present even though we do not overtly perform the corre-
sponding actions, in the same way that a musician might minimally imagine fingering 
a heard melody on an imaginary musical instrument, without even being aware of 
doing so.
If this hypothesis is true – if we are conscious of objects by imagining how we 
could interact with them, and if we do so by forming action commands which then are 
inhibited to prevent overt action – then we might reasonably ask what would happen 
with a subject whose frontal inhibitory processes had been prevented by brain trauma. 
There are indeed such cases. In a rare behavioral disorder called “utilization behav-
ior,” the subject often becomes unable to perceive objects without actually performing 
overt actions relative to them (see L’hermitte 1986). For example, if the subject sees the 
doctor’s coffee cup, he automatically picks it up and tries to drink (even if the cup is 
empty). If the subject walks into someone else’s bedroom, he automatically lies down 
on the bed. Whatever typical action comes to mind relative to the particular object, the 
subject overtly does the action.
What makes the utilization behavior patient different from the norm is a deficiency 
of frontal inhibitory activity, just the kind of activity that Jeannerod (1997) shows is 
needed to image an action without performing it overtly. If the difference between nor-
mal and utilization behavior subjects hinges on the deficiency of the frontal inhibitory 
circuits needed to inhibit action commands, this fact would be highly consistent with 
the hypothesis that normal subjects, like utilization behavior patients, do form motor 
imaging when we see objects, although pre-consciously. The difference seems to be that, 
unlike utilization behavior patients, we are able to imagine the actions without actually 
going through with them, thanks to our normal frontal inhibitory activity.
If utilization behavior is consistently found to be caused by a deficiency of inhibi-
tory neurotransmitters coming from the frontal brain areas, then it is reasonable to 
suppose that, in normal experience, we understand objects by imagining ourselves 
acting upon them or interacting with them, while at the same time we inhibit those 
action commands frontally, so that the overt action does not actually occur. In the case 
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where the frontal inhibitory process is deficient, the subject is unable to inhibit the 
imagined action, and as a result goes through with it.
3.3  Libet’s paradox
Our hypothesis also explains the long-debated Libet “readiness potential” paradox 
(see Libet 1999). The paradox is that the brain activity that presumably subserves an 
action is observable .5 second before the willed action occurs, whereas the subject is 
aware of the choice to perform the action only .1 second before the action occurs. Libet 
assumes that this means that the actual choice occurs unconsciously .4 second before 
we consciously will it. The paradox, then, is that we feel that we are deciding to do an 
action that our brains had already decided to do .4 seconds earlier.
The idea that action requires a preliminary imaging of the action that is to be 
decided upon explains this paradox. If the brain activity observed by Libet corre-
sponds to the initiation of an action, then it also makes sense that this brain activity 
would correspond to the preliminary imagining of the action – i.e. the motor imagery 
of ourselves doing the action, even in the absence of the overt action. Typically, when 
we are deliberately deciding whether or not to do an action, we first form a motor 
image of the action as a part of the deliberative process. Part of the question we form to 
ourselves has to do with what it would be like to perform that action. So we must image 
the action, in the sense of Jeannerod’s motor imagery, in order to decide whether to 
overtly do the action. And this means that the brain processes that would subserve the 
overt action have already begun, even before we have actually decided to go through 
with the action. The initiation of the action command is a part of the process of imag-
ining ourselves doing the action, and normally we do this before we decide to actually 
do the action. The brain activity that subserves an imagined action is very similar to 
the brain activity that subserves the corresponding overt action. The difference is that, 
in normal deliberate actions, the point when we decide to go through with the imag-
ined action is the point when the frontal inhibitory processes are damped down, and 
the action command, which was already underway, is allowed to lead to overt action. 
This frontal inhibitory process is just what the victims of the utilization behavior syn-
drome are unable to perform, because of frontal brain trauma or chemical imbalance 
of frontal inhibitory neurotransmitters. (For further discussion of this point, see Ellis 
2005, esp. 142–149).
3.4  Experiments with monkeys
The same conclusion is implied by the behavior of Donoghue’s monkeys (see Donoghue 
2002), who are taught to play a computer game, and then electrodes pick up the electri-
cal signal from the brain activity that subserves the monkey’s action command to 
facilitate moving its hand to move the joy stick. Now the monkey can merely think 
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of moving its hand, and the computer cursor moves just as it would if the monkey had 
actually moved its hand. Moreover, as the experiment proceeds for a day or two more, 
the monkey gradually gets away from the need to focus attention on its hand move-
ments, or even imagining the hand movements, and seems entirely focused on the 
computer screen itself. I.e. as Donoghue describes it, there is a gradual transition from 
conscious motor behavior to motor imagery, in the sense of the monkey’s moving its 
own hand and then only imagining doing so, to a final situation in which the monkey 
no longer even needs to think about its hand at all, but only focuses on the results 
produced on the computer cursor that is being moved. As described by Donoghue, 
the monkey seems only to be wanting the computer cursor to move. More recently, 
the same technique has been used to electrically pick up the monkey’s brain signals to 
move a robotic arm (Velliste et al. 2008.)
Such an experiment would not be possible if not for the fact that the brain activ-
ity that subserves action imagery – the image the monkey forms of what it would be 
like to move its hand – were not very similar to the brain activity that subserves the 
corresponding overt action. The difference is that in action imagery the same action 
command is orchestrated just as it would be for an overt action, but then it is frontally 
inhibited. So when Donoghue’s electrodes pick up on the signal of the action image, 
they are picking up the same signal as when the monkey was overtly executing the 
action. This further confirms Jeannerod’s account of action imagery, in which frontal 
inhibition is the extra ingredient that makes the difference between overtly executing 
an action and merely imagining the same action. And, at least in this case, it also sug-
gests that the Jeannerod neurophysiological story corresponds to an unconscious yet 
intentional and mental activity, because of the gradual transition from overt to merely 
imagined action, while the same motor and parietal area activity is maintained across 
this transition. In the case of Donoghue’s monkeys, the imagining of the action then 
becomes sedimented, and the monkey’s conscious attention is directed only to the cur-
sor on the computer screen (or to the movement of the robotic arm in the Velliste et 
al. study). But in order to be conscious of what it wants the cursor (or the robotic arm) 
to do, the monkey is still implicitly imaging the moving of its hand, as suggested by 
the persistence of motor and parietal area activity similar to what was present in overt 
action. The movement of the cursor seems to be understood relative to the cursor’s 
action affordances for the monkey. And implicitly imagining the action affordance 
corresponds to much of the same brain activity as explicitly imagining it, which in 
turn overlaps with the brain activity that would be needed to overtly move the mon-
key’s hand. This also shows that there often can be implicit action imagery, even when 
conscious attention is directed to the external object.
The upshot of all these observations is that afferent processing of input by itself is 
insufficient for consciousness, and that action-initiating activity is needed to trigger 
consciousness of sensory stimuli.
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3.5  Action presupposes motivation
As we have argued, actions need to be motivated by something. We first want our 
hand to move, and as a result it does move. Although it is beyond our scope here to 
go into detail (see Ellis 2005; Ellis & Newton 2010), emotional processes that play a 
role in gearing us up for imagined actions can help us understand why this is the case. 
Panksepp (1998, 2000), for example, argues that mammalian emotional tendencies 
like play, exploration, nurturance, bonding, and what he calls “seeking” system (which 
includes primarily an endogenous “exploratory” drive) are the same circuits that initi-
ate action. Their motivational thrust is primarily to gear the animal up for action. If we 
combine Panksepp’s emotion-action-initiating hypothesis with Jeannerod’s work on 
motor imagery, we can make the argument that the having of emotions is inseparable 
from an intentional (even if pre-conscious) understanding of some of the action affor-
dances of the environment. As Jeannerod shows, when the elaborated action tenden-
cies are inhibited, that is when we get action imagery rather than overt action. This 
connection provides further support for the view that, if understanding the environ-
ment is a way of assessing its possible action affordances, then emotional activations 
are an important element in this process.
Emotional activation is not dependent on specific inputs, but just the opposite is 
true: emotional activation is necessary for consciousness of inputs. Panksepp provides 
voluminous evidence that many emotional systems in mammals, such as the explor-
atory system, do not need to be reinforced in order to be activated. They are innately 
motivated and are independent of each other. I.e. we do not need to reinforce explo-
ration with a consummatory reward; animals will explore regardless of whether the 
 consummatory motives are reinforced by their exploratory behavior or not. Moreover, 
there is now ample evidence against the long-suspect implication of traditional behav-
iorism that, if an animal were completely satiated, it would not be motivated to do 
anything. Instead, each of the innate emotional systems in the brain has its own self-
energizing mechanisms making use of neurotransmitters triggered by brain-stem acti-
vation. This endogenously self-energizing view of motivation therefore offers resources 
not only to solve problems of mental causation and volition, but also more generally 
contributes to an understanding of what makes conscious processes conscious. Con-
sciousness of the environment involves (usually unconscious) intentions to act toward 
it, not merely receiving and transforming inputs.
In enactivist approaches to consciousness, the difference between action and 
passive reaction suggested by these data can be understood scientifically via self-
organization theory (e.g. Kauffman 1993). Complex systems maintain patterns 
of activity across replacements of physical components used to enact the pattern. 
Panksepp’s endogenous non-consummatory behaviors such as “seeking” control our 
attention, curiosity and exploration, and are motivated by the desire to engage in pat-
terns of activity consistent with a complex system’s tendencies to maintain optimal 
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homeostasis and complexity. The efferent and pre-efferent anticipatory gearing up for 
possible action relative to environmental affordances is at least an important part of 
the substrate of consciousness, rather than only the afferent receiving of inputs.
4.   Motivated action is a necessary component,  
but what about representation?
Many contemporary “enactivists” try to construe our intentional activities solely in 
terms of overt action. While this approach has the advantage that it avoids thinking 
of subcortical emotional contributions merely as “triggers” for cortical activity, it also 
should avoid a demand for overt action to carry more weight than it really can. One 
way in which this problem occurs is by trying to minimize the role of representation. 
Many enactivists see a stress on action as a way of sidestepping the difficult issue of 
representation. For example, Hutto (2006) wants to avoid information-theoretic or 
computationalist accounts by denying that representations (which traditionally entail 
conceptual interpretation) are part of the enactivist taxonomy:
The crux is that our primary modes of worldly and social responding do not 
involve the manipulation of representations or any inferential thought. ... On the 
contrary, we are intentionally directed at the intentional and affective attitudes 
of others (that is what we are meant to target) by means of natural signs – the 
expressions of others. (Hutto 2006: 165–166) 
The danger with this sort of attempt to avoid the errors of computationalist models is 
that it threatens to undermine the very enactivist approach Hutto supports. As we have 
argued, in any self-initiated action, the goal of the action must be represented as an 
essential component of the action program itself. Richard Menary, in his introduction 
to the volume on Hutto’s work just quoted, makes it clear that when Hutto and some 
other enactivists reject representation, they are thinking of representations purely as 
interpretations of afferent data. Hutto and Menary are right to be wary of these. But 
representations of internal goals as such are necessary to the guidance and comple-
tion of any self-initiated action. The motor programs essential to the planning and 
execution of any voluntary action include representations of the end-state, to which 
sensorimotor feedback from the completed action can be compared. These representa-
tions are sent as corollary discharge to the cerebellum and elsewhere when the action 
is initiated, and are held online for the duration of the activity itself.
The term “representation” has been the source of confusion in much recent lit-
erature. Enactivists rightly want to reject computationalist approaches that treat men-
tal representations as meaningless symbols that map onto the external world and are 
manipulated by mental calculators. But if they do so by denying a role for representa-
tions in any sense of the term, enactivism will fail. As we have argued, action imagery 
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that represents a planned action is central to voluntary motor activity (Jeannerod 1997). 
We have to imagine doing an action in the process of deciding whether or not to do it, 
and this involves imagery of what it will feel like to do the action: its intermediate stages 
and its conclusion. Entertaining such representations is not calculating over meaning-
less symbols; it is incorporating into cognition our interactions with the world. (For 
more detailed discussion of enactive accounts of representation, see Newton 2003).
It is widely agreed that the human cortex evolved in part to meet the need for 
complex and long-term action planning. Such planning, whether it involves prepar-
ing a meal or setting a distant educational goal, requires the weighing, over time, of a 
full range of alternatives, from minute-to-minute details of the process to anticipatory 
specification of the desired end state. This planning must be done in the head; one can-
not try out these possibilities in the real world.
Planning and evaluating actions requires motor imagery, and we have argued 
that this motor imagery is not merely a non-intentional physiological event, but, even 
when it occurs only pre-consciously, it can still be an intentional one. In our view, 
entertaining motor imagery is the activity of representing bodily actions and interac-
tions with the external world.
The mental process of representing is not simply a matter of encoding signals 
from the external world, although these may be incorporated into the representing 
process. Primarily, representations are mental models of the subject’s embodied activi-
ties, including the activity of sensorimotor experience. There is no question here of 
“accuracy” or “misrepresentation” of this imagery. The imagery is an essential part of 
a process and does its job as part of that process. If mistakes are made, these involve 
mismatches between a subject’s goals and the outcome of the attempt to attain the 
goal, not between a representation and a separate and distinct object it is intended 
to represent. Thus the view of representations as intrinsically meaningless symbols, 
manipulated syntactically in order to encode information about the external world, is 
completely inappropriate in the context of enactivism.
5.  Conclusion
We have argued not only that the neurophysiological substrates of emotionally moti-
vated action commands are among the primary “neural correlate of consciousness,” 
but also that in fleshing out this view, we should be careful not to make one of two 
opposite mistakes. We should take caution not to under-emphasize action by having a 
view of emotion that makes the emotions that motivate “actions” themselves too reac-
tive. On the other hand, we should be careful not to over-emphasize action by imply-
ing that any system that can act is conscious. That is where we believe it is necessary 
to bring in a kind of “representation” in which not only action, but also action imagery 
that represents the goal of an action is important.
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With regard to the role of the representation of the goal of an action: To be clear, 
we are not saying that some end-state out in the world must be represented. If we are 
sitting with our feet dangling in a swimming pool and moving them back and forth, 
the goal that we are representing may be simply to move the foot a certain distance in 
a certain direction. Or in some cases the goal could be just to move the foot in such a 
way that moving it feels a certain way that we can remember and plan to repeat. So we 
are not asserting that the “goal” is necessarily some outcome that would occur outside 
of our own bodies. But with that caveat, we can say that action requires representing 
what we want to do in some way.
In a very different kind of example, when we hit a baseball, we are not really rep-
resenting a specific trajectory of movement for either the bat or our arms. What we 
represent in this case is that the ball (which also is represented) and the bat (which is 
not yet consciously represented) should make contact. In this case, what we represent 
is something external, even almost to the exclusion of representing anything within 
the body. Our attention is directed to something outside of ourselves, even as we plan 
and execute the action.
There can also be borderline cases between action and reaction. The classic exam-
ple might be when improvising jazz. In some instances, we may have the idea of what 
we want a phrase to sound like before we execute it. Other times, we may merely auto-
matically re-act, with a habituated pattern of finger movement. And in many cases, 
we may rapidly alternate between those two modes of playing. In effect, we alternate 
between “acting” and “merely reacting.”
So when we say that consciousness can occur only in beings that act, we are not 
saying that these active beings must always be acting in the fullest sense. However, they 
are always acting in the more primitive sense we discussed above – that is, in the sense 
of self-organization that is implicitly oriented toward goals needed for maintaining the 
self-organizational system. In living beings, this involves seeking out and appropriat-
ing material components (such as food) that can be used to maintain the system. That 
is, living self-organizing systems are always seeking homeostasis at a suitable energy 
level and any other activities required to enter or sustain their preferred patterns of 
activity. Understanding how we could act in relation to the environment, as opposed 
to merely re-act to it, is therefore a crucial requirement for an organism to be capable 
of consciousness. And this presupposes that the organism has emotion as well.
References
Aurell, C.G. (1989). Man’s triune conscious mind. Percept Mot Skills, 68, 747–754.
Aizawa, K. (2006). Paralysis and the enactive theory of perception. In Toward a science of 
consciousness 2006, Abstract no. 3. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Barsalou, L.W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–660.
Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: the new wave. Boston: MIT Press.
78 Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton
Bickle, J. (2003). Philosophy and neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account. Berlin: Springer.
Boden, M. (1982). Implications of language studies for human nature. In T.W. Simon & 
R.J. Scholes (Eds.), Language, mind, and brain. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Ciompi, L., & J. Panksepp, (2005). Energetic effects of emotions on cognitions: complementary 
psychobiological and psychosocial findings. In R. Ellis & N. Newton (Eds.), Consciousness & 
emotion: agency, conscious choice, and selective perception (23–56). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins.
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: putting brain, body and world together again. Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Cytowic, R. (1993). The man who tasted shapes. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza. New York: Harcourt.
Damasio, A.R., T.J. Grabowski, A. Bechara, H. Damasio, L.L. Ponto, & J. Parvizi (2000). 
Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions. 
Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1049–1056.
Donoghue, J.P. (2002). Connecting cortex to machines: recent advances in brain interface. 
Nature Neuroscience Supplement 5 (November 2002), 1085–1088.
Ellis, R.D. (1986). An ontology of consciousness. Dordrecht: Kluwer/Martinus Nijhoff.
Ellis, R.D. (1995). Questioning consciousness: the interplay of imagery, cognition and emotion in 
the human brain. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Ellis, R.D. (2005). Curious emotions: roots of consciousness and personality in motivated action. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Ellis, R.D., & N. Newton (2010). How the mind uses the brain. Chicago: Open Court.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallese, V., L. Fadiga, L. Fogassi, & G. Rizzolatti (1996). Action recognition in the premotor 
cortex. Brain, 119, 593–609.
Gallese, V., & A. Goldman. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mindreading. 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 2, 493–501.
Gandevial, S., J.L. Smith, M. Crawford, U. Proske, & J.L. Taylor. (2006). Motor commands con-
tribute to human position sense. J. Physiol., 571, 3, 703–710.
Gendlin, E. (1962/1998). Experiencing and the creation of meaning. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan.
Gibson, E.J. (1988). Exploratory behavior in the development of perceiving, acting, and the 
acquiring of knowledge. Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 1–41.
Giorgi, A. (1973). Phenomenology and experimental psychology. In A. Giorgi, W. Fischer & 
R. von Eckartsberg (Eds.), Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology, Vol. I. (6–29) 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press/Humanities Press.
Glenberg, A.M. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 1, 1–55.
Grush, R. (2004). The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 377–442.
Haines, D., E. Dietrich, G.A. Mihailoff, & E.F. McDonald. (1997). Cerebellar-hypothalamic axis: 
Basic circuits and clinical observations. In J. Schmahmann (Ed.), The cerebellum and cognition 
(84–110). New York: Academic Press.
Humphrey, N. (2000). How to solve the mind-body problem, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 
5–20.
Hutto, D. (2006). Embodied expectations and extended possibilities: Reply to Goldie. In R. Menary 
(Ed.). Radical enactivism. Amsterdam/Philadelplhia: John Benjamins.
 Could moving ourselves be the link between emotion and consciousness? 79
Jackendoff, R. (1987). Consciousness and the computational mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Jeannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Blackwell.
Johnson-Laird, P. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Katz, J. (1992). Psychophysical correlates of phantom limb experience. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 55, 811–821.
Kauffman, S. (1993). The origins of order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelso, J.A. (1995). Dynamic patterns: the self-organization of brain and behavior. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT/Bradford.
Lakoff, G., & M. Johnson (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Levine, D.L. (2007). Persistent hand movement representations in the brains of amputees. Brain, 
130, 2.
L’hermitte, F., B. Pillon, & M. Serdaru. (1986). Human autonomy and the frontal lobes. Part I: 
Imitation and utilization behavior: a neuropsychological study of 75 patients. Annals of 
Neurology, 19, 326–34.
Libet, B. (1999). Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 47–58.
Mack, A., & I. Rock. (1998). Inattentional blindness. Cambridge: MIT/Bradford.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. New York: Freeman.
Menary, R., Ed. (2006). Radical enactivism: focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. Amster-
dam/Philadelplhia: John Benjamins.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1941/1962). Phenomenology of perception, Colin Smith trans. New York: 
Humanities Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1942/1963). The Structure of behavior. Boston: Beacon.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: Freeman.
Newton, N. (1982). Experience and imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 20, 475–487.
Newton, N. (1993). The sensorimotor theory of cognition. Pragmatics & Cognition, 1, 267–305.
Newton, N. (1996). Foundations of understanding. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Newton, N. (2003). Representation in theories of embodied cognition. In S. Gallagher & 
N. Depraz (Eds.), Embodiment in phenomenology and cognitive science (181–193), Special 
Issue of Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies, 7, 1.
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Boston: MIT Press.
Panksepp. J. (1998) Affective neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Panksepp, J. (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: 
implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind 
science. Consciousness & Emotion, 1, 17–56.
Ramachandran, V.S. & S. Blakeslee (1998). Phantoms in the brain: probing the mysteries of the 
human mind. New York: William Morrow.
Reilly, T., C. Mercier, M.H. Schieber, & A. Sirigu1. (2006). Persistent hand motor commands in 
the amputee’s brain. Brain, 129, 8, 2211–2223.
Rizzolati, G., L. Fatiga, V. Gallese, & L. Fogassi. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of 
motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131–141.
Staub, F., J. Bogousslavsky, P. Maeder, M. Maeder-Ingvar, E. Fornari, J. Ghika, F. Vingerhoets, & 
G. Assal. (2006). Intentional motor phantom limb syndrome. Neurology, 67, 2140–2146.
Thelen, E., & L. Smith. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and 
action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Bradford.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Boston: 
Harvard University Press.
80 Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton
Varela, F., E. Thompson & E. Rosch. (1991/1993). The embodied mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Velliste, M., S. Perel, M.C. Spalding, A.S. Whitford, & A.B. Schwartz. (2008). Cortical control of 
a prosthetic arm for self-feeding. Nature.
Watt, D. (1998). Affect and the “hard problem”: Neurodevelopmental and corticolimbic network 
issues, Consciousness research abstracts: toward a science of consciousness, Tucson 1998 (91–92). 
Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Woodruff-Pak, D.S. (1997). Classical conditioning. In J. Schmahmann (Ed.), The cerebellum and 
cognition (342–366). New York: Academic Press.
Zlatev, J. (2007). Intersubjectivity, mimetic schema, and the emergence of language, Intellectica, 
2–3, 46–47, 123–152.




[T]he eye is part of a dual organ, one of a pair of 
mobile eyes, and they are set in a head that can 
turn, attached to a body that can move from place 
to place. (Gibson 1986: 53)
In this chapter, I argue for two claims. First, creatures that cannot understand 
themselves as potentially moving or being moved cannot have visual experiences 
of three-dimensional, spatial objects “out there” in the world beyond their skin. 
Whilst we might be unable to detect an outright contradiction in the notion 
of creatures without such understanding enjoying perceptual experiences 
indiscriminable from ours, it is, as I will attempt to show in the first part of the 
chapter, highly doubtful whether we can make full sense of their experience as an 
experience of three-dimensional objects “out there” in space. Second, we should 
nevertheless not endorse what Noë terms an “enactive” account of perception. In 
other words, the idea that a creature cannot have visual experiences of three-
dimensional objects without experiencing itself (or having experienced itself) as 
actively moving does not stand up to closer scrutiny.
Keywords: perception; movement; perceptual presence; enactivism; Noë; Husserl
1.   Introduction
Nobody seriously wants to contest the statements that I have chosen as a motto for 
this chapter. Certainly all parties to the debate I want to consider in the following 
pages agree that Gibson’s claims are correct as regards the vast majority of humans 
and animals. The dispute turns on whether there is any essential or necessary connec-
tion between self-movement and the capacity for visual perception. Phenomenologists 
such as Husserl (1997[1907]) and Merleau-Ponty (1962 [1945]),1 and, more recently, 
1.  For two other (more recent) examples, see Sheets-Johnstone (1999: Chapters 3–5) and 
Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: Chapter 5).
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defenders of the so-called “enactive” approach to perception such as Alva Noë (2004), 
have argued that there is.2 These philosophers have all held that there is a sense in 
which an ability to move is a precondition for the ability to perceive a stable world of 
three-dimensional, spatial objects. Others, however, have disputed this claim. They 
have maintained that whereas it might be the case that all seeing animals that inhabit 
the planet Earth – or indeed all seeing creatures throughout the Universe – are able 
to move themselves, this, if true, is merely a contingent fact. There could be immobile 
creatures that were endowed with visual perceptions just like ours. There is, then, no 
essential link between self-movement and visual perception. Such claims have not only 
been advanced outside the phenomenological tradition (e.g. in G. Strawson 1994). 
Recently, in fact, philosophers otherwise sympathetic to Husserl’s take on perception, 
Peter Poellner and A.D. Smith, have argued that he ought to have abandoned the  thesis 
of an essential link between visual perception and self-movement.3
I shall argue for two claims. First, creatures that cannot understand themselves 
as potentially moving or being moved cannot have visual experiences of three-
dimensional, spatial objects “out there” in the world beyond their skin.4 My argument 
depends, in part, on a clarification of the point of a phenomenological elucidation 
of visual perception. I shall suggest that phenomenology attempts to make sense of 
perceptual experience “from within”. Whilst we might be unable to detect an out-
right contradiction in the notion of such “completely motionless creatures” enjoying 
perceptual experiences indiscriminable from ours, it is, as I will attempt to show, 
highly doubtful whether we can make full sense of their experience as an experience 
of three-dimensional objects “out there” in space.
My second main claim, however, is that we should nevertheless not endorse what 
Noë terms an “enactive” account of perception. In other words, the idea that a creature 
2.  For present purposes an “enactivist” is someone who holds that “perceiving is a way of 
acting” (Noë 2004: 1), that is, that the ability to have perceptual experiences of spatiotemporal 
objects essentially depends on skilful, active movement. Could an enactivist, thus defined, 
also be a phenomenologist? An anonymous reviewer thinks not, but I disagree. Enactivism, 
as I understand it here, is a thesis about perception. Phenomenology, on the other hand, is 
a philosophical tradition loosely held together by particular methodological commitment – 
the commitment to let the phenomena, faithfully described, decide the fate of philosophical 
theory. There is no reason in principle why an enactivist could not accept that methodological 
commitment. In fact, I think Noë fits the bill. Perhaps Husserl does as well; he comes close, at 
any rate, to adopting the enactivist thesis.
3.  For discussions of themes closely related to the topic of this chapter, see Ellis & Newton’s 
and Sheets-Johnstone’s contributions to the present volume.
4.  I shall sometimes use the concept of “transcendence” to capture this notion of the 
perceived world as “external” to us.
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cannot have the sort of understanding that the first part of my chapter argues is essen-
tial to visual experiences of three-dimensional objects without experiencing itself (or 
having experienced itself) as actively moving – this idea does not stand up to closer 
scrutiny. It is highly plausible, in my view, that the understanding in question must be 
derived from actual experiences of self-movement. But it is not obvious that among 
these experiences there must be experiences of active, self-initiated and self-controlled 
movement.
The former argument will be developed in the first part of this chapter. In the 
much shorter second part, I briefly, and somewhat tentatively, sketch my reservations 
vis-à-vis the “enactive” account of perceptual experience.
2.  The importance of self-movement
2.1  Making fully intelligible
The aim of Husserlian so-called “constitutive” or “transcendental” phenomenology is 
to make the life-world intelligible. More precisely, the task is to uncover the experien-
tial structures that permit the world to be manifested or given to a subject. The aim of 
making the world transcendentally intelligible in this way should not be confused with 
the idealist project of reducing the world to subjective or mental structures. As Husserl 
explains:
In advance there is the world, ever pregiven and undoubted in ontic certainty 
and self-verification. […] There can be no stronger realism than this, if by this 
word nothing more is meant than: “I am certain of being a human being who 
lives in this world, etc. and I doubt it not in the least.” But the great problem is 
precisely to understand what is here so “obvious.” The method now requires that 
the ego, beginning with its concrete world-phenomenon, systematically inquire 
back, and thereby become acquainted with itself, the transcendental ego, in its 
concreteness, in the system of its constitutive levels and its incredibly intricate 
[patterns of] validity-founding. At the onset of the epoché the ego is given 
apodictically, but as a “mute concreteness.” It must be brought to exposition, to 
expression, through systematic intentional “analysis” which inquires back from 
the world-phenomenon. (Husserl 1970b: 186–187)
Two points need emphasizing here. First, the aim of Husserlian phenomenology is, 
as we might put it, a “hermeneutic” one. The point is not to prove, but to make intel-
ligible. As Husserl writes, the phenomenologist is “unable to have any other scientific 
theme than that of transforming the universal obviousness [Selbstverständlichkeit] of 
the being of the world – for him the greatest of all enigmas – into something intel-
ligible [eine Verständlichkeit]” (Husserl 1970b: 180). Second, this making-intelligible 
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proceeds via “intentional analysis”: we make the manifestation (or “being”) of the 
world intelligible by “inquiring back” from the world as manifested to the intentional 
experiences in which the world manifests itself. Ultimately, then, we will unveil struc-
tures of the “transcendental ego” – the subject to whom the world is manifested.
Obviously, this means there is a difference between the phenomenological idea of 
a condition of world-manifestation and the textbook notion of a “necessary condition”. 
To show that X is not a necessary condition of Y it is enough to produce a coherent 
example of Y without X. Thus, to show, for example, that believing that p is not a nec-
essary condition of perceiving that p, we need only think of a case in which a person 
sees a pink rat running by; but, attributing the experience to the influence of alcohol or 
LSD, the person does not believe that a pink rat is running by. A condition for world-
manifestation in the phenomenological sense, by contrast, is something in the absence 
of which we cannot make a world-manifesting experience “truly” or “fully intelligible 
to ourselves”, to borrow some useful phrases from P. F. Strawson (cf. P.F. Strawson 
1966: 11, 49, 106, and passim). For a phenomenologist, therefore, there can be cases in 
which X without Y is logically possible – involving no “formal contradiction” – but in 
which we cannot make X fully intelligible without Y.5
In particular, as we shall see, there can be cases where we can coherently imagine 
that creatures, which lack a certain feature we have, experience the world just as we do; 
but where, due to the lack of the mentioned feature, we cannot make their having such 
experience truly or fully intelligible to ourselves. In such a case, the phenomenologist 
will hold that the feature in question is a condition for world-manifestation, notwith-
standing the fact that it is not a necessary condition in the standard philosophical 
sense. Because the phenomenologist is in the business of making intelligible, she or he 
has a special interest in the former, broader notion.
2.2  The problem of perceptual presence
I am right now looking at my coffee-cup placed on my desk. The cup is uniformly 
white, except for some writing on one side. From my current viewing position, how-
ever, I do not actually see the writing. The side facing me is uniformly white. However, 
the “rear side” with the writing on it is not an experiential “nothing” to me in this expe-
rience. My experience somehow seems to concern the cup as such, complete with front 
sides and rear sides – and an interior possibly still containing coffee (though I cannot 
tell from here). Compare the perceptual givenness of the desk. The cup occludes parts 
of the desk – namely, the parts directly under and behind the cup. Yet I somehow sense 
5.  See Husserl (1983: 108–9); and Overgaard and Grünbaum (2007).
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the desk as present under and behind the cup, even though I do not actually see those 
parts of the desk. Generalizing from points such as these, Husserl writes:
The object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which 
it itself is. It is only given “from the front,” only “perspectivally foreshortened and 
projected” etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the core content of 
the perception, at least in the manner which the last expressions indicate, many 
others are not present in the perception in such illustrated form: to be sure, the 
elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc. are co-intended [mitgemeint] 
in more or less definite fashion […], but they are not themselves part of the 
intuitive, i.e. of the [strictly] perceptual or imaginative content, of the perception. 
 (Husserl 1970a 712–13; translation slightly modified)
What are we to say about these co-intended rear-sides and interiors? Psychologists 
commonly speak of “amodal completion” – “amodal” because there is no sensory 
information regarding the parts of the table and the cup that are occluded. As at least 
the most enlightened psychologists emphasize, however, this does not mean that the 
phenomenon is not genuinely perceptual (e.g. Rock 1984: 120). It is no good saying, 
for example, that I somehow add the hidden and occluded features in thought or 
imagination. For, first of all, if I just glance absentmindedly at my desk, thinking of 
the text I am writing, is it at all phenomenologically plausible to claim that I add, in 
thought or imagination, any of the occluded features? Surely I do not. Yet no mat-
ter how absentminded I am, the various objects are somehow fully present to me as 
three-dimensional objects with occluded backsides and so on. Second, consider the 
sheer magnitude of the task of thinking about (or imagining) all occluded features of 
a scene as crowded with objects as my desk (full of books, papers, pens, and so on). 
Perhaps a powerful computer with the right sort of software might represent all these 
in a fraction of second; but it is hardly plausible to suggest that I might do so either 
consciously or unconsciously. Finally, consider the fact that when I imagine an object, 
I also imagine it as “presenting” itself from a certain perspective, with certain features 
“in view”, and thus as having certain other features that are not currently “presented”. 
(I cannot visualize an object seen from all perspectives at once.) We lose sight of this 
difference, however, if we say that the “unseen” features are imagined; because so, of 
course, are the “presented” features in this case (cf. Husserl 1997: 47).
Somehow, then, the presence of occluded features must be a “perceptual 
presence” (Husserl 1997: 43; Noë 2004: 60). We have a perceptual “sense” of their 
presence, even though they are not strictly seen or otherwise perceived. To a phe-
nomenologist seeking an understanding of how our experience can present a world 
consisting of three-dimensional, material objects, this presents a problem, however. 
The problem is to make intelligible how we can have a perceptual sense of unseen 
features of a scene. How are we to understand their presence? Following Alva Noë, 
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whose take on this problem seems deeply influenced by Husserl,6 I shall call this “the 
problem of perceptual presence” (Noë 2004: 59).
Note that this problem will be central to a phenomenological account of percep-
tual experience. For arguably, it is crucial to the perception of objects as spatial or 
three-dimensional that we can have various different perspectives on them. But this 
precisely means having certain aspects of them in view, while others are “co-intended”, 
as Husserl puts it. It is obvious that other, strictly “absent” aspects or profiles must 
be somehow present. For unless my first glance at an object already somehow antici-
pates other possible views of the same object, it is hard to see how any subsequent 
perception of the object from another perspective could count as a perception of the 
same unchanged object. That is, unless any perception of an opaque, three-dimensional 
object, already co-intends absent profiles of the same object, a continuous perceptual 
process revealing the object from other sides can hardly count as manifesting the same 
unaltered object. There must already be more to the object than what I currently see 
if any subsequent experience is to reveal new features of the same, unchanged object.
But why is it important that we can perceive the same unchanged object from 
varying perspectives? If all aspects of perceived objects are fully manifest, then per-
ceived objects change whenever the sensory given changes. Suppose the sensory given 
of a particular experiential sequence is the same as I have when I first view my coffee 
cup from a position directly above it, and then slowly move my head back and down 
so that the cup is now in front of me. As we might put it, the sensory given at first 
involves a circular shape (corresponding to the circular shape the cup projects onto my 
retina), and then gradually more and more elliptical shapes. Unless we make room for 
an object to present different profiles to a viewer, then clearly the perceived object in 
our scenario changes. Every change in sensory content is a change in perceived object. 
But how, in this sort of scenario, could my visual experiences be experiences of some-
thing out there in the so-called “external” world? The perceived object collapses into 
the sensory given. That is, the perceptual experience would seem to absorb the object, 
so that there would be no difference between the perceived object and the experience 
(cf. Husserl 1997: 97–101). We only have a visual experience of a transcendent, physi-
cal object if it is possible for the sensory content of the experience to change while the 
object remains unaltered. And we can only have the latter in so far as other profiles of 
the same object can be “amodally” co-intended.7
6.  Although I have only come across one single reference to Husserl in Noë’s writings 
(2004: 17), it is a reference to the volume that contains all the ideas I am outlining here.
7.  What, though, about shadows? Shadows seem to be objects “out there” in the world, even 
if they are not genuinely material in the way that cups and tables are. But although it is true, 
of course, that shadows do not have “sides” the way material things do, we can nevertheless 
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This means that if we are to make intelligible the perceptual manifestation of three-
dimensional objects we cannot ignore the problem of perceptual presence. From what 
was said above, it is not plausible that the key to this problem lies in the notion that 
we construct mental models or representations of the absent profiles. The task would 
be daunting, to say the least. And besides, the suggestion that we constantly engage in 
such internal-model building doesn’t do justice to the phenomenology of experience. 
But if we do not represent them, what is the status of the absent profiles? Both Husserl 
and Noë, in their respective ways, make the intuitively plausible suggestion that the 
absent profiles are “present” as somehow available, as something to which we have 
access (Noë 2004: 63, 67). They are, as Husserl puts it, “freely at our disposal” (Husserl 
2001: 47). In other words, in having one side of the coffee cup strictly presented to me, 
the multiple absent profiles of the cup also have a certain presence, namely as profiles 
that are available to be (strictly) perceived. This, however, cannot count as a satisfac-
tory response to the problem of perceptual presence. Surely, before we can be said 
to have made perceptual presence fully intelligible to ourselves, we must understand 
what this availability of the absent profiles amounts to. This question takes us to the 
heart of the Husserlian proposal.
2.3  Movement and perceptual presence
The proposal is marvellously simple. According to both Husserl and the enactive account, 
the basis of the availability of absent profiles is found in what Husserl calls our “kinaes-
thetic capacity”8 and Noë refers to as “sensorimotor skills” (Noë 2004: 63).9 It is, in other 
words, because we are able to move and thereby change our perspective on things that 
we have a perceptual sense of the co-presence of absent profiles. Thus, for example, the 
view the former from various perspectives, some of which may reveal features of the shadow 
that are not revealed from other perspectives (see Smith 2003: 70). Moreover, we can obviously 
have amodal completion of shadows. Not only can objects occlude other objects, or parts of 
them; they can also occlude their shadows, or parts of them.
8.  Husserl (1970b: 162). Husserl coins the term Vermöglichkeit to capture this; see the 
German text of the Crisis: § 47; also Husserl (1973b: 284–5). Vermögen means ability or 
capacity, whereas Möglichkeit means possibility. A Vermöglichkeit is thus a possibility that 
I am able to realize.
9.  An anonymous reviewer points out that “kinaesthetic capacity” and “sensorimotor skills” 
are two very different things. The former is an experiential notion, whereas the latter is a phys-
iological one that “has no anchorage in actual experience”. I think there is something to this 
point. In fact, I do believe Noë wants his sensorimotor skills to be understood as anchored in 
experience. Husserl and Noë, it seems to me, both want to claim that our awareness of absent 
profiles has to do with our ability to experience self-movement. But then here is the point: If 
that is what Noë wants, why the physiological vocabulary?
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inside of my cup is available to me as something that would be (strictly) perceived if I 
view the cup from above; whilst the rear side is accessible as that which I would see if I 
moved around the cup (or picked it up and turned it around). All of this is perceptually 
present to me here and now because I have an implicit awareness of my potential (at least 
in principle) for moving, and of how such movement would produce ordered patterns of 
perceptual presentation. The “feeling of perceptual presence” we have of strictly absent 
profiles resides, as Noë puts it, “in the immediate accessibility, through control of one’s 
sense organs, of detail that is present there all along” (Noë 2001: 51).
Let me put some more flesh on this proposal. As Husserl likes to put it, the strictly 
or “properly” presented profile of an object such as a cup is embedded in a “horizon” 
of other profiles, which are not currently presented in the strict sense. And it is so 
embedded because my current “kinaesthetic” situation – my current bodily posture 
and position – is embedded in a “kinaesthetic horizon”, a horizon of “freely possible 
series of movement” (Husserl 2001: 52) and thus of other viewing positions which I 
might adopt by moving myself. I am implicitly aware of the two horizonal “systems” as 
correlated in such a way that if I were to engage in this or that particular series of move-
ment, then such-and-such a sequence of object-profiles would be presented to me.
There is thus a certain systematic structure to the relation between the kinaes-
thetic horizon and the horizon of visual profiles. A movement of my head to one side 
will result in a “movement” of the visual profile in the opposite direction. If there is 
no such (quasi-)movement, then the object will not seem stationary, but will appear 
to move. A linear movement such as walking up to an object will be accompanied by 
a continuous quasi-expansion of the visual profile of the object. If not, the object is 
seen to change: either its position, by moving away, or its size (shrinking). Moving 
around an object will lead to a continuous revelation of new profiles of the object; 
again, if not, then the object will seem to be turning. And of course, the continuity 
of the visual appearances is crucial here. It is the gapless, continuous flow of visual 
appearances corresponding to the continuous movement around the object that gives 
me an experience of the “closedness” of the three-dimensional surface of the object 
(Husserl 1997: 175).
So, when I cast a glance at my coffee cup on the table, the whole three-dimensional 
cup is present to me perceptually because the strictly presented profile is encompassed 
by a multitude of absent profiles perceptually “present” as available but not presented. 
And this availability refers back to my implicit awareness of my own potential for 
bodily movement. My perceptual experience of the cup is an experience of it from a 
particular viewing position out of a multitude of possible viewing positions – positions 
that are, at least in principle, realizable via bodily movement. I am tacitly aware of the 
current distribution of (strict) presence and absence as one that is the result of my 
having realized this particular kinaesthetic situation out of an open-ended horizon of 
kinaesthetic possibilities.
 Visual perception and self-movement 89
It must be emphasized that the Husserlian claim is not that people who have 
become completely paralysed are unable to see transcendent, spatial objects. The cru-
cial thing is that a subject has some (implicit) understanding of how visual appearances 
would change if such-and-such kinaesthetic capacities were exercised. A subject, that 
is, need not actually be able to exercise the skill in question. All he or she needs is an 
implicit understanding of the dependence of sensory appearances on self-movement. 
It might, however, be hard to see how a subject could acquire such understanding 
without at least at some point having had experiences of self-movement. This seems 
plausible to me, and I shall assume the truth of this claim in what follows; but I shall 
not attempt to defend it.
The Husserlian approach, as I understand it, will thus include the following claim:
 (1)  Having an implicit understanding of oneself as potentially moving or  
being moved is a condition for the possibility of perceiving transcendent 
spatial objects.
Via the (I think plausible) idea that such an understanding can only be derived from 
actual experience of self-movement, we reach the further claim:
 (2)  Having had experience of self-movement is a condition for the  
possibility of perceiving transcendent spatial objects.
The enactive approach, however, as suggested by its name, goes on to make a stronger 
claim. Perceiving, in Noë’s words, “is a way of acting” (Noë 2004: 1). “Perception is 
not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do” (ibid.). And again, 
“perceptual experience” is “a form of active engagement with the environment” (Noë 
2001: 50). Note that the suggestion is not merely the plausible one that in fact percep-
tion is (mostly or generally) “something we do”. Rather, to say that perceiving as such 
is a way of acting, or a form of active engagement, is to advance a claim about the 
essential features of perception.
A similar emphasis on active movement is found in Husserl.10 In the Crisis, for 
example, Husserl stresses that visual appearances have the character of profiles or 
aspects of spatial objects “only through the fact that they are those aspects continually 
required by the kinestheses” (Husserl 1970b: 106). He goes on to say: “Thus sensibility, 
the ego’s active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a funda-
mental, essential way to all experience of bodies” (ibid., my emphasis).11
10.  Although he was not oblivious to the importance of passive movement of the self (cf. 
Husserl 1997: 240–5).
11.  “Bodies” here translates the German Körper, meaning spatial, physical objects.
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We are now in a position to formulate a third claim, which I shall call the “enactive” 
claim. The claim is as follows:
 (3)  Having had experience of active self-movement is a condition for the  
possibility of perceiving transcendent spatial objects.
One might hold (1) without holding either (2) or (3). Thus, for example, someone who 
thinks that an understanding of self-movement could be innate will regard the argu-
ment I shall advance as missing an important piece. For anyone attracted to an empiri-
cist outlook, however, I think the transition from (1) to something like (2) will not 
seem outrageous. In any case, as already indicated, I shall assume that this transition 
is not in dispute here. My discussion will therefore focus on (1) and (3). It is possible 
to hold that no (implicit) understanding of oneself as possibly moving is necessary for 
the perception of spatial, three-dimensional objects with absent profiles – that is, to 
deny (1). It is, however, also possible to accept it along with (2), but to deny the specifi-
cally “enactive” claim (3). On this view, some self-movement is a necessary condition 
for perceptual experiences of transcendent objects. But there is no reason to think it 
must be active self-movement.12
2.4  Recent criticism
The most straightforward way to prove the Husserlian thesis false is to provide a coun-
ter example: an example, that is, of some creature that is able to have visual perception 
of transcendent objects in just the way we do, but is incapable of any movement what-
soever, and has no understanding of itself as potentially moving either. Galen Strawson 
has offered an example that at least in part answers to this description. He claims we 
can imagine a sort of creatures – which he calls the “Weather Watchers” – that are 
“rooted”, like trees, and completely unable to move. Nevertheless, the mental life of 
a Weather Watcher is strikingly similar to ours. In particular, such a creature is fully 
capable of visual perception:
A Weather Watcher lives the rooted life, but there are many respects in which its 
mental life is like ours. It sees the sky and hopes the clouds are bringing rain. It 
watches a seed lodge in a gap between two rocks by the edge of the river. It forms 
the belief that a tree may grow there before long, and hopes that it will.
 (G. Strawson 1994: 255)
12.  This would seem to be the position advocated in Smith (2002: 146–7). However, Smith 
goes on to suggest (at p. 149) that the idea of a wholly inert subject who has visual perceptual 
experiences as of objects distributed in three-dimensional space is a metaphysical possibility. 
His position would thus seem closer to the one discussed in the following sections.
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Strawson thinks that unless we can prove that the idea of Weather Watchers is 
incoherent, the idea that there is a necessary connection between the ability to move 
oneself and the ability to see three-dimensional, spatial objects, has been shown to be 
false. Whilst it may well be that all seeing creatures that inhabit our planet are capable 
of some degree of self-movement, the fact that we can coherently imagine creatures for 
which this is not the case, means that the connection is merely contingent.
Note, however, that the Strawsonian story so far does not involve a rejection of (1). 
His weather watchers might, for all we have been told, understand themselves as 
potentially moving around – even though in fact they are unable to move.13 However, 
others have advocated stronger claims that do involve a rejection of (1). Such points 
have recently been raised from within the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Peter Poellner, in particular, has invoked the possibility of Strawsonian creatures in 
direct criticism of Husserl:
Why should a subject only be able to think of, or perceive, an object as 
having other, currently unperceived, aspects which could be perceived from 
other perspectives, if it can also understand itself, practically or otherwise, as 
potentially moving to take up those other perspectives? This does not seem to be 
an a priori truth. There might conceivably be subjects who, while embodied, are 
paralysed from birth and cannot experience or think of themselves as actively 
moving through space at all, and who might yet take their surrounding world to 
consist of spatial particulars with aspects unperceived by them, but perceivable 
from somewhere else. (Poellner 2007: 443)
Poellner clearly accepts that in order to have perceptual experiences as of transcen-
dent, spatial objects, a subject must have a perceptual “sense” of absent profiles. What 
he rejects is the notion that in order to have this sense one needs to be able to move. 
In fact, Poellner rejects the weaker notion that one needs to understand oneself as 
potentially moving to take up positions from where these profiles would be visually 
presented. If so, his perspective cannot be reconciled with the Husserlian one.
In a footnote, Poellner makes it clear that he is committed to the strong claim that 
I am attributing to him: his target is the very idea that self-movement is essential to per-
ceptual experiences as of spatial objects. As he writes, “Even if one accepts that a grasp 
of the possibility of movement is essential for perceiving a spatial object as having 
aspects currently occluded or outwith focal attention, why should this have to include 
13.  Indeed, Strawson offers a genetic story that he calls the “rooting story”, according to 
which the natural course of development of a weather watcher takes it from “an active, mobile 
youth to a state of immobility” (G. Strawson 1994: 254). Given this story, of course, it is entirely 
reasonable to assume that weather watchers – despite their immobility – are able to under-
stand themselves as potentially moving around.
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self-movement, rather than merely movement of the object […]?” (Poellner 2007: 443, 
Note 44). Thus, Poellner thinks (1) must be rejected. It is enough that a subject should 
understand an object as potentially moving or being moved, for that subject to have 
visual experiences of spatial objects. Indeed, Poellner seems to think that not even this 
is strictly required. Perhaps no movement of any sort has any essential role to play in a 
subject’s perception of spatial objects.
Poellner offers the following analogy to substantiate his criticism of Husserl:
After all, in the parallel temporal case, we can uncontroversially think of events 
having objective temporal properties (e.g. Napoleon studying his maps for one 
hour on the eve of the battle of Jena) which we can neither directly witness, nor 
gain any clear conception of what it would be to “move ourselves” to a temporal 
position from which we could witness them. The claim about the role of bodily 
self-movement thus seems to be one instance where Husserl does not so much 
analyse the constitutive conditions for any subject’s having representations of a 
certain (here: spatial) type, but rather the way in which certain kinds of subjects, 
namely humans, in fact represent the world […]. (Poellner 2007: 443)
In other words, past events have aspects that we cannot understand ourselves as “mov-
ing” ourselves in relation to, in such a way as to be able to “witness” them. Why, then, 
should we not be able to perceive objects as having absent aspects or profiles, even if 
we had no understanding of ourselves as moving into a position from which we could 
perceive them?
2.5  Must all absent profiles be perceivable?
In response to this criticism, the first point to consider is the force of Poellner’s analogy 
with past events. Is the Husserlian phenomenologist committed to the claim that all 
types of “absent profiles” are available or accessible in the sense that one can conceive 
of oneself as “moving” (whether literally or metaphorically) into a position from which 
they can be “witnessed”? This is a rather large question, which opens up wider issues 
about Husserl’s transcendental idealism – issues that cannot be adequately addressed 
in the present paper.14 Nevertheless, I think it is fairly easy to see that the phenomenol-
ogist has no problem allowing for absent profiles with respect to which we can make 
no sense of the notions of “moving closer” and “witnessing”. The transcendent par 
excellence, as Husserl never tires of emphasizing, are other subjectivities (cf. Husserl 
1959: 495). Another subject is someone who in principle cannot be directly presented 
to me the way she or he is “given” to herself (Husserl 1973a: 362, 438). To encounter 
another subjectivity is thus to encounter something (or rather, someone) that simply 
14.  For two very different perspectives on this question, see Smith (2003) and Zahavi (2003).
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cannot be presented to me “in its own self ”. This makes the perception of the other, as 
Husserl conceives of it, very different from the perception of mere spatial objects: the 
“improperly perceived” dimension of the other subject “makes possible no fulfilling 
perception, the way all anticipating moments within the perception of spatial things 
do” (Husserl 1959: 63).
In other words, here we have a clear case in which our experience implicates 
absent “profiles” that we cannot picture ourselves as possibly witnessing. And, closely 
connected with this, we cannot make sense of the notion of “moving closer” to these 
absent “profiles”. There are, of course, important questions to be asked about the 
status these “profiles” have for us. They cannot, for example, be “available” or “to our 
disposition”; so how do they figure in our experience? However, it is not the task of 
this chapter to answer the phenomenological question concerning our experience of 
other subjects.15 The only point we need to note is that there is no reason to think 
a Husserlian phenomenologist would have trouble accepting the notion of absent 
profiles which we cannot bring ourselves in a position to witness.
Having established this, what is to prevent us from granting that it is essential to 
something’s being a past event that there is no such thing as “going back” to witness 
the unfolding of the event? We can obviously imagine ourselves witnessing Napoleon 
studying his maps before the battle of Jena. Indeed, we know what it would take for us 
to “move” into such a position: we would have to place ourselves in Jena in October 
1806, for a start. However, we certainly have no idea how to bring such “movement” 
about.16 But this is not a problem for the phenomenologist. On the contrary, there is 
no reason why she or he should not be prepared to accept that this is part of what it 
means that an event is a past event.
So what does the temporal analogy tell us about the perceptual case? Not much, 
it seems to me. For surely, it would be absurd to suggest that the absent profiles of the 
perceived object are past profiles – or indeed that they are strictly inaccessible, as are 
the absent “profiles” of other subjects. Of course they are neither of those things. In 
principle, I can bring them into view whenever I want. In the perceptual case, we sense 
the absent profiles as belonging to the present perceived scene. The absent profiles are 
“‘co-meant’ as co-present”, as Husserl puts it (Husserl 2001: 40) – which is indeed why 
the problem we are discussing can be called the “problem of perceptual presence”.
15.  For an attempt to answer the question, see Overgaard (2007).
16.  Indeed, perhaps the very notion that it is possible to draw parallels between spatial move-
ment and “movement in time” depends on our tendency to use spatial language to describe 
temporal matters. This tendency, as Jordan Zlatev has pointed out to me, is not found in all 
cultures. See Sinha et al. (2011).
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2.6  Making sense of absent profiles
Having dealt with Poellner’s analogy, we can move on to consider the case of the crea-
tures he pictures. If we can make such creatures intelligible to ourselves as perceiving 
objects with absent profiles just as we do, then theses (1) and (3) must be false. It is, 
however, not at all clear that we can make sense of these creatures having such per-
ceptual experiences. At least, it is so far entirely unclear what sort of response to the 
problem of perceptual presence Poellner is proposing.
Call creatures that cannot conceive of themselves as possibly moving or being 
moved “completely motionless creatures”.17 The question we would like answered is 
the question concerning the status of absent profiles for such creatures. Poellner has 
suggested (in personal correspondence) that it is possible to tell a story about the pos-
sible function such co-intending of absent profiles could have for completely motion-
less creatures. It might be important for the latter to be able to predict the movement 
of objects relative to themselves, so as to enable them to prepare mentally for possible 
impacts, for example.
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that it does not seem to address the 
right question. We can imagine all kinds of functions for the co-intending of absent 
profiles to serve, but what we want here is to make sense of the perceptual experience 
of such creatures – and make sense of it “from the inside”, as it were. Noë and Husserl 
have given us plausible stories about the status of such profiles for us, in our perceptual 
experiences. The perceptual “co-presence” of the profiles is cashed out in terms of their 
being “available” to us; and that availability, in turn, is made sense of in terms of our 
kinaesthetic (Husserl) or sensorimotor (Noë) understanding. How are we to under-
stand the co-presence of absent profiles in the experiences of completely motionless 
creatures? As we will see, the answer that they are “available” creates trouble. For it 
immediately invites the question of how that availability would be cashed out.
One of the quotes from Poellner suggests that he might attempt to cash it out in 
terms of the movement of perceived objects. In other words the absent profiles of, say, 
my cup would then not correspond to the profiles that would be strictly perceived if 
I were to move (or be moved) in such-and-such a way; but those I would perceive if 
the cup moved or was moved in such-and-such a way. The question is, however, why 
would such cases not be cases of objects changing their intrinsic features, as opposed 
to unchanged objects moving so as to reveal aspects that they had to begin with? It 
is the possession of absent profiles ab initio that we are trying to make sense of here. 
17.  I have been unable to think of a more accurate name that would not become intolerably 
long and inelegant. That the name is, however, awkward and inaccurate can be seen from 
the fact that Strawsonian weather watchers – insofar as they are immobile, yet capable of 
conceiving of themselves as moving – would not be completely motionless creatures.
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And it does not seem that we can do so by reference to the movement of perceived 
objects. Rather, for a creature to be able to experience an object as moving in such 
a way as to reveal different aspects, the object must already be experienced as hav-
ing other aspects to reveal. For only then can the case where initially absent profiles 
become fully perceptually present be distinguished from cases where objects change, 
either by losing the features they had, or by developing new features in addition to the 
ones they had.
Thus, for example, a case in which the sensory material first includes a circular 
shape and then gradually more and more elliptical shapes is ambiguous between a 
number of different scenarios.18 It could be the object (say, the rim of my coffee cup) 
is changing shape; it could be it is being gradually tilted away from me; or it could be 
that I am changing my position vis-à-vis the object. It seems to me that not only are 
Poellner’s completely immobile creatures unable to distinguish between the first two of 
these scenarios. More problematically, insofar as they cannot understand themselves 
as potentially moving into a position that would (or would not) result in the reintro-
duction of the original, circular visual appearance, such a distinction can hardly even 
make sense to them. But this precisely means that their visual experience cannot be a 
visual experience as of a transcendent, spatial object in anything like our sense.
The appeal to the movements of objects, therefore, is not going to give the critic 
of the enactive approach what he or she needs. Another suggestion that Poellner hints 
at is this. A completely motionless creature might form an idea of absent profiles as 
potentially present to other perceiving subjects.19 It might have no notion whatsoever 
of itself moving or being moved into a position from which these profiles might be 
perceived; nevertheless, so the present suggestion goes, such absent profiles could fig-
ure in its perceptual experiences as profiles possibly given to (possible) other perceiv-
ers. The trouble with this suggestion, however, is that it puts the cart before the horse. 
We have not yet made sense of the notion that there could be “more to see” for this 
18.  An interesting question – which I shall not discuss here – is whether there is a sense 
in which the plate, when it projects an elliptical shape on to my retina, looks elliptical. Noë 
(2004: 78) thinks there is, but see Overgaard (2010) for a critique of this view.
19.  Poellner says his creatures might understand their world as containing “spatial par-
ticulars with aspects unperceived by them, but perceivable from somewhere else” (Poellner 
2007: 443). It seems to me that the notion that these aspects might count as perceivable from 
somewhere else tacitly invokes the idea of another (possible) perceiver whose position is such 
that she can perceive those aspects. Also, in addition to what I point out in the text, I think 
there might be another vicious circularity present in Poellner’s suggestion insofar as it isn’t 
clear how his creatures could have the sort of full-fledged understanding of space that would 
allow them to conceive of those other positions from which the unseen aspects would be per-
ceivable. But I shall not pursue this line of criticism.
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creature than what is currently presented to it. Once such an understanding is firmly 
in place, we may appeal to the idea that this “more” could be understood as some-
thing given to other perceivers. However, it is entirely unclear what would motivate 
our completely motionless creature to form such an idea of there being more to the 
world than its current experience. We cannot solve this problem by helping ourselves 
to the notion of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, if there are to be other subjects for 
the motionless creatures, they must be presented to it in its experience. And before 
we have a basic understanding of how a transcendent, spatial object could be so pre-
sented, it is hard to see how we could make any progress with the task of explicating 
how other subjects might be presented in such a creature’s experience.
Perhaps, finally, it could be maintained that there is no logically compelling reason 
why the notion of objects as being three-dimensional, and thus as possibly possessing 
unseen aspects, cannot be innate. Well, maybe this is true. To say this, however, would 
not be to answer the problem of perceptual presence; it would be a refusal to offer 
any answer. It would be a simple dismissal of all questions concerning the status that 
absent profiles may have in the experiences of completely motionless creatures. For a 
phenomenologist, however, the task is to try to make such experience fully intelligible. 
From this perspective, to renounce all such attempts is only marginally different from 
admitting that the task cannot be completed.
3.  The importance of active movement
So far, I have only discussed the prospects of denying (1). But the enactive theorist 
maintains something stronger, namely that “perceiving is a kind of skillful bodily 
activity” (Noë 2004: 2). More precisely, our ability to perceive depends on our having 
an implicit understanding of systematic relations between self-movement and sensory 
appearances, which is derived from experience of active self-movement. Above, this 
was formulated as follows:
 (3)  Having had experience of active self-movement is a condition for the  
possibility of perceiving transcendent spatial objects.
In this brief second part of my chapter I will argue that it is highly doubtful whether 
this “enactive” claim can be maintained. I will consider, and reject, three reasons for 
thinking that experience of active, self-initiated and self-controlled movement is 
necessary.
First, it might be thought that if a self-movement is not self-initiated, then we 
cannot be subjectively aware of it as a self-movement; in particular, we cannot distin-
guish self-movement from object-movement. As Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004: 114) 
put it, “if we were only passively moved through space, we wouldn’t be in a position 
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to distinguish between changes in our experiences that are simply a consequence of 
our having changed places – position-changes – and changes in our experience cor-
responding to actual changes in the world – state changes”.20 This, however, is wrong. 
Through the so-called somatosensory system we can be directly aware of the move-
ments and positions of our limbs, even if they are not self-generated. Husserl him-
self speaks of two different kinds of kinaesthetic sensations besides the active, “free” 
kinaesthesia: passive, but “allowed” kinaesthesia such as my breathing (which I could 
hold back, if I wanted to); and “foreign” or “compulsory” kinaesthesia, as I have when 
someone pushes my head or arm (cf. Husserl 1973a: 447). In addition, the vestibular 
system informs us of the acceleration of our whole body through space, as we know 
from cases where the vehicle in which we are sitting speeds up or slows down.
Moreover, as Gibson has emphasized, when we are passively moved (e.g. in a 
vehicle), the flow of visual appearances itself is typically such as to specify this as a case 
of self-movement as opposed to object-movement.21 Think of the case of looking at a 
landscape from a moving train. All features of the landscape are moving past you in a 
characteristic fashion.22 When you are driving in your car, the landscape continuously 
flows towards you from the horizon, and so on. When an object or several objects are 
moving in relation to you, on the other hand, there is no similar transformation across 
the visual field as a whole. We may hence speak of a fourth sort of kinaesthesis, namely 
what Gibson calls “visual kinesthesis” (Gibson 1986: 125).23
There is thus no good reason to think that passive self-movement could not be dis-
tinguished from object-movement. So there is no obstacle to thinking that a creature 
incapable of self-initiated movement could experience itself being passively moved 
through an environment, and distinguish its own passive movement from changes 
in visual stimulation. However, and this is the second point that can be introduced 
in favour of the enactive thesis, it could be suggested that the “if-then” structure – 
the systematic relation between kinaestheses and visual appearances – collapses if a 
20.  For a similar claim, see Overgaard and Grünbaum (2007: 21–2).
21.  Eye-movements, it should be noted, are a special case. When one’s eyes are moved pas-
sively, the scene before one’s eyes seems to move. One can confirm this by closing one eye, and 
gently pushing the other eyeball with a finger. See Gregory (1998: 102).
22.  The closer objects race past you, while more distant things move more slowly. This is 
known as “motion parallax” – an important cue to distance.
23.  It does not, of course, give infallible information. We are all familiar with the illusion of 
the moving train. It is only when the adjoining train has passed, and we can see other features 
of the environment (e.g. the station building) that we realize that it wasn’t our train that was 
moving.
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perceiving subject has no experience of active, self-initiated movement.24 A subject 
with experience of passive movement only “would not be able to experience a sys-
tematic relation between her own movements and the appearances of things in space” 
(Overgaard & Grünbaum 2007: 22). Rather, she or he would, at most, experience “an 
arbitrary relation between the dynamic structure of the visual field and the structure 
of the actual kinaesthetic sequence as it is actualised in this particular situation, but 
she or he would have no experiential grounds on which to relate it to other possible 
sequences and thereby to other possible appearances” (ibid.).
There are, it seems to me, two different issues here that should be held apart. The 
first is the question of the relation between self-movements and the flow of visual 
appearances. The second concerns the wider context (or “horizon”) of possible move-
ments and the associated “horizon” of visual appearances. As for the first, it is not 
clear why passive movements could not be related to visual appearances in the rel-
evant systematic way. In other words, there is no obvious reason why experiences of 
passive movement could not lead to an implicit understanding of relations of the fol-
lowing sort: If I were to be moved to such-and-such a position, then such-and-such 
visual appearances would result. Any reason to think this will not work must hinge 
on the second point: that whatever movement is (passively) realized, this cannot be 
related to other possible movements. It cannot, as Husserl would put it, lead to the 
formation of a kinaesthetic “horizon”. If this is right, then it would follow that the 
actual visual appearance cannot be understood as one profile out of a multitude of 
absent but “available” profiles of the same, unchanged object. And then, indeed, we 
would have made it impossible to conceive of perceptual experiences of transcendent, 
spatial objects.
However, the force of this argument depends on the idea that we cannot make 
sense of an open-ended kinaesthetic “horizon” for such a passive subject. It seems to 
me that we can make sense of the latter notion. When one such creature is moved, 
say in a linear fashion, it will surely form implicit expectations (what Husserl calls 
“protentions”) as to what is coming next. And when the movement stops, or changes 
direction, such a protention will be disappointed; the creature will experience some 
degree of surprise that the movement did not continue. Surely, this is completely inde-
pendent of the fact that the creature did not itself have anything to do with initiating or 
performing the movement. Yet, given such protentions, it is surely understandable that 
the creature might form some idea of this linear movement continuing (even though 
in fact the movement did not continue in this fashion). So here we see how the creature 
24.  This suggestion is again found in Overgaard and Grünbaum (2007: 22). As should be 
evident, I am no longer convinced of the truth of some of the stronger claims advanced in 
that paper.
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would be able to conceive of series of possible self-movements beyond the movements 
that actually occurred.
Now, it may well be that for systematic relations of the proper sort to be set up 
between an open-ended horizon of possible movements and a similar horizon of 
possible visual appearances, a creature needs to have had experiences with a fairly 
extensive variety of passive movements. For example, it is plausible that experiences 
of being moved in a linear way towards an object and away from it will not, by them-
selves, yield a sufficiently rich kinaesthetic horizon for fully-fledged three-dimensional 
objects to be perceived. For it is not clear, for example, that a creature with such lim-
ited experience would be able to form a notion of “cyclic” movement, a movement 
around an object. In fact, it seems it would rather be the experience of cyclic move-
ment and the visual appearances accompanying it that would give rise to the notion of 
a three-dimensional object as something that can be moved around. However, a vari-
ety of experiences of being moved around would seem sufficient to equip our creature 
with a kinaesthetic horizon: a horizon of possible (passive) self-movement. In fact, 
given a sufficiently rich inventory of experiences of passive movement, our passive 
creature would surely be able to experience an (in principle) open-ended kinaesthetic 
horizon much as we do. And then it seems plausible to assume that the rich inventory 
of experiences of characteristic changes in visual stimulation corresponding to this 
inventory of passive movement would enable the creature to forge a link between the 
kinaesthetic horizon and a horizon of visual stimulation. But surely, this means we 
have all the ingredients needed to make sense of our passive creature as co-intending 
absent profiles.25
However, here we can introduce the third, and final, objection. Briefly stated, this 
objection consists in the observation that we have no adequate response to the prob-
lem of perceptual presence for passive creatures such as the ones discussed here. It is 
not clear, after all, that absent profiles could count as “available” to our passive crea-
tures. In particular, the absent profiles could hardly figure in these creatures’ experi-
ence as “freely at their disposal”. The creatures have no way of bringing the profiles into 
view. This is because, for these creatures, unlike for us, the kinaesthetic horizon would 
not be “a horizon of freedom” (Husserl 2001: 52). Surely, it must be conceded that there 
would be a major difference between the experiences of the imagined creatures and 
25.  Research comparing the perceptual development of kittens being moved around pas-
sively with kittens moving around actively seems to suggest that the former are perceptually 
impaired (see Held & Hein 1963). However, Gregory (1998: 143) suggests reasons to be scep-
tical of this conclusion. Besides, here we are concerned with “essential” matters, not factual 
matters.
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our experience. The answer to the problem of perceptual presence cannot be identical 
in the two cases.
The crucial question, however, is whether an answer to the problem can be given 
in the case of our passive creatures. And clearly it would be question-begging to simply 
assume that because absent profiles could not be freely at the disposal of passive crea-
tures the problem of perceptual presence cannot be satisfactorily resolved. Whether it 
can or not is precisely the issue under dispute. I think it is clear that at least a beginning 
of an answer can be given. Absent profiles could figure in their experiences as “acces-
sible” in some sense. For if and when fortune so decides, these profiles are presented 
to the passive creatures.
Consider also the example discussed above, in which (to put this in purely third-
person terms) the rim of my cup first projects a circular shape onto my retina, and 
then projects gradually more elliptical shapes. I said that the series of visual appear-
ances this gives rise to is ambiguous between three different scenarios. It could be 
the object is changing shape; it could be it is being gradually tilted away from me; or 
it could be that I am changing my position vis-à-vis the object. Now, given “visual 
kinaesthesis”, our passive creatures would be able, in principle, to rule out the last 
scenario. And the distinction between the other two would certainly make sense to 
them. In fact, on occasion, they might be able to detect the nature of the case. For 
example, they could be moved immediately after the event into a position that, on 
the hypothesis that the cup was tilted away, would result in the reappearance of a 
circular sensory profile. Based on the actually resulting appearance, the ambiguity 
could be resolved.
To be sure, the visual experiences of such creatures would generally be marred by 
ambiguities. It would be only very occasionally that such ambiguities were resolved for 
them, and when this happened it would be nothing but a pure stroke of luck. Here we 
may catch a first glimpse of the enormous difference between their life-world and ours. 
However, to begin to gauge this difference is to begin to make sense of their visual 
experiences. It is to begin to appreciate what their experience might be like, “from the 
inside”. And it does seem that, despite enormous differences, this experience might, 
like ours, include a co-intending of absent profiles. These would not be “available to the 
creatures”, but they might have some measure of “accessibility”.
Perhaps – and with this suggestion I will bring the present discussion to a close – 
the “accessibility” conclusion could be buttressed by reference to the possible presence 
of other perceiving subjects. If the experience of being moved about passively can give 
rise to some conception of the world extending beyond what is currently given to 
them, then there is no obstacle in principle to them forming an idea of themselves as 
placed in a world of three-dimensional, transcendent objects. Although a story would 
have to be told about how they would be able to identify certain particulars within 
that world as other subjects of experience, there is no reason in principle to think such 
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a story could not be told.26 And then it becomes possible for the passive creatures to 
conceive of what is currently unavailable to their visual perception as something that 
is currently available to someone else’s visual perception.
4.  Concluding remarks
In the preceding pages, I have discussed two theses concerning the connection between 
self-movement and visual perception.
First, I have argued that creatures that cannot conceive of themselves as poten-
tially moving (or being moved) cannot have visual experiences of transcendent, three-
dimensional objects. The attempt to claim otherwise fails to give a satisfactory answer 
to the problem of perceptual presence. For anyone who goes down that route faces 
a choice. Either they must concede that somehow absent profiles are co-present as 
available or accessible. But then we need an account of that availability; and none of 
the suggestions discussed seemed very promising. Or else they must claim that absent 
profiles are co-intended as having some other status (e.g. “accessible to others”). But 
then this story must be fleshed out convincingly. I have suggested that it is hard to see 
how one could offer a convincing story along either of these lines.
Second, I have argued that we should nevertheless stop short of adopting the 
“enactivist” perspective. For it seems there is no good reason to think one could not 
develop the required understanding of oneself as potentially moving (or moved) on 
the basis of a (sufficiently rich) inventory of experiences of being moved passively. 
There are, as I have suggested, a number of things we could say about the visual expe-
riences of an imaginary class of passive creatures – enough, perhaps, to make their 
experiences “fully intelligible to ourselves”. Of course, I have come nowhere near com-
pleting the latter task here. But I have shown that popular reasons for thinking that 
the task cannot be completed do not stand up to closer scrutiny. At the very least, this 
shifts the onus of proof onto the enactivist.
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Emotion regulation through the ages*
Stuart Shanker
York University
This paper reviews how emotion-regulation has been an archetypal, even 
a defining theme in the history of Western views about healthy mental 
functioning. The ancient Greeks bequeathed a constricted view of emotions, 
however, as ‘wild horses’ that need to be tamed by reason, which led to an 
equally constricted view of the development of emotion-regulation. In recent 
years, significant advances have enabled us to move beyond this classical 
outlook: most importantly, in our understanding of the types of experiences that 
enhance the development of emotion-regulation; the factors that can impede 
these experiences; and the reasons why emotion-regulation is so important for a 
child’s long-term well-being.
1.  Introduction
I read: “…philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of ‘Reality’ than Plato got, …”. 
What a strange situation. How extraordinary that Plato could have got even as 
far as he did! Or that we could not get any further! Was it because Plato was so 
extremely clever? Wittgenstein, Culture and Value
With this remark, Wittgenstein embarked on his stunning exploration of how, ever 
since Plato, language has kept leading Western thinkers down the same paths and into 
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and David Leavens for his wonderfully incisive comments on an earlier draft. I owe a special 
thanks to Marc Lewis, who was only shown a copy of this paper after I had already made 
liberal use of his ideas. 
106 Stuart Shanker
the same cul-de-sacs. One issue he did not consider, however, is the extent to which 
Plato actually shaped that language, influencing the very questions that we ask and the 
way we try to answer them. If Wittgenstein is right, then some of the great questions 
that Western thinkers have struggled with for over two millennia are unanswerable 
because of some logical problem implicit in the question itself. But sometimes the 
reason for this obduracy lies in hidden assumptions that are built into the framework. 
And sometimes, as in the case of emotion-regulation, it is a combination of the two.
In The First Idea Stanley Greenspan and I explored the profound influence that a 
culture has on the kinds of mental traits that parents seek to inculcate in their children 
(Greenspan & Shanker 2004). Of all these traits, one of the most important – for par-
ents and scientists alike – is that of emotion-regulation, which, according to modern 
theorists, involves the child’s ability to “monitor, evaluate and modify” her emotional 
responses (Gross & Thompson 2007; Thompson 1994). Over the past decade, signifi-
cant advances have been made in our understanding of the mechanisms involved and 
the connections between emotion-regulation and a child’s psychological (Kochanska 
et al. 2000), social (Eisenberg & Spinrad 2004), prosocial (Kochanska et al. 1997), and 
educational development (Blair 2002). What remains unclear, however, is how these 
connections are forged, what sorts of biological and/or social factors can impede their 
formation, and how such obstacles can be mitigated and a child’s emotion-regulation 
enhanced.
The reason why emotion-regulation has become such a leading issue in recent 
years may in part be due to rapid societal changes and demands that have resulted in 
a growing number of children with problems regulating their emotions, or children 
who display largely flat or negative affect. One worry here is that urbanization brings 
with it all sorts of physical and psychological stresses that test a child who might have 
coped better in a more rustic setting.1 There is growing concern, for example, over 
the amount of visual, auditory, and social stimuli in cities (see Field 2007); the lack 
of green spaces and nature-based experiences (Kahn & Kellert 2002); the decline of 
Finally, my debt to Stanley Greenspan goes beyond anything that could be justly recorded 
in a footnote. Those familiar with his work will immediately recognize that the developmental 
theory presented in this paper was developed by Stanley Greenspan over the course of thirty 
years. 
1.  We can get some idea of these trends from the latest Government of Canada Report 
(2006) on ‘The Well Being of Canada’s Young Children’. In 2002/3 16.7% of Canada’s children 
2–5 years of age displayed signs associated with emotional problems. This is up from 13.8% 
in the year 1998/1999.  In 2002/3, 12.7% of children 2–5 years living in rural areas were 
reported to have emotional problems, versus 17.2% of children in urban centres. In 2002/3, 
7.7% of male children living in urban centres were reported to display signs of hyperactivity 
and inattention versus 5.15 of rural males.
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exercise as it becomes problematic for children to walk to school (Franco et al. 2007; 
Cotman et al. 2007); the decline of organized sports (Ratey 2008); changing family 
and social patterns (Mustard et al. 2007); changing leisure pursuits (Healy 1999), and 
especially, the exposure to violent or troubling emotional themes in the media (Levin 
1998); changing eating and sleeping habits (Olfman 2005), and so on.
Furthermore, children have to adjust to the rigors of spending a large part of their 
day in a formal education setting at an increasingly younger age (Kirp 2007). In order 
to be able to deal with this challenge, a child has to maintain a calm state and settle 
herself when she becomes anxious or frustrated. She needs to learn how to control her 
emotional outbursts, attend to and become interested in what her teacher is saying, 
and if she is to mix comfortably with other children and take an active role in social 
interactions, she needs to understand what they are thinking and feeling and adjust 
her emotions to those of others (Loveland 2005).
What data there is suggests that a large and possibly growing number of chil-
dren are having trouble meeting these challenges (Rimm-Kaufman et al. 2001). The 
apparent rise in behavioral problems over the past ten years (Baker & Milligan 2006) 
and the fact that behavior management programs for young children now abound 
attests to what is, at least, a widespread perception that there is a serious problem 
(Twenge 2008). What is unclear is the extent to which the problem may be due to 
environmental factors that are affecting the pre/postnatal development of prefrontal 
regulating systems (Kishiyama & Boyce 2009), and/or is due to society’s placing ever 
greater demands on younger and younger children (Levin & Kilbourne 2009). What 
is clear, however, is that we need to develop a better understanding of the complex 
interplay between biological and social factors that may lead to a child becoming 
poorly regulated or even dysregulated.
Apart from the very real practical reasons why emotion-regulation has become 
such a large concern, there is also a substantial philosophical issue at stake. For emotion-
regulation represents the axis of mind-body interaction: not the sort of gateway that 
Descartes claimed to have located in the pineal gland, but rather, the point at which 
we can identify how the social experiences that shape the growth of the child’s mind 
thereby influence the development of the brain, and how neural structures and pro-
cesses influence a child’s receptivity to these very experiences.
In other words, the natural next question that arises from our exploration in The 
First Idea of the influence that a culture has on the development of a child’s mind is 
whether the same can be asked of a child’s brain. From the time of Plato onwards, 
Western thinkers have debated whether the mind shapes the brain or the brain shapes 
the mind (Kagan 1994). There is now consensus amongst developmental scientists that 
the answer to this archetypal question must be: Both. But the devil lies in the details: in 
our understanding of how the nurturing experiences that influence the development 
of self-regulation influence the organization of those parts of the brain that support 
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the child’s ability to be remain calmly focused and alert, and how neurobiological pro-
cesses and the organization of neural systems influence the kinds of experiences that a 
child can process or seeks out (Lewis et al. in press; Tucker 2007).
From a developmental pathways point-of-view (Shanker 2008; Mundy & Burnette 
2005), the key point here is that, while these neural factors may constrain a child’s 
capacity to regulate her emotions in such-and-such conditions (Lewis 2004), these 
conditions are constantly changing, not least of which as a consequence of the child’s 
style of regulating her emotions. But then, the more scientists have studied this issue 
the more they have come to realize that emotion-regulation is not simply a matter 
of learning how to control one’s negative affects; emotions also play a regulating role 
(Lewis et al. in press). Positive emotions are essential, not only for activating and energiz-
ing actions (Izard 1991), but also for motivating and sustaining the attention necessary 
for learning to occur (Tucker 2001).
Indeed, it is ultimately the child’s motivation, interest, curiosity, and her feeling 
of security and self-worth that enable her to thrive: to experience what the Ancient 
Greeks referred to as eudaimonia, and what we simply refer to today as well-being. 
When the child exerts the effort required to master some new challenge, or to deal 
with a growing range of factors (both internal and external) that can interfere with 
emotion-regulation, her brain is forced to develop the networks needed to support 
this behavior. There is not some internal mechanism that dictates the extent to which 
a child can experience such drives. To be sure, a child’s desire to confront and con-
quer these challenges is strongly influenced by biological factors; but it is fueled and 
supported by the types of interactions that she experiences with her caregivers and 
teachers (Bruner 1966).
Emotion-regulation affords – and indeed, has afforded from the very moment that 
Western thinkers started thinking about the mind-body problem – a critical area in 
which to explore this issue. At birth a child displays a number of automatic or ‘reactive’ 
self-regulating behaviors, such as gaze-aversion or withdrawal (Eisenberg 2002). Over 
the next few years she begins to develop more voluntary self-regulating behaviors, 
such as seeking out a comforting sight when stressed, or learning how to reappraise 
a discomfiting emotion (Rothbart 1989). There is such a complicated nexus between 
these two aspects of emotion-regulation that it may, for all intents and purposes, be 
impossible to disentangle them.
For example, is the reason why a child is having problems controlling her anxiety 
because she hasn’t learnt how to redirect her attention, or is it because she is so exces-
sively over-reactive to novel stimuli that this overloads her voluntary self-regulating 
abilities (Kagan 1998)? The same point applies to caregiving experiences. Extensive 
research suggests that there is a close connection between a caregiver’s parenting style 
and the child’s attentional control (Calkins & Johnson 1998). But is a caregiver overly 
directive because the child is overly reactive? Is maternal sensitivity to some extent 
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a function of a child’s temperament? Or a reflection of how the parent self-regulates 
around the stresses involved in parenting?
What is clear is that emotion-regulation does not simply kick in when the brain 
reaches a certain level of maturation, although the growth of the prefrontal cortex 
is clearly a critical factor in the development of emotion-regulation (Diamond 2002; 
Stuss & Alexander 2000). Rather, emotion-regulation represents a paradigm exam-
ple of why developmental scientists now think in terms of a nature/nurture synthesis 
(Lewis 2005; Gottlieb 1997). For no matter how robust a child’s biological endowment, 
the presence of specific types of caregiver-infant interactions is decisive in the ongo-
ing development of emotion-regulation: an idea that is not nearly quite as modern as 
it sounds.
As we shall see, the roots of our preoccupation with emotion-regulation are sur-
prisingly ancient. Indeed, the very manner in which developmental neuroscientists 
look at emotion-regulation is surprisingly ancient: the questions asked, the processes 
emphasized, even the tasks used to study the relevant neural systems, have their roots 
in a Western outlook that traces back to Plato’s reading of Homer. There is, perhaps, 
no more significant example of the profound influence that Plato has had on the kinds 
of mental traits that parents seek to inculcate in their children than that of emotion-
regulation; and, perhaps, no more pressing area where we need to go beyond his way 
of thinking if we are to succeed in enhancing the healthy mental functioning of our 
children.
2.  The wrath of Achilles
Just as the culture that we inhabit is one that prizes the cognitive skills celebrated by 
the Ancient Greeks, so too developmental scientists remain preoccupied with the 
same question that preoccupied the ancient Greeks: namely, how does a child acquire 
the capacity to regulate her appetites and emotions? From the time of Plato onwards 
Western thinkers have been obsessed with the question of which kinds of caregiving 
practices can best support the development of this capacity. That is certainly not to 
suggest that the West has succeeded in developing a ‘more regulated child’ than other 
cultures: i.e. a return to the sort of absurdity seen in Charles White’s thesis that the 
Ancient Greeks marked the apex of human evolution (see White 1799). Yet one can’t 
help but wonder how much the incredible march of science and technology over the 
past 2,000 years owes to a poem: the greatest of all the ancient epics.
Whether or not Homer intended the Iliad to be read as a meditation on the 
importance of emotion-regulation, it came to symbolize and nourish an obsession 
with precisely that theme. Achilles was regularly used by Western thinkers to illustrate 
the damage wrought by uncontrolled emotions on one’s well-being. In some ways the 
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Iliad came to be read like a medieval mystery play rather than a heroic epic. Unlike the 
contemporary cinematic depiction of the Iliad, which has much more in common with 
ancient mythology, Achilles served for Western philosophers as a foil to Socrates, who 
had learned to master his emotions.
The perepeteia of the Iliad occurs in Book IX, when Achilles, who has been deeply 
affronted by the insult to his honour that he has suffered at the hands of Agamemnon, 
the leader of the Greek armies, rejects the overtures of the peace commission led by 
Odysseus. We have been led all along to expect that Achilles will accept Agamemnon’s 
“gifts of friendship” (9.113).2 But when the critical moment arrives Achilles is unable to 
accept the offering, which various authorities assure us is extremely generous. Achilles 
seems to be as surprised as everyone else by his own intransigence (9.636–9; 9.645). He 
presents Agamemnon with terms that couldn’t possibly be met (9.385–387), derailing 
a story that, up until this point, had been proceeding along standard heroic lines (as 
Phoinix reminds us at 9.523–6).
There have been many attempts to explain just why Achilles refuses to accept 
Agamemnon’s lavish attempt to atone for his “moment of madness” (which includes 
marriage to one of his own daughters). Whatever the reason, it is clear that Achilles’ 
decision brings a larger psychological issue to the fore; for unlike Socrates’ refusal 
in the Apology to abandon the role of philosophy as he conceives it – which must, as 
Socrates fully recognizes, lead to his own destruction – Achilles’ action (or rather, lack 
thereof) results in the whole-scale slaughter of his comrades (as Odysseus reminds us 
at 9.300–303) and not just himself.
Whereas for the ancient Greeks it was Agamemnon who was to be faulted, for 
Western thinkers it became Achilles who should be censured, and not without some 
basis in the text. For Achilles makes it clear that he held his comrades just as respon-
sible as Agamemnon for the insult to his honour: i.e. for failing to side with him in 
his quarrel with Agamemnon (9.316–317). Nestor reminds us at the start of Book 
IX that “Out of all brotherhood, outlawed, homeless shall be that man/who longs 
for all the horror of fighting among his own people” (9.63–4). He is clearly allud-
ing to Agamemnon, but for later commentators, the question being raised here is 
whether Achilles himself was any less guilty of this cardinal sin against his commu-
nity (Sorabji 2000). The important point, however, was simply that the connection 
between individual and social well-being had become inextricably bound together.
Most significant is the fact that Achilles has completely lost his capacity to regulate 
his emotions, a victim of his own “uncontrollable fury” (ménos). We are repeatedly 
2.  At 1.213–214 Athena tells Achilles that “Some day three times over such shining gifts shall 
be given you by reason of this outrage.” This is indeed what happens and, at the start of the 
poem, Achilles seems to be indicating that he will indeed accept this restitution when it comes.
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told how he has been thrown into this dysregulated state by the combined forces of 
his overpowering spirit or life force (thūmós); Agamemnon’s transgression; the fail-
ure of his society to honour its own heroic code; and the uncharted psychological 
waters in which he finds himself. In book XI Homer presents us with a powerful image 
of the paralyzed state into which Achilles has been thrown, standing on the stern of 
his beached ship and watching the battle unfold in the distance (11.599). From this 
inability to act flows a series of disasters, leading, ultimately, to the deaths of Patroclus 
and Hector, the “devastation” and “thousandfold pains” suffered by the Achaeans, and 
Achilles’ own death (which is foreshadowed in the Iliad).
One has to be careful, of course, about allowing modern sensibilities to intrude 
on one’s interpretation of how ancient Greeks might have construed Achilles’ behav-
ior. Yet it is noteworthy that numerous characters within the poem – including such 
reliable sources as Patroclus (16.29–30), Ajax (9.629–30) and even Achilles himself 
(16.203–206) – comment on how Achilles’ spirit (thumos) is out of control, culminat-
ing in Apollo’s warning in the final book that “Achilles’ mind is unbalanced, nor is his 
thought kept in check in his breast; his thoughts are wild, like a lion who gives in to his 
great force and overmanly heart and goes against the flocks of mortals, to seize his feast; 
so Achilles has lost pity, and there is no abashment in him” (24.39–45).3 Moreover, just 
before Apollo utters these lines, the narrator describes how, unable to overcome his 
grief over Patroclus’ death, Achilles, unlike the rest of the army, is unable to sleep, 
weeps uncontrollably, and lies “sometimes along his side, sometimes on his back, 
and now again prone on his face; then he would stand upright, and pace turning in 
distraction along the beach of the sea”.
The great question that the Iliad raises is: what brought Achilles to this state? Of all 
the many different answers that Homer himself explored, one of the most important 
occurs towards the end of the meeting with the peace commission in Book 9. Homer 
inserts a long speech by Phoinix, which, on the surface is somewhat puzzling insofar as 
it seems to disrupt the flow of the scene. But there is a telling line at 9.485: after learn-
ing how Peleus had entrusted him to raise his son, Phoinix remarks: “I made you all 
that you are now”. Suddenly we are given an insight into just what sort of upbringing 
Achilles has had.
One is reminded of the beginning of Don Quixote, where we learn that Alonso 
Quijano has spent far too much time reading old chronicles on chivalry. What Phoi-
nix’s speech reveals is how Achilles has been raised on similar heroic stories, told to 
him over and over and thereby molding his character, but without the necessary expe-
riences that would enable him to remain in control of his emotions in the face of great 
stress. This would explain the deep poignancy of Achilles response to this long speech, 
3.  This is Michael Clarke’s translation (Clarke 2004). 
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in which he rejects the heroic code that Phoinix sought to instill in him (9.607–608). 
But what he cannot reject is the character that Phoinix stamped onto a temperament 
that was vulnerable to just the collapse that we witness. Or at least, this was the theme 
that Plato was to explore throughout his writings.
3.  The new Achilles
One of the most intriguing of all the allusions to Homer in Plato occurs in what is 
commonly regarded as amongst the earliest of the dialogues. Socrates tells his jurors in 
the Apology that his determination to continue as a philosopher, should they decide to 
spare his life, should be compared to Achilles’ decision to return to battle, even though 
it portends his early death (Apol 28cd). Socrates’ point is that the kind of heroism it 
takes to be a philosopher is comparable to the heroism displayed by Achilles.4 It seems 
likely that it was the historical Socrates who originally made this comparison, but it is 
a studied decision on Plato’s part to return to this theme over and over.
No doubt this sort of allusion to Achilles was common at the time, but in Plato’s 
hands it is latent with psychological meaning. In the Laches Plato has Socrates define 
courage as applying, not just to a warrior’s behavior on the battlefront, but as including 
“those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who show courage in illness and 
poverty and affairs of state” (Laches 191d). Plato is attempting to show that the concept 
of courage operates at a relatively polarized level in Homer, and shift it into a grey-area 
concept where the individual applies it to his own behavior as an internal standard. 
That is, he sets out to show that Homer’s definition of courage is one-dimensional: viz., 
the individual must behave in such-and-such a way in battle in order to demonstrate 
courage. The idea that courage can be applied to the behavior of someone who is ill or 
frightened is a question that could not arise in Homer. But what Plato is doing is not 
so much an attack on the Homeric ethos as an attempt to raise it to a more advanced 
level of psychological functioning: one that applies to all human beings and not just a 
demi-god.
Throughout the Iliad Achilles is compared to a rampaging lion. At the end of the 
Laches Plato raises the question whether a lion does, in fact, demonstrate courage, and 
thence, whether Achilles’ behavior, which licensed this simile, can be described as cou-
rageous. Laches asks Nicias whether he is saying that wild beasts are not, in fact, brave, 
and Nicias answers: “rashness and courage are not the same thing”; the cases which 
4.  Plato returns to this theme in the Crito (44), the Hippias Major (292) and Hippias Minor 
(363), it runs all through the Republic: indeed, allusions to Achilles occur in the great majority 
of Plato’s writings (see Hobbs 2000).
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“the man in the street calls courageous, I call rash” (Laches 197c). Nicias makes the 
point that wild animals or small children who do not fear something because they 
don’t know that it should be feared cannot be called courageous; he would not call 
someone who “for lack of understanding, does not fear what should be feared” 
courageous but rather “rash and mad” (Laches 197b).
Plato’s intention here was not to convince his contemporaries that Achilles was 
not, in fact, brave, but rather to highlight the importance of the shift introduced by 
Homer from the pre-Homeric homage paid to the hero who goes beserk in battle to 
the Homeric exploration of emotional control, such as Achilles demonstrates when he 
reconciles with Priam. The calmly regulated person is the one who experiences pride, 
shame, anger, happiness, and so on, and not just his fear in battle, and controls these 
emotions. The kind of emotion-regulation that Plato is talking about, therefore, is that 
which is learned, which requires some effort on the part of the individual.
The very fact that the comparison of Socrates to Achilles is such a recurrent theme 
in the dialogues (sometimes quite subtle) tells us that more is involved here than a 
mere figure of speech. But how can we compare this towering figure of philosophical 
enlightenment to the great hero of the Iliad who, as we just saw, collapses and ultimately 
goes berserk before he finally recovers his equilibrium? It is always possible that Plato 
intended this to be read ironically, but it seems far more likely that Plato intended this 
comparison to be read literally: i.e. that Socrates should be seen as the ‘new Achilles’ of 
the rationalist age. This is a Socrates of heroic dimensions who at the same time serves 
as an Everyman: a model of what each of us can and should strive to attain.
According to this reading, the reason why there should be a section on the Iliad 
in a paper such as this on emotion-regulation is because of Plato. In Plato’s words – to 
a significant extent because of Plato’s words! – Homer should be seen as the “educator 
of Greece” (Resp 606e).5 The very fact that Plato and following him, Aristotle, were so 
interested in the Iliad is often cited as important evidence of Homer’s stature in ancient 
Greece, and was to a considerable extent the source of that stature.
Plato’s (and Aristotle’s) reading of Achilles is filtered through the lens of tragedy; 
for like both Sophocles and Euripedes, they were concerned – as indeed were several 
of the great Hellenic philosophers who followed in their footsteps – with the conse-
quences of the “wrath of Achilles,” not simply for his society, but more fundamentally, 
for Achilles’ own well-being. Indeed, the point of Plato’s comparison of Socrates to 
Achilles is very much a product of the tragedians’ twinned preoccupation with the 
5.  Note that in 380BC, Isokrates recounts how it was thought that, by listening to the Iliad 
and the Odyssey, one would come to “desire to perform the same deeds” (Panagyrikos 159).
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issues of madness and temperance.6 But unlike the tragedians, Plato saw Achilles’ 
emotional turmoil, not as the result of an external agent (i.e. a vengeful god), or a con-
flict with his society, but rather the consequence of the manner in which his character 
was formed.
In Plato’s hands, the Iliad becomes a psychological meditation on the develop-
ment of emotion-regulation: on how to tailor one’s interactions with a child in order 
to maximize that child’s potential to regulate his or her emotions. For some idea of just 
how influential this interpretation of the Iliad was on Western thought, one need only 
read Emile and Rousseau’s advice to the reader early on to “Read Plato’s Republic. It is 
not at all a political work, as think those who judge books only by their titles. It is the 
most beautiful educational treatise ever written” (Rousseau 1782).
What Rousseau is referring to here is the Enlightenment “dream of perfectability”: 
the question of how to maximize a child’s ability to master his or her emotions and 
appetites. As far as Rousseau was concerned, Plato’s key message was that Achilles’ 
eventual collapse was fixed by the manner in which he was raised. If we go back to 
the speech by Phoinix discussed in the preceding section, in which he alludes to the 
manner in which he raised Achilles to be a hero, we can see Plato telling us that what 
Phoinix accomplished was precisely the Achilles who cannot control his emotions in 
the face of great trauma.
That is not to say that, according to Plato, any child who had been raised in a like 
manner would have turned out to be an Achilles. Plato distinguishes, for example, 
between the effects of too much flute music on a child with a weak thumos and one 
who has a very “spirited nature” (Rep. 411b). The former “will become weak and dis-
solute,” the latter “quick-tempered, prone to anger and filled with discontent, rather 
than spirited.” Overlooking what must strike us today as Plato’s rather curious hostility 
to the flute, the important point here is Plato’s insistence that a child’s caregiving expe-
riences should be tailored to suit the child’s temperament: something that Plato, long 
before Mary Rothbart sharpened our focus (1989), saw in biological terms.
Achilles operates as an example of someone born with an overweening thumos 
and raised on a regimen that no doubt included too much lyre-playing. He illustrates 
how those who “devote themselves exclusively to physical training turn out to be more 
savage than they should,” where “the source of the savageness is the spirited part of 
one’s nature” (Rep 410d). Herein lies the source of the distinction that Plato makes 
in the Republic between courage and savagery: Thumos, “if rightly nurtured, becomes 
courageous, but if it’s overstrained, it’s likely to become hard and harsh” (Rep. 410d). 
6.  Throughout the tragedies the chorus is constantly reminding us of the importance of 
harmony and balance, moderation and temperance. Typically, the antonym for madness in the 
great tragedies is sōphrosunē, moderation or temperance (Simon 1978: 92). 
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Achilles is the paradigm example of the thumoeidic person who has not been “rightly 
nurtured,” insofar as he descends into a dysregulated state. Indeed, it is for exactly this 
reason that Plato returns so often to the example of Achilles to illustrate his argument 
about the importance of appropriate nurturing for developing the capacity to regulate 
one’s emotions.
But then, what is the key characteristic of an individual-differences approach to 
appropriate nurturing? Once again, Achilles provides Plato with the perfect vehicle for 
his answer. At the height of his frenzy, when his primal emotions have been unleashed, 
Achilles descends to the level of a beast and, in this maddened state, commits what 
Apollo describes as “evil” and “shameful deeds” (21.19).7 What restores him to nor-
malcy at the end of the poem is not a blood-letting, or soothing potions, or a sacrifice 
to the gods, but the fact that, by identifying Priam with his own father – what we might 
describe today as an act of cognitive reappraisal! – Achilles is able to regain control 
over his emotions. This idea becomes the key, not simply to the ancient Greek view 
of emotion-regulation, but a theme that has dominated western thinking about the 
subject right up to the present.
4.  The problem of Akrasia
Plato’s view of unbridled emotion as the source of “mental disease” and reason as the 
means to “mental health” was the hallmark of the rationalist revolution that occurred 
in the 5th century BCE. This pivotal event in the formation of western conscious-
ness was marked by the celebration of logic, and, intimately connected with this, 
the emergence of science. As far as the history of Western thinking about the mind 
is concerned, its most important feature was this bifurcation between reason and 
emotion: quite literally, in Plato’s model, as belonging to different parts of the psuchē 
(see, e.g. Rep 604). It is an idea that is not that far removed from modern views of 
emotions as originating in subcortical systems and the executive functions regulating 
these impulses that are supported by prefrontal cortical systems (see Ledoux 1996).
For Plato, emotions are very much a part of the mind, with their own predeter-
mined set of desires. This makes it difficult to say whether Plato viewed the bifur-
cation between reason and emotion as a conflict between rational and irrational (or 
arational) forces. But for the Stoic philosophers who followed in his footsteps it is clear 
7.  Achilles is the paradigm example of someone who can do “whatever he wishes, except 
what will free him from vice and injustice and make him acquire justice and virtue”; he thus 
illustrates the force of the point: “how can it be worth living when his psuchē – the very thing 
by which he lives – is ruined and in turmoil?” (Rep 445b)
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that the bifurcation between reason and emotion does not involve a conflict between 
the rational and irrational; for they regarded emotions themselves as cognitive phe-
nomena: judgments about the value of responding in such-and-such a way to an event. 
Indeed, it is precisely because of this cognitive basis that emotions were thought to be 
amenable to “philosophical therapy.” Thus for the ancients there was no problem of 
explaining how our emotional responses are elicited by our appraisals of the signifi-
cance of an event, for them, emotions just are ‘cognitive appraisals’.
To be sure, the Stoics talk about ‘first movements’, which encompass what we 
would describe as autonomic and automatic reactions. But for the Stoics these ‘first 
movements’ are not in any way primitive emotions, or even part of emotions; rather, 
they are simply physical reactions triggered by an event that may or may not elicit 
an emotion. An emotion must, by definition, involve the value judgment that there 
is benefit or harm at hand and that it is appropriate to react in such-and-such a way 
to this event (see Sorabji 2000). For example, I may get goose bumps from a breeze 
but that does not elicit a feeling of fear, whereas goose bumps produced by the sight 
of a charging lion are likely accompanied by such an emotion. The ‘first movements’ 
themselves are similar in both cases; the difference between my two responses lies in 
my having no emotional response to the first event and an emotional response to the 
second.
Why, then, do certain events trigger an emotion? For the Stoics, the answer was 
that we are taught to respond in these ways. That is, society teaches us to fear the 
prospect of death or to feel love for another human being (Nussbaum 1994). Hence 
emotions are social constructions, and given what the ancients saw as the depravity of 
society, it is no surprise that emotions should be the source of so much human misery. 
Far from holding the key to our happiness, they are the basic obstacle we must over-
come. And given their fundamental belief that happiness is what we all strive for, or 
will strive for if we are rational, it follows that we must learn to contain, and if possible, 
curtail this damaging element of our psyche.
As we shall see below, such an argument may not be all that far removed from 
current thinking about appraisal, although it represents a striking contrast with those 
modern theorists who see emotions as playing an important positive as well as nega-
tive role in cognition (Diamond & Aspinwall 2003). That is, while we might agree with 
the ancients as far as the negative consequences of catastrophic emotions are con-
cerned, there is considerable interest today in the constructive role that emotions play 
in, e.g. motivating or focusing attention. But the Stoics had no such interest in explor-
ing a positive side of emotions; for them, emotions were a negative phenomenon that, 
at a minimum, had to be controlled if not actually extirpated by learning how to view 
reality for what it is, shorn of social conditioning.
What came to be seen as the problem of akrasia – the question of why people 
behave in ways that are contrary to their own self-interest – dominated philosophical 
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thinking throughout the classical age. Indeed, even though the Iliad remained unknown 
during the Dark and Middle Ages, its view of the consequences for mental health if 
emotions are not held in check infused Christian thinking (Sorabji 2000). Over and 
over one encounters the basic theme that when emotion is not ruled by reason the result 
is mental pain and possibly madness. It is not surprising that a warrior culture should 
have placed so much importance on holding one’s emotions in check – especially, 
one’s fear of death. But, through his depictions of all the major characters (e.g. Agamem-
non’s greed and pusillanimity, Paris’ vanity) Homer transformed this elemental theme 
into a meditation on the need to control all one’s passions: be it anger, love, grief, or lust 
(whether for plunder or kléos).
5.  The prevention of mental illness
The question of whether or not Achilles was free to choose his own destiny is not one 
that could be asked until the first century BCE (see Sorabji 2000 Chapter 21) – at least, 
not in terms that we would recognize as similar to what we understand by free will. It is 
not at all clear, then, how Plato would respond to the question of whether or not Achil-
les was responsible for his own breakdown and subsequent actions. But it is certainly 
a question that is – or should be – uppermost in our own minds when we think about 
the reasons why young children have trouble regulating their behavior.
We saw in the preceding section how Plato placed great emphasis on the signifi-
cance of the kinds of childhood experiences that Achilles had undergone as the source 
of his overweening thumoedic spirit; perhaps that might be taken to mean that Achil-
les was more a victim of his temperament rather than its author. Even in Homer, and 
certainly in Plato, there is a moral overtone to this argument. We frequently encounter 
the suggestion that when one allows oneself to be ruled by one’s emotions and appetites 
one descends to the level of the beasts: a theme that is already present in the Iliad, with 
some of the censure that was to become so prominent in later writings. But ancient 
thinking seems primarily to have been that the reason why one should gain control 
over – or even, according to the Stoics, eradicate – one’s emotions was in order to enjoy 
tranquility. If the fear of death causes much mental anguish then one must learn to be 
passive to its inevitability: e.g. to condition oneself, as Epictetus counseled, to the even-
tual loss of one’s loved ones. Hence the widespread appeal of the story that, when told 
of his son’s untimely death Anaxagoras replied: “I knew that I had begotten a mortal.”
Does that mean that, just as the glutton was seen as responsible for his own disso-
lute condition, the mentally ill were also seen as somehow responsible for their “disease,” 
and for that reason deserved to be treated harshly? Plato’s remark that a family should 
seek to contain a mentally ill person “by whatever means they can improvise” would 
seem to sanction the barbaric practices that followed, such as binding the insane in 
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chains or forcing them to live amongst the household’s animals. Yet Plato’s primary 
reason for wishing to sequester the mad was in order to preserve social harmony. Far 
from seeing madness as the result of demonic forces, or as a sign of intrinsic guilt, he 
identified madness as “a disease of the psuchē” (Tim 86b). In fact, he distinguished 
between “several kinds of madness, brought on by several causes. [Some] are the result 
of illness, but there are some people with an unfortunate natural irritability, made 
worse by poor discipline (Laws xi.934.d).
Plato was the first to talk about the causes of mental illness, and how madness 
might be prevented. The upshot of his argument is that, regardless of whether an indi-
vidual’s madness is the result of illness or the wrong sorts of childhood experiences, 
Hippocratic medicine would be limited in its capacity to cure the adult’s mental afflic-
tion, insofar as both types of psychopathology are ultimately due to “one or another 
corrupt condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing” (Tim 86e). But even 
“rational discourse” will have a limited impact on the truly mad. Hence the reason why 
there is so much emphasis in Plato’s writings on the early years of life and the need to 
discover which kinds of experience will best cater to the temperament of a child and 
create the discipline needed to enjoy both mental and physical health.
It is an argument with a remarkably modern ring to it. But, apart from Posidonus, 
it was not an idea that was seriously pursued by ancient thinkers. Rather, their atten-
tion became increasingly fixed on the idea that the failure to control one’s emotions 
was a sign of character weakness. To be sure, they continued to accept that a great 
many cases of mental illness were the result of physical disease; yet even these latter 
cases were traced back to the failure to inculcate the sorts of habits and attitudes that 
promote humoral balance. Thus Galen, who was to exercise more influence in the 
history of Western medicine than any other figure, stressed above all else the role of a 
proper regimen in the pursuit of physical and mental health. And given that we alone 
are responsible for what we eat and drink, or our work and exercise ethic, it follows 
that we alone are responsible for engaging in those sorts of actions that exacerbate 
humoral imbalances, resulting in physical and mental disease (Temkin 1991).
By the time we get to the early Christian thinkers, who, as Sorabji has shown 
(2000), were profoundly influenced by Stoic doctrine, we get an extremely close con-
nection drawn between disease, whether physical or mental, and sin. This was seen as 
the direct result of Original Sin; for prior to the Fall Adam and Eve enjoyed perfect 
humoral balance, with reason in full control of their emotions, and thus, immunity 
from disease. By succumbing to the Devil’s temptation, their reason weakened and 
their affects strengthened. Henceforward it became a constant struggle for humans to 
control their emotions, all of which have a corrupting influence on the body (i.e. on the 
humors). Mental illness was seen as clear proof of sin: i.e. of the failure to control one’s 
emotions. Indeed, mental illness was regarded as perhaps the worst of all diseases, 
insofar as it represents the utter collapse of reason.
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To this day there remains a tendency to stigmatize a child who has trouble regulat-
ing his emotions. If not the child himself who is seen as responsible for his externaliz-
ing or internalizing problems, then we lay the blame on some external cause: his genes 
perhaps, or his parents, or his peers, or the media. Unfortunately, the likelihood is that 
the child who is having self-regulating problems will be exposed to experiences that 
only serve to exacerbate those problems. The challenge that we face, if we are to over-
come this archaic attitude, is only partly a matter of better understanding the develop-
mental pathways involved in emotion-regulation; on a conceptual level, we also need 
to consider the limitations in the original Greek view of emotions.
6.  The positive role of emotions
There could be no more telling indication of the persisting influence of Stoic thought 
on modern sensibilities than the fact that we so often still speak of “emotion-regulation” 
full-stop, as if basic emotions constitute elemental forces – Plato’s “wild horses” – that 
need to be reined in, without considering the regulating role of emotions (Lewis et al. 
in press). According to contemporary ‘affect program’ theorists (Ekman 1992), basic 
emotions are triggered by a selective range of stimuli, setting off a wave of physiologi-
cal, behavioral and experiential responses that the child cannot regulate himself due 
to his under-developed Executive Functions. If, for example, a baby starts to become 
angry, the emotion will, if the child is left alone, keep escalating until sheer exhaus-
tion forces the system to shut down.8 The caregiver must thus exercise this regulating 
function until such time as the relevant prefrontal systems can support this function 
on their own (Fox & Calkins 2003).
On one line of thinking, then, it has taken us 2000 years to bring these ancient 
Greek insights to fruition; but on another line of thinking, it has taken us this long 
to overcome the moralism associated with emotion-regulation. It has also taken us 
this long to get to the point where we can recognize a deep tension running through-
out Western thought between the idea that emotions are something that need to be 
regulated and the idea that through appropriate caregiving practices we can enhance 
the regulating role of emotions. The problem was that these caregiving practices were 
viewed as a means of controlling a disruptive element in the psyche rather than as 
8.  In fact, this is a strategy some parents use for hyper-active children who cannot calm 
down for bed: i.e. they just let them keep running until utter exhaustion kicks in, or they might 
let the child cry itself to sleep. See (Calkins & Hill 2007) on the long-term consequences of 
these strategies.
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recruiting this very element of the psyche in the development of the capacities that 
enable one to enjoy a meaningful life.
We now possess abundant evidence showing how important it is for mental health 
that a child learns how to control her negative emotions (Bradley 2000). But the study 
of emotion-regulation is not just concerned with the control of fear, anxiety, anger, and 
frustration; equally important are goal selection, interest, motivation, curiosity, cogni-
tive flexibility, effective decision-making, calmness, and contentment. In other words, 
positive emotions can play an energizing and even a regulating role, while negative 
emotions (anger, fear, anxiety, sadness) need to be controlled. Furthermore, there is a 
dynamic interplay between negative and positive emotion-regulation in different con-
texts: e.g. a transition between them, or a positive reframing of potentially embarrass-
ing, frustrating or frightening circumstances (Diamond & Aspinwall 2003).
Developmental neuroscientists have gone still further and have looked at the cru-
cial role of emotion in the consolidation of synaptic connections (Tucker et al. 2000) 
and in the integration of various parts of the brain involved in spontaneous cognitive 
activities of all kinds (Lewis 2004). Tucker and Lewis have proposed the metaphor of 
vertical integration along a “neuroaxis” as a way of understanding the sorts of top-
down and bottom-up coordination involved in emotion-regulation (Tucker 2007; 
Lewis 2005). The neuroaxis is conceptualized as proceeding from the lowest or most 
primitive level of the brain (the brain stem) to the most advanced (i.e. phylogenetically 
newest) structures in the cerebral cortex. The idea here is that the oldest levels are the 
most structured at birth. These are the automatic perceptual and behavioral programs 
that flow up the neuroaxis: i.e. stimulus-response systems formed in our prehistory. 
At the upper end are the highly plastic structures that are shaped by the child’s experi-
ences (Tucker 2001; Lewis 2005; Lewis & Todd 2007).
The more there is ‘synchrony’ between these different levels of the neuroaxis the 
more stable and flexible is the brain’s response to a stimulus. Equally important is the 
number of systems involved, their amplitude, and their processing efficiency. That is, 
some forms of regulation are more constricting than others, in terms of being in an 
optimal state for learning to occur (see Shanker 2010). This is especially true in the 
case of autism, where reactive self-regulating mechanisms strongly inhibit the child’s 
capacity to engage in those early social experiences that are essential for the develop-
ment of effortful self-control (see Shanker et al. in preparation). But the same point 
also applies to voluntary forms of self-regulation.
For example, if it requires a great deal of effort to remain calm, the child might 
have little remaining capacity to attend to what her caregiver is saying. Or if a child 
deals with her feelings of distress or anxiety by withdrawal, she might be cutting him-
self off from experiences that are necessary for the development of the ‘social’ brain 
network (Shanker et al. in preparation). Similarly, a child who regulates herself by, e.g. 
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self-stimming or perseverating might be able to maintain a feeling of relative calm, but 
such actions will significantly inhibit the child’s capacity to attend to other aspects of 
her environment (Casenhiser in preparation; Casenhiser et al. in preparation).
It might be tempting to view the neuroaxis as exemplifying the view that emotion 
and reason reside at opposite poles. That is, emotions would occupy the lower levels of 
the neuroaxis, the source of automatic responses to stimuli, and the uppermost level 
would be the home of Executive Functions, where reason serves to tame the impulses 
surging up from below. But Lewis has repeatedly stressed that “in every part of the 
brain, from the cerebral cortex to the brain stem, it is usually impossible to assign 
either cognitive or emotional functions to any particular structure” (Lewis & Todd 
2007). That is, all brain processes have cognitive aspects such as appraisal (i.e. inter-
pretation of the world) or self-monitoring (i.e. appraisal of the self) and emotional 
response aspects (i.e. an urge to act in keeping with those interpretations; Lewis 2005).
What this argument amounts to is the claim that brain systems cannot be parsed 
into psychological categories: i.e. it is impossible to assign strictly cognitive or emo-
tional functions to any particular structure, and even if one chose to do so, many struc-
tures become synchronized in all neural functions, so trying to distinguish between 
them is a bit like trying to separate the woodwinds from the strings in a melody. What 
we see are “whole brain” processes in which a stimulus ends up exciting everything 
in the brain, some systems more so than others, and cognition and emotion are both 
involved in every response.9
In one sense this conclusion has been known for some time: it goes back to a point 
that Anthony Kenny made famous in his classic paper on ‘The Homunculus Fallacy’ 
that, for strictly logical reasons, concepts that apply to a person cannot be applied to 
parts of that person (e.g. brain systems; see Kenny 1971). But there is a deeper issue 
at stake: one that relates to the Greek bifurcationist view of the mind. For the Greek 
model of emotion-regulation is grounded in their picture of emotions and reason as 
9.  For example, sensory input makes its way to the amygdala very quickly, and also to the 
frontal cortex, which has inhibitory (regulatory) connections back to the amygdala and the 
rest of the limbic system (and probably also back to the sensory cortex aiding it in its percep-
tual tasks). Young children have stronger reactions to stimulation (e.g. they are more easily 
frightened by loud noises, etc) either because the amygdala overreacts or because it is under-
inhibited by the PFC. The PFC also regulates thalamic (n. reticularis) input to the cortex, so 
as it matures, the PFC becomes capable of reducing the effects of input: sort of shutting off 
the stimulation at the faucet. We call this habituation, or sensory gating, and this isn’t as pos-
sible in those with damaged frontal lobes. Activation in the amygdala energizes the cortex by 
activating the stress responses, increasing cortical activation and increasing the likelihood 
that the PFC will typically shut down the stimulation cycle somewhat.
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residing in different parts of the psyche; and it is precisely this picture that we need to 
transcend if we are to understand how self-regulation involves ‘whole mind’ as much 
as ‘whole brain’ processes.
7.  The critical role of affect signals in self-regulation
As touched on above, Marc Lewis, more than any other contemporary emotion theo-
rist, has drawn attention to the fact that it is impossible to parse neural systems into 
separate cognitive and emotion functions (Lewis 2005). Lewis’s point is that systems 
up and down the ‘neuroaxis’ are so tightly bound together, or involved in multiple 
functions, that it is impossible to assign strictly cognitive or emotion functions to any 
particular structure. But as Lewis has explained in his recent writings, this discovery 
should not be in the least surprising, given how tightly interwoven cognitive and emo-
tional elements are at the psychological level (Lewis et al. in press).
It was precisely in order to explain how this interweaving comes about that we 
introduced the notion of emotional transformations in The First Idea: i.e. the idea that 
in the first two years of life emotional, cognitive, communicative and social processes 
become increasingly bound together as the result of infant-caregiver emotional inter-
actions (Shanker & Greenspan 2007). To be sure, as Kagan showed early on in his 
career, some infants can be extremely sensitive to novel stimuli (Kagan 1989); but even 
here the caregiver’s responses can play a critical role in the child’s development of 
effortful control (Greenspan & Shanker 2004).
The crux of Lewis’ neuroaxis hypothesis is that the more time there is between 
stimulus and response, the more opportunity to select the most beneficial action. But, 
of course, the big question is: how do a child’s experiences help to stretch out the time 
between stimulus and response? The answer to this question, we argued, lies in these 
emotional interactions that the child experiences with her caregivers. What is involved 
here is not simply learning such things as strategies for reducing one’s fear or anxiety, 
but the very meanings that a child comes to associate with a stimulus, which serve to 
stretch out the time between stimulus and response.
The critical role of the caregiver’s subtle affect signals in this process is a point 
that is easily overlooked. Consider, for example, the famous example from LeDoux 
of a child who sees what looks like a snake on the path: the thalamus, which first 
receives the signal, interprets it as a snake and stimulates the amygdala to produce a 
fear response. On Ledoux’ reading, the visual cortex, with its more refined perceptual 
discrimination, also receives the signal from the thalamus and, if it determines that the 
object is a stick and not a snake, sends a message to the amygdala that quells the fear 
or stress response (LeDoux 1996).
Neuroscientists have added considerably to the complexity of this story. Instead of 
a linear stimulus-response-reappraisal sequence, they argue for a complex interaction 
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between the limbic system and the outer layers of the cortex, in which limbic reso-
nance guides focused perception and reappraisal (Lewis et al. in press; Tucker 2001). 
But what is the nature of the experience that leads to this complex dynamic process?
It could, of course, simply be trial-and-error: e.g. through repeated exposures to 
snakes and sticks, the brain learns how to distinguish between the two. But note how 
phrasing the argument in this manner runs the risk of succumbing to the mereo-
logical fallacy (Bennet & Hacker 2003). For it is the child who learns to distinguish 
between snakes and sticks, not a part of the child’s brain. And the reason why this 
classic philosophical argument is so relevant here isn’t simply because it clarifies the 
logical grammar of reappraisal as a person-concept: it is because it draws attention 
to the importance of viewing reappraisal as a higher-order, developmental outcome, 
comparable to the sort of self-modifying algorithms used in pattern-recognition 
systems.
That is, if it is the child who learns to distinguish between snakes and sticks, then 
this raises the obvious question of how. Perhaps there are some children who carefully 
scrutinize the various objects in their environment and thereby learn to differentiate; 
but far more often it is how the caregiver responds to a stimulus, or to her infant’s 
response to a stimulus, that leads to the sort of reappraisal described by LeDoux. For 
example, an anxious or startled response from the caregiver will often result in a simi-
lar behavior in the infant, as will utter indifference on the part of the caregiver. Indeed, 
depending on how the caregiver responds, the infant might become terrified by the 
sight of sticks (i.e. mom suffers from a form of hylophobia); fascinated by the sight 
of sticks (is it suitable for termite-fishing); excited by the sight of sticks (kindling for 
the cooking fire); aware of a stick’s communicative significance (signifying “turn left 
here”; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986), and so on. It is through a caregiver’s actions and 
reactions that an infant is typically led to appraise or reappraise as the case might be.
What brought this particular example to mind was the fascinating new book by 
Lynne Isbell documenting how our visual system evolved in an ecology that our pri-
mate ancestors shared with snakes (Isbell 2009). What she shows in convincing detail 
is that there do appear to be human perceptual biases in the detection of evolution-
arily relevant threat stimuli (cf. LoBue & DeLoache 2008). The fascinating studies by 
Cook and Minkea showed that monkeys quickly learn to be afraid of snakes if they see 
another monkey react fearfully to the sight of a snake, yet display no such response 
to the digitally-altered video of monkeys responding fearfully to the sight of flowers 
(Cook & Mineka 1989). Yet as Clara Moskowitz has remarked, “babies and very young 
children do not usually fear snakes” (LiveScience March 5, 2008).
In other words, the fact that we have these perceptual biases does not entail that 
we are born with an innate fear of snakes, any more than we are born with an innate 
fear of beach balls because we duck if one comes at our head. Rather, a child’s cogni-
tive/emotional perceptual acts and appraisals are, as Lewis has argued, inextricably 
bound together precisely because they are molded by a caregiver’s (or another agent’s) 
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responses. It is through her caregiver’s affect cues that the child learns to look at the 
stick. Indeed, looking, on this argument, might always involve this sort of cognitive/
emotional nexus (see Lewis et al. in press).
Such an argument is very much based on the sort of classic studies done by 
Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert (1985) showing that by 12 months babies use visual 
information from their caregiver’s face to make sense of new or confusing situations. 
Indeed, Phillipe Rochat showed that as early as 9 months an infant will hesitate cross-
ing the deep side of a visual cliff if their mother expresses fear (Rochat 2001), and 
that at 10 months infants begin to attend carefully to a caregiver’s reactions to a novel 
stimulus (like Striano & Rochat’s [2000] toy barking dog). But the argument is also 
more than just a bit reminiscent of the Stoic argument about ‘first movements’ that we 
looked at above, as indeed is the argument about emotional transformations that we 
shall examine in the next section.
8.  The emotional transformation of stimulus-response connections
The basic principle of the concept of emotional transformations that we described 
in The First Idea is that infants initially experience a limited number of global states, 
for example, stillness, excitement, distress (Fox & Calkins 2003). A caregiver’s calm-
ing interactions enable the infant to experience soothing pleasure and interest in 
the caregiver’s sounds and sights, and to form the sensory-affect-motor connections 
involved in, e.g. turning to look at the caregiver. In this way, certain emotional pro-
clivities, such as pleasurable interest in soothing sounds, begin to differentiate from 
these global states. They also differentiate nonpositive states: puzzlement, hesitation, 
irritation, etc.10
As the child’s nervous system develops, in part because of nurturing interactions, 
and the capacity to discriminate differences and organize patterns develops further, 
the infant begins to further differentiate and elaborate these global states. She does 
this through continuing interactive experiences with her caregivers. For example, as 
caregivers respond to their infants’ interests with different types of smiles and joyful 
sounds, we often observe the infant expressing a range of pleasurable smiles and a 
deepening sense of joy and security.
Through continuing human interactions of this type, infants associate more and 
more specific subjective qualities with selective physical sensations. For example, the 
sound of the voice registers as a sensation, but it is also either pleasurable or aversive. 
10.  I am grateful to Marc Lewis for pointing this out; as he remarked in a personal commu-
nication, these nonpositive states also contribute significantly to elaborating the world.
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Mother’s touch is a tactile sensation that also may be soothing or overstimulating. 
Every experience that a child undergoes involves this form of association. Both aspects 
of a child’s perceptions, the physical and the emotional, are bound together. Thus, a 
hug feels tight and secure or tight and frightening; a surface feels cold and aversive or 
cold and pleasant, a mobile looks colorful and interesting or colorful and frightening.
These emotional associations can have an almost infinite degree of subtle varia-
tion so that each child’s sense of pleasure or security is unique and highly textured. 
A child’s ability to choose between different goals is very much a function of these 
emotional associations. By the time an infant has begun to choose between goals she 
has gone through a series of progressively more complex emotional transformations, 
in which the affect patterns described above come to give rise to and then orchestrate 
a large range of cognitive, communicative and social processes.
As just noted, in the first stage the child begins to forge sensory-affect-motor con-
nections (0–3 months). Pleasurable, affective experiences, along with growing motor 
control, enable a baby to begin to respond with actions, such as reaching towards a 
pleasurable touch and turning away from an unpleasant one. In this manner motor 
responses quickly move beyond reflexes and become part of a sensory-affect-motor 
pattern. That is, affect serves as a mediator between sensation and motor response, 
connecting the two together. This basic unit of sensory-affect-motor response becomes 
more and more established through infant-caregiver interactions.
In order to form these connections, a baby must experience positive emotions. 
For example, because she finds the stimulus pleasurable the baby turns towards the 
sound of her mother’s voice or turns to look for her smiling face. If the experience is 
unpleasant, primitive neural systems trigger an automatic response to avoid the expe-
rience, thereby inhibiting the formation of the stimulus-affect-motor connections that 
will underpin the child’s subsequent development of effortful control.
To forge the sensory-affect-motor connections, individual differences must be 
attended to. Infants vary considerably in how they attend to sounds, sights, touches, 
smells, and movements. Some are very sensitive and require more soothing, while 
others are under-reactive and require more energetic wooing. Some quickly turn 
towards the source of a sound while others take more time to develop this skill. Simi-
larly, some infants begin to recognize visual or auditory patterns fairly quickly and 
others more slowly. Thus caregivers have to tailor their interactions to their baby’s 
individual preferences and abilities. The better that caregivers can adjust their behav-
iors to the child’s biological profile the better the dyad displays ‘goodness-of-fit’ in 
their interactions (Thomas & Chess 1984). Should a caregiver fail to recognize the 
child’s negative reactions or respond appropriately to a child’s overtures, the child may 
become subdued and withdrawn or adopt reactive defensive behaviors such as gaze 
aversion or arching his back and straining to turn away (Beebe & Jaffe 2008; Downing 
2008; Spitz 1965; Tronick 1989).
126 Stuart Shanker
By no means, then, is a child’s ability to engage in shared gaze or to recognize 
social and communicative patterns simply a maturational phenomenon. Rather, the 
caregiver must engage in a variety of subtle affective behaviors, both soothing and 
arousing, that are finely tuned to the child’s individual sensory proclivities, in order 
to promote the development of these capacities (Greenspan 1997). A baby must be 
enticed by the emotional rhythm of the caregiver’s voice, big smiles and gleaming eyes, 
to look or listen to interesting sounds and sights if she is to progress beyond the very 
simple stimulus-response sequences that she displays at birth and begin to engage in 
shared gaze.
In the second stage of affective transformation, the child develops a more intimate 
relationship with her caregiver (2–5 months). With warm nurturing the baby becomes 
progressively more invested in and interested in her caregivers, whom she can now 
distinguish from other adults. Positive and often joyful emotions enable her to coor-
dinate gaze, listening, and movement in synchronous and purposeful interactions. 
Through these affective interactions she begins to discern patterns in her caregivers’ 
voices and affect signals. She begins to discriminate their emotional interests, such as 
joy, indifference, and annoyance, and to recognize the emotional significance of facial 
expressions or vocalizations.
In the third stage of affective transformation, the child begins to master the abil-
ity to engage in purposeful two-way interactions (4–10 months). For this to happen, 
caregivers need to read and respond to the baby’s emotional signals and challenge the 
baby to read and respond to theirs. Through these interactions, the baby begins to 
engage in back-and forth emotional signaling. The 6-month-old smiles eagerly at her 
mother, gets a warm smile back, and then smiles again, even more expansively. Differ-
ent motor gestures – facial expressions, vocalizations, arm movements – become part 
of this signaling, which now harnesses a broad range of emotions (pleasure, curiosity, 
assertiveness, fear, etc.), sensations (touch, taste, sights, sounds, odours), purposeful 
movements, and emerging social patterns.
By 8 months, many of these exchanges usually occur in a row. The infant is now 
using purposeful affective signaling to orchestrate the different components of her 
central nervous system in an integrated manner. She is beginning to use her purpose-
ful activity in affective interactions to form higher-level cognitive, communicative 
and social skills: for example, searching in the caregiver’s hand for her rattle, recipro-
cally exchanging a variety of sounds, and initiating facial expressions and gestures to 
achieve closeness, such as reaching out to be picked up.
Through these increasingly complex interactions, the child acquires implicit 
knowledge of the social and communicative patterns that will serve as a framework 
for her growing understanding of her world: what is felt, said, and done, and what is 
unacceptable, not said or not done. Through the endless smiles, head nods, friendly 
gestures, animated movements, etc. that she encounters in her countless interactions 
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with her caregivers, the child is learning to read and respond to the social and emo-
tional cues of others as well as to communicate her own. These meaningful patterns 
involving the back-and-forth reading and responding to each other’s emotional signals 
enable the toddler to begin forming for herself the social patterns, cultural norms, 
rules (including obligations) that characterize her family, community and culture.
In the fourth stage of affective transformation, which we call shared social problem- 
solving, the infant learns to sustain a continuous flow of back-and-forth affective com-
munication in order to collaborate with a caregiver in solving affective, meaningful 
problems (9–18 months). For example, the 14-month-old infant takes the caregiver by 
the hand and, with a series of emotional gestures and vocalizations, gets the caregiver 
to go over to the toy area, points at and vocalizes about the desired toy up on the shelf, 
and manages to get the caregiver to pick her up to reach for the desired object. In these 
complex interactions, the infant is further developing the capacities outlined above – 
to read and respond to a broad range of emotional and social signals as a basis for 
forming patterns that include a growing sense of self and expectations from others as 
well as social and cultural norms.
9.  Developmental pathways
As was noted above, infants and children differ in their basic responses to sensations. 
Certain types of touch, sound, or smell, for example, may be soothing to one infant 
and overstimulating to another (i.e. an infant may be hyper- or hyporeactive to a 
given sensation). The same sound can be stimulating and pleasant for one child and 
piercing and shrill for another. These physical differences can be experienced with 
a near-infinite range of subjective affective coloring, depending on early caregiver-
infant interactions. For example, how a caregiver soothes or overreacts to her infant’s 
hypersensitivity to touch will influence her subjective experience of that sensation. Or 
they might vary for the individual child according to her arousal state, which itself can 
be highly variable.
As an infant constructs a subjective emotional world, “experience” and physi-
ologic expression continuously influence one another. Subtle reading and respond-
ing to an infant’s emotional cues as part of a reciprocal interaction keeps refining her 
physiologic and emotional experience and expression. Growing central nervous sys-
tem organization serves to organize and facilitate the expression of ever more complex 
and refined interactive emotional experiences.
To be sure, basic properties of the child’s neurobiology constrain the sorts of 
demands or challenges we might impose on a child; but it is the nature of the demands 
or challenges that we impose through our emotional interactions which dictate how 
that child’s neurobiology is going to develop. It also goes without saying that an initial 
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biological deficit can have a powerful effect on the kinds of social experiences that a 
child is receptive to or seeks out, which may further reduce the input to certain neu-
ral systems whose development hinges on these social experiences. But that does not 
mean that it is impossible for the child to engage in the sorts of experiences that will 
provide these neural systems with the needed input.
For example, recent research has demonstrated that a shortage of dopamine – a 
neurohormone that supports the ability to wait for a reward – might be a critical fac-
tor in the development of attentional problems (Sagvolden et al. 2005). Sagvolden’s 
model raises the question of whether, if a child is born with a short version of the 
genes involved in the production of dopamine, there is a heightened risk that in 
stressful conditions these might be turned off prematurely, with the result that the 
child has a shortage of dopamine and thus experiences delay as aversive (see Rueda 
et  al. 2007). Such a child would then be prone to engage in behaviors that favour 
immediate reward.
If no effort is made to lengthen the time-frame in which a reward must be 
delivered in order for it to be associated with a behavior, or to help the child deal 
with distractions, or to help the child develop the capacity to self-organize and see a 
task through to completion, or even to choose between equally attractive goals, the 
child’s craving for instant gratification could well result in a lack of input to the parts 
of the brain regulating inhibitory control. This outcome might be especially true in 
the case of a highly anxious caregiver who perhaps herself suffers from a shortage of 
dopamine and thus responds to her child’s ‘delay aversion’ by constantly catering to 
the child’s need for rapid gratification, thereby exacerbating the under-development 
of the parts of the brain that not only help regulate the time-window in which a 
behavior can be associated with a reward, but which enable the child to recognize 
and remember patterns.
Similarly, a sensory hyper-reactivity to visual stimuli might lead a child to avoid 
those face-to-face interactions with her caregiver that are crucial if the fusiform gyrus 
is to receive the inputs that it needs to become fully functioning in the recognition of 
facial expressions of emotion. Not surprisingly, when imaging studies were conducted 
on adult subjects with autism, it was discovered that there was a striking lack of activity 
in the fusiform gyrus. This led researchers to question whether autism was somehow 
the result of a genetic malfunction in the fusiform gyrus itself or some ‘lower’ system 
feeding into it (Baron-Cohen 1995). But a discovery by Morton Gernsbacher and her 
colleagues at the University of Minnesota revealed a more complex developmental 
picture (Gernsbacher et al. 2003).
Adults with autism were shown photographs of actors displaying happiness, 
anger or fear, half of the photographs with the agent’s eyes looking straight ahead 
and half with their eyes averted. There was indeed a significant diminishment in 
the activation of their right fusiform gyrus, along with a significant increase in the 
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activation of centres involved in conflict monitoring and the detection of threat, 
when these subjects viewed the eyes-straight-ahead photographs. But there was no 
comparable effect when the subjects viewed the photographs in which the actors’ 
eyes were averted. Thus, the Gernsbacher study suggests that subjects with autism 
avert their gaze in order to reduce the stress that is created in direct social encoun-
ters. That is, the explanation for this behaviour would indeed appear to lie in sensory 
over-reactivity to social/visual stimuli, not in a specific malfunction of a ‘dedicated’ 
face-processing system.
The upshot of this way of thinking, then, is that an initial neurological deficit 
constrains the child’s dyadic interactions, which results in reduced social input and 
thence decreased activation of specialized systems for functions like face processing, 
reading emotions, social orienting, and social motivation, which in turn constrains 
the child’s capacity to engage in these very social interactions and has other measur-
able effects on brain development. A neurobiological deficit at birth or in the early 
years that obstructs these interactive experiences can thus result in a reduction of the 
input on which the development of these systems depends. If these neural systems are 
deprived of the input needed for their development, this can further impinge on the 
child’s willingness or ability to engage in the necessary social experiences, resulting in 
a further constriction in the network of capacities necessary for healthy development 
(Segalowitz & Shmidt 2007).
The developmental pathways model, as so stated, sounds like the most modern 
of theories, grounded as it is in contemporary theories of physiological reactivity and 
the integration of neural systems; and yet, as we have tried to show in this paper, the 
pathway on which Western thinkers have looked at the interaction between biology 
and emotion-regulation has been surprisingly constant. Far from construing this as a 
philosophical constraint, however, we see this as a tradition that has opened our minds 
to the possibilities of enhancing children’s healthy mental development.
10.  A plea for philosophy
The title of this paper alludes to two different lenses for looking at emotion- 
regulation: one historical and the other developmental. On the one hand, emotion-
regulation has operated as an archetypal, even a defining theme in the history of West-
ern views about healthy mental functioning. On the other hand, it is a psychological 
lens for studying the development of this core capacity throughout the lifespan. Inter-
estingly, the ancient Greeks were already aware of this ambiguity.
Being the great poet that he was, Homer provides us with all sorts of clues 
right from the outset of The Iliad that foreshadow Achilles’ eventual collapse. Yet 
much of the drama of the poem derives from the fact that all of his peers are utterly 
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dumbfounded by his breakdown. It is a tension that we are all too familiar with 
at Milton and Ethel Harris Initiative in York University (see www.mehri.ca), given 
our interest in the early detection of autism. We know that, for many children with 
autism, things appear to be going well in the beginning but then the disorder sud-
denly emerges, often but not necessarily because of some precipitating event. Yet 
when we view early videos of cases of regressive autism it seems that we can, in fact, 
discern some subtle sign of the disorder (see Bayrami 2010).
The Achilles who has not been tested emotionally is really still an adolescent. It is 
only when he is subjected to stresses unlike anything he has hitherto experienced that 
his emotions become uncontrollable. When we look at the normative development 
of emotion-regulation we see an interesting parallel. When problems in emotion-
regulation appear suddenly, out of blue as it were, it is typically at a major transition-
point. It seems likely that what has happened is that the child was able to deal with the 
range of challenges or demands that she was exposed to until then but the sudden shift 
stretches her beyond her capacity to stay regulated.
For example, the Rimm-Kaufmann study, cited above, suggests that for many chil-
dren the transition from a home or nurturing daycare environment to a classroom is 
quite difficult. This is not the first and certainly not the last of such critical transition-
points the child will have to deal with. There is another one, from example, in the 
move from grade 6 to 7, or when they enter puberty or go to college. In other words, 
we need to take a longitudinal perspective on the ongoing development of emotion-
regulation: a point that has been reinforced by developmental neuroscientists who 
have identified periods of extreme brain lability that occur at the same time as some of 
these ‘transition-points’.
Jay Giedd’s work has been especially influential in this respect (Giedd et al. 2004). 
Giedd has shown that, while a child enters kindergarten with 95% of her adult brain, 
her grey matter continues to thicken over the years of elementary schooling and there 
is a sharp growth spurt in the PFC just before puberty. At puberty there begins another 
critical phase of synaptic pruning, which appears to be pivotal for the individual’s sub-
sequent self-regulatory abilities over the course of their lifetime. The experiences that 
the adolescent engages in at this time turn out to critical for the wiring of the self-
regulation network (Giedd 2002).11 In a particularly memorable image, the adolescent 
brain has been likened to a race car without a skilled driver at the wheel (Steinberg 
2005). It is clearly highly significant that adolescence marks the peak age of onset for 
many psychiatric disorders (see Paus, Keshavan & Giedd 2008).
In order for the child’s emotion-regulation to continue to grow and strengthen 
over the school years, she must continue to undergo the types of experiences that 
11.  Giedd, J. Inside the teenage brain. Frontline, Jan 31, 2002
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nurture these core capacities. It is highly important that by the time she enters school 
the child has developed a number of strategies for dealing with sensations or situa-
tions that render her anxious or frustrated. It is equally important that we consider 
sorts of experiences that will promote the development of her positive emotions, such 
as sports, music, art, drama, clubs. But at the top of this list – at least as far as con-
cerns the young adult – Plato would have us consider the role of philosophy.
Plato’s view of philosophy as a “medical art for the soul” – what Cicero was to call 
the medicina mentis – inspired a philosophical tradition that runs all the way from 
Arcesilaus, who took over as Head of the Academy in the third century B.C., to the 
present article. Just as Achilles serves an example of what happens to the thumoeidic 
individual when they are raised in the wrong way, so the stories about Socrates are sup-
posed to represent an example of how thumos can be “relaxed” by “soothing stories” 
and made “gentle by means of harmony and rhythm” (Rep. 441e).
Plato’s core idea was that philosophical reflection can enhance an individual’s con-
trol over his or her emotions. A great deal of thought went into the stories that are told 
in the dialogues, which ebb and flow in much the way that conversations do, which 
balance off characters and ideas against one another, which endeavour to soothe the 
psuchē and to excite certain desires or appetites, such as for justice, or indeed, for 
health. Thus, the dialogues do not operate as instruction manuals for how to achieve 
mental health but rather, are meant to guide the reader to this result. Like a dramatic 
poet, the language that Plato uses and the structure of the story are critical factors in 
this healing process.
Whatever one might feel about the importance that Plato assigned to the writ-
ten word,12 what is of utmost importance is his emphasis on the need to understand 
the nature of mental health before one can consider the experiences that promote 
12.  Plato’s view of the power of the written word dates back to the ancient Greek shamans, 
according to whom the incantation of words, the manner in which they are expressed, have a 
special power to operate on the human mind These are the epôdai, the magic charms that, as 
Laín Entralgo showed in his classic The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity, are crucial 
to Plato’s view of philosophy (see also Nussbaum 1994: 49ff). This is the point that lies behind 
Socrates’ argument in the Laches that medicine needs “to proceed beyond Hippocrates” (pros 
tô Hippocratei) if it is to treat disease effectively, whether it be mental or physical. The context 
for this argument is as follows: Socrates tells the young Charmides, who has asked for his help 
in treating a headache, that he learned a cure from a Thracian physician that involves admin-
istering a plant and uttering an epôdê. Socrates emphasizes that the important lesson here is 
that “one should not attempt to cure the body apart from the psuchē. And this … is the very 
reason why most diseases are beyond the Greek doctors, that they do not pay attention to the 
whole as they ought to do, since if the whole is not in good condition, it is impossible that the 
part should be. Because… the soul is the source both of bodily health and bodily disease for 
the whole man, and these flow from the psuchē” (Char 156de). And these epôdai “consist of 
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it. And what is fascinating is the extent to which Western thought has remained 
so heavily dominated by Plato’s outlook: like Moliere’s physician, we still look at 
emotion-regulation through Plato’s lens, even if we are not fully aware of the fact.
To appreciate the significance of this point, just consider how the Iliad is ultimately 
a story about a monumental culture shift, one that deeply informs everything that we 
now take for granted when we study emotion-regulation. As his listeners would have 
fully realized, Homer was depicting the transition from an ancient ethos, in which 
warriors who would go beserk in battle were prized, to the dawning of a new culture 
that valued the importance of staying in control of one’s emotions. Plato went to great 
lengths to make this theme explicit. He employs the figure of Achilles to shift our focus 
from a preoccupation with extrinsic rewards (e.g. the trappings of public status) to a 
meditation on the psychic well-being of the individual.
Over and over Plato compares mental with physical health so as to question what 
would constitute ‘mental health’ and how one would attain such a state (Gorgias 504). 
He argues that, just as someone who eats and exercises properly will experience what 
is termed “health,” so someone who tempers their appetites and desires and is unafraid 
of death will flourish. This is very much the underlying theme in the long discussion 
on the nature of justice in the Republic. Plato argues that “just and unjust actions are no 
different for the psuchē than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body. … Virtue 
(aretē) seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and well-being of the psuchē, 
while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness” (Rep 444d).
Plato’s most explicit statement on mental health occurs in the Timaeus, which, for 
historical reasons, is amongst the most important of all Plato’s writings on the subject; 
for the Timaeus was the only one of his texts widely available in Latin in late antiquity 
and the Middle Ages. The Timaeus presents a comprehensive review of the Hippo-
cratic theory of disease, which culminates in the critical claim that:
diseases of the psuchē that result from a bodily condition come about in the 
following way. It must be granted, surely, that mindlessness is the disease of the 
psuchē, and of mindlessness there are two kinds. One is madness, and the other is 
ignorance. … The diseases that pose the gravest dangers for the psuchē are excessive 
pleasures and pains. When a man enjoys himself too much or, in the opposite case, 
when he suffers great pain, and he exerts himself to seize the one and avoid the 
other in opportune ways, he lacks the ability to see or hear anything right. He goes 
raving mad and is at that moment least capable of rational thought”.  (Tim 86bc)
What Plato is arguing here is that the humoral theory of physical disease does not suf-
fice to explain mental disease; for the problems that need to be explained for the latter 
beautiful words. It is a result of such words that sōphrosunē arises in the psuchē, and when the 
psuchē acquires and possess sōphrosunē, it is easy to provide health” (157a).
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are why someone has trouble regulating his emotions, why he overindulges his appe-
tites or fails to attend to his proper needs. And the latter dimension of human behavior 
cannot, he insisted, be reduced to biological causes.
There is an important argument in the Phaedo in which Socrates belittles 
Anaxagoras for failing to recognize the difference between reasons and causes.13 
Socrates’ criticism of Anaxagoras represents the first attack on materialism in West-
ern thought. Just as a man’s actions cannot be explained by examining the operations 
of his bones and sinews, so a man’s mental illness cannot be explained by measuring 
the levels of the four humours. That is, you cannot explain why Achilles behaves in 
the manner that he does by arguing that he has too much choler in his blood; for the 
question that concerns us is precisely why he has this overabundance of choler; and 
that, according to Plato, is not simply a matter of biology – i.e. not simply something 
he was born with – but rather, is a question that can only be explained by studying 
the development of his psuchē. Moreover, mental health occurs, not because there is 
a balance between the body’s four humours, but rather, because reason is in control 
of the different components of the mind,14 tempering and overseeing the individual’s 
bodily and thumoeidic desires and thereby resulting in humoral balance.15
13.  The term is Wittgenstein’s but it was Plato who saw the problem first. Anaxogoras, 
Socrates scornfully insists, “would mention other such [physical] causes for my talking to 
you: sounds and air and hearing, and a thousand other such things, but he would neglect to 
mention the true causes, that, after the Athenians decided it was better to condemn me, for 
this reason it seemed best to me to sit here and more right to remain and to endure whatever 
penalty they ordered. … To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without 
bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be 
right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best 
course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not 
being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able 
to act as a cause.” (Phaedo 99)
14.  There has been much debate over whether Plato was being literal when he argued that 
the psuchē is composed of three elements (Rep. 580d): reason, thumos, and the appetites (cor-
responding to the three classes in his ideal state: the Rules, Auxiliaries, and the Producers). 
The point that concerns us here is Plato’s emphasis on the need for harmony imposed from 
above between the different elements of the mind (“justice”) if the individual is to enjoy a state 
of mental health. Essentially what he is saying is that we have different kinds of drives and 
desires, ‘higher’ and ‘lower’. The ‘lower’ are innate; they are what we share with animals, what 
governs the actions of an infant. If these lower desires are given free reign this will lead to a 
life of vice; but the ‘higher’ desires – those that separate us from animals – can lead to a life of 
virtue and justice – i.e. mental health.
15.  “To produce mental health” the components of the psuchē have to be “in a relation of 
control and being controlled” (Rep 444d).
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Achilles struck Plato as the perfect illustration of his point; for at the height of his 
frenzy when his primal emotions have been unleashed he descends to the level of a 
beast, totally out of control.16 Yet what restores him to normalcy at the end of the poem 
is not a herculean act of rational self-control, but a point that is easily overlooked: it is 
a strong positive emotion, the compassion that Achilles feels for Priam. How different 
the history of studying emotion-regulation might have been if the importance of this 
point were grasped: i.e. if it were recognized that emotions are not simply an aspect of 
the mind that need to be controlled, or worse still, suppressed: that cultivating a child’s 
positive and prosocial emotions is as important an aspect of emotion-regulation as 
learning how to control her negative ones. That is, that emotions are not simply the 
object, but also the vehicle for strengthening the mind.
The more we think about the importance of emotion-regulation for a child’s long-
term benefit, both physical and mental, the more we need to take this lesson to heart. 
Without a compensating emphasis on the importance of the affective interactions that 
nurture a child’s curiosity and interest, her security and self-esteem, desires and atti-
tudes, empathy and moral integrity, her overall happiness, we run the risk of reduc-
ing emotion-regulation to behavior management. In The Modern Art of Taming Wild 
Horses (1858), one of the classics on the importance of treating animals with kindness, 
John Solomon Rarey revealed how the secret to the extraordinary feats of the great 
Arab horsemen was that they never resorted to punishment or cruelty but rather, lov-
ingly schooled their horses in a remarkably broad range of nonverbal signals, thereby 
enhancing the communication between horse and master immeasurably. It is a point 
every bit as relevant to Plato’s constricting view of emotions as ‘wild horses’ that need 
to be controlled by a cold faculty of reason.
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When I sing to make you dance I truly know why 
there is music in leaves… 
(Rabindranath Tagore, Gitanjali, 62)
Being moved by others is central to social and cognitive development. This paper 
explores the other side of the phenomenon: that of wanting to move others. 
Within philosophy and psychotherapy several different terms have been used 
to refer to the importance of having an impact on others – being recognised, 
acknowledged, affirmed, etc. Implied in this process of moving another person to 
a reaction to oneself is being known by them in some way, allowing interpersonal 
openness and dialogue. The impact of failing to move others is evident in 
everyday life as well as in psychological research.
The central part of this paper traces the development of the desire and ability 
to move others in increasingly complex ways during the first year of human 
infancy. Starting from expectations of temporally and affectively contingent 
reactions to their actions, human infants become increasingly able to perform 
actions which are aimed directly at eliciting specific adult reactions. Clowning, 
showing-off and teasing in the second half of the first year reveal infants’ 
awareness of the links between their actions and others’ responses and a clear 
desire to repeatedly obtain some of these reactions. The paper ends by exploring 
the mutuality between being moved by others and wanting to move them: a 
mutuality which is developmentally central and maintains the moral bases of 
social relations.
Keywords: infancy; engagement; moving others; mutuality; contingency
1.  Being moved and moving others
This chapter owes its existence to two papers, both published in 2007 and the titles of 
both beginning with the phrase: On Being Moved (Hobson 2007; Bråten 2007a). In 
both cases, the point being argued was that being moved by others – in posture, in atti-
tude, in stance, in thought and in feeling, or in other words, being moved in one’s own 
orientation – is an inborn human capacity fundamental to social life. In discussing a 
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range of instances – from Adam Smith’s famous example of spectators unconsciously 
adopting the stance of the tightrope walker, to one-year-olds from different cultures 
opening their own mouths while trying to feed someone else – Stein Bråten talks of 
this capacity as emerging from the ability to be centered in another’s body: “what is 
common here in the above instances is the manifestation of an intersubjective capacity 
for participant perception, entailing that the perceiver resonates with what the other 
is doing or trying to do or say as if the perceiver’s frame of reference were bodily 
centered in the other. Hence the term ‘alter-centric’” (Bråten 2007b: 117). In a similar 
vein, Peter Hobson speaks of the ability to identify with another – an ability that he 
argues is affected to different degrees in people with autism – as being fundamental to 
being able to be moved. Speaking of its importance he writes: “The central idea is that 
being moved by others – and here I am talking about movement in subjective orienta-
tion, especially as these involve feelings and attitudes – is one of the most significant 
features of human social life. It is fundamental for experiencing people as people with 
their own subjective orientations to the world.” (Hobson 2007, italics in the original). 
That the capacity to be moved by others is fundamental to ‘typical’ social and cogni-
tive development is either implicitly accepted or explicitly supported by much recent 
research on imitation, joint attention, social referencing and so on. This paper explores 
the other side of this phenomenon: that of wanting to – and trying to – move others.
A number of philosophers have stressed the importance for human existence 
of moving others in some way. Hegel, for instance, speaks of being ‘recognised’ or 
‘acknowledged’: “Self-consciousness exists … by the fact that it exists for another self-
consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognised’.” (Hegel 
1967: 104). Bakhtin speaks of the centrality of ‘response’: “for the word (and conse-
quently for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than a lack of response” 
(Bakhtin 1986: 127). William James speaks of being ‘noticed’: “No more fiendish 
punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one 
should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members 
thereof… (from this) the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would 
make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth 
as to be unworthy of attention at all.” (James 1890/1950: 293–294).
These different terms – being acknowledged, recognised, responded to, noticed, 
attended to – are not synonymous. A fascinating dialogue between Martin Buber and 
Carl Rogers in 1957 illustrates this. Rogers suggests that his own term ‘acceptance’ 
means the same as Buber’s term ‘confirmation’ (here are two more to add to the list); 
Buber disagrees. For Buber, the term confirmation means more than acceptance of the 
other as they are; it means accepting the other as they could be – or more precisely, see-
ing the potential of the other for what they could be. To confirm another can include 
wanting them to not be as they are – provided the change that is sought is a change 
towards that which is potentially theirs (Kirschenbaum & Henderson 1990). Each of 
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these words seems to be relevant to slightly different situations. In some cases it is 
enough to be noticed that you are present in the room, in others it is your point of view 
that needs to be acknowledged or your feelings that need to be recognized, in yet oth-
ers it is you in terms of your potential for developing that needs to be confirmed. The 
multiple words nonetheless converge on three common grounds: one, they all relate 
to moving another person (the other’s attention, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, judgements, 
and so on) by something that one does, or by how one is; two, they are all closely 
bound up with the issue of being known by another in some way (being known to exist, 
to be present, to intend something, to be sincere, to be a person rather than a member 
of a category, and so on); and three, all of them are only possible if there is some kind 
of openness in the other towards oneself (in order for the other to see, notice, acknowl-
edge, confirm, recognise, accept, etc. whatever aspect of us is relevant in a particular 
situation) – an openness which allows a real ‘seeing’ of the self and genuine dialogue 
rather than its scripted appearance.
In the sections below I first ask what we know of the consequences of moving 
others or failing to move others in ordinary everyday situations and in psychological 
studies. I then ask how wanting to or seeking to move others emerges and develops in 
infancy. Finally, I ask about the mutuality between being moved and moving others 
and why it matters.
2.  Moving others in everyday life
Moving others may be important for many reasons. The simplest of these reasons is that 
it is only if you move someone else – with your being or your actions or thoughts – that 
you have evidence that they are engaged with you. Their engagement can be of the most 
minimal kind, or the most subtle, but in order for you to be aware of this engagement it 
must always involve some evidence of your impact on them.
There is no doubt that in everyday life we are disturbed by the failure to make a dif-
ference to others. You walk into an open plan office and stand uncertainly while several 
people continue working at their desks, and nobody looks up. You are literally unseen. Or 
you go up to speak to someone at a conference and wait while they are talking with some 
other important people around them. You are within their visual field, but there is no sign 
of their having noticed you (no flickering of gaze or pause as it touches you) nor of any 
intention to turn to you in due course. You are visible but appear unnoticed. Or you are at 
a party and you stand at the edge, nobody actually ignores you, but nobody talks to you 
either, and any interactions with you are brief and either awkward or instrumental, of a 
different quality to those you perceive going on around you. Your existence is acknowl-
edged, but almost as irrelevant. Or at a party, a neighbour has an odd discussion with you 
about ‘your kind of people’ – and you realize the depth of your anonymity to her, seen and 
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responded to, but not recognized as an individual, as you, assumed instead to be a mem-
ber of a category, an anyone. Or a child starts talking excitedly of his day at school and 
the parent corrects his grammar, not noticing his excitement. Or there is of course, 
the traditional doctor-patient-dialogue, noted for its monologic character in which 
the patient is heard only within strict limits. In all these cases there is a door shut in 
the engagement, someone or something else already scripted in there, the engagement 
closed rather than open.
Or there are deeper, more sinister ways of being unseen. Take this excerpt from 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, where Aleksei Karenin, described as a cold, ambitious and 
determinedly conservative man, is confronted with an insight into the consciousness 
of his unhappy wife, which he suppresses: “For the first time he vividly conjured up 
her personal life, her thoughts, her wishes; and the idea that she might, even must 
have a personal life all her own was so frightening that he hastened to drive it away. 
This was the chasm into which he dared not look” (Tolstoy 1995: 141). This denial of 
the other’s consciousness may sound extreme, but may be common enough when we 
think of it as a defensive reaction. In fact, there may be many and more pernicious 
versions of denial around us. The wife who will not believe that her husband doesn’t 
love her anymore, the husband who cannot accept the fact of a wife’s depression, the 
father who cannot bear to acknowledge that his children do not admire him, the 
teacher who refuses to see his students’ lack of respect for him and so on. The attach-
ment to a particular vision of the world is so strong that the ideal blocks out the real-
ity. A person who is confronted with a denial of this kind may suffer from its subtlety 
far more than the complete denial of person-ness that Aleksei had of Anna – which 
she, at least, could leave.
And the converse in each of these instances could serve as examples of recogni-
tion. You walk up to someone while they are talking to someone else and their body 
orients towards you slightly while they carry on talking; you go into a busy office and 
the receptionist glances up and smiles at you while she continues talking on the tele-
phone; you make a joke in a meeting and someone stifles a laugh; you telephone an old 
friend, and on hearing your voice they laugh in recognition; your eyes fill during an 
argument with someone and they suddenly stop ranting, realising something new; or 
you ask someone a question in a formal interview and it stops them short – their hesi-
tant thoughtful answer revealing their grasping of a thought previously unrecognized – 
and you know that you have literally moved the other to a different place.
3.  Moving others: Psychological research findings
Four strands of research attest to the importance for well-being of moving or not mov-
ing others (in specific ways). Research on the effects of being imitated by others shows 
that, at least in some situations, being imitated has remarkably beneficial effects on the 
 Moving others matters 143
relation between the imitator and the imitated person. In effect, being imitated can 
be seen as one form of validation, of being affirmed for what you are through another 
person’s adoption of the same action, posture, etc. (Although being imitated can also 
have exactly the opposite effect – of being mocked and ridiculed for what one is; see 
Zeedyk in preparation). Imitation can serve to open dialogue as is evident in meetings 
between people who don’t speak the same language see, for example, Darwin’s contact 
with Tierra del Fuegians (Darwin 1905) and between members of different species 
(Fossey 1983). It requires of course, that the person or animal imitated recognizes that 
they are being imitated – or at least recognises the similarity of the actions if not the 
imitative intention of the imitator. In other words, that it is their action or their posture 
that has provoked the other’s act.
The pioneering work of Jacqueline Nadel and Phoebe Caldwell has shown that 
in children and young adults with autism, being imitated leads to dramatic increases 
in communicative attempts by the autistic person. Imitation aids communication. 
Nadel used a modified version of the still-face paradigm which involved holding the 
whole body still and unmoving. A first ‘still’ condition was followed by an imitation 
condition and then by a second ‘still’ condition. While in the first ‘still’ condition 
children with autism showed little interest in or concern about the silent behavior of 
the adult, after the rather odd condition in which their behavior was imitated, they 
showed marked interest in the other and reacted to the stillness in the second ‘still’ 
condition. Nadel’s interpretation of the difference is that in the imitation condition 
the adult showed to the child that they were a human being, and that in the case of 
children with autism with few generalized social expectancies, this ‘proof ’ was neces-
sary for the absence of contingent responses to matter. In any case, the effect of see-
ing that someone is doing the same as oneself appears to have a dramatic influence 
on one’s openness to dialogue with that person (Nadel & Fontaine 1989; Nadel & 
Peze 1993). Working with adults with severe communication problems Caldwell has 
shown the dramatic changes that can follow from the therapist’s success in tuning 
into and repeating, their actions (Caldwell 2010; Zeedyk 2006). Perceiving the imita-
tion of their actions by a sensitive other in such contexts seems to act to shift them 
from their isolation to connectedness and expressions of joy. In typical adults too, 
‘unconscious mimicry’ (rather than apparently deliberate imitation) of another’s pos-
ture can lead to various positive consequences for the mimicker – more tips, more 
help, more positive appraisals, more contracts signed. And more broadly, those who 
smile more and nod more in response to others seem to be perceived as more likeable 
(Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Zeedyk 2006).
On the negative side, the impact of being ignored, or excluded or neglected 
has been shown to be generally damaging. In the social psychological litera-
ture there is considerable evidence since the 1990s that being excluded in a triadic 
social situation such as two players throwing a ball exclusively to each other and 
leaving a third player standing by, leads to intense and immediate negative effects 
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(Williams 2007; Williams, Cheung & Choi 2000). Participants report feeling 
‘awful’, and they appear to feel physically colder, as judged by their evaluations 
of room temperature and as judged by their choice of hot or cold drinks immedi-
ately after (Zhong & Leonardelli 2008). Further, the area of the brain that is acti-
vated during physical pain (the anterior cingulate cortex) is also activated during 
such social exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman & Williams 2003). What is particu-
larly interesting is that this negative reaction to being ‘ignored’ is reported to occur 
even when the excluded person is aware of some other reason for the exclusion – 
such as the imminence of a particular sequence in the game, or that the other players 
have been instructed to play it in a certain way. Even when they know that the exclu-
sion is unintentional and unmeant, it still, to put it simply, hurts.
Behaviourist training programmes which emphasise withdrawal of reinforcement – 
such as instructing children to go out of the room and sit on the ‘naughty step’ for ten 
minutes – appear to centre on this key effect. In that tradition, though, ignoring a per-
son is seen to be effective in inhibiting specific behaviours and linked to the withdrawal 
of attention. Given the supposedly brief, occasional and circumscribed nature of the 
‘ignoring’ in behaviourist training methods, there is no presumption of a more general 
deleterious effect on the well-being or interpersonal awareness of the person. Within 
parts of the psychoanalytic tradition, however, such treatment would be  considered 
as emotionally damaging. The therapist’s healing role depends squarely on relating to 
the patient as a person (Binder 2006; Rogers 1951), and on opening a dialogue which 
is genuine on both sides – a point strikingly illustrated by R. Hobson’s description of 
a frustratingly unproductive therapeutic relationship with a young adolescent boy. 
Hobson describes how one particular session became a turning point. Hobson had 
been listening to a crucial cricket match and he could not switch out of this interest 
when the client came in: “For some minutes I spontaneously and unreservedly poured 
out my opinions and feelings about the game – an unprofessional piece of behavior. 
Then I asked him what he thought about the play and at that moment – this is the vital 
point – I really needed a response. Sam smiled. For the first time. Then we began to 
talk. Together.” (Hobson 1988: 4). Ignoring can be effective in some ways, and interest-
ingly seems to work in methods for training wild or disobedient animals; in the case 
of intensely social animals such as horses, the ignoring seems to function to attract the 
animal to the ‘ignorer’ (whether human or senior horse), rather than to inhibit any 
particular behaviour directly (Roberts 1996). Some therapies for people with commu-
nication disorders explicitly reject behaviourist therapies – partly because they involve 
a necessary de-personalisation of the ‘patient’, and partly because they portray the prob-
lem as one of ‘behavior’ ignoring motivations and anxieties and subjective orientation 
(Smith & Fluck 2000).
Evidence about the frightening effects of complete neglect in infancy and early 
childhood comes from recent studies of children in Romanian orphanages (Zeedyk 
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Davies, Parry & Caldwell in press). The consequences of the harshness with which 
children in Victorian work-houses were treated might be as nothing compared to the 
consequences of neglect. Oliver Twist may have suffered both a verbal and a physical 
whiplash in response to his request for ‘more soup’. But he did at least get a response. 
Although detailed data about age-specific effects or the specific differences between 
near-complete neglect and abuse are still lacking, the overall picture is one of causing 
impoverished being. Spitz’s term ‘institutional autism’ (Spitz 1945) or the related term 
‘quasi-autistic features’ has been used to describe the effects of neglect on children – 
self-stimulating behaviours such as rocking, picking at themselves and head-banging, 
withdrawal, limited verbal expression and attachment to routines, features shown 
by 12% of the children in Romanian orphanages – have been described as a kind of 
‘learning to be autistic’ (Rutter et al. 1999, 2001).
4.  When and how do children begin to want to move others?
The literatures on which one can draw to address this developmental issue are vast 
and bedeviled with fundamentally different questions, assumptions and conclusions. 
In order to really answer the question we need to look not just at infants’ differentia-
tion between specific conditions, but at the way in which these conditions affect them 
differently. That is, we need to explore the emotional significance for infants of being 
noticed or not, of being addressed or not, of being responded to or not, of being 
emotionally ‘felt’ or not, and so on. In each of these cases the nature of the emotional 
responses of the infants can help to pull us away from sterile debates about whether 
the differentiation between conditions signifies a recognition of a ‘mere’ behaviour or 
a more intentional or psychological state in the other (see Reddy 2008 for a discus-
sion).The answers to the developmental questions in this chapter are inevitably linked 
to the answers to questions about infants’ knowledge of other minds. In order to 
perceive that one has affected the other’s subjective orientation one has to be able to 
recognize the existence of subjective orientations – and this is an issue of considerable 
metaphysical as well as theoretical debate.
The answers we have available in the discipline, like the questions, are riddled 
with differences of assumption about the nature of mind and the possibility of its avail-
ability and are, therefore, complex and often messy. In general, however, they point 
to the earliest days after birth as revealing evidence of the significance of some sort 
of interpersonal recognition, a significance which changes in complexity and form 
through the first year. In the following sections I try to describe evidence of the ways 
in which and the extent to which infants seek to affect or move others in the first year 
of life, by focusing on how infants act in response to others’ responses towards them. 
I divide the evidence into sub-sections entitled Engaging, Expecting and Exploring 
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others’ movements; these are meant to be neither chronologically nor conceptually 
exclusive. They are not stages: engaging is necessarily present in expecting and in 
exploring. Exploring is often present in engaging, and expecting is certainly present 
in exploring even if not always there in the simplest engagements. The terms, there-
fore, while not mutually exclusive, are intended to capture something of the flavor of 
different interaction types which are more prominent at different ages.
4.1  Engaging with others’ movements towards the self
In this section I will focus on studies exploring infants’ awareness of the directedness 
of others’ gaze and actions towards them, and of infants’ attempts to get others to act 
towards them.
Noticing that someone else is aware of you can at the simplest level, be a ques-
tion of noticing their perceptual directedness towards the self, the most obvious and 
distinct indicator of which is of course gaze. In human adults, the perception of gaze 
towards the self leads broadly to neural changes, often linked to specific brain regions – 
the paracingulate cortex and the temporal pole (Kampe, Frith & Frith 2003). We know 
that in other species, too, gaze towards the self is perceived as significant, albeit with 
different emotional meanings such as threat (Emery 2000). Perceiving others’ gaze 
towards the self is also significant in human infants. Recent studies suggest strongly 
that the detection of gaze towards the self is not only extremely early in human infants, 
but that it enhances other perceptions and actions. In a remarkable study by Teresa 
Farroni and colleagues, newborn infants – between two and four days of age – were 
shown pairs of images. In each pair one face had gaze directly focused on the infants 
and one face had gaze randomly averted to the left or right. The infants looked signifi-
cantly more frequently as well as longer at faces with direct than averted gaze (Farroni 
et al. 2002). In four-month-olds these authors also found that there was enhanced face 
processing in the infant brain when looking at faces with direct gaze than at faces with 
averted gaze. Further, by four months, following another’s gaze to a distal location/
target is enhanced (or primarily occurs) when it is preceded by a period of mutual 
gaze (Farroni et al. 2003). And again, by 4 or 5 months, direct rather than averted gaze 
allows the enhanced processing of facial expressions (Striano et al. 2006) and differ-
ently influences the perception of objects and the hearing of words (Parise et al. 2008). 
In all, it would seem that the detection of another person’s gaze to self (as different 
from gaze to something else nearby) is present at birth, with, at least by 4 months, such 
detection leading to significant consequences for the awareness of persons and for 
learning about the world.
So it matters even at birth when someone looks at you. But in what way does it 
matter? There have been studies from the 1970s and 80s identifying mutual gaze as a 
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prompt for infant smiles. Peter Wolff ’s studies of two-month-olds showed that infants 
smiled more when they were being directly looked at by others than when they weren’t 
(Wolff 1987). In this study, however, without further details of the exact moment of 
onset of the smile in relation to preceding events it isn’t easy to know whether it was 
simply the fact of the gaze to themselves that mattered to the infants or perhaps also 
the fact that the gaze may have been a response to some prior action or invitation by 
the infant. Nonetheless it is significant that at least by two months of age, infants show 
emotional reactions to being noticed. These emotional reactions to gaze to self can be 
not only positive, as in this study, but also negative if attention cannot be disengaged 
(Brazelton 1986), indifferent, or ambivalent (Reddy 2000). It is also likely that in all 
these reactions, the onset of gaze is more powerfully emotional than gaze in continuing 
interaction. Findings from a study of coy smiles in two to four month-olds show that 
in interaction with a familiar adult partner the frequency of ordinary smiles as well as 
coy smiles was significantly higher in the first minute after renewal of interaction than 
in the second and third minutes (Reddy 2000). This suggests that it is the start of some-
one attending to them which matters more to the infants and leads to more (positive 
and coy) emotional reactions than continued interaction. The other’s ‘hello’ or initial 
‘address’ in other words, seems to matter at least as early as two months of age.
The huge literature on neonatal imitation presents another angle on newborn 
infants’ interest in others’ actions towards them. Although the arguments about the 
extent and socio-cognitive significance of neonatal imitation continue, there are 
several studies documenting neonates’ responses to tongues protruded and mouths 
opened while an adult model gazes directly at the infant (Meltzoff & Moore 1977; 
Kugiumutzakis 1998). The imitative responses of neonates suggest at the very least a 
recognition of the directedness of the model’s action towards themselves, a directed-
ness which impels them to respond with similar actions. The other’s actions directed 
towards the self, then, matter to the infant sufficiently to prompt the infant to respond. 
In neither of these sets of research, however (gaze to self, or actions towards the self) 
is it the infant’s action that has moved the other. It is merely the infant’s presence which 
has moved the other to act, and which in turn moves the infant to act or express some-
thing. Perceiving the directedness of such simple actions to the self, the other’s move-
ments towards her matter to the neonate: not as a response to her actions, rather as 
movements in response to the infant herself.
The only data suggesting that the neonate is not merely responding to but actually 
seeking to move others come from studies in the neonatal imitation literature. Looking 
not just at what happens in the short period after an adult model presents a facial or 
manual gesture to an infant, but at what happens when that same adult does not pres-
ent this gesture, Meltzoff and Moore (1994) and Nagy and Molnar (2004) have both 
found (although looking at infants of different ages) that the infant appears to expect 
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the model to produce once again the gesture they had previously modeled and tries 
to provoke or re-elicit it. Meltzoff found that 24 hours after seeing an adult protrude 
their tongue, when they saw the adult again, six-week-old infants protruded their own 
tongues even though (or rather, because) the adult was not doing so. Nagy and Molnar 
looked at this phenomenon in neonates discovering (by accident during a pause in the 
experiment) that neonates themselves initiated this unusual gesture in the presence of 
the same adult, directing the gesture (with gaze) towards them. The ‘provocative’ finger 
raising was distinguished from ‘imitative’ finger raising by different heart rate patterns, 
decelerating rather than accelerating (Nagy & Molnar 2004). In other words, it seems 
that the neonates were not only responding to others’ movements towards them but 
were trying to actually get them to move when they weren’t moving. There is no data 
as yet on the emotional significance of these provocative attempts for the neonates: 
getting others moving appeared to matter to them but perhaps only as an act of curios-
ity or enquiry or ‘polite’ conversation rather than as an act of seeking recognition and 
validation of themselves. The question remains open for exploration.
4.2  Expecting to move others (and minding when you don’t)
What happens when the adult does not get moved to a response by the infant’s pro-
vocative invitation? What happens when the adult stops noticing the infant? Or stops 
responding? Does it matter how the adult is moved by the infant’s actions? The answers 
to at least some of these questions, although fraught with contradictory interpretations 
and theoretical disagreements, are numerous and extremely rich.
4.2.1  Recognising the absence of an expected response
When a previously interactive communicative partner suddenly ceases to respond, 
freezing in the middle of a conversation, as it were, 2 month-olds show discomfort – 
decreased eye contact and increased frowns – and attempt to re-engage the partner 
with intermittent communicative initiatives (Tronick & Cohn 1989). The ‘still-face 
effect’ as this is called is limited to the unresponsiveness of a person and not to that of 
an object (Ellsworth, Muir & Hains 1993). In most ‘still-face’ studies the unresponsive 
partner looks directly at the infant, so it is not the withdrawal of gaze but the absence 
of response that is detected and causes distress. One key study found aspects of the 
still face effect even with gaze turned away from the infant (towards a wall, or towards 
another person), suggesting that it is the loss of communication that is in itself the 
‘problem’ (Striano 2004) rather than the psychological cause of the loss. Most dramati-
cally, at least some aspects of this effect are apparent in newborns as well. Nagy (2008) 
in a study in Hungary tested 33 newborn infants between 4 and 96 hours after birth 
using a still-face set-up with the experimenter looking directly at the infants with an 
expressionless face and found decreased eye contact, increased negative affect (actual 
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distress in some cases) and more sleepiness during the still face condition, although 
in another study the effect was not significant in newborns (Bertin & Striano 2006).
What does this withdrawal of response actually signify for the young infant? On 
the one hand, some studies suggest that it is not until about 4 months of age that 
infants recognize the significance of the still face in emotional or intentional terms. 
For instance, Rochat & colleagues (2002) found that while four month-olds showed 
the same patterns of distress to a ‘happy’ but unresponsive face as to a ‘blank’ and emo-
tionless face, two month-olds did not – showing no behavioural differentiation (see 
also Rochat, Querido & Striano 1999). This would suggest that the two month-olds 
are seeking some sort of emotional action by the other – regardless of the relevance 
of the other’s action to the infant’s prior actions. On this account, for two month-
olds, moving others does not matter (at least in this situation), it is receiving a happy 
face that matters. However, studies using the double video technique and presenting 
infants with a suddenly unresponsive but active partner (that is, replaying a positive 
segment of partner behaviour which had previously led to positive responses from the 
infant) have found that 2 month-olds respond in the replay condition with decreased 
eye contact, decreased smiles, increased frowns, closed mouth and negative affect 
(Murray & Trevarthen 1985; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau 1999). The happy face of the 
partner is insufficient to stop negative effects on the infant at 2 months of age and it 
is strikingly the response to the infant, not the happy behaviour, that is crucial to the 
two-month-old.
4.2.2  The ‘mere’ contingency argument
Rochat and colleagues’ conclusion is backed by a theory that it is only from around 4 
months of age that infants can appreciate the timing patterns of the contingent social 
responses involved in social interaction. Gergely and Watson (1996, 1999) suggest 
that there is a contingency detection module from birth which allows the detection 
of all contingency violations (as in the still face and double video perturbations) and 
that receiving contingent responses is in itself a pleasant and rewarding experience. 
Within the predictions of this theory, it is not the loss of ‘being recognized’ or ‘being 
noticed’ or ‘moving others’ that leads to infant distress in either still face or video-
replay and lag studies, but rather, the perturbation of effectiveness per se. In other 
words, the contingent responding of a nipple that does not respond to sucking and 
the contingent responding of a mother who smiles when the infant looks at her, would 
be seen in this theory as emotionally equivalent. They argue, further, that infants until 
after about three months of age prefer perfect contingencies – e.g. the simultaneity of 
mirror reflections – and only after that age do they prefer the imperfect contingencies 
necessary for social responses and interaction. Watson’s early suggestion that infant 
goals involve attempts to maximize or elevate contingent responsiveness (because of 
the preference for the perfect contingency) is, however, challenged by two studies. 
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In one study two month-old infants were shown to prefer similar levels of contin-
gent response (that is, similar to what they have become accustomed) rather than the 
highest levels (Bigelow 1998), suggesting that infant interactive goals may be to test 
and maintain rather than maximize contingencies even at two months (Watson 1994). 
At the very least, this suggests that responsiveness to levels of contingency means more 
to the infant than just obtaining ‘effects’ – if it was the latter then the greater the stran-
ger’s contingent responsiveness the greater should be the infant’s. However, the infant 
appears to be learning meanings about responsiveness within the experience of con-
tingent responsiveness she receives. This was also true at 2 months of age (Bigelow & 
Rochat 2006), particularly in relation to infant smiling responses to adult smiles, 
although the patterns of similarity were more variable at 2 months than at 4 months.
In another double video study contrasting live and replay face-to-face interactions 
with themselves (as if in a mirror) two month old infants were seen to differentiate 
the replay from the live conditions. One sub-group of infants actually preferred the 
non-contingent replay condition to the perfectly contingent live condition. In both 
sub-groups of infants, and in both types of conditions, however, there were attempts to 
provoke the ‘partner’ (i.e. the self in the monitor) by ‘testing’ with discrete movements 
such as waving an arm, nodding or shaking the head and protruding the tongue, sug-
gesting strongly that checking a ‘response’ mattered (in both the Live and Replay con-
ditions any ‘response’ was illusory of course, being either synchronous or accidental). 
Infants differed in the extent and manner of their testing behaviour and in the extent 
to which a lack of ‘response’ to their testing appeared to have a negative effect (Reddy 
et al. 2007). The lack of an overriding preference for high contingency is evident even 
in four to five week olds. Compared to natural interaction where the contingencies are 
temporally looser and responsive, imitative interactions have tighter temporal contin-
gencies and closer identity of content, and ought, according to the contingency detec-
tion predictions (Gergely & Watson 1996, 1999), be preferred at this age. However, 
although this prediction was supported for infants whose mothers were deemed low 
in affect mirroring and responsiveness, it was not supported for infants whose mothers 
were high in affect mirroring and responsiveness (Legerstee 2005).
In sum, there is (as yet) no evidence for the prediction that infants begin life with 
a preference for the perfect contingency. It is likely that right from birth neonates are 
interested in both perfect and imperfect contingencies, as for instance in the non-
perfect contingencies present in imitative, provocative and responsive interactions.
4.2.3  Contingency or emotional responsiveness?
So the question still remains: what is it that matters to the infant? The pure temporal 
contingency of the other’s action? Or the confirmatory or recognitory content of the 
action? Two sets of studies offer some answers. One explores infants’ differentiation 
between people and animated dolls and the other compares responses to the timing 
 Moving others matters 151
of contingent responses versus to its emotional content. Infants as young as 5 weeks 
get upset when people refrain from responding to them, but not when physical objects 
remain immobile (Legerstee et al. 1987). It would seem that one month-olds expect 
or want responses from people but not from things. Contingent responding by people 
seems to subsequently make 3 month old babies happier (more cooing and smiling) 
and learn faster (higher speed of habituation) (Dunham et  al. 1989; Finkelstein & 
Ramey 1977) but contingent responding by objects does not have the same effect; and 
non-contingent (random) reactions by objects does not upset babies at 3 months while 
random responding by people does (Legerstee 1997). These results suggest that not 
just any contingent reactivity matters, even very early in the lives of human infants. 
Perhaps not quite the torture that William James hinted at, but a degree of handicap, 
seems to depend upon whom the non-contingent responses come from, rather than 
merely from the fact.
Keller and colleagues suggest that temporal contingency may not only vary 
between different modalities of expression in the same individual, but be a dimension 
of maternal style separate from interactional quality (Keller et al. 1999). Attempting to 
separate the content of response from the level of contingency, Legerstee & Varghese 
(2001) found that infants’ prior affective experience strongly influenced their reactions 
to contingency perturbations. At three months infants of mothers who showed high 
affective mirroring (i.e. sharing of emotional content) were not only more responsive 
to their mothers but also discriminated better between the Live and Replay conditions 
in a perturbation study. The infants of low affective mirroring mothers were, like the 
other infants, also sensitive to the contingency violation of the Replay condition. How-
ever, their responses differed emotionally: if they were first exposed to a contingent 
interaction they responded much the same as the other infants with a drop in gaze, etc. 
But if they were first exposed in the experiment to the Replay condition, it appeared 
that, unlike the other group, they did not bother to re-engage with a recovery in the 
subsequent Live condition. Infants’ experience with how others respond to them – not 
just whether they receive contingent feedback – does seem to make a difference to their 
subsequent interpersonal interactions. In particular, the finding that affective mirror-
ing may be the crucial differentiator suggests that infants by two and three months of 
age not only expect a response to their actions, but they appear to thrive better on a 
response which mirrors or ‘confirms’ their emotions (if not quite all their actions).
Differential vocal responsiveness to the mother versus to a female stranger is 
found in 3 month-old infants to be greater when the mothers are prone to showing 
more positive affect (Roe et al. 1985) and is less when mothers show more ‘rejection’ 
in their emotional expressions (Voelker 2005). Intriguingly, when infants at three 
months show differential vocal responding in favour of the stranger, they also show 
more mother avoidance at 12 months (Voelker 2005). Together with the research on 
maternal depression and its early effects on infants and the findings with neglected 
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orphans, this finding suggests that infants in the period of what Trevarthen calls ‘pri-
mary intersubjectivity’ are already influenced by much more than the contingency of 
their communications with their parents, and may look to others for their ‘emotional 
needs’ if these are not met by their primary caregivers. Of course, the assumption of 
a single primary caregiver can only be relevant for those infants whose early cultural 
experience supports this – although it is not clear as yet how infants in cultures with a 
genuine plurality of caregivers deal with strangers or indeed with ‘rejection’ by one of 
them at any particular time.
4.2.4  Recognising being imitated
Infant recognition of – and perhaps emotional appreciation of – being imitated might 
be another way to address the question of when and how infants know that they have 
moved others in some way. When do infants recognize that they are being imitated? 
The answer may be a graded one (Nadel 2002). On the one hand, there is the evidence 
above of the experience of affective mirroring by their mothers even at 4 or 5 weeks 
of age making a difference to infants’ subsequent interactions (Legerstee & Varghese 
2001). And there is evidence that at three and a half months imitation by their mothers 
led to more gaze to the mother than did spontaneous interaction or intense attention 
getting behavior (Field 1977) although it is unclear whether the greater gaze to mother 
was a factor merely of the lower maternal activity in the imitative condition rather 
than of the imitation per se. On the other hand, clear evidence of imitation recogni-
tion is only available as yet from the second year. Adult imitation of infant behavior 
has been shown to lead to intentional testing of adult behavior at 14 months (Meltzoff 
1990) and to reciprocal imitative behavior at 18 months (Asendorpf, Werkentin & 
Baudonniere 1996) and at 24 months with peers (Eckerman 1993). Nadel’s graded 
sequence of the emergence of imitation recognition suggests that initial imitation rec-
ognition occurs without any conscious awareness of the other’s intention to imitate. 
Following the emergence of such awareness there might be a further third ‘stage’ at 
around 24 months, in which there is recognition of the intentional communicative 
intention of the imitator (i.e. as compliant with the intention of the child who is imi-
tated, Nadel 2002).
4.2.5  Minding being excluded from groups
Somewhat comparable to the adult research on the irrepressibly negative effects of 
social exclusion are infant studies involving the interaction of triads. These studies typ-
ically use situations where a parent and infant ‘dyad’ are joined by either another infant 
or an infant-like doll whom the mother then starts to attend to, or situations involving 
three same-age infants where any exclusion is left to occur naturally. Typically, from 
around 4 to 5 months of age infants show signs of jealousy in the form of distress or 
discomfort at the parent’s engagement with another infant or a doll (Draghi-Lorenz 
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2001, 2010; Hart et al. 2004.). Shortly after this age (in a triad of 6 to 9 month-olds) 
a much more subtle sense of infant loss is reported in infant triads when an infant 
‘deserts’ one partner and turns to engage with the third infant for a few moments 
(Selby & Bradley 2003). Markova and colleagues showed that by 9 months of age the 
non-preferred infants in same age triads displayed less positive affect, showed fewer 
initiations and responses and less play (Markova, Stieben & Legerstee 2010). Adult 
emotional reactions to social exclusion (Williams 2007) would, therefore, appear to 
have its roots at least by 5 months in infant responses to exclusion by mothers or even 
peers, the early roots supporting the findings that the reaction is far from ‘rational’ in 
adults, occurring despite conscious knowledge of contrary intentions.
4.3  Exploring how one can move others
Why in the cases of the still-face and double video studies, are these attempts to re-
engage made by infants? To re-establish communicative engagement, to re-establish 
a sense of a sane and responsive world, to feel liked and wanted? Or ‘simply’ from a 
desire to produce movement in someone else for its own sake? Is the desire to move 
someone else for ‘its own sake’ actually more indicative about interpersonal awareness 
or less?
A very odd argument is possible here. The skeptic could argue that in order to 
demonstrate that infant interest in others’ emotional reactions is genuinely interper-
sonal (if not communicative) we would need to demonstrate that the infants’ interest is 
in fact in the other’s act as a reaction rather than in the act itself. For example, to show 
that I am interested in your response to my act, I would have to show that I am not 
interested in your act per se, but only in the fact that it is a response! In other words, 
we would have to establish that the infant wants the response as a response but has 
no interest in the content of the response. The oddness of this argument lies of course 
in the requirement that in order to demonstrate interpersonal significance we would 
need to establish interpersonal disinterest in all but mechanical terms!
Even if it were possible to clearly separate interest in reactions from the need for 
the actions in themselves, such a mechanical exploration might be more indicative of 
developmental psychopathology (as in bullying or in seeing the other as an object to 
test) than of developmental advance. It might be helpful, however, to conceptualise 
this separation as a matter of degree, as a dimension rather than as a categorical one. 
Infants do seem, in the second half of the first year, to be curiously interested in explor-
ing others’ reactions as reactions. Evidence from studies showing that infants look 
for others’ emotional reactions to ambiguous events as in social referencing (Klinnert 
et al. 1982) or to pleasant events or their own accidental actions as in attentional refer-
encing (Reddy 2005) suggest that infants are already well aware that others can or do 
respond to events in the world and to things that the infant does. In the phenomena of 
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clowning, showing-off and teasing, infants are actively exploring and then continuing 
to seek specific reactions by others to their own actions. It is often difficult but some-
times possible to separate out the specific reactions of laughter, attention, approval, 
surprise, annoyance that an infant seeks to re-elicit, using the recent histories of spe-
cific sequences, showing the range of reactions that infants are interested in exploring 
at various ages.
4.3.1  Clowning
Clowning often starts from accidental discovery – an infant may be exploring the feel-
ing or sound or effect of some action for herself, and perhaps finds that ‘significant 
others’ are laughing at it. With an interested recognition of the others’ reactions and its 
‘cause’ the infant may then intentionally set out to repeat the action for this effect on 
others. Such sequences are common enough that their first occurrences, with infants’ 
eyes widening at an unexpected audience reaction to an action by herself and repeat-
ing the action, are sometimes caught on video. They show an unfolding interest in a 
newly discovered reaction of the other rather than a pre-existing desire to gratify some 
already felt need through obtaining this reaction. In subsequent repetitions over the 
next days – sometimes until the audience is struggling to squeeze out the semblance 
of a laugh – the infant is showing evidence of a quickly developed desire for a specific 
reaction (Reddy 1991).
In one longitudinal study (Reddy 2001) seventy four percent of 8-month-olds 
were reported by parents to have shown some form of clowning (that is, a clear rep-
etition of an action to re-elicit laughter from others at least once). The simplest early 
forms of clowning reported at 7 months (Reddy 1991) were things like splashing in 
the bath, discovering its effect on the other and immediately (or on the next occasion) 
repeating the splashing to re-elicit the laughter. Given that these studies did not begin 
before 7 months of age it is very likely that a focused study might uncover clowning 
even earlier. More complex than splashing are behaviours involving odd movements 
of the head (like shaking it rapidly from side to side, perhaps initially to explore the 
sensation of the movement), deliberately distorting a movement they have mastered 
(like walking in a funny way), imitating others’ odd facial expressions (like a snoring 
face) or sounds (like coughing), using familiar objects or clothes in an unusual way 
(like putting the potty on the head or lifting up the frock to reveal the tummy) and so 
on (Reddy 2001).
4.3.2  Showing-off
Parents often spontaneously use the term ‘showing-off ’ to describe infant efforts to 
try and attain, regain or retain others’ attention by doing a variety of actions. Some-
times these actions involve the display of silly, boisterous behavior in specific con-
texts, sometimes motor skills or actions or words that they have just mastered, and 
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sometimes a display of a repertoire of tricks to an attentionally available (but often 
unsuspecting) audience. Parents often report situations like first visits to family or 
friends or work-places as eliciting such displays (Reddy 2008), where the key might lie 
with the ‘new’ audience’s willingness to respond with enjoyment to tricks the family 
has already tired of.
Infants at this age also seem to use their knowledge of the social value of their 
newly developing motor skills to obtain appreciation – what might be called ‘clever 
showing-off ’ to distinguish it from the ‘anything that works’ or ‘silly showing-off ’. The 
skills in question must generally have been already reacted to with appreciation in 
order for them to be marked out as having social value, although in some cases, the 
infant’s own effort to achieving some difficult feat (such as struggling and then manag-
ing to hold two blocks in one hand) can lead her to look around for a reaction. Typical 
motor skills associated with family praise and often ‘used’ by infants in the second 
half of the first year are pulling themselves up to stand, crawling and walking. Inter-
estingly, infants seem to be sensitive to the possibility of others’ reactions (and inter-
ested in them) to actions they have done even when the actions were unintentional (as 
in an accidental noise followed by a shy look at the researcher). Incidents of seeking 
attention by defiant or negative acts (which are traditionally called negative attention-
seeking in the psychological literature) might be better discussed in the context of 
provocative behavior or teasing.
4.3.3  Teasing
Somewhat more complex than showing-off and clowning are examples of teasing 
where infants appear to be deliberately violating some expectation or mutual under-
standing or shared convention in order primarily to provoke a reaction from the other. 
Teasing is a creative discourse which contributes to the dynamism of cultural pro-
cesses. Ultimately, provocation has unpredictable consequences and the exploration of 
such unpredictability has itself to be unpredictable. Teasing is mainly successful when 
it involves surprise. The motivations in teasing are varied. It could involve a seeking to 
move the other which is intensely intimate and connected. Or it could involve a blind 
experimentation – such as might be the case with little boys trying to pull wings off 
butterflies. Or it could involve a colder, more bullying experimentation by prodding 
the other where you know it hurts to provoke a specific or explore a new reaction. The 
reactions sought through teasing are enormously varied.
Teasing is widespread before the end of the first year and seems to start blossom-
ing (in a manner of speaking) from around 8 months. In one study clear signs of seek-
ing a reaction with a playful or watchful look were reported in less than a quarter of 
8 month olds and three quarters of the 11 month olds. But in a looser form of seeking 
some reaction from others to a disruptive or prohibited or tricky action, teasing was 
evident in half of the sample of 8 month olds and almost all 11 month olds.
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At this age, before the end of the first year, the reactions sought appear to be pri-
marily positive. Watchful looks while doing provocative acts do occur, but they are 
less frequently reported than the cheeky or more playful expressions that accompany 
teasing. In one study (Reddy 1991) there were only two instances of ‘negative teasing’ 
which involved repetition of provocations which had led to clear distress in the other. 
Both cases involved an intrusion into the actions or possessions of a very young older 
sibling (like pulling out the dummy and crawling away very fast). (Of course there is a 
circularity in judging the positiveness or negativeness of intention in teasing since the 
response of the other defines it.)
Before the end of the first year infant provocations take numerous forms: the 
most common forms are teasing with offer and withdrawal of an object (about 50% 
of infants have persisted in this at some point before the end of the first year), teasing 
with non-compliance (again not only a very prevalent form which almost all infants 
try to some extent, but a particularly salient one for parents if it becomes frequent) and 
teasing by disrupting the other’s activity. Other forms include offer and withdrawal of 
the self, false requests for food or drink, false refusals, and so on.
5.  Mutuality
There are at least two ways in which being moved and moving others can be seen to 
involve mutuality. One is the circularities of effects (and lack of effects) that can be 
seen in both short-term interactions and long-term relationships. Another is the evi-
dence of what happens when moving an other is attempted without mutuality.
Peter Hobson reports a wonderful example of the mutuality of a failure of move-
ment in his study of the greeting and farewell responses of people with autism. He 
describes the case of one adolescent girl who gave the briefest glance at him as she 
entered the room, responding with another delayed glance and a toneless ‘Unn’ to an 
introduction, maintaining the lack of eye contact as she walked across the room, sat 
across him at the table, responded to the questions in the session and then got up to 
leave when it was over, responding with a minimal ‘Bye’ and a vague backward flap of 
the hand in response to Peter’s insistent ‘Goodbye’. What was most interesting from 
the point of view of a mutuality, however, is the way in which Peter behaved. In the 
presence of what seemed to be an awareness of his presence but little sense of him as a 
person, he had unintentionally become (as seen on the videotapes) stiff and forced in 
his gestures, with a loss of his otherwise fluent and spontaneous behaviour (Hobson & 
Hobson 2008). There is other evidence that people with autism show deficits in 
responsive movements – that is in being moved by others. For instance, head shaking, 
head nodding and smiling are ‘unimpaired’ in autism when averaged across a range of 
social interactions (Capps, Kehres & Sigman 1998; Tantam, Holmes & Cordess 1993). 
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However, when studied in closer detail, although there is indeed no deficit in interac-
tive head nods and shakes overall, there appears to be an absence of head nodding or 
shaking while listening to the partner talking (Garcia-Perez, Lee & Hobson 2007). 
For the purpose of this paper the question is of the effects that this lack of responsive 
movement has on the other.
In a study comparing pre-school children with Down Syndrome and pre-
school children with autism we found that the latter show less frequent attention 
to others’ laughter during interactions in the home. They appear to be significantly 
less ‘moved’ by others’ laughter to turn around, look, smile or laugh in response. 
There was no group difference overall in amounts of the children’s own sponta-
neous laughter in everyday life, nor in the amounts of spontaneous laughter by 
the parents of both groups. However there was a difference in the amount of par-
ent laughter directed to or involving the children: the parents of the children with 
autism showed significantly fewer laughter episodes directed to or involving their 
children (Reddy, Williams & Vaughan 2002). The lower amount of ‘being moved’ in 
the children could be argued to lead to a lower amount of ‘seeking to move’ in the 
parents. This diminishing of attempts to move (if they can be called that) is very 
likely to be outside of consciousness. In the head-nodding study an unexpected 
result of the lack of responsive movement in the participants with autism was an 
immediate decrease in the interviewer’s own head nodding (while speaking, but 
not while listening) – an unintended lack of movement in response to the unmoved 
stance of the other (Hobson & Hobson 2008).
The feel of another consciousness engaging with you (this feeling of mutuality) 
is necessarily open-ended and ‘indeterminate’ (Auvray, Lenay, & Stewart 2009, cit-
ing Sartre). Neither you nor the other are fixed and objectively definable entities – a 
challenge to the ‘objective’ nature of conscious entities strongly argued by Mearleau-
Ponty. It is something like an incompleteness of each person that allows what he calls 
‘co-extensive being’ through dialogue and the creation of a common ground between 
persons. The shared world in which people act is a ground which provides a necessary 
logic to the actions of the people who act within it. Co-extension with another con-
sciousness, then, would mean that the movement of one is logically involved with the 
movement of the other (which makes each transparent to the other) (Merleau-Ponty 
1961). The fundamental circularity between being noticed and being, often asserted by 
theories of the dialogical self (Bakhtin 1975; Hermans 1996; Winnicott 1960; Fogel, 
de Koeyer, Bellagamba & Bell 2002), suggests that how one is noticed or not noticed 
is responsible for how one is, that is, for how one needs to be noticed or not noticed. 
To be and to move others must therefore be mutually constitutive. Such mutuality is 
profoundly impressive and, for anyone who works with people in any way, profoundly 
scary. This is not to say, however, that the self is only constituted by another conscious-
ness; the self must also be constituted by its experience of moving things in the world. 
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The newborn infant could not act as an agent if she was not already constituted by her 
body and her experience in utero (see MacLaren 2008 & Zahavi 2005 for differing but 
not irreconcilable views on this issue). The mutuality is as relevant – even though in a 
much simpler way – to moving a world of physical things and forces.
The mutuality is also evident at a simpler level. You will not want to move others 
unless you are interested in them and are already moved in some way by them. To the 
extent and in the shape of your interest lies the extent and shape of the effect you seek 
in others. This can be seen in the way in which infants seek different kinds of reac-
tions from their caregivers at different ages and in different situations. The face to face 
responses that move the two month-old to seek to elicit more of them are quite dif-
ferent from the laughter and attention that the 9 month-olds seek from others to their 
odd or clever actions. The testing for synchronous movement that is sought by the 
two-month-old in the mirror is different from the search for emotionally contingent 
response sought by them in interaction with others and different yet again from the 
teasing and testing of reactions and boundaries of the nine month-old. In each case, 
the interests, motives and perceptual capacities of the infant constrain and shape the 
reactions they seek from others.
A lack of mutuality can be deeply problematic. To seek to move others without 
being moved oneself can result in the kind of unethical experimentation that one 
hears of in boys tying crackers to dogs’ tails or in the recent videos of American sol-
diers laughing and joking while torturing Iraqi prisoners. The problem in such cases is 
characterisable as an absence of empathy, but an absence which arises from an imbal-
ance of power. This imbalance can allow – even encourage – attempts to act on others 
without openness to them as persons and attempts to seek reactions to fit an external 
agenda. To be sure, the little boys and the American soldiers appear to enjoy the reac-
tions of their victims and to this extent their attempts to move match their ability to 
be moved. However, the interaction is profoundly non-reciprocal – they recognize the 
victim as one capable of specific reactions, the victim does not exist as a person who 
can be moved. A reciprocity of recognition is crucial, argues Merleau-Ponty, other-
wise one or the other vanishes in the interaction. This recognition is something that 
occurs in inter-subjective relation. If it did not, if each withdrew into themselves and 
made their gaze ‘inhuman’, they would see each other as objects, each feeling that his 
actions were not “taken up and understood, but observed as if they were an insect’s”, 
something that happens when one “falls under the gaze of a stranger”. This feeling of 
‘being observed’ is unbearable, but only, he argues, “because it takes the place of pos-
sible communication” (p. 420). Writing about cases of abuse and the extreme neglect – 
even demonization – of children, Karsten Hundeide (2007) offers the idea of a ‘zone 
of intimacy’ within open and mutual communication. He suggests that the experience 
of being ‘outside the zone’ can be radically transformative – just as transformative as 
the experience of intimacy in cases of communicative disorder (Zeedyk 2006) or in 
psychotherapy (Stern 2004). Ultimately, we are caught within this necessary mutuality. 
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Moving others matters; it matters because it shows us to have been known by others, 
it matters because it shows us to have mattered to them, and it matters because within 
this mutual mattering we can develop in ways that we cannot yet know.
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Neurons, neonates and narrative
From empathic resonance to empathic understanding*
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The problem I want to address is a classic one in the philosophy of mind. In 
that context it is called the problem of other minds, but it is a problem that is 
debated in and across a number of disciplines and approaches – the problem 
of intersubjectivity in phenomenology, empathy or understanding others in 
hermeneutics, social cognition or theory of mind (ToM) in cognitive sciences, 
psychology, and developmental studies, and most recently, under similar titles, 
we find discussions of motor resonance processes in the cognitive neurosciences. 
The basic question addressed under these different headings is: How are we 
able to understand other people – their intentions, their behaviors, their mental 
processes? All of these different titles for the problem, however, are themselves 
problematic and in some way beg the question. To cast the problem in terms 
of ‘mind’, ‘inter-subjectivity’, ‘cognition’, ‘empathy’, or ‘motor resonance’, already 
biases the way one is tempted to solve the problem. One strategy for balancing 
out, if not canceling out these different biases, is to take an interdisciplinary 
approach, and that is what I will do here. I will review several debates that are 
ongoing across these various disciplines, and, in contrast to certain standard 
views, I will map out an alternative position that will draw support from 
neuroscience, developmental psychology, phenomenology, and narrative theory.
Keywords: empathy; interaction theory; mirror neurons; motor resonance; 
narrative competence; simulation; theory of mind
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1.   Two debates about empathy
In the past several years a debate on the question of how we understand others has 
taken shape, motivated by the discovery of mirror neurons and what is more gener-
ally referred to in the cognitive neurosciences as resonance systems. Briefly, mirror 
neurons are located in the premotor cortex and parietal areas and are activated in two 
conditions: (1) when the subject engages in intentional actions of a specific sort (e.g. 
actions that involve reaching and grasping) and (2) when the subject sees someone else 
engaging in the same kind of action.1 More generally, it has been shown that there are 
overlapping neural areas (shared representations) in the brain that are activated when 
the subject intentionally acts in specific ways, observes the same kind of actions, or 
imagines such actions (Jeannerod 1997; Ruby & Decety 2001; Grezes & Decety 2001).
1.1   The early debate and some terminological strategies
The contemporary debate, which I will summarize shortly, was clearly prefigured by a 
similar one that took place at the beginning of the 20th century, based on  behavioral 
and phenomenological observations which suggested that embodied, sensory-motor 
and action-related processes were important for explaining our understanding of 
 others. Thus, Theodore Lipps, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and others contested 
these issues in terms that involved concepts like analogy, projection, expression, and 
empathy. Lipps (1903), for example, discussed the concept of Einfühlung, which he 
equated with the Greek term empatheia, which in turn motivated Titchener’s (1909) 
translation of the term as ‘empathy’. Lipps attributed our capacity for empathy to a 
sensory-motor mirroring, an involuntary, “kinesthetic” inner imitation of the observed 
vital activity expressed by another person. Husserl, and other phenomenologists, 
including Scheler, and later, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, developed phenomeno-
logical critiques of Lipps’ account, contending that empathy is something more than 
these involuntary processes and that in some cases empathy happens as a solution or 
supplement to the breakdown or inadequacy of the more basic, automatic, perceptual 
understanding of others (see Zahavi 2001; 2005 for a good summary of these debates).
In light of this early discussion problems of terminology and definition become 
apparent. We noted that Lipps equated Einfühlung with empatheia which, in its use 
in late philosophical Greek, meant simply being in a state of passion, not necessarily 
a passion related to another person. Hineinversetzen, a term used by Dilthey (1926), 
1.  These neurons were originally discovered by single cell neuron recordings in the macaque 
monkey (Rizzollatti et al. 1999; 1996), and there is evidence that they exist in humans (Fadiga 
et al. 1995). See Dinstein et al. (2008) and Hickok (2009) for some critical limitations on claims 
about mirror neurons.
 Neurons, neonates and narrative 169
which literally means putting oneself in the place of the other, has also been trans-
lated into English as ‘empathy’. Dilthey associated this term with Nacherleben – to re-
live something in our experience. Terminological and translation problems are also 
complicated by the fact that various authors make various differentiations among the 
concepts of empathy, sympathy, and compassion, and no two authors seem to agree on 
what is what, or if one is more basic than the other. Scheler (1954 [1923]), for example, 
prefers the term ‘sympathy’, which means to have an accordance of feeling, and seems 
intrinsically intersubjective. This term is also used by Hume, who suggests a more 
psychological sense: “The minds of men are mirrors to one another” (1739/1978: 365). 
The idea that the self naturally mirrors the other goes back at least as far as Aristotle 
and his analysis of friendship. Hume, however, regards sympathy not as an immediate 
feeling, but as the result of an inference we make about the emotional state of the other 
(1739/1978: 576).
Faced with this terminological difficulty, there are several strategies that one 
could take. First, one could simply abandon the term ‘empathy’ and opt for some 
other word. Second, one could stipulate one’s use of the word ‘empathy’ to signify just 
the basic resonance processes that are described by the research on mirror systems. 
Third, one could limit the use of the term to whatever is needed for understanding 
others that is more than just those basic resonance processes. I will pursue a fourth 
(and more Wittgensteinian) option designed to short-circuit the terminological and 
conceptual issues, and suggest that the term ‘empathy’ has many different meanings 
depending on the context in which we use it. In effect, there are many different kinds 
of empathy – from those processes that involve basic resonance (“elementary empa-
thy”) to more sophisticated kinds that involve higher cognitive functions (“empathic 
understanding”).2 Rather than worry about how to define the term ‘empathy’, I want 
to look at what it takes, in a full sense, to understand others. What I mean by ‘in a full 
sense’ is what it takes for a mature adult to understand what another person intends. 
But to work out what it takes for a mature, adult human to understand another human, 
we cannot ignore how this ability develops and originates in early infancy, or what 
animal studies can tell us about the perception of intentional action.
1.2   The contemporary debate
The contemporary debate, motivated by the new data on mirror systems, shared 
representations and motor resonance, features proposals similar to Lipps’ theory, 
2.  The distinction here follows Dilthey (1926), who suggested a distinction between  elementary 
understanding and mature empathic understanding. As we’ll see, regardless of the terminological 
dissensus, there is a building consensus over the idea that there are two processes at stake: an early, 
automatic process, and a more mature and controlled process. 
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 associating empathy directly with motor resonance processes (e.g. Gallese 2001), and 
in contrast, proposals that suggest that empathy involves something more than motor 
resonance processes (e.g. Decety 2005). In light of these debates we want to ask: What 
is the relationship between resonance processes and empathy? And, what, if anything, 
is the “something extra” that is needed for empathy?
Neuroscience and developmental psychology inform the contemporary debate 
in ways that motivate a focus on two discussion areas. The first area concerns the 
operation of basic resonance processes, about which we have good science and good, 
although limited consensus; the second area concerns some kind of higher-order 
empathic understanding, about which we have no consensus. We can map out the 
terms of this debate by looking at representatives on either side of the major dividing 
line between these two areas. Vittorio Gallese (2001, 2003), for example, focuses his 
analysis of empathy on basic resonance processes. Jean Decety (2003, 2005) suggests 
that empathy involves a form of higher-order understanding.
Gallese is part of the neuroscientific team that discovered mirror neurons, and he 
builds his theory of empathy on the fact that
when we observe goal-related behaviours … specific sectors of our pre-motor 
cortex become active. These cortical sectors are those same sectors that are active 
when we actually perform the same actions. In other words, when we observe 
actions performed by other individuals our motor system ‘resonates’ along with 
that of the observed agent. (Gallese 2001: 38)
For Gallese, our understanding of the other person’s action relies on a neural mecha-
nism that matches, in the same neuronal substrate, the observed behavior with a behav-
ior that we (observers) could execute. This lived bodily motor equivalence between 
what we observe others doing, and the capabilities of our own motor system allows us to 
use our own system as a model for understanding the other’s action. “Empathy is deeply 
grounded in the experience of our lived-body, and it is this experience that enables us 
to directly recognize others not as bodies endowed with a mind but as persons like us” 
(2001: 43). Thus Gallese uses action understanding as a framework to define empathy. 
In support of this he cites the work of Lipps: “When I am watching an acrobat walking 
on a suspended wire, Lipps (1903) notes, I feel myself inside of him” (2001: 43). Gallese’s 
argument, however, is based on the neuroscience of mirror neurons. “I submit that the 
neural matching mechanism constituted by mirror neurons – or by equivalent neurons 
in humans – … is crucial to establish an empathic link between different individuals” 
(2001: 44). Gallese appeals to simulation theory to extend this model to include expres-
sive aspects of movement that give us access to the emotional states of others (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998). I will return to the concept of simulation theory shortly.
Jean Decety (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), in contrast, contends that empathy does 
not imply simply an action or emotion resonance initiated by the action or emotion 
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state of the other. It also requires a minimal comprehension of the mental states of this 
person. He does not deny the importance of resonance systems, especially in early 
infancy, and he accepts that we have an innate capacity to feel that other people are 
“like us.” But we also quickly develop the capacity to put ourselves mentally in the place 
of others. He also emphasizes that in this process difference is just as important as 
similarity. Empathy is founded on our capacity to recognize that others are similar to 
ourselves, but to do so without confusing ourselves with the other.
According to Decety (2005; Decety & Jackson 2004; Jackson, Meltzoff & Decety 
2005) then, three fundamental components interact to create empathy:
a component of motor resonance (resonance motrice) whose release is generally 
automatic and nonintentional;
insight into the subjective mental perspective of the other which may be 
controlled and intentional;
the ability to differentiate between self and other.
The third component is satisfied at the same basic neuronal level of resonance, and 
specifically by Georgieff and Jeannerod’s (1998) concept of a “who system.” On this 
model, the shared representations (activated neuronal areas) for my action and the 
perception of the other person’s action overlap and create the required resonance 
that enables the automatic recognition of the other’s action as similar to action 
of which I am capable. But, as Georgieff and Jeannerod indicate, the overlap is 
not complete, so that different sets of neurons that are activated when I act are 
not  activated when I see others act, and vice versa. This difference, they propose, 
allows for the differentiation between self and other (but see Legrand 2007, and 
Note 6 below).
Both Gallese and Decety agree that basic resonance systems are in place, not only 
in early infancy, but also in non-human primates. The major difference between the 
positions represented by Gallese and Decety concerns the second component. For 
Gallese, this component is not something more than what the resonance systems 
already deliver, automatically; for Decety, this is the “something extra” that is needed 
for empathic understanding. For a precise understanding of the difference between 
these two positions, however, and to specify what the “something extra” is that is alleg-
edly needed for empathic understanding, we need to briefly review a third debate that 
falls under the heading “theory of mind” (ToM).
2.   The theory of mind debate
There are several strong candidate theories to be considered as solutions to the  question 
of what more than resonance or mirror systems one needs in order to  understand 
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 others in the full sense. Under the general title of theory of mind (ToM), the estab-
lished contenders are “theory theory” (TT) and simulation theory (ST).
2.1  Theory theory
TT claims that one must take a theoretical stance toward the other in order to infer or 
“mindread” their beliefs, desires, or intentions (e.g. Baron-Cohen 1995;  Carruthers & 
Smith 1996; Premack & Woodruff 1979). That is, the ability to understand  others is 
based on having a certain kind of knowledge, a theory (or folk  psychology) of how 
people behave in general. According to some theory  theorists, the folk  psychology 
may be learned via experience; other theorists  contend that it is based on innate 
capacities that emerge developmentally. There is also  disagreement about whether 
we use the theory explicitly (consciously) or implicitly ( non-consciously). All 
theory theorists, however, embrace three suppositions, although sometimes only 
implicitly.
that we understand others to be other minds that are perceptually inaccessible, 
and that “mindreading” involves an attempt to explain or predict the behavior of 
the other person on the basis of what the subject infers to be the other person’s 
beliefs or desires;
that in our encounters with others we are primarily observers;3 and
at least for many theory theorists, use of folk psychological theory is our primary 
and pervasive way of understanding others, once we reach the age of 4 years.
This is the age that we begin to pass false-belief tests, and this is taken as evidence that 
we attain a theory of mind at this age (see below).
3.  Peter Carruthers denies this is the case. “In particular, it is simply false that theory- 
theorists must or do) assume that mentalizing usually involves the adoption of a third-person, 
 detached and observational, perspective on other people. On the contrary, theory theorists 
have always emphasized that the primary use of mindreading is in interaction with others 
(which  Gallagher calls “second-personal”) (2009b: 167). Yet the third-person observational 
stance is consistently implied throughout most of the literature on TT, and in most discussions 
of false-belief tasks, which are set up as third-person observational tasks. The observational 
stance is directly tied to the idea that the task in social cognition is to “explain and predict” the 
actions of others. To take up a task of theory-based explanation clearly implies a third-person 
process based on observations of the other person’s actions. Even for  Carruthers the task 
seems to be just this: “to provide fine-grained intentionalistic predictions and  explanations” 
based on “inferences from observation” (1996). And he indicates that “we surely use our mind-
reading system, for example, when processing a description of someone’s state of mind as well 
as when observing their behavior” (Carruthers 2002: 666); and he characterizes mindreading 
as something done by “a third-party observer” (2009a: 134). 
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2.2  Simulation theory
In contrast to the knowledge-rich approach of TT, ST claims that in our attempt to 
understand others we do not need a folk psychology; rather, we employ our own 
mind as a model on which we simulate the other’s mind by creating “as if ” or pretend 
beliefs, desires, intentional states (e.g. Goldman 2006; Gordon 1996; Heal 1996). We 
then make inferences about the other person’s mind on the basis of the simulation. 
As in TT, there is debate about whether our simulating ability is a product of expe-
rience or is an innate capacity activated by experience. Traditional ST suggests that 
simulation is explicit (conscious or introspective, involving imaginary enactments).4 A 
more implicit version of ST suggests that simulation routines are non-conscious, and 
are performed automatically and sub-personally at the level of mirror neurons (e.g. 
 Gallese & Goldman 1998; Goldman 2006). Similar to the suppositions that inform 
TT, many simulation theorists adopt the mentalizing supposition that we understand 
others as other minds that are perceptually inaccessible; that we primarily take the 
observational stance toward others; and that simulation is the primary and pervasive 
way in which we understand others.
Consider the claim about taking an observational stance. Both TT and ST are 
based on the idea that our attempts to understand others are always made in the mode 
of observation. Person A observes the behavior of person B and then resorts to either 
theory or simulation to predict or explain B’s action. In TT this observational stance 
involves an explicit third-person perspective. As a third-person observer I consult 
the theory and infer what is in the other’s mind and accordingly predict or explain 
the  other’s behavior. In ST this observational stance involves a first-person perspec-
tive in the sense that the simulation process is accomplished in a model of my own 
first-person thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. I simulate from a first-person perspective, 
and then infer or project beliefs or desires to the other in order to predict or explain 
their behavior.
2.3  Interaction theory
In contrast to both of these approaches, I have argued elsewhere (Gallagher 2001a, 
2004, 2005, 2007a&b) that our primary and pervasive way of encountering  others 
is not characterized by observation, but by interaction. That is, the others we try 
to understand are usually people with whom we are interacting, engaged in some 
 communicative act, or in some common task, or situated in some common setting. 
4.  Goldman, for example, describes it this way: “When a mindreader tries to predict or ret-
rodict someone else’s mental state by simulation, she uses pretense or imagination to put 
herself in the target’s ‘shoes’ and generate the target state” (Goldman 2005; see Goldman 1989).
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Our primary way of understanding others is worked out not via 3rd-person obser-
vation or 1st-person simulation, but via real (2nd-person) interaction in pragmatic 
and social contexts. As an alternative to TT and ST, I’ve proposed interaction theory 
(IT) that appeals to evidence from phenomenology and developmental psychology. IT 
 challenges the ToMistic models of TT and ST on each supposition.
1. It (or IT) rejects the mentalizing supposition, that is, the Cartesian idea that other 
minds are hidden away and inaccessible, and cites evidence that in many cases 
knowing the other person’s intentions, emotions, and dispositions is simply a 
 matter of perceiving their embodied behavior in the situation. In most cases of 
everyday interaction no inference is necessary.
2. IT rejects the spectatorial supposition that we are primarily observers of others’ 
behaviors. Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is not third- 
person, detached observation; it is second-person interaction. For the most part 
we are interacting with them on some project, or in some communicative prac-
tice, or in some pre-defined relation.
3. IT rejects the supposition of universality in regard to either theory or simula-
tion. Rather, mindreading, as either TT or ST describes it, is at best a specialized 
activity that is relatively rarely employed. Our everyday understanding of others 
depends more on embodied and situated ways of perceiving and interacting with 
them, and is enhanced by narrative practices.
3.  The science of social cognition
Let us consider the evidence for and against these different approaches. First, there 
are a number of phenomenological problems with the explicit versions of TT and 
ST (see Gallagher 2005 for a full discussion). To put it most simply, taking a theo-
retical stance or running a simulation routine is not the way it seems to happen 
in everyday interaction. If we take a close look at our experience as we encounter 
others, rather than consulting a theory or running a simulation, we seem rather 
to have a direct perception of how it is with others. In most cases we know what 
they mean or intend without consulting a theory or simulation model. The contrast 
to such everyday or ordinary encounters may be found in more difficult or puz-
zling cases, where we may not know the person, or where we find their behavior 
strange. In such cases we may indeed revert to the observational mode and attempt 
to draw on a theory or simulation routine in order to figure out what is going on. 
But this is relatively rare in the larger context of everyday interaction. Furthermore, 
in our normal second-person interactions, we do not stand back in order to draw 
up an explanation. Rather, we engage with others in pragmatic activities or social 
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 practices which may involve evaluative understandings of others (and of myself in 
light of how others view me).
To say that this is the way it seems, from a phenomenological perspective, how-
ever, does not necessarily rule out implicit versions of TT and ST. It may be the case 
that it does not seem that we appeal to theory, or that we run a simulation routine, but 
in fact we may be doing so non-consciously. Phenomenological evidence would not 
be able to show that this is or is not the case. Thus, we need to look at the empirical, 
scientific evidence offered in support of these implicit versions of TT and ST.
3.1   Theory theory and false-belief tasks
When theory theorists turn to science to find support they most frequently appeal to 
false-belief tests. For example, in a content change task, a child might be shown a box 
that appears from its packaging to contain sweets or candies. She is asked what she 
thinks is inside, and she naturally answers “candies.” The box is then opened to reveal 
that something other than candies are inside, e.g. there may be pencils inside the box. 
The child is then asked to think about another person, X, who may walk into the room. 
When shown the box, what will the other person say the box contains? It turns out that 
the four-year old will correctly predict that X will say that there are candies in the box. 
On average, however, three-year olds will reply that X will say that there are pencils 
in the box. This seemingly demonstrates that on average, children who are three and 
younger do not have a developed theory of mind since they are not able to see that 
another person could have false beliefs.
This kind of experiment, and other variations of false-belief tests, set up a situ-
ation in which the child is seemingly forced to rely on an abstract and theoretical 
approach. Often times there is no other real person X. Sometimes a puppet is used; 
other times the test is based on a story about some fictitious child named Sally or Maxi. 
In such cases the child is not involved in any kind of real second person interaction 
with X. For example, there are no movements or facial gestures that X might pres-
ent; there is no meaningful encounter with X, and to the extent that is the case, the 
test is more about problem solving than it is about social cognition. Moreover, while 
three-year olds might have problems passing the false-belief test,5 and explaining or 
predicting the action of a third person, they seemingly have no problems understand-
ing what the experimenter is asking, or understanding the scenario that is presented to 
them. That is, they seem to have little or no difficulty engaging in the second-person 
interaction that defines their relationship with the experimenter. Regardless of what 
5.  This claim has now been complicated by recent studies that show that infants as young as 
15 months are capable of passing properly designed (non-verbal) false belief tests (Onishi & 
Baillargeon 2005). 
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we conclude about such issues, these kinds of false-belief tests can tell us nothing about 
an implicit use of theory, since the task that is set for the child is set at a conscious, and 
even metarepresentational level. It is not a test for some implicit process, since the 
child is asked explicitly to respond explicitly, and nothing rules out the possibility that 
the four-year old may be using an explicit logic to arrive at the correct answer. As far 
as I know, there is no scientific evidence that our normal encounters with others are 
characterized by implicit appeals to theory. Even those studies that examine implicit 
brain processes in the context of theory of mind tests propose only that such activity 
is the substrate of an explicit process of reasoning about mental processes (e.g. Saxe 
et al. 2004). False-belief tasks may have much to tell us about when children come to 
develop a concept of belief, but they tell us very little about social cognition, unless we 
already assume that our understanding of others is by way of a theoretical inference 
about beliefs that are hidden away in the other’s mind – suppositions that clearly guide 
the design of such experiments.
3.2  Simulation theory and the neuroscience of mirror neurons
In contrast to TT and its appeal to false belief tests, it may seem that ST has more sig-
nificant scientific support in the form of the recent neuroscience of motor resonance 
processes. If, as in ST’s formulations of an implicit simulation, the claim is that the 
simulation is sub-personal, instantiated in the workings of mirror neurons, or more 
general resonance systems, and is therefore automatic and nonconscious, then it seems 
that phenomenological objections have no force since the scope of phenomenology 
is limited to conscious processes. But let’s take a close look at what is claimed about 
implicit neural simulation.
The general claim is that one’s motor system reverberates or resonates in one’s 
encounters with others. Mirror neurons in my motor system are activated when 
I perceive another person performing an intentional action, for example. One 
claim that can be made by explicit simulation theorists is that these processes 
 underpin (or are the neural correlates) of explicit acts of simulation (Goldman 
2006; Ruby & Decety 2001). For the implicit simulation theorists, however, these 
subpersonal processes themselves just are a simulation of the other’s intentions. 
 Gallese  captures it clearly in his claim that activation of mirror neurons involves 
“ automatic, implicit, and nonreflexive simulation mechanisms …” (Gallese 2005, 
117; also see Gallese 2007). On this hypothesis, at the explicit, phenomenological 
level, one is not  explicitly simulating; rather one is experiencing an empathic sense 
of the other person, and this is the result of a simulation process that happens on 
the  subpersonal level.
Implicit neural ST understood in these or in similar terms is the growing 
 consensus. Thus, for example, Marc Jeannerod and Elizabeth Pacherie write:
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As far as the understanding of action is concerned, we regard simulation as 
the default procedure …. We also believe that simulation is the root form of 
interpersonal mentalization and that it is best conceived as a hybrid of explicit 
and implicit processes, with subpersonal neural simulation serving as a basis for 
explicit mental simulation.
 (Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004: 129; see Jeannerod 2001, 2003)
Goldman (2006) now distinguishes between simulation as a high-level (explicit) 
mind-reading and simulation as a low-level (implicit) mind-reading where the lat-
ter is “simple, primitive, automatic, and largely below the level of consciousness” 
(p. 113), and the prototype for which is “the mirroring type of simulation process” 
(147). The claim is that mirror neuron activation is a simulation not only of the goal 
of the observed action but of the intention of the acting individual, and is therefore 
a form of mind-reading. Mirror neurons discriminate identical movements accord-
ing to the intentional action and contexts in which these movements are embedded 
(Fogassi et al. 2005; Iacoboni et al. 2005; Kaplan & Iacoboni 2006). Neural simulation 
has also been extended as an explanation of how we grasp emotions and pain in oth-
ers (Avenanti & Aglioti 2006; Minio-Paluello, Avenanti & Aglioti 2006; Gallese, Eagle, 
Migone 2007). The idea that “simulator neurons” are responsible for understanding 
actions, thoughts, and emotions is taken up by Oberman & Ramachandran (2007) 
who provide evidence that the mirror neuron system as an internal simulation mecha-
nism is dysfunctional in cases of autism.
In contrast to the claims of implicit neural ST, there are several reasons why mir-
ror neuron activation should not be thought of as a form of simulation, and there is 
an alternative interpretation of the neuroscientific evidence about the mirror system 
that is more consistent with IT. First, let’s consider the reasons for not considering 
mirror neuron activation an implicit simulation. The first reason concerns the mean-
ing of ‘simulation’ as defined by ST. According to standard accounts of ST, (1) simula-
tion involves pretense, and (2) has an instrumental character, i.e. it is characterized in 
terms of a mechanism or model that we manipulate or control in order to understand 
something to which we do not have direct access. These two aspects of simulation are 
ubiquitous in the ST literature, and are considered essential to the concept of simu-
lation. Goldman (2002: 7), for example, explains that simulation involves “pretend 
states” where, “by pretend state I mean some sort of surrogate state, which is delib-
erately adopted for the sake of the attributor’s task … In simulating practical reason-
ing, the attributor feeds pretend desires and beliefs into her own practical reasoning 
system.” Both the instrumental and pretense character of simulation are reflected in 
this account. Dokic & Proust’s (2002, viii) description reflects the instrumental char-
acter: simulation means “using one’s own evaluation and reasoning mechanisms as a 
model for theirs.” Gordon (2004: 1) locates this instrumentalism at the neuronal level 
by suggesting that on the “cognitive-scientific” model, “one’s own behavior control 
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system is employed as a manipulable model of other such systems. (This is not to say 
that the “person” who is simulating is the model; rather, only that one’s brain can be 
manipulated to model other persons).” Adams (2001: 384) indicates that “it is a central 
feature of ST that one takes perceptual inputs off-line,” that is, that simulation involves 
pretense. Bernier (2002: 34) also takes both instrumental and pretense aspects to be 
essential elements of simulation.
According to ST, a simulator who runs a simulation of a target would use the 
resources of her own decision making mechanism, in an “off-line” mode, and 
then the mechanism would be fed with the mental states she would have if she 
was in the target’s situation.
The aspect of pretense is one of the things that distinguishes simulation from a theo-
retical model or a simple practice of reasoning (see Fisher 2006). This characterization 
also purportedly applies to the sub-personal processes of the motor system in iST: “our 
motor system becomes active as if we were executing that very same action that we are 
observing” (Gallese 2001: 37). The neurons that respond when I see your intentional 
action, respond “as if I were carrying out the behavior …” (Gordon 2004: 96). For ST, 
in all of its various forms, the concept of simulation clearly needs to meet these two 
conditions: it is a process that I control in an instrumental way (in the explicit version 
it is “deliberately adopted”), and it involves pretense (I put myself “as if ” in the other 
person’s shoes).
It seems clear, however, that neither of these conditions is met by mirror neurons. 
First, in regard to the instrumental aspect, if simulation is characterized as a process 
that I (or my brain) instrumentally use(s), manipulate(s), or control(s), then it seems 
clear that what is happening in the implicit processes of motor resonance is not simu-
lation. At the personal level, I do not manipulate or control the activated brain areas – 
in fact, I have no instrumental access to neuronal activation. Nor does it make sense to 
say that at the subpersonal level the brain activates a model or methodology in order to 
generate an understanding of something else. Indeed, in precisely the intersubjective 
circumstances that we are considering, these neuronal systems do not take the initia-
tive; they do not activate themselves. Rather, they are activated by the other person’s 
action. The other person has an effect on us and elicits this activation. It is not us (or 
our brain) initiating a simulation; it’s the other who does this to us. This is a case of 
perceptual elicitation rather than executive control.
Second, in regard to pretense, in sub-personal mirror processes there can be no 
pretense. This is obviously the case if we understand neurons as vehicles or mecha-
nisms: neurons either fire or don’t fire; they don’t pretend to fire. More to the point, 
however, and to adopt the standard terminology, in regard to their representational 
function, what these neurons represent or register cannot involve pretense in the way 
required by ST. Since mirror neurons are activated both when I engage in intentional 
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action and when I see you engage in intentional action, the mirror system is neu-
tral with respect to the agent; no first- or third-person specification is involved (de 
Vignemont 2004; Gallese 2005; Hurley 2005; Jeannerod & Pacherie 2004). In that 
case, it is not possible for them to register my intentions as pretending to be your 
intentions; there is no “as if ” of the sort required by ST because there is no ‘I’ or ‘you’ 
represented.6
One could go against the standard characterization of simulation and argue for a 
more minimal conception. Goldman (2006; Goldman & Sripada 2005), for example, 
in reference to neural simulation, acknowledges a discrepancy between the ST defini-
tion of simulation and the working of subpersonal mirror processes. “Does [the neu-
ral simulation] model really fit the pattern of ST? Since the model posits unmediated 
resonance, it does not fit the usual examples of simulation in which pretend states are 
created and then operated upon by the attributor’s own cognitive equipment (e.g. a 
decision-making mechanism), yielding an output that gets attributed to the target. …” 
To address this discrepancy Goldman and Sripida propose a generic definition of 
simulation:
However, we do not regard the creation of pretend states, or the deployment of 
cognitive equipment to process such states, as essential to the generic idea of 
simulation. The general idea of simulation is that the simulating process should 
be similar, in relevant respects, to the simulated process. Applied to mindreading, 
a minimally necessary condition is that the state ascribed to the target is ascribed 
as a result of the attributor’s instantiating, undergoing, or experiencing, that very 
state. In the case of successful simulation, the experienced state matches that 
of the target. This minimal condition for simulation is satisfied [in the neural 
model]. (Goldman & Sripada 2005: 208)
There is good reason to think, however, that matching, as a minimal condition for 
simulation, cannot be the pervasive or default way of attaining an understanding of 
others. There are many cases of encountering others in which we simply do not adopt, 
or find ourselves in, a matching state. Furthermore, with respect to implicit neural ST, 
if simulation were as automatic as mirror neurons firing, then it would seem that we 
6.  I think this is the case even if there is some aspect of mirror neuron activation that dif-
ferentiates between my action and the other’s action, e.g. the frequency of the spiking activity, 
as Legrand (2007) suggests, or possibly the timing of activation relative to other sensory-
motor processes (Gallagher 2005). This last point is especially important, as Legrand points 
out ( personal communication), given that the brain functions in terms of neuronal  assemblies 
which are “built” according to temporal constraints (synchrony of action potentials). The 
“same” neuronal activation slightly delayed may end up forming an entirely different assembly, 
and having a different function. Such differences would subtend a simple agent discrimination 
rather than a simulation.
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would not be able to attribute a state different from our own to someone else. But we 
often do this in cases where we see someone acting in a way that actually motivates 
the opposite reaction in us, for example, if I see someone enjoying acting in a way that 
for me is disgusting (Gallagher 2007a). In such cases, neither my neural states, nor my 
motor actions (I may be retreating with gestures of disgust just as the other person is 
advancing with gestures of enthusiasm), nor my feelings/cognitions match his. Yet I 
understand his actions and emotions (which are completely different from mine), and 
I do this without even meeting the minimal necessary condition for simulation, that 
is, matching my state to his at any level.
Consider, in addition, the difficulties involved if we were interacting with more 
than one other person, or trying to understand others who are interacting with 
each other. Is it possible to enter into the same, or what are likely different states, 
and thereby simulate the neural/ motor/ mental/ emotional states of more than 
one person at the same time? Or can we alternate quickly enough, going back and 
forth from one person to the other, if in fact our simulations must be such that we 
instantiate, undergo, or experience, the states in question? How complicated does it 
get if there is a small crowd in the room? Would there not be an impossible amount 
of cognitive work, or subpersonal matching required to predict or to understand 
the  interactions of several people if the task involves simulating their mental states, 
especially if in such interpersonal interactions the actions and intentions of each 
person are affected by the actions and intentions of the others (Morton 1996 makes 
a similar point).
Finally it should be noted that the scientific research on mirror neurons sug-
gests good reasons to think mirror neuron activation does not involve a precise 
match between motor system execution and observed action. Between 21 and 
45% of  neurons identified as mirror neurons are sensitive to multiple types of 
action; of those activated by a single type of observed action, that action is not 
 necessarily the same action defined by the motor properties of the neuron; further-
more,  approximately 60% of mirror neurons are broadly congruent, which means 
there may be some relation between the observed action(s) and their associated 
executed action, but not an exact match. Only about one-third of mirror neurons 
show a  one-to-one congruence (Csibra 2005). Activation of the broadly  congruent 
mirror neurons, therefore, may represent a complementary action rather than a 
similar action (Newman-Norlund et  al. 2007: 55). In that case they could not be 
simulations.
In denying that mirror neurons are simulating or matching in such cases, I am 
not denying that mirror neurons may be involved in our interactions with others. 
Indeed, it is likely that they do contribute to our ability to understand others or to keep 
track of ongoing intersubjective relations. What I am denying is that they constitute 
simulations in any acceptable use of that term. There is a much more  parsimonious 
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interpretation of mirror neuron activation which is consistent with the IT approach 
to social cognition.
3.3    Interaction theory, intersubjective enactive perception, and evidence 
from developmental psychology
The alternative interpretation of the mirror neuron data suggests that rather than 
simulation, mirror neuron activation is part of the neuronal processes that underlie a 
form of intersubjective enactive perception. That is, the articulated neuronal processes 
that include activation of mirror neurons or shared representations may underpin a 
non-articulated immediate perception of the other person’s intentional actions, rather 
than a distinct process of simulating their intentions. On this view, perception is a 
temporally dynamic and enactive process.
We know that mirror neurons fire 30–100 milleseconds after appropriate visual 
stimulation. This short time scale motivates the question of precisely where to draw 
the line between perceptual processes and something that would count as a sub- 
personal simulation. Distinctions at the neuronal level between activation of the visual 
cortex and activation of the premotor cortex, do not constitute a distinction between 
processes that are perceptual simpliciter and processes that involve something more 
than perception (see Gallagher 2008). Even if neuronal processes that involve infor-
mation-flow from sensory cortex to pre-motor cortex take some time (as much as 
100 milliseconds) it is not clear that we should identify this dynamic flow as constitut-
ing a two-step process (perception plus simulation) rather than a temporally extended 
and enactive perceptual process. If we think of perception as an enactive process 
(Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991), as involving sensory-motor skills rather than as 
just sensory input/processing – as an active, skillful, embodied engagement with the 
world rather than as the passive reception of information from the environment – 
then it may be more appropriate to think of mirror resonance processes as part of the 
structure of the perceptual process when it is a perception of another person’s actions. 
Mirror activation, on this interpretation, is not the initiation of simulation; it’s part of 
an enactive intersubjective perception of what the other is doing.
This interpretation of mirror neuron activation provides a tight fit with the inter-
action theory of social cognition, which can be further supported by developmen-
tal studies. On this account the capacities for human interaction and intersubjective 
understanding are already operative in infancy in embodied practices that are emo-
tional, sensory-motor, perceptual, and nonconceptual. Evidence from developmental 
psychology suggests that infants much younger than three-years are able to perceive 
the intentions and feelings of others in their movements, gestures, and actions. Our 
access to others is based on certain innate or early developing capacities manifested 
at the level of perceptual experience. This is the notion of primary  intersubjectivity 
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( Trevarthen 1979), a set of capacities that allow us to see, in the other person’s bodily 
movements, facial gestures, eye direction, etc. what they intend and what they feel. 
Neonates less than an hour old, for example, are capable of imitating the facial  gestures 
of another human (Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983; Gallagher & Meltzoff 1996). 
Although there is a debate about how precisely to characterize this behavior (see, e.g. 
the papers in Meltzoff & Prinz 2002) there is growing consensus that it involves the 
mirror resonance systems, even if they are not fully developed in the infant (see, e.g. 
Gallagher 2001b; Hurley 2005; Williams et  al. 2001). Primary intersubjectivity also 
includes capacities for eye tracking, and for parsing various movements of the head, 
the mouth, the hands, and more general body movements as meaningful or goal-
directed. Such perceptions are important for a non-mentalistic (pre-theoretical, non-
conceptual) understanding of the intentions and dispositions of other persons, and 
they are operative by the end of the first year (Baldwin & Baird 2001; Baldwin et al. 
2001; Johnson 2000; Johnson et al. 1998). This is not a form of “mindreading” in the 
sense of discerning mental states hiding behind observed behavior; rather, seeing the 
actions and expressive movements of the other person is already to see their meaning. 
No inference to a hidden set of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) is necessary.
The infant already has a pre-reflective sense of itself as an experiencing subject; 
it has a perceptual sense that certain kinds of entities (but not others) in the environ-
ment are indeed such subjects; it has a sense that in some way these entities are similar 
to and in other ways different from itself. This is a non-mentalising understanding 
of the intentions and dispositions of other persons, a perceptual grasp of emotional, 
embodied, enactive meaning. Moreover, it is part of what is primarily a second-person 
interaction rather than a third-person observation. One can see this in the timing and 
emotional mirroring of infants’ behavior (Hobson 2002). Infants “vocalize and ges-
ture in a way that seems [affectively and temporally] ‘tuned’ to the vocalizations and 
gestures of the other person” (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997: 131). In this regard, it is the 
interaction itself that contributes something that is not reducible to the actions of the 
individuals involved.
[T]he intentionality in the mother-infant interaction does not reside in any 
individual mind; it emerges as a product of their social interaction. Thus, what 
is intentional about the mother-infant interaction cannot be explained simply in 
terms of the mother’s and infant’s intentions with respect to each other.
 (Gibbs 2001)
On average, around the age of 9 months to 1 year, when the capacity for joint attention 
begins, the infant goes beyond person-to-person immediacy and enters into the con-
texts of shared attention, interacting with others in a way that allows for learning about 
the surrounding world, what things mean and what they are for. This is the beginning 
of secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978).
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The defining feature of secondary intersubjectivity is that an object or event can 
become a focus between people. Objects and events can be communicated about. … 
the infant’s interactions with another person begin to have reference to the things 
that surround them. (Hobson 2002: 62)
Merleau-Ponty (1962: 353) put it this way: “No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a  living 
body in the process of acting than the objects surrounding it immediately take on 
a fresh layer of significance.” At 18 months infants can re-enact to completion the 
goal-directed behavior that an observed subject does not complete, showing that 
they recognize the unfulfilled intentions of others (Herrmann et  al. 2007; Meltzoff 
1995). Secondary intersubjectivity gives us the capacity for socially and pragmatically 
 contextualized understanding, a more developed understanding of others in context. 
Through all of this the infant or young child is not trying to discover mental states in 
the other person’s head; they are trying to discover meaning in the other person’s world, 
which is the same world that they share and in which they interact with the other.
The evidence provided by these developmental studies is not ignored by theory 
theorists, but rather interpreted as indicative of some “precursors” to fully developed 
ToM (e.g. Baron-Cohen 1995; Currie 2008). Baron-Cohen identifies three basic mech-
anisms that contribute to this development: the intentionality detector (ID), the eye 
direction detector (EDD), and the shared attention mechanism (SAM), but, on his 
account, these mechanisms are inadequate for explaining the more mature ToM abili-
ties that come online at around the age of four. Gopnik & Meltzoff (1998) cite much of 
the same evidence mentioned here, but they interpret this as already a form theorizing 
in practice. The infant is honing its theoretical skills, constantly making inferences 
about the behavior of others, and testing them out in quasi-experimental fashion. 
Infants are small scientists gradually building a folk psychology that will come to rule 
our more mature interpretations of others.
The capabilities and practices of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, how-
ever, are not stages that we pass through, and are not replaced by more sophisticated 
theory-governed interpretations, and in that sense cannot count as precursors to use of 
folk psychological theory. These capabilities do not disappear in adulthood; as studies 
of perception of emotional expression using simple point light displays demonstrate, 
they mature and become more subtle (Dittrich et al. 1996).7 As adults, for example, 
when we see a smiling face (and other facial gestures) we automatically, involuntarily, 
7.  As Merleau-Ponty notes, through these early developing capabilities the child can appro-
priate objects and “learn to use them as others do, because the [motor resonance of the] body 
schema ensures the immediate correspondence of what he sees done and what he himself 
does … and the unsophisticated thinking of our earliest years remains as an indispensable 
acquisition underlying that of maturity” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 354).
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and non-consciously attune to it with an enactive, mimetic, response (Schilbach 
et al. 2008). Face perception includes an enactive element through which we engage 
with and respond to stimuli instead of a mere passive perception of face-based cues 
(Schilbach et al. 2008). Even as adults we frequently need to go no further than what 
is already the rich and complex comprehension that we gain through the perception 
of a situated agent – that is, of an agent who is situated in an environment which 
also tells us something about what that person is doing and thinking. If, through a 
perception that is already informed by my interaction with the other person, as well 
as by my previous situated experiences, my habitual ways of understanding, and 
by cultural norms and established practices, I see the situation and what the agent 
is doing in it, and how the agent is doing it, and what the agent is expressing (e.g. 
through her gestures and style of movement), then in our normal ordinary engage-
ments the work of understanding is already sufficiently accomplished for most prac-
tical purposes, and I do not have to go any further. I do not have to start thinking 
about what might be going on in the other person’s mind since everything I need for 
gaining some understanding of her is there in her action and in our shared world.
4.  Empathy and narrative competency
Primary and secondary intersubjective capacities do not rule out the possibility of 
misunderstanding, unresolved ambiguity, or that the other person may in some cir-
cumstances be a real puzzle. I may not have enough information perceptually or con-
textually (or otherwise) to make sense out of what the other person is doing. But in a 
broad range of normal circumstances enough meaning for our everyday intersubjec-
tive interactions is already available in the perception of movements, gestures, facial 
expressions, and so on, as well as in cues provided by pragmatic and social contexts. 
This, however, cannot be the complete story. Our mature ability for understanding 
(or misunderstanding) others, even if it does not leave primary and secondary inter-
subjective capabilities behind, is enhanced by a different kind of practice. In opposi-
tion to TT and ST, however, I want to argue that this enhancement is not a matter of 
theorizing or simulating; it involves communicative and narrative competency.8
8.  It’s important to note that a complete explanation of our intersubjective capabilities cannot 
be captured by any one of these aspects. The thought that primary intersubjectivity is the 
full explanation, for example, the basis for Carruthers (2009b) criticism. He focuses on what 
Buckner et al. (2009) happily call “a weakly integrated swarm of first-order [sensory-motor] 
mechanisms,” i.e. those aspects that constitute primary intersubjectivity, and he claims that 
“Appealing just to sensorymotor skills (as Gallagher does) is plainly inadequate to account for 
the flexibility of the ways in which adults and infants can interact with others” (p. 167). IT does 
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4.1  The development of communicative and narrative competence
There is good evidence that sometime around the age of two years, a number of things 
happen that lead to a capacity for empathic understanding. Decety & Jackson (2004) 
note:
It is around the 2nd year that empathy may be manifested in prosocial behaviors 
(e.g. helping, sharing, or comforting) indicative of concern for others. Studies 
of children in the 2nd year of life indicate that they have the requisite cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral capacities to display integrated patterns of concern for 
others in distress (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler & Ridgeway 1986). During this 
period of development, children increasingly experience emotional concern “on 
behalf of the victim,” comprehend others’ difficulties, and act constructively by 
providing comfort and help.
 (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner & Chapman 1992)
What does it take for this kind of empathy (empathic understanding) to emerge? 
We can point to a number of important developments in the child around this age. 
At 12–18 months we see the development of secondary intersubjectivity in which 
children start to see things in pragmatic contexts: objects start to get their meaning 
from the way people interact with them. Children begin to make sense of the world 
through their interaction with others – a process that de Jaegher and Di Paolo call 
“participatory sense-making” (2007). Just around the same time the ability for mirror 
self-recognition emerges, and this provides the child with a more objective sense of 
self, in contrast to an earlier, proprioceptively-based sense of self (Gallagher 2005). 
In addition, sometime between 15–24 months, children start to speak, or as Merleau-
Ponty might put it, language starts to acquire them and advances their communica-
tive capacities. Finally, between 18–24 months, children start to manifest an ability for 
autobiographical memory.
By 18–24 months of age infants have a concept of themselves that is sufficiently 
viable to serve as a referent around which personally experienced events can 
be  organized in memory…. The self at 18–24 months of age achieves whatever 
‘critical mass’ is necessary to serve as an organizer and regulator of experience.… 
This achievement in self-awareness (recognition) is followed shortly by the onset 
of  autobiographical memory… (Howe 2000: 91–92)
Along with a developing communicative competence, autobiographical memory, and 
a more objective sense of self, comes the capacity for self-narrative. It may be that 
not limit the explanation of intersubjectivity, however, “just to” the sensory-motor processes 
found in primary intersubjectivity; rather, it in addition consistently points to the capacities 
involved in secondary intersubjectivity and narrative competency.
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2-year olds work more from scripts than from full-fledged narratives; their autobio-
graphical memories have to be elicited by questions and prompts (Howe 2000; Nelson 
2003; 2009). But from 2–4 years, children fine-tune their narrative abilities by means 
of a further development of language ability, autobiographical memory, and the grow-
ing stability of their sense of self.
Through narratives we also learn from others and engage more fully in partici-
patory sense-making. Katherine Nelson (2003: 31) suggests that, in Jerome Bruner’s 
(1986) phrase, the “landscape of action” narrative emerges in 2-year olds, “with respect 
to the child’s own experience, which is forecast and rehearsed with him or her by par-
ents.” Self-narrative requires building on our experiences of others and their narra-
tives. Thus, “children of 2–4 years often ‘appropriate’ someone else’s story as their own” 
(Nelson 2003: 31). As Dan Hutto (2008) has pointed out, the fact that in most cultures 
children grow up surrounded by stories that transmit cultural meanings and values 
initiates them into practices of understanding reasons for action. The pragmatic and 
social contexts of secondary intersubjectivity become semantically enriched with the 
development of this kind of narrative competency.
4.2   Narrative competency and empathic understanding
I want to argue that this development of communicative and narrative competency is a 
necessary component of empathic understanding. I don’t mean that empathic under-
standing requires an occurrent or explicit story telling: but it does require the ability 
to frame the other person in a detailed pragmatic or social context, and to understand 
action in that context in a narrative way. My own action, and the actions of others 
have intelligibility and begin to make sense when we can place them in a narrative 
framework (see McIntyre 1981). This kind of narrative scaffolding is an extension of 
secondary intersubjectivity and an enhancement of participatory sense-making. Our 
understanding of others and their situations, and hence the possibility of empathizing 
with them, is not based on attempts to get into their heads in a mentalising fashion, 
since we already have access to their embodied actions and the rich worldly contexts 
within which they act – contexts that can be translated into narratives that operate 
to widen or make more specific the meaning/significance of actions and expressive 
movements.
Through narrative competency the more primary form of empathy based on the 
activation of resonance systems is brought to a more conceptual level. If, for  example, 
I see someone crying, I may immediately, on the basis of resonance  processes, 
empathize with him on a very concrete, but still ambiguous (non-valenced) level of 
 concern. Only when I find out his story will I be able to move to a level of empathic 
 understanding. If, however, his story is that he is crying because he lost the gun with 
which he was going to kill me, then it is unlikely that any sort of positive empathic 
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understanding will result, although I may still understand his intentions, his actions, 
and maybe even his motives. The story, the narrative, helps to fill in the circum-
stances, and for understanding of the empathic sort, one needs to understand the 
circumstances. Dilthey puts us on the right track.
It is necessary to distinguish the state of mind which produced the action by 
which it is expressed from the circumstances of life by which it is conditioned. 
… [In some cases] action separates itself from the background of the context of 
life and, unless accompanied by an explanation of how circumstances, purposes, 
means and context of life are linked together in it, allows no comprehensive 
account of the inner life from which it arose. (Dilthey 1926/1988: 153)
Dilthey’s account, however, remains too mentalistic; it is not the inner life or the men-
tal life that we attempt to access, but simply the other’s life in its worldly/situational 
contexts, and that’s what narrative can capture.
As de Waal (1996) points out, differentiation between self and other is impor-
tant for distinguishing empathy from emotional contagion, which involves a complete 
identification with the other. This is also emphasized by Reed (1994: 288): “When one 
empathizes, one perceives a situation from another’s point of view without losing track 
of one’s own point of view.” These different perspectives are worked out and stabilized 
through communicative and narrative practices. To occupy a position within a narra-
tive, and to distinguish it from another, requires more than a minimal (pre-reflective, 
non-conceptual, proprioceptive/kinaesthetic) self-awareness – it requires a concep-
tual, objective, narrative self that is aware of itself as having a point of view that is 
different from others.
4.3   Narrative and ToM
One might think that this ability to distinguish different points of view, or to have this 
narrative competency depends on already having a theory of mind. Janet Astington 
(1990) argues in this way. She cites the distinction between the landscape of action (a 
narrative of simple actions) and the landscape of consciousness (a folk-psychological 
narrative which expresses “what those involved in the action know, think, or feel, or 
do not know, think, or feel” – Bruner 1986: 14). To understand narrative, and by exten-
sion, to empathize, she argues, we need access not only to the character’s actions but 
also to their minds. We gain the latter either through folk psychological theory or simu-
lation. Astington therefore suggests that children younger than 4 years prefer descrip-
tive accounts of actions (the landscape of action) to folk-psychological narratives (the 
landscape of consciousness). Children at 4 years (when they acquire ToM) start to pre-
fer narrative stories that include mental terms. In folk-psychological narratives we find 
verbs signifying mental states (thinking, remembering, desiring,  believing, etc.) and 
attribute them to characters in the narrative: The character believes X; the character 
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desires Y; or the character intends to do Z. Once we can see things in this way, Astington 
proposes, then we can understand the characters and their different points of view.
We can find evidence against this prioritizing of ToM and folk-psychology from 
experiments conducted by Bruner himself. He offers good experimental evidence 
against the importance of mental or folk-psychological terms (and by implication, ToM) 
for understanding narratives. In a study of narrative comprehension in adults (Feldman, 
Bruner et al. 1990), two different versions of the same story are presented. One version 
has a rich language of consciousness; the characters are construed as  having specific 
mental states. A second version of the same story is stripped of all such  language and 
is reduced to a pure language of action. Different subjects are asked to read one of the 
 versions and then to tell the gist the story; they are asked to recount the facts of the story, 
and to do so in the order they occurred in the story. The results showed no significant 
differences between landscape-of-action narratives and  landscape-of-consciousness 
narratives, (1) when providing the gist; (2) in recounting the facts of the story; (3) in 
recounting the order of events; or even (4) in the use of reader-related mental verbs 
when they recount the landscape-of-consciousness narrative.
4.4  Narrative and resonance processes
While the presence of mental terms, or a folk psychological vocabulary, and by impli-
cation, ToM, may not make a difference for narrative understanding, the presence or 
absence of resonance processes, especially in the affective order, do seem to make a 
difference. Within the context of a narrative, affective resonance (as represented in 
expressive movements and gestures) needs to be consistent if empathic understand-
ing is to emerge. This has been shown by Decety & Chaminade (2003). Subjects were 
presented with a series of video clips showing actors telling sad and neutral stories, as 
if they had personally experienced them. The stories were told with either congruent 
or incongruent motor expression of emotion. As a measure of empathy the subjects 
were then asked to rate the mood of the actor and how likable they found that person. 
When the subjects were exposed to sad stories (eliciting an empathic understand-
ing) versus neutral stories, there was increased activity in emotion processing-related 
structures (including the amygdala and parieto-frontal areas) predominantly in the 
right hemisphere. But when the story-tellers showed incongruent facial expressions 
(happy gestures while telling a sad story, for example) these areas were not activated, 
indicating an absence of empathy. These areas of neural activation respond not simply 
to perceived features of action and expression (and the subjectivity of the other person) 
but also to the larger story, the represented scene, the narrative circumstances of the 
other person, and how features of action and expression match or fail to match those 
circumstances. The affective resonance that comes along with  expressive  movements 
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and gestures, and the pragmatic sense of the person’s instrumental actions are not 
without relevance for empathic understanding. We have argued, however, that they 
are not enough; one needs to see these elements in the larger situation or in the con-
text of the larger story.
5.   Conclusion
If we return to the contemporary debate about empathy, we are now in a position to 
get a clearer idea of the different positions on this question. First, on an account that is 
consistent with the neural or implicit simulation theory, empathy is automatically gen-
erated in the activation of the mirror system. Gallese, for example, equates empathy 
with the motor resonance processes that he also equates with an implicit simulation. 
Thus, in his “shared manifold hypothesis” he distinguishes three levels of analysis (see 
Gallese 2001: 45).
The phenomenological level: the sense of similarity with persons like us – the 
empathic level involving actions, emotions and sensations.
The functional level: simulation routines, as if processes enabling models of others 
to be created.
The subpersonal level: mirror matching neural circuits – resonating body schemas.
Accordingly he claims, “… sensations, pains and emotions displayed by others can 
be empathized, and therefore understood, through a mirror matching mechanism” 
(2001: 45).
In contrast to this, Decety suggests that basic resonance processes are not suffi-
cient for empathy. For empathy one needs to have in place a more sophisticated theory 
of mind (perhaps in the form of an explicit simulation ability) in addition to the reso-
nance processes. That is, something more than basic resonance activity is required for 
empathy.
Within these debates there is a growing consensus around the idea that infants 
are capable of very basic or elementary empathic behavior, although disputes remain 
whether we should explain this behavior in terms of a pre-curser to theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen 1995; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; Meltzoff 2002), something that is 
already simulation (Gallese 2001), or something closer to intersubjective  enactive 
perception, as in interaction theory (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2001a; 
2004; 2008a&b; Reddy 2008; Rochat 2004; Zahavi 2008). There is also some agree-
ment that something more subtle and sophisticated happens as part of human 
social maturity. The following table (Table 1) summarizes a variety of positions on 
this point.
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Table 1. Different views of empathic behavior
Basic processes starting  
in infancy
“Something more”
Elementary understanding Empathic understanding Dilthey (1926)
Percursor processes (ID, EDD, 
SAM)
Theory of mind (TT) Baron-Cohen (1995)
Low-level simulation High-level simulation Goldman (2006)









Gallagher (2006); Gallagher & 
Hutto (2008)
The consensus is that there are at least two parts to this story. There is, of course, 
no consensus on what constitutes either of the parts – elementary or empathic under-
standing – or what the “something more” is that constitutes the more advanced 
capacity. In most cases it is acknowledged that what starts in infancy does not end in 
infancy but continues and is perhaps transformed by the more developed processes. 
I have argued against theory and simulation accounts, and in place of ToM capabili-
ties, I have suggested that the development of communicative and narrative compe-
tency provides the “something more” needed for empathic (or even non-empathic) 
understanding.9
In part, what I have attempted to map out here is a story about how we understand 
others, consistent with both phenomenological and scientific evidence. With respect 
to the basic capacities for understanding others, ToMistic approaches invest in either 
theory (folk psychology) or in simulation. These approaches have recently been trying 
to account for capacities that clearly develop in children younger than 4 years of age. 
ST has been helped by the recent advances in the neuroscience of resonance systems 
9.  Here I remind the reader that we’ve adopted a Wittgensteinian strategy in regard to the 
terminological problem with the term ‘empathy’. I’m using this term in a broad sense to en-
compass a variety of phenomena. Notwithstanding this strategy let me point out that uses of 
terms like ‘empathic understanding’ (Dilthey) or ‘reenactive empathy’ (Stueber) suggest that 
our normal and everyday understanding is always empathic, and that may be tied to the spe-
cific theory of understanding to which these theorists hold. For example, Stueber equates 
empathy with simulation and considers ST the “default position for our ability to understand 
rational agents within the folk-psychological context” (2006: 167). In that sense empathy is 
not a special way of understanding others; it is simply the way that we always understand 
others. Although I want to suggest that there is a variety of phenomena that might be called 
empathic, I want to stop short of equating empathy with any and all forms of intersubjective 
understanding.
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that may offer some explanation for these earlier capacities for intersubjectivity. IT 
takes as its starting point just such capacities for primary and secondary intersubjec-
tivity, and argues, in contrast to TT and ST, that these are embodied, sensory-motor 
capacities of enactive perception. But clearly this is not sufficient to explain our more 
developed capacity for empathic understanding.
One option would be to say that IT provides a good account of intersubjectivity 
up until the fourth year of life, at which time the child acquires a theory of mind – an 
ability to use folk psychology or simulation routines to make inferences about other 
people’s mental states. The use of mentalising inferences, however, seems to be more 
the exception than the rule, and would make empathic understanding more a matter 
of observational logic than of being moved by the other’s situation. Rather than pur-
suing some form of TT or ST, or some hybrid version of ToM, I’ve tried to make the 
case for the importance of communicative and narrative competency to address this 
issue. The capacities of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, which characterize 
our human interactions in early and late infancy, are not replaced by a cold theo-
retical logic, or a self-controlled simulation. They are extended through language and 
autobiographical memory into a narrative competency that allows us to recognize 
the other person’s circumstance and to construct an appropriately nuanced narrative 
understanding.
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Intersubjectivity in the lifeworld
Meaning, cognition, and affect
Barbara Fultner
Denison University
“All relations with others, if deep enough, bring 
about a state of insecurity.”
Maurice Merleau-Ponty 1964
Adequate accounts of intersubjectivity must recognise that it is a social, cognitive, 
and affective phenomenon. I draw on Jürgen Habermas’ formal-pragmatic 
theory of meaning and of the lifeworld as an alternative to phenomenological 
approaches. However, his conception of the lifeworld reflects a cognitivist bias. 
Intersubjectivity cannot be adequately conceptualised merely in terms of our 
mutual accountability and exchange or reasons; the affective dimension of our 
social interactions must also be recognised. I propose to redress this shortcoming 
by taking account of empirical research on intersubjectivity, joint attention, and 
attachment. This leads me to suggest supplementing the three Habermasian 
validity claims to truth, normative rightness, and sincerity with a fourth, a claim 
to attachment, which fits with understanding the earliest infant interactions in 
terms of altercentric participation. Since an adequate account of the social nature 
of linguistic communication must do justice not only to the lifeworld as a shared 
background of intelligibility, but also as a background against which differences 
in point of view are articulated, I conclude with a brief look at the ontogeny of 
perspective.
Keywords: lifeworld; intersubjectivity; validity claims; attachment; cognition; 
affect; perspective; J. Habermas; M. Merleau-Ponty
1.  Introduction
Philosophers have long acknowledged the social aspects of language. Just how to con-
ceptualize this social dimension, however, has been a matter of dispute. There is a 
trivial sense in which language is social: it is used for communication. Empiricists such 
as Hobbes and Locke understood language primarily, though not exclusively, as an 
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external medium for sharing internal thoughts or ideas with others. This understand-
ing of language has been challenged, notably by Wittgenstein (1953), Quine (1960), 
and Davidson (1984) in philosophy’s analytic tradition. The rule-following debate 
has brought to the forefront the idea that language is a social practice and that the 
very idea of linguistic meaning only makes sense in a social context.1 Yet analytic phi-
losophers have lacked adequate resources to conceptualize intersubjectivity and often 
cannot shake a persistent individualism. Davidson, for instance, (purportedly follow-
ing in Wittgenstein’s footsteps) has denied that knowing a language requires knowing 
a socially shared set of conventions (meanings) and has instead privileged idiolects 
(Davidson 1986). Even those most sympathetic to viewing language as social prac-
tice and intersubjectivity as constitutive of semantic content (e.g. Brandom 1994) fall 
short of fully doing justice to intersubjectivity – not least for lack of a social theory. 
Philosophers of language have also paid much less attention than might be expected 
to ontogeny, and they have all but neglected emotional aspects of meaning and the 
conative dimension of social interaction in general.
By contrast, the continental tradition’s concept of the lifeworld, originally intro-
duced by Husserl and developed by Heidegger, Schutz, and others, is a promising 
conceptual model for intersubjectivity. Whether one defends a phenomenological, 
hermeneutic, cultural, or communication-theoretic version, it is agreed that the 
lifeworld serves as a shared background of intelligibility against which communica-
tion takes place and which is maintained by communication. I shall here focus on 
Jürgen Habermas’ communication-theoretic concept of the lifeworld because my main 
interest is in linguistic meaning and communication and because his especially richly 
structured notion of a background of intelligibility makes him a suitable candidate for 
dialogue with other, empirical disciplines. As I will argue, his theory of communica-
tive action is very much consonant with much of the research approach that motivates 
the contributors to this volume. Yet he seems to be entirely overlooked in the litera-
ture. Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson and others who draw on continental philoso-
phy, have tended to focus on phenomenology and embodiment (e.g. Gallagher 2005; 
Thompson 2007; Trevarthen 2005). These approaches could be argued to be less well 
suited to conceptualizations of intersubjectivity than the socio-cultural perspective so 
prominent in Habermas’ work inasmuch as they tend to privilege embodiment over 
social interaction. In my view, however, the two are equally important.
Johanna Meehan (1995) argues that Habermas’s intersubjective and relational 
account of moral agency presupposes “primary attachments marked by mutual 
1.  This debate took centre stage in mainstream philosophy with the publication of Saul 
Kripke’s On Rules and Private Language (1982). For an overview of the ensuing debate, see 
Miller and Wright (2002).
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recognition.” I extend this argument to communicative interaction and linguistic 
understanding in general by drawing not on psychoanalysis as she does, but on devel-
opmental psychology and cognitive science. Habermas’ emphasis on learning in his 
epistemology as developed in Truth and Justification (2003) warrants this approach. 
The absence of considerations of developmental psychology is striking in Habermas’s 
work on meaning, particularly in light of his interest in developmental moral psychol-
ogy when he was developing discourse ethics in the 1980s. In extending Meehan’s 
argument, I argue that Habermas’s account of communicative action in general, not 
just of moral action, presupposes primary intersubjective relationships or attachments.
In this chapter I begin with a sketch of the lifeworld as a (back)ground of intel-
ligibility for the theory of communicative action and show how the lifeworld, as a 
complement to communicative action, fits with Habermas’ formal-pragmatic theory 
of meaning (Section 2). One of the short-comings of philosophical analyses of the 
social has been their almost exclusively conceptual or rational nature. Despite his best 
efforts to develop a balanced theoretical framework, I argue that Habermas provides 
an overly cognitivist account of the lifeworld (Section 3). I propose to redress this 
shortcoming by attending to structures of the lifeworld he himself introduces and by 
taking account of some recent empirical research on intersubjectivity and attachment 
(Section 4). I conclude with a very brief look at the ontogeny of perspective since 
an adequate account of the social dimension of linguistic communication must do 
justice not only to the lifeworld as shared background of intelligibility, but also as a 
background against which differences in point of view can be articulated (Section 5). 
2.  From language to lifeworld
At the level of social theory, Habermas proposes conceiving societies simultaneously as 
systems and as lifeworlds. His theory of the evolution of society and of modernisation 
rests on the premise that there is increasing differentiation of systems (e.g. law, state 
bureaucracy, the economy, education) and increasing rationalization of the lifeworld. 
Indeed, Habermas argues that in modern societies, there is a tendency for systems 
to colonise the lifeworld (1987). Although the notion of lifeworld may be based on a 
spatial metaphor, it is not to be thought of as a container. In the context of the theory 
of communicative action, Habermas writes, “the structures of the lifeworld lay down 
the forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding;” (Habermas 1987: 126). 
Communicative action is embedded in the lifeworld (Habermas 1998: 238). Indeed, 
the two are “complementary” concepts (1987: 119) and the lifeworld is “the correlate of 
processes of reaching understanding” (1984: 70). Lifeworld and communicative action 
are mutually explanatory and presuppose one another. On the one hand, the fact that 
we share a lifeworld explains our ability as participants in communicative action to 
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mutually understand one another directly, i.e. without inferences on the basis of 
behavioural observation and appeals to hidden intentions. On the other hand, the 
lifeworld is constituted through communicative action (1998: 248). It is maintained, 
reproduced, and hence also transformed through communicative action. Its presup-
positions are the product of communicative interactions among social actors. Thus 
it corresponds to what Arie Verhagen, following Anscombre and Ducrot, calls topos 
in a speech situation: a shared model for making sense of a situation and the objects 
encountered in it (Verhagen 2005: 12). Habermas would concur with Verhagen that 
linguistic communication is inherently “argumentative,” though they may not mean 
quite the same by this. According to Verhagen, “engaging in cognitive coordina-
tion comes down to, for the speaker/writer, an attempt to influence someone else’s 
thoughts, attitudes, or even immediate behavior. For the addressee it involves finding 
out what kind of influence it is that the speaker/writer is trying to exert, and deciding 
to go along with it or not” (Verhagen 2005: 10). By contrast, Habermas distinguishes 
between persuading another (making her believe something) and convincing her (by 
giving her reasons which are themselves criticisable). Linguistic communication, for 
Habermas, is inherently rational and not merely a strategic means of influencing oth-
ers, of “managing and assessing their behavior,” as Verhagen puts it. This may be a 
mere verbal dispute, inasmuch as Verhagen, too, endorses a version of inferential-
ism and accords communication the primary function of action coordination. Nev-
ertheless, it is important to point out that merely influencing others need not involve 
genuine intersubjectivity. At minimum, “influencing others” rhetorically suggests 
an observer’s third-person rather than an interlocutor’s second-person perspective. 
In the lifeworld, interlocutors are engaged in joint activities; they interact with one 
another in the second person.
The theory of communicative action holds that when two interlocutors com-
municate, they are aiming to reach a mutual understanding about something in the 
world. It thus incorporates the objective, intersubjective, and subjective elements of 
communication from the outset. This triad of world, other, and self runs through-
out Habermas’ understanding of language and of the lifeworld (see Table 1). In per-
forming a speech act, a speaker raises three types of validity claims: a claim to truth 
(that what she says is true), a claim to normative rightness (that what she says is 
context-appropriate), and a claim to sincerity (that she is not lying). Other formal-
pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action that constitute communicative 
competence include the assumption that speakers’ respective interpretations of the 
speech situation and of their diffuse environments largely coincide, that their diverg-
ing lifeworld perspectives converge, that interlocutors mean the same thing by their 
words, and that the validity claims they make are redeemed or at least in principle 
redeemable. In smoothly running communication, the validity claims interlocutors 
raise are intersubjectively recognized. Interlocutors take yes/no stances toward their 
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respective claims. That is, they either accept or reject these claims. Correlatively, to 
understand an utterance is to know its conditions of acceptability. In making a claim, 
a speaker takes on the warrant to vindicate it, if necessary, with reasons. This gives 
rise to an inferentialist semantics (cf. Brandom 1994), according to which language 
is understood as an inferential web and meanings are the result of making explicit 
the inferential relations between terms. The notion of the lifeworld serves as a crucial 
supplement to this account, for it functions as a background of intelligibility and a 
source for such reasons.




Truth Normative Rightness Sincerity
Objective, Social, 
Subjective “Worlds”






Lifeworld Culture Society Personality
Consider the utterance “The oil in the pan is hot.” (1) It has an explicit proposi-
tional content (that the oil in the pan is hot); Habermas dubs this “thematised” knowl-
edge. (2) There is further information that is not explicitly stated, but nevertheless 
implicit in the utterance or, as Habermas puts it, “thematised along with the propo-
sitional content.” “The oil in the pan is hot” may be uttered as a warning to someone. 
This kind of implicit or secondary thematization can easily be made explicit (e.g. 
“I’m warning you the oil is hot!”). (3) There is information that is neither explicit nor 
implicit in the utterance itself, but presupposed. The warning “The oil is hot!” pre-
supposes facts about hot oil burning skin, about a person’s reaction to touching the 
pan, about pans being containers, etc. Paul Grice (1989) was one of the first to draw 
the attention of philosophers of language to these presuppositions or, to use his term, 
conversational implicatures. “Presupposition” and “implicature” are suggestive of 
how this lifeworld background functions from the perspectives of the speaker and 
of the hearer respectively. On the one hand, the meaning of the utterance can only 
be grasped against the background of these presuppositions (Habermas 1998: 238). 
On the other hand, as Grice emphasized, utterances routinely communicate more 
than their explicit propositional and illocutionary content; thus what, for the speaker, 
may be a presupposition, can, for the hearer, be something understood by inference 
from what is explicitly said. In either case, what remains implicit is  meaning-constitutive 
inasmuch as it determines the semantic content of the utterance (cf. Searle 1983: 145). 
Moreover, successful communication depends on this implicit background knowledge 
being shared.
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This level of the background is fairly easily articulated or thematised. “If you spill 
it, you will burn yourself ” follows straightforwardly from “The oil is hot.” It repre-
sents a material inference grounded in practice (Brandom 1994). As Habermas points 
out, this kind of “unthematically concurrent” background information, on the one 
hand, “fosters the acceptability” of what is uttered explicitly. On the other hand, it can 
also be easily problematised. It is drawn on to justify one’s utterances if challenged. Of 
course, one can only make good on one’s claim if the reason cited is one the interlocu-
tor accepts, i.e. shares. Finally, this unthematised information has three features that 
Habermas attributes to the lifeworld: It represents a set of taken-for-granted presup-
positions of communication; it functions as a source of situation interpretations that 
allows us to cope with the world and others; and it shapes the horizon of everyday 
communication – points to which I’ll return.
Habermas, however, believes there is a deeper kind of background knowledge 
that is not so readily accessible, but which is nonetheless connected to the more easily 
articulable information. To say that this kind of knowledge is deeper means, in the first 
instance, that it cannot be as easily (if at all) drawn into the game of giving and asking 
for reasons; it thus has a greater stability. Habermas calls the presuppositions of this 
“background knowledge of the lifeworld” unavoidable.
This lifeworld background is distinct from the formal-pragmatic conditions of 
communicative competence. Remember that the lifeworld complements rather than 
constitutes communicative action as such. It is “the concrete knowledge of language 
and the world that dwells persistently in the penumbra of the prepredicative and 
the precategorial and that forms the unproblematic ground for all thematized and 
concomitantly thematized knowledge” (Habermas 1998: 239). It is thus a concrete 
and particular form of knowledge covering the categories of culture, society, and 
personality (see below) and is characterised by the following. (1) The lifeworld back-
ground carries an immediate certainty for us in that it represents a set of taken-
for-granted presuppositions. These are pregiven, prereflexive, and pretheoretical. 
Qua background presuppositions, they are unquestionably certain (at least in that 
particular speech situation). This means that the lifeworld performs what Haber-
mas calls its grounding function: it ensures that everyday interactions are mean-
ingful and acts as a bulwark against dissenting interpretations. This unquestioned 
preunderstanding is culturally ingrained; the lifeworld is “ours” before it is “mine” 
(Habermas 1984: 82–4). (2) The lifeworld has a center and a horizon: It is centered 
on a shared speech situation, but has indeterminate, shifting, yet non-transcendable 
boundaries. That is, interlocutors cannot step outside of the lifeworld, as it were, but 
always move within its horizon which delimits the possibilities available to agents in 
that situation. (3) The lifeworld is characterised by holism: Background knowledge 
forms a holistic “thicket” that prefigures the propositional contents, illocutionarily 
established interpersonal relations or speaker’s intentions that can be articulated and 
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differentiated in language (Habermas 1998: 244). Insofar as they are undifferenti-
ated, the lifeworld presuppositions are also somewhat indeterminate. (For further 
discussion, see Fultner 2001).
We might refer to the above as a formal description of the lifeworld. Haber-
mas also identifies culture, society, and personality as structures of the lifeworld, and 
these can be seen as providing its substantive content.2 By culture Habermas means 
the shared stock of knowledge that agents draw on to get around in the world. It 
allows them to interpret situations in which they find themselves, that is, to take 
them to be meaningful. Society refers to legitimately regulated interpersonal rela-
tions whereby group membership is established and solidarity is secured. Personal-
ity refers to the competencies of a speaking and acting subject that enable her to 
assert her own identity. Formally, these, too, correspond to the tripartite division 
between the objective, intersubjective, and subjective (cf. Table 1). All three are his-
torically and culturally variable. A university president, for instance, does not stand 
in the same social relationship to the faculty as a medieval prince to knights; simi-
larly, a “manic” personality only became possible in the late 19th century and meant 
something different then than it does now (Martin 2007). Communicative action 
not only enables interlocutors to reach mutual understanding, but effects cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization: “the everyday communicative 
practices in which the lifeworld is centered are nourished by means of an interplay 
of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization that is in turn rooted 
in these practices” (Habermas 1998: 251; see also 1987: 142). Society, culture, and 
personality are theoretical abstractions that are intertwined in everyday language. 
That is, when communicating with others, as participants in interaction, subjects 
do not differentiate between these three aspects. This can be seen as a corollary of 
the lifeworld’s holistic structure. People act as more or less responsible, more or less 
well-socialized and acculturated agents, and these actions maintain and transform 
their lifeworld to a greater or lesser degree.
3.  Cognitivist bias
Following Habermas, I have been referring to the lifeworld background as knowl-
edge or (pre-)understanding. Strictly speaking, however, it is not knowledge; it is 
2.  Habermas (1987) differentiates between a formal-pragmatic conception of the lifeworld, 
which he develops based on a phenomenological conception, and a conception based on the 
“everyday” or “commonsense” notion of the lifeworld, which he claims to be more suitable 
(less limited) for empirical purposes. The relationship between these two conceptions requires 
further clarification.
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certainly not justified true belief from the perspective of an individual participant in 
interaction. “Information” may be a better, more neutral term. Remember that the 
background is unquestionably certain, hence infallible. Qua background, it cannot 
become problematised and is hence not fallible (Habermas 1987: 130f.; 1998: 242). It 
becomes fallible only once articulated, but then, of course, it is no longer part of the 
background.3 Habermas himself insists that he aims to develop a conception of the 
lifeworld that is not, as he puts it, “culturalistically abridged,” one, that is, that does 
not consider only the cultural aspects of the lifeworld. Yet despite his recognition 
that the background presuppositions of the lifeworld do not constitute knowledge in 
the strict sense, he conceives the lifeworld in overly epistemic terms and pays insuf-
ficient attention to the structures of personality and society when discussing the 
lifeworld as background of intelligibility.
This is partly because he models his account of communicative competence on 
Chomsky’s reconstruction of linguistic competence, i.e. linguistic knowledge ( Habermas 
1998: 28–41). It also reflects a certain cognitivist or rationalist conception of mean-
ing. Recall that to understand an utterance is to know its conditions of acceptability. 
Someone who raises a validity claim takes on the warrant to support it with reasons 
if necessary. Rationality, however, is something Habermas associates with culture: Not 
only does he define culture as the stock of knowledge or interpretations that enables 
actors to cope with the worlds and others; he claims that “Continuity and coherence 
[of a tradition, society, or lifeworld] are measured by the rationality of the knowl-
edge accepted as valid”. Knowledge (or belief) is rational if it has undergone a pro-
cess of justification. By contrast, “the coordination of actions and the stabilization of 
group identities are measured by the solidarity among members… [and] Interactive 
capacities and styles of life are measured by the responsibility of persons” (Habermas 
1987: 140–141).  Culture, as defined above, perhaps lines up most obviously or natu-
rally with the lifeworld  background inasmuch as it provides a font of situation inter-
pretations. Yet once articulated, the other two spheres also take on cognitive features. 
That is, whether someone is responsible is a function of how well she can justify her 
actions, and even the “empathetic sensitivity” that lies at the core of solidarity boils 
down to “an understanding of the other sufficient to allow an insight into the rational-
ity of the other’s consent” (Rehg 1994: 108). This results in a configuration where the 
lifeworld functions as the background of intelligibility, while simultaneously two of its 
3.  Elsewhere I have argued that it cannot be knowledge because of its presuppositional status 
(Fultner 2001). There is, of course, the dialectical relationship between lifeworld background 
and communicative action. Accordingly, problematised claims may recede again into the 
background once justified.
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structural components either fall outside the realm of our theory of meaning or are 
assimilated to the third.
A more detailed discussion of the conceptualisation of and relationship among 
culture, society, and personality lies beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say 
that it raises questions about what a theory of meaning ought to encompass – and what 
is meant by “semantics” and what the connections are between semantics and prag-
matics. The former is widely defined in terms of the “factual” or in terms of referential 
relations between language and the world. This is consistent with the truth-conditional 
semantic programme in philosophy of language. Habermas (along with Wittgenstein 
and his heirs) has gone out of his way to emphasise that a theory of meaning that takes 
account only of the connection between language and objects or states of affairs is too 
narrow. He has emphasised the pragmatics of language use and expanded the theory of 
meaning to include not only truth – but also normative rightness and sincerity claims. 
However, our theoretical framework may need to be adjusted yet more radically than 
he suggests. Habermas is routinely criticized for being too rationalistic. The criticism 
levied here is of a somewhat different sort. I am not claiming that Habermas is naively 
overlooking the role of power or that all action is – really – strategic rather than com-
municative. My claim is that his analysis of meaning must be supplemented in accor-
dance with his own understanding of the structures of the lifeworld. The analysis of 
solidarity and responsibility, for instance, must aim to do justice not only to the socio-
cognitive accountability of agents to one another, but also to the affective bonds that 
bind them. One step in this direction, I’ll suggest, is to add a new kind of claim to his 
framework.
4.  The intrusion of embodiment and affect
One way to try to redress the above cognitivist bias is by considering some connec-
tions between recent empirical research on intersubjectivity and the concept of the 
lifeworld. This will also provide a developmental perspective on intersubjectivity 
and the social aspects of language that is lacking in most approaches to the theory of 
meaning. Perhaps the main challenge posed by the considerations that follow lies in 
how a theory of meaning might incorporate affective aspects of intersubjectivity. If 
Trevarthen is right that – at least in part –“meaning is made by emotions” (2005: 63), 
then not incorporating them into one’s theory of meaning is bound to produce a 
skewed or, at best, partial theory of meaning.
I began by noting that a Habermasian approach to social life fits with much of 
current research. In particular, Michael Tomasello’s account of shared intentionality 
and the pivotal role he assigns to the emergence of first joint attention, and then lan-
guage is consonant with Habermas’s model of communicative action (Tomasello 
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1999; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll 2005; Akhtar & Tomasello 1998). 
Tomasello maintains that children learn language not primarily through osten-
sive labelling but in a variety of pragmatic contexts which presupposes that they 
understand and can discriminate the intentions of their interlocutors. He argues 
that infants develop crucial abilities for interacting socially with others, starting 
at around 9 months (Tomasello 1999). They develop what is the defining feature 
of intersubjectivity for Tomasello, namely, the capacity of joint attentional focus. 
Although children clearly interact with others in affectively meaningful ways from 
birth, such interactions are not truly intersubjective according to Tomasello until 
infants begin to treat others as intentional agents. By about 18 months, they are 
capable of intention-reading, an ability that becomes increasingly fine-grained with 
the advent of language. Object-labelling studies indicate that children as young as 18 
months can discriminate an adult’s intentions. Twenty-four-month-olds will imitate 
actions even if only shown failed attempts and they can discriminate between inten-
tional and accidental behaviour (Akhtar & Tomasello 1998; Tomasello 1993; also 
Meltzoff & Moore 1998).4
4.  Several object-labelling studies showed that children as young as 18 months are able dis-
criminate an adult’s intentions. The experimenter would say “Let’s find a TOMA!” and look 
through several buckets, finding and rejecting one object before excitedly finding the target 
object. In subsequent studies, toddlers were also shown to be able to learn new verbs even if 
the referent of the target action was absent. The goal of the experiment was to teach children 
to predict which of several novel actions was impending by associating one of four toy char-
acters with four novel actions (“Let’s meek big bird!”), but in one group one of the actions 
was not performed (because the experimenter could not find the required action prop). 
“Learning the verb” here meant children knew the verb meant to refer to the intended action, 
even though they never saw it performed (319). Similarly, Meltzoff and Moore (1998) have 
shown that 18-month-old infants will imitate an action even if they’ve only been shown failed 
attempts at it. Infants will furthermore interpret the behaviour of persons (pulling apart a 
dumbbell-shaped object) as intentional and imitate it, but will not react this way to machines 
performing the same actions). Akhtar and Tomasello’s studies with 24-month-olds had an 
experimenter announce her intention to PLUNK big bird, then performing the action inten-
tionally and saying “there!”, then perfoming another action accidentally and saying “oops!” 
Alternatively, the experimenter would perform the accidental action before the target action. 
Children associated PLUNKing with the intentional action in either case, indicating “their 
ability to enter into a joint attentional (intersubjective) state with the adult by determining her 
intended action, and by applying their knowledge that adults use new pieces of language to 
indicate intended, not accidental, actions” (Akhtar & Tomasello 1998: 318). These children at 
24 months were also shown to be able to discriminate whether an adult was labelling an action 
or an object. The main point in these studies, however, was that children learn language not 
so much in labelling situations but in situations where adults are using language to regulate or 
anticipate the ongoing social interaction (320). 
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Joint attentional focus (i.e. intersubjectivity) not only precedes language acquisi-
tion; it is also a precondition for “cultural learning,” that is, learning to “comprehend 
and produce [a word] in conventionally appropriate contexts” (Akhtar & Tomasello 
1998: 325). This can be extended to learning other culturally specific practices. In this 
way, joint attentional focus becomes a condition of possibility of acculturation and 
socialization in general.
Both intention reading and joint attentional focus require sharing a lifeworld 
with the other. Arguably, the capacity for joint attention is tantamount to having 
entered into a shared lifeworld. After all, joint attention and activity requires that all 
sorts of things are mutually presupposed by participants in interaction. Seen in that 
light, joint attention is no longer merely about two individuals’ attention to the same 
object; it also has to do with the intersubjective meaningfulness of their context of 
interaction and the preunderstandings they bring to that situation. Tomasello thus 
identifies true intersubjectivity with what is sometimes termed secondary (vs. pri-
mary) intersubjectivity.5 According to Tomasello, it emerges only once children are 
able to understand others as intentional agents and hence to participate in shared 
cultural activities including linguistic communication. He argues that this occurs 
around one year of age, i.e. before the emergence of language and symbolic com-
munication – recently called “tertiary intersubjectivity”, by Bråten and Trevarthen 
(2007) – and considerably before the four year-stage when “theory of mind” proper, 
the ability to attribute beliefs and desires that may or may not be true, emerges 
(Tomasello & Rakoczy 2003). This is theorized as a cognitive – albeit a social-cog-
nitive – process; affect does not figure in the analysis.6 The distinction between 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity on the one hand, and tertiary intesubjec-
tivity on the other matches a sharp distinction Habermas draws in The Theory of 
5.  This distinction was introduced by Trevarthen (1978) and Hubley and Trevarthen (1979). 
There is some disagreement as to when secondary intersubjectivity appears. Some researchers 
identify it around 9 months, others at 18. In some of his other work, Tomasello himself situ-
ates the emergence of secondary intersubjectivity at 9 rather than 18 months. (Thanks to Tim 
Racine for pointing this out). “Secondary” intersubjectivity has been used to refer to interac-
tions once the infant can share in joint attention to some object with another subject. Fogel 
et al. however, place the onset of secondary intersubjectivity in the second half of the first year, 
i.e. prior to intention-reading: “Infants now become able to refer to distant objects and events 
and to their own feelings during communication frames… After 12 months of age, this form 
of intersubjectivity becomes increasingly symbolic (Fogel et al. 2001: 195). – Lots of other im-
portant developments occur around 18 months as well, such as self-recognition in mirrors, 
which has led some to attribute a concept of self to infants at this point.
6.  Although Meltzoff and Moore are willing to say intersubjectivity is there from the earliest 
moments of life, the affective dimension is completely absent from their account.
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 Communicative Action between interaction in “a prelinguistic,  instinctually bound 
mode” and a “language-dependent, culturally bound” one (Habermas 1987: 26).
Yet something is lost by seeing this fundamental change as transforming 
intersubjectivity into something social-cognitive rather than social-affective-
cognitive. Understanding primary and secondary intersubjectivity as continuous 
helps to steer clear of the cognitivist bias discussed above. In other words, it will 
help avoid an overly epistemic conception of the lifeworld in terms of background 
knowledge and an excessive emphasis on rational justification in our conception 
of language and communication. Studies of imitation and of emotional develop-
ment indicate that intersubjectivity develops on a continuum, and that linguistic 
– shared – knowledge develops in tandem with other social knowledge and empir-
ical knowledge – even though it may not be possible to differentiate between them 
in early stages of development (Meltzoff & Moore 1998); Soussignan & Schaal 
2005). Evidence of cognitive and affective processing and their interrelatedness 
in infants is mounting (Trevarthen 2005; Soussignan & Schaal 2005). True, the 
capacity to provide reasons, to justify one’s claims, requires language. Nor do I 
wish to deny that language acquisition represents an important, perhaps essential 
developmental milestone for humans and introduces new possibilities of social 
interaction and cognition, including the ability to differentiate ourselves with 
increasing clarity from others – a point to which I shall return. Yet as a number of 
researchers have pointed out, the three dimensions of validity Habermas identifies 
(objective, subjective, and intersubjective) already structure – albeit inchoately – 
very early child development. Colwyn Trevarthen (2005), for example, speaks of the 
self, the communicative person, and the thing/object outside the body.7 Moreover, the 
infant’s interactions with the world are socio-culturally mediated from the very begin-
ning (Fogel 1993). In this vein, mother-infant interactions at 2–3 months and earlier – 
before infants can effectively manipulate objects – have been described as “protocon-
versations” where infants respond in patterned ways to their mothers’ vocalization. 
This research goes back to the late 60’s and early 70’s and suggests an “emotive foun-
dation for language and learning of culture” (Trevarthen 1998, p. 23). Trevarthen 
emphasises this “intrinsic rhythmicity” and reads infant behaviour as far more 
organised and intersubjectively coordinated than had been thought. (This accords 
with, e.g. Rochat’s [2001] findings regarding intermodal coordination in neo-
nates.) Trevarthen argues against Stern (1985) that the “neonate’s emergent self [is 
not] purely emotional,” whereas Stern “does not allow the infant an intersubjective 
7.  In some of his very early work and recently in a talk at the 2007 International Cognitive 
Linguistics Association conference in Krakow, Trevarthen has acknowledged (the early) 
Habermas as an influential figure on his thought.
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self before 7–8 months” (Trevarthen 1998: 23f.). The turn-taking that character-
izes this communication might be seen as a proto-perspective-taking. Early lan-
guage development may also be a mechanism for developing a shared perspective 
with another. Thus Patricia Kuhl has interpreted the loss of infants’ ability to dis-
criminate foreign-language sounds by 12 months as a mechanism for producing 
shared perception, which she takes to be the precondition for intersubjectivity 
(Kuhl 1998: 314).8
It is becoming increasingly clear that even neonates engage in interactions that 
are not reducible to stimulus-response behavior, but involve primary intersubjectivity 
(Rochat 2001; Braten 1998; Kugiumutzakis 1998; Trevarthen 1998; Bloom 2001). Neo-
natal imitation is claimed to be “non-reflexive, volitional, and intentional“ (Meltzoff & 
Moore 1998).9 Neonates identify themselves and others as interacting persons – since 
they seem to know how to take turns – and even have a sense of the experimenter’s 
motivation (to get them to imitate) (Kugiumutzakis 1998). They must recognize their 
own face – which they have not yet seen as isomorphic to that of the experimenter.10 
The above evidence is compatible with a cognitivist or socio-cognitivists approach. 
However, there appears to be increasing and persuasive evidence that the same areas 
of the brain are involved in both cognitive and affective processing and integration 
of the mind (Damasio 1994; Siegel 1999). Furthermore, attachment theory stresses 
the importance of emotional attachments to cognitive development (Siegel 1999). 
8.  There are several conceptual difficulties with Kuhl’s theoretical position. The metaphor of 
warping or distortion she uses presupposes that there is such a thing as the way the world is 
 independently of how we perceive it. In itself, that is a legitimate presupposition, but we need 
not conclude that all perception distorts that reality, thus making reality in effect inaccessible. 
She further argues that infants store representations of speech. In addition to being highly 
 representationalist, her model also seems to be too deterministic. Obviously, our capacity to 
acquire other languages at a native level is not utterly compromised by 12 months.
9.  They claim to demonstrate non-reflexivity by inserting a delay between the stimulus and 
the motor response; volition by the fact that infants imitate a gesture they saw the day before 
if the same person returns and, when confronted with two people, they may imitate the first 
when viewing the second person’s gesture; intentionality or goal-directedness is evidenced by 
the fact that infants make mistakes and try to correct them when they imitate, “monitoring 
and modifying their own acts to bring them into congruence with others.” Hence Meltzoff 
and Moore conclude that the most fundamental distinction in early infancy is not between 
animate and inanimate objects, but between human acts and other events (58). The precise 
interpretation and implications of their work are still under debate.
10.  This recognition can be seen as a precondition of imitation rather than as the result of 
the imitation experience (“active intermodal matching” [Moore & Meltzoff 1998]). That is, 
this isomorphism is not learned, but a precondition of imitation. If that is correct, it is also, 
presumably, a precondition of learning in general.
210 Barbara Fultner
Intersubjectivity therefore cannot be adequately conceptualized merely in cognitiv-
ist or epistemic terms as Habermas is liable to do with his model of the redemption 
of validity claims. What is called for is another look at the structures of society and 
personality. Moreover, I now want to suggest, perhaps an additional claim, a claim 
to attachment, must be added to the theory as a way of doing justice to the affective 
aspects of meaningful communication.
A paradigm example of earliest infant attachments is nursing. A nursing 
mother and infant are participants in a learning process that simultaneously 
establishes a profound social-affective bond. Nursing is emotionally charged and 
deeply intersubjective. Writing on the phenomenology of nursing, Eva Simms 
(2001) analyses breast milk as a “coexistential form,” as the substance that bridges 
or rather blurs the gap between self and (m)other: “We begin life not as sepa-
rate monads but as mingling presences, as aspects of significant wholes where the 
newborn’s action finds its complement and completion in the actions of the (m)
other… Implicit in the first cry, the first turning of the head toward the (m)other’s 
voice, the first search for the breast is an intentionality, a directedness that pre-
supposes that there is something to turn to…” (Simms 2001: 26–7).11 The phrase 
“mingling presence” indicates a lack of differentiation in the neonate’s world. What 
differentiation there is between self and (m)other is, as yet, inchoate. By the same 
token, there is also some lack of differentiation from the perspective of the mother. 
Her own bodily boundaries are blurred, as they already were in pregnancy (Young 
2005). Importantly, the example illustrates what I propose to call a primary “claim 
to attachment”. To be sure, neither infant nor caregiver “raises” any kind of propo-
sitional “validity” claim. Nor is the claim vindicated by reason-giving. (Either of 
these suggestions would amount to committing the “intellectualist fallacy” ( Nelson 
2005) of reading the rationalist-cognitivist bias back into infancy.) But each, as it 
were, “lays claim” to the other. The infant lays claim to the (m)other by virtue of 
its demand to be cared for. At the same time as the infant cries for the breast, it 
must respond to the “claim” of the mother: in rooting, it shapes its mouth around 
the mother’s breast, it conforms to the mother’s arms, etc. Thus nursing is a joint 
activity premised on mutual responsiveness. This is to deny neither that there are 
asymmetries in social competence, cognitive ability, or power between the two 
agents here, nor that we sometimes include infants in our practices by courtesy.12 
11.  Simms’ account requires further discussion from a feminist perspective. While she allows 
for the possibility that fathers can create the “maternal milieu,” the exhortation of the nursing 
mother juxtaposed with discussions of the uncared-for infant are surely problematic.
12.  For an excellent analysis of mother-child power relations, see Allen (2007).
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Nonetheless, lack of responsiveness has negative consequences on both sides (lack 
of nourishment for infant, engorgement for mother). To be sure, this example 
forcefully illustrates the phenomenon of embodied intentionality (which is Simms’ 
emphasis). Yet nursing is not only the first learning experience for the infant, it is 
a mutual learning process – a joint problem-solving activity – that establishes the 
ground for (embodied) intersubjectivity. It is also very much a culturally infused, 
even charged, process. This becomes evident as soon as we consider that nursing 
has gone in and out of fashion, that whether a mother breastfeeds is usually a mat-
ter of choice in this culture, that women who have difficulty nursing nowadays fre-
quently resort to lactation consultants, that some may regard nursing as a “natural” 
rather than a learning process, that breastfeeding in our society is often assisted by 
technology (pumps), etc. Insofar as it is a deeply affectively infused process, inter-
subjectivity rests on the affective attachment between infant and caregiver. But this 
affective attachment, I submit, is always also culturally mediated.
While nursing is a paradigmatic example of the experience of primary intersub-
jectivity, an analogous case can be made for bottle feeding or for other interactions 
between caregivers, male or female, and infants. This is borne out in the discussion 
of Bråten’s account of altercentric participation. He defines this as “ego’s virtual par-
ticipation in alter’s act as if ego were a co-author of the act or being hand-guided 
from alter’s stance” (Bråten 2007: 115). In infant-caregiver interactions, the infant’s 
bodily self is complemented by an other, creating what he calls a “companion space” 
where infants participate “altercentrically” in another’s actions. When infants imi-
tate such actions, according to Bråten, they do so from an “e-motional” memory. He 
uses the term to “qualify the affective experience of bodily communion and the non-
conscious remembrance of virtually moving with the other’s movements” (Bråten 
1998: 109) and highlights the continuity between these early e-motional memories 
and subsequent joint attention later in infancy. An intuitive illustration of altercentric 
participation is riding on a parent’s back which allows the infant to “automatically 
share perceptions form (literally) the [parent’s] point of view, without having to tran-
scend its own” (123). The notion of “authorship” implies a strong sense of agency on 
the infant’s part. Bråten is particularly struck by the fact that face-to-face encounters 
require that the infant reverse or invert what the model is doing in order to re-enact 
the model’s actions. A paradigm example is reciprocating feeding (around 10 months, 
perhaps earlier). Bråten describes the infant as “virtual co-author” of the care-giver’s 
spoon-feeding. Having learned feeding behaviour through altercentric participation, 
the child acquires ‘e-motional’ memory that subsequently enables her to reciprocate 
the care-giving behavior. As in nursing, the child must respond to the care-giver’s 
behavior and, indeed, anticipate it; this, too, is a mutual learning process. Imitation 
plays a significant role since parents routinely open their own mouths in order to 
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get children to open theirs.13 In addition, Bråten introduces the notion of the other’s 
perspective or point of view: “The reciprocating infant’s circular re-enactment of 
what they have experienced as recipients of spoon-feeding show that they must have 
been able to participate in the feeder’s movements from the feeder’s stance – the very 
reverse of what is seen from the outside, egocentric stance in such face-to-face situa-
tions” (Bråten 2007: 117–8).
On the one hand, Bråten thus begins with an other-centred starting point in 
human development, followed by a series of decenterings (Bråten 2007: 111).14 This 
means that intersubjectivity plays a central role from the outset and is not some-
thing that has to be (re-)constructed. Moreover, although Bråten postulates an innate 
capacity to learn by altercentric participation, this is better understood as a learning 
mechanism, rather than as a form of innate knowledge. For one, his is not a repre-
sentationalist model, but one founded on the notion of embodiment, counterveiling 
excessive cognitivism. Moreover, he speaks of a capacity. The notion of a capacity is 
a dispositional one. Nonetheless, it makes sense to speak of capacities not simply as 
being triggered by the environment, but as developed, fostered, and nurtured. They 
are thus shaped by the intersubjective relationships, cultural practices, etc. in which 
individuals find themselves.
Finally, thinking of Bråten’s companion space as the lifeworld is a way to enrich 
our understanding of it; consider, for instance, that the caregiver enters the situation 
as a fully acculturated and socialized person. Her actions occur precisely against the 
backdrop of the lifeworld. Her responses to the infant depend on this background 
and are culturally (as well as individually) variable (e.g. Reebye et al. 2008). Simulta-
neously, the affective component in early altercentric participation helps us to appre-
ciate the affective aspects of sharing a lifeworld even later in life (cf. Siegel 1999). 
While much more work would need to be done to support this hypothesis, altercen-
tric participation and attachment may prefigure subsequent development of solidar-
ity. Here I can merely suggest that a theoretical account of solidarity will require an 
affective foundation. De Waal similarly speculates that learning by observation also 
partly depends on having an emotional bond or identifying with those observed and 
that “the cultural transmission of habits and skills is based on conformism with those 
to whom one feels close” (De Waal 2007: 63). This research, thus, is liable to have 
13.  This mechanism seems to continue to operate well beyond infancy, as children learn to 
brush their teeth, for instance, and into adulthood (as Merleau-Ponty already pointed out).
14.  Bråten contrasts this with Piaget’s “egocentric” starting point, but Zlatev (2007) points 
out that Piaget understands egocentrism as a failure to differentiate between ego and alter and 
between one’s own and others’ point of view. This fits with the discussion of differentiation in 
Merleau-Ponty below.
 Intersubjectivity in the lifeworld 213
implications for fields like political theory, as well. This last suggestion, of course, 
indicates that understanding intersubjectivity requires a multi-pronged and multi-
disciplinary approach such as the one fostered in this volume.
On the other hand, Bråten’s model raises a number of questions for further 
investigation. For one, the counterfactual “as-if ” characterization of altercentric 
participation seems to require further clarification. This point is tied to a second 
one regarding the elaboration of the perspective of the subject. Arguably, the infant 
barely if at all has a point of view of her own, let alone being able to take the point of 
view of another. The same kind of idealisation appears in Daniel Stern’s description 
of early intersubjectivity and what he has dubbed “affect attunement”: “we experi-
ence the other as if we were expecting the same action, or feeling the same emotion. 
This ‘participation’ in another’s mental life creates a sense of feeling/sharing with/
understanding them, and in particular their intentions and feelings” (Stern 2007: 37, 
italics added). According to Stern, we have an innate sensitivity to the minds of 
others. But what sense can we make of quasi-participation in another’s mental 
life? There appears to be a tension here between aiming to identify a primordial 
or primary intersubjectivity and being able to articulate it only in terms of a more 
developed, differentiated, secondary kind. Perhaps here, too, the notion of a claim 
to attachment is helpful as a kind of pure claim to intersubjectivity and shared expe-
rience, a connection with and openness to the other. I shall close by considering the 
ontogeny of a point of view.
5.  Multiple perspectives and intersubjectivity
I began with the suggestion that Habermas’ conception of the lifeworld is better 
suited as a framework for theorising intersubjectivity than phenomenological con-
ceptions. It may be thought that the examples of nursing, back-riding, and feeding 
I have cited point precisely to the primacy of embodiment that the latter sorts of 
conceptions champion. However, inasmuch as we are looking not merely for a cor-
rective to excessively cognitivist conceptions of agency, but also for an appropriate 
conception of intersubjectivity, phenomenological accounts tend to fall short by pri-
oritising embodiment over culture and sociality. Daniel Stern has recently written 
that “Intersubjectivity is not simply a capacity, it is a condition of humanness from the 
phenomenological point of view” (Stern 2007: 36). Yet even in as subtle and refined 
conception of the lifeworld as Merleau-Ponty’s, the other enters the picture late. In 
The Phenomenology of Perception, the Other is thematised only in Part II, Chapter 4, 
after the body, after language, and after objects and nature. (An analogous claim can 
be made about Thompson’s Mind in Life (2007.) To be sure, Merleau-Ponty acknowl-
edges that we are part of and have incorporated not only a natural world, but, just as 
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importantly, a cultural one. Indeed, he rejects the nature-culture dichotomy, arguing 
in “On the Child’s Relations With Others,” that relations with others are not subordi-
nate or secondary to our relations with nature (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 98).15 Nonethe-
less, it is first and foremost its objects that make us aware of the culture we inhabit and 
through which we first experience the Other. The first of these objects whereby we 
become aware of all the others is the Other’s body, manifested through its behaviour 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962: 399–400). Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of this encounter with the 
Other radically undercuts the problem of other minds that has so plagued modern 
philosophy. He argues that children do not need to infer the existence of other minds 
since they experience them directly in the actions of others, which they imitate. There 
is much here that anticipates the work of Bråten with regard to reciprocity and how we 
experience the actions of another. Merleau-Ponty writes:
This conduct which I am able only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make 
it mine; I recover it or comprehend it. Reciprocally I know that the gestures I 
make myself can be the objects of another’s intention. It is this transfer of my 
intentions to the others’ body and of his intentions to my own, my alienation of 
the other and his alienation of me, that makes possible the perception of others. 
 (1964: 118)
The emphasis on reciprocity means, inter alia, that imitation, as Merleau-Ponty under-
stands it, is not a matter of mere copying, but involves intersubjectivity. Yet immedi-
ately following, we find a marked difference with Bråten:
The perception of others is made comprehensible if one supposes that 
psychogenesis begins in a state where the child is unaware of himself and the 
other as different beings. We cannot say that in such a state the child has a genuine 
communication with others. In order that there be communication, there must 
be a sharp distinction between the one who communicates and the one with 
whom he communicates. (1964: 118)
In early childhood, in other words, the lack of differentiation of self means that there 
is at best “pre-communication,” an anonymous collectivity and undifferentiated group 
life. The corresponding standard for genuine communication is thus high: it must take 
place between two different points of view and requires awareness of perspective. The 
15.  He refers to Frenkel-Brunswick’s studies showing that the perception of sensory qualities 
and space is partly determined by the perceiver’s personality and interpersonal relationships, 
writing that “we can never grasp a child’s ways of perceiving purely, independently of his 
social conditioning” and “inversely, you can never say that the way in which the child struc-
tures his social enviornoment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of 
his nervous system… What will be ‘natural’ in the individual and what will be acquired … are 
part and parcel of a single global phenomenon” (108).
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point is clearly reminiscent of Tomasello’s claims about genuine intersubjectivity, dis-
cussed in Section 3. Merleau-Ponty does provide a story of how differentiation devel-
ops. Again, it begins with the body and its objectification, leading to the stage when the 
child (recognising his image in the mirror) learns that “there can be a viewpoint taken 
on him” (1964: 136). The model of development involved might be termed Hegelian, 
based on Hegel’s notion of mediation and increasing differentiation (Hegel 1977). 
Development transforms what is there, sometimes fundamentally. Hermeneutics has 
also long recognized the transformative power of articulation (interpretation). More-
over, it seems quite plausible that the fine-grained inferential structure of language 
is what is required for the full articulation of this difference. Psychologist Katherine 
Nelson has proposed a comparable account of how children learn to interact with 
others and to understand what they do and think, differentiating between imitating, 
understanding others’ goals and intentions, and having a full-blown theory of mind 
that attributes beliefs about such goals (Nelson 2005).16
Merleau-Ponty’s dichotomy between pre-communication and genuine communi-
cation seems too sharp. The examples of nursing and altercentric experience seem to 
be communicative interactions, even if what is communicated is not propositionally 
differentiated. By the same token, it is worth recalling that the lifeworld functions as 
a shared background of intelligibility against which communicative action and the 
articulation of difference take place. Along these lines, I already cited Kuhl’s research 
indicating that very early language development already contributes to the emergence 
of a shared perspective. Yet as important as sharing a perspective is the recognition of 
perspectival difference. The development of a point of view is crucial to a  Habermasian 
account of communication since interlocutors take yes/no positions with regard to 
one another’s claims. Where does the sense of a point of view originate? Alan Fogel 
and his colleagues offer a plausible account. Fogel et al. examine the development of 
the “dialogical self ” during the first two years of life, which they describe as “inherently 
multivocal, embodied and social” (Fogel, Koyer, Bellagamba & Bell 2002). In the first 
six months of life, the infant experiences how multiple sensory modalities compose 
16.  Nelson argues that, during their first ten years of life, children enter “the community 
of minds” “through the use, comprehension, and production of language” (28). She is a neo-
Piagetian who argues against the “theory-theory” view of cognitive development, in part 
because she rejects that assumption that children have basically the same intellectual re-
sources as adults (operate with the same cognitive mechanisms). She stresses the importance 
of narrative in this process. Joining the community of minds, significantly, involves the recog-
nition that other minds differ from one’s own, that not everyone has the same knowledge (32). 
All of this presupposes that children must learn the language of the mind and be able to use 
language as a representational system.
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her world.17 Fogel et al. describe this as a dialogue between multiple I-positions. Dur-
ing the second half of the first year of life, the infant discovers that she has a unique 
perspective on the world that she can share with others (Fogel et al. 2002: 198). During 
the next stage, between twelve and eighteen months, the infant begins to differenti-
ate between her own inner world, the external world, and the inner worlds of others 
at the level of both cognition and affect. The budding understanding that all of these 
as potential subjects of communication introduces new possibilities for interacting 
with others. Fogel et al. specifically name consensus and conflict as what I would call 
cognitive-affective points of negotiation and interaction. In the final stage of their lon-
gitudinal observational study, the creative frame is one where a girl and her mother 
play with a lion puppet. First, the mother “frightens” the girl with the lion, then the 
girl takes the puppet from her mother and reverses roles. This occurs at seventeen 
months and two weeks and thus fits with Tomasello’s chronology of development of 
secondary intersubjectivity. The example beautifully illustrates the interrelatedness of 
cognition, affect, and the taking on of another’s perspective. The girl is experiment-
ing with being scared and scaring, but the role of the mother in facilitating this 
experimentation and modulating the emotional response is crucial. (The example 
also relies on the capacity of pretend play, which marks the beginning of coun-
terfactual imagination and thought; cf. Rakoczy 2008). These presuppose a con-
ception not only of intersubjectivity but also of normativity – and a developing 
understanding of reasons and reason-giving.
Thus the development of communicative action in the Habermasian sense – of 
aiming to reach mutual understanding with another about something in the world, 
of vindicating one’s claims with reasons if necessary – hinges on intersubjective inter-
actions with others in a lifeworld. Paying attention to this development allows us to 
see how children enter into the lifeworld through such interactions. It also allows us 
to recognise the ways in which intersubjectivity is a social, cognitive, and affective 
phenomenon. An account of linguistic meaning and communication that takes inter-
subjectivity seriously must therefore also aim to do justice to all three of these aspects 
of intersubjectivity.
17.  Rochat ties this intermodal perception to the infant’s developing sense of self. It under-
lies coordinated activity, such as mouth-opening in anticipation of contact with the hand, in 
neonates (2001: 50). 
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Primates, motion and emotion
To what extent nonhuman primates  
are intersubjective and why
Timothy P. Racine,1 Tyler J. Wereha1 & David A. Leavens2
1Simon Fraser University / 2University of Sussex
Focussing on the capacity for joint attention and communication, we review 
research that demonstrates the important and often overlooked role that emotion 
and motion may play in intersubjectivity and consciousness of self and others. 
We discuss the source of the continuing belief that such skills are uniquely 
human and suggest that there are no good grounds to deny such capacities to 
the other great apes. We suggest that despite the recent resurgence of interest 
in intersubjectivity, emotion and the lived body, mainstream contemporary 
developmental and comparative theory may still be based on questionable 
assumptions about the relation between mind and behaviour and simplistic 
notions of mental and evolutionary causation.
Keywords: intersubjectivity; joint attention; non-human primates; Wittgenstein; 
evolution
1.  Introduction
Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. – One says to oneself: how 
could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might 
as well ascribe it to a number! And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these 
difficulties vanish and pain seems to get a foothold here, where before everything 
was, so to speak, too smooth for it.  (Wittgenstein 1958: §284, emphasis original)
The importance of intersubjectivity for development cannot be seriously disputed, 
but it is often overlooked and neglected. This volume joins other recent attempts to 
place intersubjectivity in the foreground (e.g. see chapters in Morganti, Carassa, & 
Riva 2008; Zlatev, Racine, Sinha, & Itkonen 2008) and endeavours to make linkages 
to other conceptually-related phenomena such as consciousness of self and other, 
the lived body and affectivity. Although consciousness and intersubjectivity are, in a 
very particular sense, internal properties of an organism, following Wittgenstein and 
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others, we will attempt to show in this chapter that the mind is not hidden, at least not 
in typical circumstances. Although we do not expect this to be a particularly radical 
hypothesis in a volume such as the present one, our arguments will turn out to have 
some potentially radical consequences for mainstream developmental and compara-
tive theorizing concerning the intersubjectivity and consciousness of other primates. 
But as Dennett (1995: 283, his emphasis) has noted,
There is a familiar trio of reactions by scientists to a purportedly radical hypothesis: 
(a) “You must be out of your mind!”, (b) “What else is new? Everybody knows 
that!”, and, later – if the hypothesis is still standing – (c) “Hmm. You might be on 
to something!”
Although we, and many others, have tried to demystify, or to put it more strongly 
demythologize, the development of an awareness of the mind for some years now, 
the phase in which such ideas fall in Dennett’s typology is uncertain at this point. 
Although Dennett for one is unlikely to endorse the roughly Wittgensteinian conclu-
sions of this chapter – hopefully not because we “just indulge in a sort of interminable 
logotherapy” (Dennett 1995: 141; see Dennett 2007 for a less polite expression of such 
views), the idea that attributes of mind are typically plain in view and made oddly mys-
terious in much psychological theorizing is seeming less radical to a growing number 
of contemporary researchers.
The interest in concepts such as intersubjectivity occurs at a time when a growing 
number of researchers in psychology, neuroscience, philosophy and AI are becoming 
increasing sceptical about explanations of behaviour that rely on centralized control 
and single-cause, often mentalistic or gene-centred, explanations of purposeful activ-
ity. An important aspect of what ties these apprehensions together is the conviction 
that the causal story is far more complicated than is often realized, with a suspicion 
that single, efficient cause, sorts of explanations of many phenomena may not only fail 
to give us full insight into the topic of concern but may even provide a quite distorted 
image of what we are trying to understand. In our view, the resurgence of interest in 
intersubjectivity and its relation to consciousness should be understood in part in the 
context of this much broader groundswell of related concerns.
Despite this potential shifting of ground, many developmental and compara-
tive psychologists continue to claim that particular inner states or adaptations are 
causally responsible for differences between younger and older human infants and 
human infants and other primates (typically, captive common chimpanzees, Pan trog-
lodytes) who manifestly perform similar, or in some cases, identical acts. For exam-
ple, the debates between Tomasello, Povinvelli and their colleagues (e.g. Hare et al. 
2000; Hare & Tomasello 2004; Povinelli & Vonk 2003, 2004; Tomasello et al. 2003) 
involve differences that are said to pivot in large part on the relative influence of such 
mechanisms, and putative methodological concerns as well (but see Andrews 2005). 
Although differences in the capabilities of older and younger humans and other apes 
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with respect to their capacity for intersubjectivity and self and other consciousness 
continue to merit serious sustained empirical attention, the extent to which any dif-
ferences should be taken to be the cause of manifest performances is no simple matter. 
And the increasing interest of many researchers in concepts such as intersubjectivity, 
embodiment, distributed and/or situated cognition, and systems theory may herald a 
shift away from conceiving of mental capacities as private, individual, simple efficient 
causes of behaviour to something far more complicated and far less in-the-head that 
has often been theorized (e.g. Fogel 1993; Greenspan & Shanker 2004; Johnson 2001; 
Kaye 1982; Leavens et al. 2008; Leavens & Racine 2009; Leavens, Racine & Hopkins 
2009; Lindblom & Ziemke 2006, 2008; Racine 2004; Racine & Carpendale 2007, 2008; 
Racine et al. 2008; Shanker & King 2002; Susswein & Racine 2008, 2009; Witherington 
2007). In a complementary vein, population-genetic level explanations of psychologi-
cal functions are being taken to task by evolutionary systems approaches, the latter of 
which is inherently systems oriented and critical of simple, single cause genetic expla-
nations (Gottlieb 2002; Gottlieb & Lickliter 2007; Griffiths & Stotz 2000; Lickliter & 
Honeycutt 2003; Lickliter 2008; Oyama 1985, 2000; Wereha & Racine 2009a, 2009b). 
However, although contemporary comparative work has found that many capabilities 
that have historically been understood to be uniquely human are harder to separate 
from those of some other species, the conceptual nexus of these issues is rarely con-
sidered in psychological theory. But as we, and others, have previously suggested, 
conceptions of mind may be the wellspring for many of these debates.
Intersubjectivity seems a paradigm case of a not-just-in-the-head phenom-
enon since it necessarily involves other subjects (Susswein & Racine 2009) and 
although intersubjectivity is straightforward in the sense that we know it when 
we see it (Susswein & Racine 2008), its ontogenesis and phylogenesis are another 
matter (Racine & Carpendale 2008; Leavens et al. 2005, 2008; Leavens & Racine 
2009; Racine et al. 2008). The promissory note of a focus on the role of emotion and 
bodily motion in the development of intersubjectivity and other forms of conscious-
ness should presumably be that researchers will be able to have a clearer view of the 
relation between intersubjectivity and consciousness of self and other. However, in 
this chapter we will attempt to consider the potential influence of these factors while 
also paying careful attention to the relation between mind and behaviour and to 
recent developments in evolutionary developmental psychology. To do so, we will 
introduce the historical motivation for the use of related terms such as intersubjectiv-
ity and embodiment and discuss research concerning mirror neurons that seems to 
vindicate this motivation. This will lead to a discussion of the extent to which nonhu-
man primates might be said to communicate intentionally, a capacity that many feel 
involves a non-basic level of intersubjectivity and consciousness. We then locate and 
describe research conducted by Leavens, Hopkins and their colleagues that empha-
sizes the role of motion and emotion in the development of secondary intersubjectiv-
ity and consciousness and consider its implications for extant research and theory. 
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Then we focus on the relevance of the conceptualization of mind and body for this 
research and recent research in evolutionary developmental biology from a more sys-
tems perspective. We conclude by suggesting that giving emotion and bodily motion 
a seat at the table of intersubjectivity and consciousness is helpful to the extent that it 
continues to square with adequate conceptions of mind and causality.
2.   The resurgence of intersubjectivity, consciousness, motion  
and emotion
Husserl (1977), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Scheler (1954) and contemporary research-
ers who follow in and extend the phenomenological tradition (e.g. Gallagher 2005; 
Thompson 2001; Zahavi 2001) have done much to locate our relation to others in our 
natural, bodily-centred attitudes towards them. This way of thinking arose in contra-
distinction to the Cartesian ego and its radical separation of self and other. For our 
present purposes, the chief insight of phenomenology is that it draws attention to the 
primordial bond that may exist between others, for we apprehend their psychological 
states in our reaction to such states. And much as a chimpanzee need not have a con-
cept of desire in order to respond to the wants of another, neither must a young infant. 
From a phenomenological point of view, another’s actions evoke natural responses 
from oneself and strong categorical distinctions between inner and outer or mind and 
body become problematic:
in the blush . . . we perceive shame, in the laughter joy. To say that ‘our only initial 
datum is the body’ is completely erroneous. This is true only for the doctor or 
the scientist, i.e. for man in so far he abstracts artificially from the expressive 
phenomena. (Scheler 1954: 10, emphasis original)
Recent work in neuroscience seems to vindicate the primordial sharing of experience 
theorized by phenomenologists and, as we will see in the next section, in a related 
sense by Wittgenstein. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons in macaque mon-
keys in the 1990s provided a large part of the impetus for the birth of social cognitive 
neuroscience, under the umbrella of which mirror neuron systems are suggested to 
exist in humans (see Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2007 for a review). This system tracks the 
correspondences between observed actions onto an observer’s own actions. And as 
Gallese and his colleagues note, 
the description by Merleau-Ponty of what it means to understand an action 
(‘The sense of the act is not given, but understood, that is recaptured by an act 
on the spectator’s part’ [Merleau-Ponty 1962: 185]), expresses nicely the direct 
experiential understanding of the observed actions mediated by the mirror 
mechanism. (Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti 2004: 397)
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Gallese and colleagues and others have extended the functioning of mirror resonance 
systems to the understanding of not only action and by extension intention (but see 
Jacob 2008), but also emotion. Thus, although this will not be our goal in the present 
chapter, the functioning of mirror mechanisms could be a primary focus when discuss-
ing the role of motion and emotion in the intersubjectivity and consciousness. To be 
sure, such neural systems may be necessary for the development of intersubjectivity 
and consciousness, but given that humans share this system with monkeys, with whom 
we had a common ancestor some 30 million years ago, this is an ancient system (Hutto 
2008). Also, the exact nature and role of such a system continues to be debated (Hickok 
2008). Although apes might use this system to make sense of goal-directed behaviour, 
the simple presence of the mirror system cannot be sufficient for the attribution of 
intentions to others. It is even unclear whether it is the outcome of a developmental pro-
cess or the source of one. As Meltzoff (2002: 22) notes, researchers do not know whether 
the system fires “the first time an animal sees an act executed, or … the mirror neuron is 
activated only after an observation/execution association is built up over time.” In either 
case, Ramachandran’s (2000) pronouncement that “mirror neurons will do for psychol-
ogy what DNA did for biology” may be premature. For one thing, systems approaches 
are becoming increasingly popular in evolutionary and molecular biology. While DNA 
is a necessary part of the functioning of such systems, as we will discuss later in the 
chapter, it is increasingly seen as co-determinative rather than causal:
Given that genes are but one component in a structured system of components 
across many levels, they cannot be offered as causes of development. They are 
necessary conditions for developmental outcomes, and they have codeterminative 
power, but genes in and of themselves have no direct causal power.
 (Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003: 828)
If there is a lesson to be learned here for psychology, pace Ramachandran (2000), it 
may be don’t think of mirror mechanisms in the way that the biologists first thought 
about DNA.
At present, social cognitive neuroscience as a field seems to tilt in the direction 
of over-emphasizing the role of neural mechanisms – even those related to topics of 
interest to this volume such as action control and affectivity – in the development of 
intersubjectivity and consciousness. In our view, Gallese (2005: 197) typifies the field 
quite well when claiming that “Much of what we ascribe to the mind of others when 
witnessing their behaviour depends on the resonance mechanisms that their behav-
iour triggers in us.” In one sense, this is a truism because without an intact brain one 
would not ascribe very much at all to the mind of another. But in another sense, it cre-
ates a potentially misleading view of how one develops an understanding of mind, for 
which a functioning mirror system is quite likely necessary but which is still a causally 
impotent part of a complex system of interacting components (see also Susswein & 
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Racine 2008; Racine et al. 2008). As we will discuss in more detail in subsequent sec-
tions, given that the meaning of a mental state is logically dependent upon behavioural 
activity in the situation in which it occurs, appropriate rearing experiences are also a 
necessarily crucial part of this system (Leavens et al. 2008, 2009; Leavens & Racine 
2009; Racine et al. 2008; Racine & Carpendale 2007, 2008).
It is also telling that research on macaques has previously also demonstrated the 
presence of neural networks in the visual cortex (V5) that support the perception of 
colour (see e.g. Zeki 1993). But having a system that codes for colour is not tanta-
mount to having an agent that is aware that the world is made up of hues of red, green 
or blue. Agents need to be taught how these concepts function in the many subtle 
ways in which they can be used in this human form of life (e.g. not only is this a green 
ball, but she is green with envy, he looks green after eating all that ice cream, and so 
on). So it also goes for neural networks in the premotor cortex (F5, and the inferior 
parietal lobule, IPL), which support the perception of intentions. Given this, it is not 
at all surprising that the mere presence of such a system does not sentence agents to 
see the world in intentional terms. Although the issue of what in addition to a mir-
ror neuron system is precisely required to allow one to make sense of others in terms 
of their goals is a critical one upon which we shall elaborate in a later section, the 
point for now is that we should greet single-cause explanations with polite caution. 
Although social cognitive neuroscience is often explicitly anti-mentalist in its criti-
cism of contemporary explanations of interpreting goal-directed behaviour (e.g. see 
Sinigaglia 2008: 18), it is not always clear that one putative efficient cause is not being 
exchanged for another.
A related source of theorizing regarding the primacy of the body and emotion in 
intersubjectivity and consciousness is a proliferation of concern about the embodi-
ment of mental functions (e.g. Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1992). Although the impe-
tus for this way of thinking was in part to point out the crucial dependence of the sorts 
of thoughts that agents have upon the form of their bodies, the discovery of mirror 
neurons seems to have moved us towards what should perhaps be more properly called 
embrainment than embodiment. But, ironically, the work of Varela and colleagues was 
one spur for the development of situated or distributed forms of cognition which in 
fact stretch our bodies into some particular physical and sociocultural surround. We 
believe that Wittgenstein can help to get us back on firmer footing.
3.  Wittgenstein, intersubjectivity and consciousness
Like the phenomenologists, Wittgenstein, upon whose work we rely to a large extent 
in this chapter, emphasizes the intrinsic logical relation between body and mind and 
inner and outer experiences (see also e.g. Overgaard 2006; Racine & Müller 2009; ter 
Hark 1990):
 Primates, motion and emotion 227
‘We see emotion’ – as opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and 
make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe the face 
immediately as sad, radiant, bored even when we are unable to give any other 
description of the features. (Wittgenstein 1980, § 570, emphasis original)
Whether or not mirror circuits subserve action, Wittgenstein emphasizes the natural 
reactions we have toward others and how these reactions and our everyday behaviour 
form the ground for communication and language use:
Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is and so on, are so 
many natural and instructive kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, 
and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. 
Our language is an expression of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is 
behaviour.) (Instinct.) (Wittgenstein 1981, § 545, emphasis original)
Although the following remark by Wittgenstein is used to make a point about the jus-
tification of action, Wittgenstein’s concerns about the non-inferential nature of many 
activities seem to apply equally across similar species: “The squirrel does not infer by 
induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And no more do we need a 
law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions” Wittgenstein (1969, § 287). 
However, given that nonhuman animals (and human infants for that matter) are bereft 
of a language with which to discuss the mental states of others, it might be protested 
that it is unclear whether babies or other primates could be said to understand the men-
tal lives of others as opposed to just react to their conduct. In our view, Wittgenstein 
is questioning the very contrast being drawn here. That is, an agent’s understanding of 
the emotional state of another is manifest in her particular reaction to it. Being able to 
have a conversation about your motivations for reacting the way that you did or think-
ing back on your reasons for acting and wishing you had acted differently are different 
matters. And although they may presuppose an understanding of intention, there are 
non-verbal criteria that would satisfy this rather basic concept. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that mainstream developmental and comparative theory seems to believe 
otherwise, understanding is not an experience (Racine et al. 2008; Susswein & Racine 
2008). Thus, the fact that an agent may manifest, behaviourally, her understanding of 
another’s intentions, desires or beliefs, this does not license one to talk about an agent 
necessarily experiencing such an understanding – let alone experiencing it in their cra-
nium or some other location otherwise specified (Susswein & Racine 2009). However, 
although it is clear that Wittgenstein means that some human psychological states 
cannot be sensibly applied to nonhuman animals (understanding not being one of 
them – because it is not per se a mental state), his views on the mentality of nonhu-
man animals are subtle and require some care (see also Bavidge & Ground 2009; 
Canfield 1996; Glock 2000, 2006; Huemer 2006; Malcolm 1982; Pleasants 2006; 
Racine & Carpendale 2008; Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh, 
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Fields & Taglialatela 2001; Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, Segerdahl, & Rumbaugh 2005; 
Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker & Taylor 1998; Shanker & King 2002; Susswein & Racine 
2008).
Wittgenstein issued the following reminder:
Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human 
being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious. (Wittgenstein 1958, § 281)
This clearly leaves open the door to ascribe at least certain psychological attributes to 
other animals. But as Wittgenstein (1958: 223) also remarked: “If a lion could talk, we 
would not understand him.” And:
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will 
come the day after tomorrow? Can only those hope who can talk? Only those 
who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope 
are modes of this complicated form of life. (Wittgenstein 1958, § 174)
According to Wittgenstein, one does not attribute mental states like hope to other 
animals. But not because animals have a more limited imagination, which they surely 
do, but because the primary application of a concept like hope is tied up extensively 
with the human form of life. The point here is not about the mentality or lack thereof 
of other animals, but rather a logical point about the grammar of the concept hope; a 
lot of stage-setting needs to be in place before we can apply this concept to any agent. 
This stage-setting is not in the human mind or mirror system. In order to hope, one 
must have mastered many human abilities, customs and concepts:
Language is the vehicle for the determinacy of sense that makes specifically 
human concept-use possible. But still, in the end, it is the myriad shapes of 
human life that fix sense and not some linguistic medium floating above life and 
running parallel to it. (Bavidge & Ground 2009: 140)
At issue here is that some psychological concepts can be manifest behaviourally. For 
example, developmental and comparative researchers make a lot of the fact that an 
infant must understand another’s attention when the infant points, follows gaze, 
socially references and so on – a phenomenon that researchers call joint attention (see 
Racine & Carpendale 2007 for a review; Susswein & Racine 2008 for further discus-
sion). These actions are minimally constitutive of understanding another’s attention 
and therefore it is illogical to claim that a baby who points understands joint atten-
tion but that a pointing chimpanzee does not. Now, although we have argued that 
such intersubjective skills that involve rudiments of consciousness of self and other are 
acquired though basic learning processes and that the capacities are likely common 
across the great apes, even if we are wrong about this and there is a more adequate 
causal story to be told – this would not mean that other apes do not understand joint 
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attention. These behaviours are minimally constituent of an understanding of another’s 
attention, which the field describes as a secondary form of intersubjectivity, whether 
one is a prelinguistic child or an apparently non-linguistic ape. Although these pro-
nouncements might seem counterintuitive or even problematic to some, in his later 
philosophy upon which we are drawing in the present chapter, Wittgenstein examines 
and rejects a psychologistic view of meaning. In such a view of meaning, the mean-
ing of a psychologically-relevant action is assumed to be provided by the underlying 
mental state of the actor (see Racine 2004). However, discontinuous views of the social 
cognitive capabilities of human and nonhuman animals abound (e.g. Penn, Holyoak & 
Povinelli 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll 2005). The general form of 
this seemingly anti-Darwinian view is captured well by Bennett:
It is common knowledge that there is a very large difference between the level 
of intellectual ability of humans and that of all other terrestrial creatures. It is 
commonly believed that this difference is in some important way one of kind 
rather than of degree: that between a genius and a stupid man there is a smooth 
slide while between a stupid man and an ape there is a sharp drop, not just in the 
sense that there are no creatures intellectually half-way between apes and stupid 
men, but in the sense that there could not be such creatures. (Bennett 1964: 41)
If hope is an aspect of human life that would make little sense for other forms of life, it is 
notable that intersubjectivity and consciousness are on a different order of complexity. 
Like Wittgenstein, we would expect the latter phenomena and many related capacities 
to exist in species that are similar to ours. And on grounds of genetic and behavioural 
similarity, we would certainly expect for nonhuman primates to manifest intersub-
jectivity and consciousness. Indeed, some enculturated nonhuman primates could 
be argued to have mastered a rudimentary language in the sense that Wittgenstein 
means and have even been reared to different extents with human caregivers, and 
thereby afforded the opportunity to acquire some experience in this complicated form 
of life (see Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2005, 1998). Tak-
ing his cue from the talking lions, Gill (1997: 26) argues that such chimpanzees “do 
speak and we do understand them because, at least to a significant extent, we share 
a common ‘form of life,’ grounded as it is in gestural, reciprocal, and task-oriented 
embodiment.” And in referring to primitive language-games to which he compares 
the communicative capacities of other animals, Wittgenstein (1972: 17) notes, “we rec-
ognize in these simple processes forms of language not separated by a break from our 
more complicated ones.”
We agree with Wittgenstein’s rejection of psychologism and are concerned with 
the ways that it has infected developmental and comparative theory and research. It 
has also wreaked havoc in our view in how many researchers conceive of the mental 
capacities of other animals. A focus on the common ground provided by early rearing 
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experience turns out to have considerable relevance for these issues. In the next section 
we review research conducted primarily by Leavens, Hopkins and their colleagues that 
discusses the role that bodily motion and emotion may play in the development in 
secondary forms of intersubjectivity and consciousness in young humans and other 
primates.
4.   Emotional engagement, bodily motion and secondary  
intersubjectivity and consciousness
It is a truism that emotional experiences are a necessary aspect of development in 
many species. Part of how one learns about one’s world, and the limits thereof, is 
through encounters with others who express particular emotional signals in their 
conduct. Despite the fact that such engagement is not the only factor implicated in 
research concerning the effects of early socioemotional deprivation on development, 
such studies have suggested that quite drastic effects result from such deprivation on 
a variety of capacities (e.g. Nelson, Zeanah, Fox, Marshall, Smyke, & Guthrie 2007; 
Rutter & the English and Romanian Adoptees (ERA) Study Team 1998), including 
quasi-autistic behaviours (Rutter & the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team 
(ERA) Study Team 1999). Although it is not possible or possibly even desirable to sep-
arate out the emotional dimension of social interaction, it is uncontroversial to suggest 
that emotional engagement and affective signals in general might play a critical role in 
human development. For example, Hobson (2002) has argued that an inability to fully 
engage in such experiences is a key part of what is compromised in children who go on 
to be diagnosed with autism. Greenspan & Shanker (2004) have elaborated a phyloge-
netic and ontogenetic model of the origins of thought that gives the main impetus to 
emotional factors. On a related note, others have suggested that the standard theory-
of-mind explanation of human action may better explain how children with autism, 
rather than typically-developing children, actually function (Gallagher 2004; Hobson 
2009; Shanker 2004). Ironically, Shanker (2004: 220) has noted, “This is very much the 
view of social cognition introduced by Descartes in the Second Meditation.”
It is also obvious, but perhaps not as well known, that affect plays a similar role 
in the typical early development of nonhuman primates (see e.g. Bard & Leavens 
2009). However, what is less obvious is that the rearing experiences of other primates 
may play a role in the conclusions that many in the field draw about the social cogni-
tive capabilities of nonhuman primates. We now turn to a brief review of research 
investigating the role of emotion and motion in the development of capacities that 
Trevarthen & Hubley (1978) have described as involving secondary intersubjectiv-
ity. As we will again demonstrate, the grounds for attributing an understanding of 
what has more recently become known as joint attention do apply equally to human 
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and nonhuman primates (see also Bard & Leavens 2009; Leavens et al. 2008, 2009; 
Leavens & Racine 2009; Racine 2004; Racine & Carpendale 2008; Racine et al. 2008; 
Susswein & Racine 2008).
We begin by introducing what Leavens and his colleagues have dubbed the Ref-
erential Problem Space (for more detail, see Leavens et al. 2008, 2009). Leavens and 
colleagues have argued that wild apes do not encounter the same problem space as do 
captive apes and human infants. Human infants who are able to intentionally signal 
their desires are subject to a variety of external and internal barriers to object retrieval – 
a situation that is also faced by captive apes. However, apes in the wild do not face this 
problem space because they achieve independent locomotion before they are able to 
engage in means-end reasoning. Thus, apes in the wild can simply retrieve a desired 
object without needing to engage the assistance of a conspecific (Leavens et al. 2008, 
2009). On the other hand, because human infants are not able to retrieve objects with-
out the intervention of a caregiver, these infants learn that they must manipulate the 
attention of their caregivers in order to retrieve objects. Captive apes learn that this is 
indeed the case for their actions as well. Leavens and colleagues have argued that this 
is why actions like manual pointing are frequently observed in caged apes, but are an 
exceedingly rare means of directing attention in apes in their natural habitats.
Of course, not only do human infants experience particular sorts of constraints in 
their rearing environments that other apes do not, human infants are also afforded the 
opportunity to direct attention in ways that some researchers claim show an interest in 
directing attention as an end in itself rather than a means to some other end. We have 
noted elsewhere that there are no grounds to suppose that anything of the sort is in 
fact happening because it is clear that infants find such actions emotionally rewarding 
whether or not they are taken to be an end in themselves (Leavens et al. 2009; Leaven & 
Racine 2009; Racine et al. 2008). However, even if so-called declarative pointing actu-
ally needed to be explained in a different way than did imperative pointing, as we 
noted earlier, either form manifests secondary intersubjectivity and signifies an under-
standing of the attention of another. In either case, it does not take much imagination 
to consider the possibility that if imperative pointing has its origins in basic patterns 
of human interaction (Racine & Carpendale 2007, 2008), then declarative pointing 
could easily as well. Tomasello (2003) also allows that it is possible for human infants 
to begin pointing by means of social shaping; he just does not think that this is the pre-
ferred route for humans. As we will subsequently discuss, perhaps if Tomasello were 
not attempting to explain intentional behaviour by recourse to causal mental states 
also called intentions, the distinction that he draws between these forms of pointing 
would cease to have the same meaning to him.
We have expanded this argument elsewhere to suggest that human infants learn 
to follow gaze, socially reference and point because of the Problem Space within which 
they are embedded and because of the reinforcing contingencies of infant-caregiver 
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interaction (Leavens et  al. 2008, 2009; see also e.g. D’Entremont & Seamens 2007; 
Gómez 2007; Moore & Corkum 1994; Southgate, van Maanen & Csibra 2007). We 
have further argued that since the activities that demonstrate joint attention are exhib-
ited in all great apes species, a capacity for joint attention seems to be relatively ancient. 
Although we are well aware that this is a controversial claim in the current mentalistic 
and adaptationist zeitgeist, we argue that it is more productive to understand the dif-
ferences that exist between species in terms of differential capacities that are tied up 
with different, but not bifurcated, forms of life.
We surmise that there are at least two main reasons why this line of argument may 
have failed to capture the imagination of mainstream developmental and compara-
tive researchers. The first is the ostensibly overwhelming evidence of social cognitive 
discontinuity across the human and nonhuman primate lines (e.g. Penn et al. 2008; 
Tomasello et  al. 2005). However, as we have noted elsewhere, the rearing histories 
of experimental nonhuman primates are confounded with experiencing relatively 
impoverished enclosures and restricted opportunities for interaction with caregiv-
ers of their own species, let alone human caregivers. Conversely, the human children 
with whom their performances are often compared are sampled from typical human 
families (see Leavens et al. 2008, 2009; Racine et al. 2008). As Gardner (2008: 136) has 
recently remarked, captive apes are “lucky if they have a rubber tire to play with or a 
rope to swing from.” Citing earlier work by Tomasello and Povinelli, Gardner points 
out that the more experience that chimpanzees have with being housed in cages, the 
lower are their scores on standard measures of cognitive functioning. Conversely, 
the more experience that chimpanzees have with humans, the higher are such scores 
(Carpenter, Tomasello & Savage-Rumbaugh 1995). This is directly consistent with the 
findings of Rutter and colleagues concerning the cognitive functioning of orphans 
who experience extreme socioemotional deprivation (Rutter & the ERA 1998, 1999).
The second reason that our arguments may have fallen on somewhat deaf ears, 
to this point, is not methodological, but rather, as we have implied earlier, conceptual. 
Simply put, in the main, the developmental and comparative literature seems to have 
one set of standards for human (infants) and another for nonhuman primates. Essen-
tially, the prelinguistic skills of human infants are explained one way and what are taken 
to be the nonlinguistic skills of nonhuman animals are explained in quite another (see 
Canfield 1996; Racine & Carpendale 2008). For example, Tomasello (1999) has argued 
that social shaping (which he idiosyncratically calls ontogenetic ritualization) accounts 
for social cognitive skill development in nonhuman animals whereas identical skills in 
humans are explained by an infant recognition of the intentionality of others. Toma-
sello et al. (2005, Tomasello, Carpenter & Liszkowski 2007) take this further and claim 
to show that human infants have a natural motive for cooperating with others, whereas 
chimpanzees do not. Setting aside the extent to which any such motivation might be 
natural for children reared in typical families and unnatural for chimpanzees reared 
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in biomedical research facilities, Tomasello, Povinelli and many in the field seem to 
conceive of mental life as radically, and we can only surmise dualistically, distinct from 
the conduct and circumstances of everyday behaviour. We believe that this is tied up 
with an overly simplistic view of causation where internal states or adaptations of an 
organism function as efficient causes. We consider internal states in the following sec-
tion and adaptations in the one that follows.
5.   Intersubjectivity, consciousness, emotion, motion,  
minds and behaviour
If we begin by noting that it is behaviour that is intentional, not mental states, we are 
likely to be misunderstood. But the fact remains, given that one is a living animal 
and not a robot (or one of Wittgenstein’s smooth stones mentioned in the remark 
that opened this paper), creatures that possess a capacity for intentional behaviour 
manifest intentionality in their conduct in particular circumstances (Leavens et  al. 
2008, 2009; Leavens & Racine 2009; Racine 2004; Racine & Carpendale 2008; Racine 
et al. 2008; Susswein & Racine 2008). If one evokes Dennett (1995: 283) and exclaims, 
“What else is new? Everybody knows that!”, this may be because the question that 
one immediately seems to ask is whether an agent understands that her behaviour is 
intentional. Surely this is a mental phenomenon that is independent of these sorts of 
considerations. Although there may be a certain sense in which this is true, we hope 
that it is sobering for the reader to realize that this is the sort of theorizing exhibited by 
Descartes some 400 years ago – the same Descartes who denied subjectivity to animals 
because they could only behave but not think. Much like the contemporary tendency 
for conceptions of mind to ramify through empirical and theoretical work, Descartes’ 
own empirical anatomical research reconfirmed his metaphysical hypothesis:
Examining the functions that might result in such a body, what I found were 
precisely those that may occur in us unconsciously, without any cooperation of 
the soul, that is to say of the element distinct from the body of which I said above 
that its nature is merely to be conscious; the very operations in which irrational 
animals resemble us; but I could find none of the operations that depend on 
consciousness and are alone proper to us as men. (Descartes 1637: 41)
Most modern researchers probably chuckle at such obvious bias. However, concep-
tual biases are often only this obvious in a historical context. What are our modern 
biases? Isn’t it conceivable that researchers in 400 years time will laugh at contempo-
rary developmental and comparative researchers for how they used to think about 
mental life? If that is the case, then it is likely that what we are writing in this chapter 
may be a bit off as well. However, although most contemporary researchers – but not 
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at all (e.g. Chomsky 1966) – claim to not share Descartes’ conceptions of mind and 
further feel that his claim that the pineal gland is the anatomical correlate for human 
uniqueness to be quite primitive, the debates that continue to play out in mainstream 
contemporary theory and research are thoroughly Cartesian in character.
Although the present authors do not believe that intentional behaviour works this 
way in typical circumstances, we certainly do not wish to deny that animals some-
times think about their intentions and sometimes actually sequence their behaviour 
in attempts to satisfy them (cf. Tomasello et al. 2005). It is clear to us that humans can 
intend to do things that other animals cannot – like write a chapter in a book con-
cerning intersubjectivity and consciousness, which the first author has endeavoured 
to do for some months now despite his “best intentions.” However, the fact that the 
respective forms of life of humans and other apes afford different opportunities for the 
expression of intentions and other mental states does not mean that other animals do 
not intend to do what they do and are often conscious that they do so – i.e. they are not 
sleep-walking, or the like. This only seems counterintuitive because researchers tend 
to think of intentions mentalistically: there is outer behaviour; there are inner inten-
tions. But Wittgenstein’s insight was that behaviour expresses intentions in particular 
circumstances. The two are logically, internally, related and to speak of an intention 
as a strictly mental event is to not understand an intention. Or a mind. The question 
becomes whether there are grounds for attributing such an understanding to an agent 
so described. But the grounds are not whether or not an agent has a mind per se; rather, 
we think of an agent as having psychological properties because of the abilities and form 
of life that she possesses. Even this statement is sure to be misunderstood by some. It 
might seem that we reject the mind but embrace the body. Although we reject the 
Cartesian theatre of mind and the conceptions of action with which it is tied up, it is 
possible and indeed often desirable to emphasize the inner over the outer. Our point, 
and indeed Wittgenstein’s, is simply that inner and outer, body or behaviour, or brain 
and mind are different ways of describing the behavioural capacities of animals – as 
are intentions. However, intentions are precisely those sorts of properties that are easy 
to conceive of in misleadingly causal terms.
Wittgenstein (1958) demonstrated the socially constituted nature of an intention 
in a discussion of knowing moves in a chess game. If one does not know how to play 
chess, one cannot intend to play a game of chess; by parity, if one does not know how 
to play chess, one cannot understand that another intends to play a game of chess (see 
also Racine 2004; Racine & Carpendale 2007). Whatever neurological, genetic or psy-
chological events might be necessary for an agent to behave intentionally, these are not 
sufficient – they are external to the meaning of the action. Importantly, children must 
be trained to learn the proper normative uses of such terms. As Huemer (2006) has 
recently clarified, what Wittgenstein meant by training is not teaching or the like but 
something more like conditioning:
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when Wittgenstein emphasizes that teaching language is training rather than 
explanation, he insists that the first steps of language acquisition can be fully 
explained by a setting up of stimulus-response patterns: they take place at the 
level of pattern-governed behaviour rather than rule-conforming behaviour. 
We condition children to occupy their first positions in the language game 
which, from the adult speakers’, but not the children’s point of view, contain an 
intrinsically normative element. (Huemer 2006: 208)
This description again implies that nonhuman animals might enter into normative 
training in the same sort of manner given the appropriate opportunity and the sort of 
similarity in forms of life mentioned earlier (Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields 2000; Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. 2001, 2005).
6.   Intersubjectivity, consciousness, emotion, motion,  
genes and behaviour
The recent application of systems thinking to evolutionary theorizing has the potential 
to integrate the findings of Leavens and their colleagues and to provide a more suit-
able meta-theory of understanding the development of capacities such as intersub-
jectivity and consciousness. Thus, understanding the impetus for this theorizing may 
help to illuminate a way forward. Essentially, the problem faced by the more familiar 
adaptationist, population genetic, interpretation of evolutionary processes, was that its 
practitioners conceived of evolution strictly as changes in allele frequency in a popu-
lation over time, thereby presupposing particular developmental processes rather 
than elucidating their nature. That is, development was assumed to be the outcome 
of genetic processes and in this sense, ironically, development became the junk DNA 
of evolution. By avoiding development or by at least assuming that it proceeded in a 
predictable, reliable manner, the only relevant factors in accounting for evolutionary 
influences were taken to be mutation and separation of genes. This is clearly captured 
in the so-called central dogma of biology where the genome is modelled as indepen-
dent of influences above the genetic level and information flow proceeds in essentially 
a feed-forward manner. Genes are considered to contain the information required to 
construct or determine the organism’s growth and form (Gottlieb 2002).
Research conducted in the past generation in genomic and developmental biol-
ogy has undermined the ontogenetic determinism of genes and motivated many to 
question the adequacy of the population-genetic view (e.g. see reviews in Lickliter 
2008; Lickliter & Honeycutt 2003). This has lead to careful rethinking of what have 
traditionally been seen as antinomies, e.g. proximate and ultimate causes and more 
fundamentally, development and evolution, nature and nurture. It is now understood 
that genetic processes are not strictly feed-forward, but are rather affected by events 
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in the neural, behavioural and external environment (see Gottlieb 2002). The classi-
cal central dogma and the set of dogmatic assumptions with which it is tied up is also 
inconsistent with the discovery that DNA is considerably less stable than has been 
assumed to be the case and might be more affected by non-Mendelian mechanisms 
of genetic turnover than base-base substitutions (Gottlieb & Lickliter 2007). The 
view that emerges out of these considerations is that the developmental functions are 
emergent and epigenetic in nature with multiple sources of bidirectional interactions 
occurring within and between different levels of analysis, including many factors other 
than genes (Gottlieb 2002). The strong implication of evolutionary systems approaches 
is that there are always developmental precursors to any new behaviour. In particular, 
according to this approach, in addition to DNA, organisms inherit numerous epigen-
etic resources (Johnston & Gottlieb 1990; Oyama 1985). Furthermore, as an illustra-
tive example of a further implication of conceiving of evolution as occurring within a 
system, Johnston and Gottlieb (1990) report evidence that changes in primate jaw and 
tooth anatomy are mainly due the direct mechanical effects of dietary change and not 
natural selection. That is, dietary change can lead to specific anatomical adaptations 
that persist across generations and such phenotypic modifications occur in advance of 
any changes in gene frequency (see Lickliter 2008 for other examples of such Baldwin 
effects).
It may perhaps seem challenging to apply evolutionary systems principles to 
developmental and comparative psychology and, to our knowledge, few have system-
atically tried. But as Bard & Leavens (2009) have noted, the effects of rearing histories 
and the emotional contours with which such experiences are tied up, upon the devel-
opment of intersubjectivity and consciousness in chimpanzees are predictable from an 
evolutionary systems point of view. To take this positive point further in the present 
chapter, the general thrust of work conducted both jointly and independently by Leav-
ens, Racine and their colleagues is also predictable from such a perspective. However, 
to close on a more negative assessment, what is not consistent with an evolutionary 
systems point of view are the bulk of mainstream approaches to intersubjectivity and 
consciousness in the developmental and comparative literature.
Two salient examples, again, are Povinelli and Tomasello, both of whom apparently 
not only agree on the basic Cartesian character of mind but also programmatically on 
an adaptationist view of the evolution of such capacities. For his part, Tomasello (e.g. 
1999) describes joint attention as an adaptation for human culture. Although Toma-
sello would not expect such an adaptation to “unfold” in a situation of extreme neglect, 
nowhere does he spell out a nuanced position that takes into account the foregoing. 
This may account for lack of emphasis of the effects of rearing history on social cog-
nitive competence, despite contributing to the scholarship that supports such a view 
(Carpenter et al. 1995). On the other hand, Povinelli has proposed a reinterpretation 
hypothesis (see e.g. Penn et al. 2008 for a recent discussion of this view) by which our 
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hominid mental state skills reinterpret the meaning of the behavioural capacities that 
we share with other primates, thereby imbuing such behaviours with newfound inten-
tionality that only humans can understand. To be consistent with such a metaphysics, 
Povinelli (e.g. Povinelli & Vonk 2004) has had to deny the strong evidence produced 
by Tomasello and his colleagues (e.g. Hare & Tomasello 2004) that suggests chimpan-
zees understand intentions in at least some contexts. And around we go.
7.  Conclusion
The bulk of contemporary research concerning the intersubjective capacities of human 
infants and great apes seems to show conceptual excesses in two directions: (a) exces-
sive reliance on inner causal states, and (b) excessive reliance on simple linear adapta-
tions. Although a thorough treatment of the relation between these two conceptions 
warrants serious attention, we leave that for another paper. But from the perspective 
presented in the present chapter, the inner life of a great ape is not radically different 
than our own, although it certainly admits of fewer degrees of freedom. However, our 
remarks, when properly understood, implicate a more limited form of life than a more 
limited mentality per se. And in an important sense, to speak about mental capaci-
ties is to speak about the behavioural capacities and forms of life with which they are 
tied up. Form of life, from an evolutionary systems point of view, leads away from a 
reaction-range conception of possibility to one in which rearing histories can change 
and otherwise amplify what is normative for a life form.
We have also described ways in which emotion and bodily motion impact on 
capacities for intersubjectivity and consciousness, particularly when explaining why 
humans naturally point but other apes do not. But it would not be very evolution-
ary systems to overstate the importance of any single factor in the origins of a given 
behaviour. For example, although we do not question the potential importance of this 
discovery, our discussion of mirror neurons may provide a telling case of placing far 
too emphasis on one mechanism. In the same way, care must be taken to ensure that 
emotion and motion are emphasized in the field (and, hopefully, in this volume) in a 
way that does not place undue weight upon their importance; it would not be helpful 
for the field if researchers were to replace one questionable metaphor with another.
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Reaching, requesting and reflecting
From interpersonal engagement to thinking
Jeremy I.M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis
Simon Fraser University / Lancaster University
From many contemporary theoretical perspectives, the body and emotions play 
little role in the development of thinking and consciousness. If emotions are 
given any part it is in biasing thinking, rather then contributing to cognitive 
development. This volume, in contrast, presents alternatives to that position. 
From our perspective, embodied engagement with others – necessarily involving 
emotions – has a role in structuring the interactional conditions in which the 
development of thinking occurs. Just the body and emotions, however, are 
insufficient; the mythical baby isolated on a desert island would have a body and 
emotions (or at least the potential for their further development), but would 
not go on to develop human forms of thinking. What is needed is a shared 
history of routine patterns of interpersonal engagement. The body and emotions 
are necessary for setting up these forms of interaction and routines in which 
communication can emerge and then thinking and consciousness. In this sense, 
the development of human forms of thinking requires a social environment. We 
draw from Mead the point that self-awareness arises from interacting with others, 
and thus, self-consciousness is inherently social (Farr 1980; Mead 1909, 1910a, 
1910b, 1922, 1934; Morss 1985).
Keywords: Infant communication; gestures; social cognition; meaning;  
G.H. Mead
1.  Introduction
Our goal in this chapter is to outline our view of the development of human forms 
of thinking, and social cognition in particular. We argue that such forms of thinking 
are closely linked to the nature and development of language. A more recent version 
of Mead’s classic position is Levinson’s claim that language is based on earlier forms 
of interaction: “Language didn’t make interactional intelligence possible, it is interac-
tional intelligence that made language possible” (Levinson 1995: 232, italics in original), 
and “we have been damagingly distracted from the interactional underpinnings that 
244 Jeremy I.M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis
make it possible” (Levinson 2006: 42). Levinson’s term “interactional intelligence” may 
appear to emphasize the individual competence rather then the form of the interac-
tion. Instead, it is this foundational form of interaction in which meaning arises that we 
wish to consider.
In accounting for the development of this form of interaction, we take an activ-
ity based, relational approach, according to which infants develop knowledge of the 
world in terms of their successful activity, including their interaction with other peo-
ple (Carpendale & Lewis 2004, 2006, 2010). From the perspective of a relational meta-
theoretical framework, accounting for the development of thinking and mind begins 
from relations (Jopling 1993; Overton 2006). Thinking, from this approach, is part 
of a continuum of an organism’s adaptation to its environment, which does not exist 
pre-given before interaction can take place. Thinking is rooted in and emerges from 
activity, and human forms of thinking develop within social interaction. Sensorimo-
tor, practical, or ‘lived’ knowledge – knowledge in action, or know-how – is not just 
about the physical world, it is also about infants’ social interactive experiences. Thus, 
by facilitating forms of interaction within which thinking develops, the body and emo-
tions create the medium in which particularly human forms of thinking can develop. 
These forms of interaction are intertwined with and make language possible. From this 
perspective, “all thought is a system of meanings” (Piaget 1977/1995: 223). And, thus, 
“Human beings can be said to live in a natural environment of meaning” (Hendriks-
Jansen 1996: xi). Therefore, we have to explicate the processes through which such 
forms of meaning develop.
Relational approaches contrast with more individualistic or cognitivist perspec-
tives according to which a split is assumed between the self and both the other and the 
world. The starting point in accounting for thinking for this latter view is the individual. 
This results in a focus on the individual cognitive development rather than the ways in 
which development is embedded in interpersonal engagement. With this starting point 
the problem becomes how does the individual come to learn about and communicate 
with other minds. In contrast to individualistic positions, from a relational perspective 
communication develops first and thinking later (Jopling 1993; Overton 2006).
2.  Interaction and meaning
Views of thinking are grounded on assumptions about the nature of meaning. The 
cognitivist assumption is that thought is the manipulation of mental symbols which 
represent the world. We (Carpendale & Lewis 2004, 2006, 2010), and others, have crit-
icized such views and have argued, for example, that the assumed connection between 
symbols in the mind and the world is problematic (e.g. Goldberg 1991; Heil 1981; 
Kenny 1991; McDonough 1989, 2004; Turnbull 2003; Wittgenstein 1968).
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An alternative view of meaning can be drawn from Mead (1909, 1910a, 1922, 
1934). He argued that communication develops first and then thinking emerges 
from this process, not the other way around – we develop the ability to speak before 
we develop the ability to think, in the reflective sense. From this perspective, we 
have to explain the emergence of the forms of interaction on which language is 
based. If communication emerges within interaction with others, then we need to 
account for the development of such forms of interaction within which meaning 
is conveyed. For example, we have to explain the transition in which an infant’s 
extended index finger becomes a pointing gesture that is meaningfully used in 
interaction.
Attempts to answer these questions differ radically depending on one’s episte-
mological framework. As individualistic approaches take the individual mind as the 
starting point in development, this results in the problem of how individuals learn 
about and communicate with other minds. This approach is also tied to the code 
model of language as a means for communicating between minds, which is based on a 
mechanistic view of meaning. Mead (1934: 6) was clear that he was not proposing an 
approach that begins with isolated individuals, as if trapped in their own prison cells, 
who have to learn how to communicate with each other. This individualistic assump-
tion was present in Saint Augustine’s Confessions, where he views himself as an infant 
trapped within and attempting, unsuccessfully, to communicate to those without (for 
a more recent example of this mechanistic view of meaning see Pinker 1994). Such 
approaches already assume that the mind and thinking are given. Rather, for Mead it is 
communication that develops first and individual minds are differentiated out in this 
social process (Morss 1985).
Mead’s account of how the form of meaning present in human interaction begins 
with his notion of a “conversations of gestures.” Examples of this form of interaction 
include: a hen’s cluck and her chick’s response; a dog responding to another dog’s 
growl; chicks opening their beaks when their parent bird returns to the nest and 
the parent responding by feeding the chicks; a human infant crying and a parent 
responding. “All of these gestures, to the intelligent observer, are significant symbols, 
but they are none of them significant to the form that make them” (Mead 1922: 160). 
These gestures function to communicate because they are meaningful to others; they 
are early indicators of the upcoming action, but the organism making the gesture 
does not understand this meaning for others. For example, a young infant crying 
communicates its distress to its parents because the crying is meaningful for the par-
ents (usually!), but the infant has not yet learned how her parents typically respond 
and so has not organized her behaviour in order to take this expectable response 
into account. This is what we mean by understanding this meaning from the parents’ 
perspective. In contrast, an older child may understand the meaning of crying for her 
parents and she may cry with the intention of attracting attention. This is a different 
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form of communication based on a form of meaning Mead (1934) referred to as sig-
nificant or self-conscious gestures.
As another example, consider the “arms up” gesture, which many infants acquire 
early on in development (Lock, Service, Brito, & Chandler 1989; Service, Lock, & 
Chandler 1989). This begins as infants reach toward their parent and, over a history of 
interaction, they learn what to expect when they extend their arms toward their parent – 
they get picked up. This gesture begins from the infant’s natural reaction of reaching 
toward a parent and, because the parent recognizes what the infant wants, the begin-
ning of the act of reaching toward the parent begins to serve as a signal for the infant’s 
desires. This is a form of interaction in which later forms of meaning can emerge. 
Other examples can be drawn from research on the development of chimpanzees’ 
gestures (Plooij 1978; Tomasello 1999).
This is the social process that Vygotsky (1978) discussed in explaining the emer-
gence of pointing, building on Wundt’s suggestion from 1912 (in Vokerpsychologie, 
cited in Werner & Kaplan 1963: 78). That is, the infant reaches toward a desired object 
and their initially unsuccessful reach is completed by an adult who understands the 
infant’s goal. The infant’s initial action serves to indicate to the adult what the infant 
wants and this gradually becomes a request. This explanation, however, would require 
modification in order to account for the emergence of other forms of pointing ges-
tures, like those that are used to direct attention or inform others, or ask questions. In 
Mead’s (1934) terms there is an important transition from “conversations of gestures,” 
in which the infant is not aware of their meaning for others, to what he referred to as 
“significant” or “self-conscious” gestures, which involves learning how others react to 
the gesture and thus the infant begins to understand the meaning of the gesture from 
the other’s perspective. We return to this transition after first considering the condi-
tions that set up the human social process.
3.  Evolution and meaning
The human body and emotions play an important role in cognitive development 
because they set up the patterns of interaction in which human forms of thinking 
develop. For example, in humans, ironically, helplessness may be an long-term advan-
tage because it may be one factor in setting up the conditions for certain forms of 
interaction that might not otherwise occur and in which human communication can 
emerge, and, then, later human forms of thinking. Other primates do not experi-
ence such an extended period of dependency in infancy (Bruner 1972; Gould 1977; 
Portmann 1944/1990). Gould focuses on head size and the limits of the human birth 
canal as factors requiring a birth about nine months earlier than similar mammals, per-
haps in order to preserve bipedality in the mother, and thus resulting in an extended 
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period of immaturity in human infancy, but there may be potential beneficial side 
effects of this outcome. Portmann referred to human infancy as secondary altriciality 
because although humans are helpless at birth, their senses are fairly well developed 
compared to other species with similar motoric limitations. Chimpanzees do not expe-
rience the same problem space as human infants because they are able to get what they 
want earlier in development, unless they are held in captivity and cared for by humans. 
In captivity, chimpanzees often begin to use pointing gestures, whereas this gesture 
does not appear to be used in the wild (Leavens, Thomas, & Hopkins 2004; Leavens, 
Racine, & Hopkins 2009). For humans, a payoff for the high cost of a prolonged period 
of helplessness in infancy is that it enables a new way of being social. This sets up the 
need for making requests and the social context in which they can emerge.
Consider a subtle difference between the problem space for humans and other 
primates. Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, Segerdahl & Rumbaugh (2005) discuss the differ-
ences in potential for interaction that arise as a result of the different rearing patterns 
evident when comparing a bonobo mother and a human caretaker interacting with a 
bonobo infant, Kanzi. Even the way the infant was carried illustrates differences. The 
bonobo mother carried Kanzi quadrupedally, which meant that the infant had to sup-
port himself and “attend to clinging and saw only the rushing panoply of green as they 
traversed the forest” (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2005: 16). Human infants lack the ability 
to hold on in this way. In contrast, the human caretaker carried Kanzi bipedally, the 
way human infants are often carried, which meant that he did not have to support his 
weight and could look around and manipulate things with his hands as they walked. In 
addition, Kanzi’s interests and desires to move toward certain things would be obvious 
to the caretaker from his shifting weight and his extended arms. This simple difference 
results in a situation in which the infant’s desires become evident and, thus, the poten-
tial for the development of requests emerges. That is, the environment in which Kanzi 
developed changed; his social environment become more responsive to his interests, 
and thus the potential for him to learn how to manipulate his social environment 
emerged.
From this way of thinking of infancy, immaturity is not simply some obstacle to 
be overcome but rather produces the expectable social environment in which human 
development typically occurs. Although it might appear that human infants’ helpless-
ness does not make them well suited for survival, in fact, it may be just these limita-
tions that result in the particular environment in which they develop, and which foster 
the development of thinking. Not only do motor limitations structure human infants’ 
social environment, sensory limitations may also play a similar role. An organism’s 
sensitivities determine its environment. For human infants objects about 20 cm away 
are most clearly in focus, and it is only large objects or large features that are resolv-
able. This reduces the amount of visual information the infant must deal with, and 
this sensory limitation coupled with the fact that mothers tend to hold their babies 
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at about this distance away might explain the early development of interest in faces 
and may result in the facilitation of early face-to-face dyadic interaction (Turkewitz & 
Kenny 1982).
Other factors, such as emotional reactivity, are also important in setting up the 
interactive system between parent and infant (see Reddy 2008, for a discussion). We 
acknowledge that referring to emotions raises many complex problems concerning 
how we define and classify emotions and conceptualize emotion regulation and other 
aspects of emotion. One of Darwin’s (1872) insights was that the expression of early 
emotions serves the function of communication between infant and parent. This sets 
up the human forms of interaction which provide the foundation for language, and 
within which emotions and their regulation develop further. More complex emotions 
such as guilt and shame develop that are linked to the social structure and further 
development of awareness of others’ typical reactions to the self. We also acknowledge 
that in speculating about the role of emotional reactivity in parent-infant interaction 
we do not know the extent of the role of rearing on such development. In chimpanzees 
there is evidence that the type of rearing history is linked to general emotional respon-
siveness (Bard & Leavens 2009).
As well as these factors that are involved in setting up forms of interaction 
in which attention is coordinated, a second group of neurological factors may be 
required for a species to profit from such forms of interaction to take them to another 
level, through the development of neurological pathways. The extended period of 
helplessness in human infancy and the forms of interaction resulting from this cannot 
completely explain human social skills, because children with particular disorders 
like autism experience infancy and form attachments to their care-givers (Rogers & 
Ozanoff 1993), yet such attachments are not clearly related to joint attention skills 
(Naber et al. 2007) and they go on to have difficulties in social development. Chil-
dren differ in ways that hinder or facilitate their entrance into typical forms of inter-
action with their caregivers, or their ability to profit from such interaction, resulting 
in different forms of developmental difficulties. There are many possibilities here 
including differences in attention or interest and emotional reactivity (e.g. Shanker 
2004, this volume). For example, individuals with autism differ in the things they 
pay attention to in social scenes compared to typically developing individuals (Klin, 
Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar 2003).
4.  The emergence of triadic forms of interaction
The development of infants’ earlier social expectations can be seen in the “still face” 
experimental procedure. Four- to 5-month-old infants whose mothers interact with 
them contingently during a two minute interactive phase of this procedure tend to 
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make more social bids (i.e. they look at their mother and smile, as if attempting to 
re-engage her in interaction), during the one minute phase in which their mother has 
been instructed to present a still face, when compared to infants whose mothers did 
not interact in such a contingent manner (Mcquaid, Bibok, & Carpendale 2009). These 
infants appear to have learned about what happens in this form of social interaction. 
That is, they have learned what works in interaction; e.g. their mother responds when 
they smile. In Piagetian terms, this is a scheme – an action pattern – with their mother 
that is linked with positive experience – their mother smiles and engages with them in 
response. This is a learned pattern of interaction to do with other people which results 
in a response. Therefore, these infants may try it out in the still face phase, presumably 
with the expectation that it will elicit a response from their mother. Infants’ actions 
manifest their early social knowledge or expectations they have developed about social 
interaction, their practical know-how about interacting with others. Another source of 
evidence of the emerging social skills acquired by infants of this age is that they attend 
more to a stranger who had interacted contingently with them six days before then to 
a stranger who interacted noncontingently (Bigelow & Birch 1999).
The baby and parent are parts of an evolved interactive system. It is important to 
emphasize that these are not pre-existing entities which exert their effect when given 
minimal environmental priming, but rather each participant draws out responses from 
the other, so the focus should be on the relations between them and the process of 
further development. What is required for this system to function? This form of inter-
action is enjoyable for the adult – babies are cute and we are drawn to care for them – 
and gradually the interaction becomes engaging for the infant. Of course, during early 
interactions parents do most of the work; anything the infant does is responded to 
and brought into the interaction (Hopkins 1983) and parents build an apparent con-
versation on the basis of the most minimal reactions from their infant (Stern 1977). 
Parents treat their infant’s actions as intentional, as a contribution to the interaction 
(Newson & Newson 1975), building an interactive routine around anything the baby 
can do. Within such responsive interaction the baby begins to learn about what hap-
pens through this history of shared social interaction. These expectations, practical 
knowledge, or patterns of activity to do with other people are what Piaget (1945/1962) 
referred to as personal or affective schemes. This is similar to Bowlby’s (1958) notion of 
the beginning of an internal working model, and may have been derived from Piaget. 
All of this presupposes bodily and emotional interaction with the physical and social 
world. And this interaction may be constrained in ways if the infant lacks senses such 
as sight. The development of joint attention is delayed in children with congenital 
visual impairment (Minter, Hobson, & Bishop 1998).
In dyadic interaction, interaction involves responses to the other’s response, 
but not yet to aspects of the world beyond the dyad. However, the child comes to 
understand him or herself as the object of attention, which Reddy (2008) argues 
250 Jeremy I.M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis
is a cornerstone in the development of triadic interaction. Gradually objects may be 
introduced into this dyadic interaction, stretching it into the beginnings of triadic 
interaction. As early as four months infants show some ability to follow another per-
son’s line of gaze (e.g. Scaife & Bruner 1975; Striano & Reid 2006). At first this may 
not yet be simultaneously triadic. That is, early forms of triadic interaction may be 
formed from sequences of the infant being engaged with the other, then the object, and 
then the other. With older infants this sequence becomes more fluid and rapid. Older 
infants show greater interest in the world beyond the dyad. Being drawn into others’ 
responses to objects and the coordination of the infant’s own attitude and the other’s 
attitude result in the emergence of the “epistemic” (Chapman 1991) or “relational” 
triangle (Hobson 1994). This involves the infant, the other and aspects of the world. It 
is a form of lived experience involving components from self as well as other about an 
aspect of the world, although these components may not yet be clearly distinguished. 
Various factors might be associated with this transition such as increased ability to 
focus on objects farther away.
Parent-infant interaction involves what Hobson (2002/2004) describes as being 
‘moved’ or influenced by others’ attitudes toward things. For Mead, someone’s per-
spective or attitude is directly manifest in their bodily attitude, their directedness 
toward an aspect of the world is evident to others. Another person’s perspective is 
right there in the actual interaction. No “mindreading” or telepathy is required. This 
way of thinking about attitudes is not common, except in the work of a few scholars 
such as Hobson (2002/2004) and Reddy (2008, this volume). With experience within 
particular forms of interaction a child becomes increasingly sophisticated in learning 
about how others will react. This is what is involved in the development of the ability 
to take another’s role.
To address these issues further we need to review the many forms of interac-
tion such as gaze-following and pointing which grouped together are referred to 
as joint attention. Even by about 3 months some infants may tend to follow oth-
ers’ head turns and thus end up looking in the same general direction (e.g. Scaife & 
Bruner 1975). This could be thought of as cuing of attention (Moore 1999). This 
initial tendency gradually becomes more fine-tuned and sophisticated. At 6 months 
infants follow others’ gaze but tend to stop at the first interesting thing they see. By 
12 months infants are better at locating the object the adult is actually looking at, and 
further skills at following gaze in more complex situations continue to develop up to 
18 months (Butterworth & Jarrett 1991). So gaze following may begin with looking 
at the same thing but without explicit awareness that both are attending (Moore & 
Corkum 1994). During these months infants develop more skill in interacting with 
others. Part of this involves greater awareness or understanding of the other as attend-
ing. The other’s attentiveness is manifest in their bodily orientation toward the object 
or event – their attitude is evident in their engagement (Mead 1934). This is an aspect 
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of the experience of coordinating attention, i.e. the emotional exchange with the other. 
Reddy (2008: 57) stresses the role of ‘relational knowledge’ in dyadic interaction. Face 
to face interactions scaffold development and provide the medium through which 
infants become more skilled in their interaction with others. This is referred to as 
learning to take others’ perspectives.
There are many different social situations involving the gradual coordination of 
attention between infant and adult. Infants become aware of more subtle aspects of gaze 
following of increasing complexity, using and understanding pointing gestures of dif-
ferent types, and games in which infant and adult take reciprocal roles (Carpendale & 
Lewis 2006), as well as giving and taking routines (Hay & Murray 1982; Rheingold, 
Hay, & West 1976), We (Bibok, Carpendale, & Lewis 2008) argue that infants develop 
skills in all of these common social routines. We would argue that their ability to 
engage in these different forms of interaction is not based on one underlying insight 
about others as intentional agents, as Tomasello (1995) argued. Rather, as infants 
develop and coordinate these various social skills their activity begins to appear to 
be based an underlying insight. There is evidence that individual skills have particu-
lar developmental outcomes. As an example, consider Brune & Woodward’s (2007) 
research with 9- to 11-month-old infants showing that those infants who used more 
pointing gestures were more successful at understanding such gestures compared to 
infants who used fewer pointing gestures. Those infants who engaged in more shared 
attention in social interaction than their age mates were also better at understanding 
shared attention in an experimental procedure.
5.  The roots of language and the emergence of meaning
In accounting for meaning, language and thinking, we contend that the body and 
emotions, although required, are not sufficient in themselves. An infant’s extended 
index finger is not enough to convey meaning; the ability to follow gaze or point-
ing gestures is not sufficient to achieve understanding. Consider, for example, Moll & 
Tomasello’s (2007a) story of walking down the aisle of a hardware store and encounter-
ing a stranger who looks at you and points to a bucket. Although joint attention coor-
dinated on the bucket would be achieved, meaning would not be conveyed. What is 
needed is what Moll and Tomasello refer to as a “joint attentional frame.” For example, 
two friends might be looking for a particular type of bucket for a certain purpose. 
That is, some shared framework, some history of interaction, is required in order for a 
pointing gesture to do any work, to convey any meaning.
The need for such shared experience is evident in Hare & Tomasello’s (2004) 
research in which they show that chimpanzees can follow an experimenter’s direc-
tion of gaze or pointing gesture to locate which of two buckets the experimenter 
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is indicating. The chimpanzees do not, however, understand that the meaning the 
experimenter is attempting to convey is that food is hidden under that bucket. What 
is the difficulty here? It seems so obvious to us, and it is even clear to young chil-
dren. What is needed in addition to gaze following is some experience with such a 
form of cooperative activity in which someone indicates food to them. The chimpan-
zees in this study apparently did not typically experience this form of activity. They 
did, however, experience competitive interaction around food, so that if the situation 
was changed into competition with the experimenter and the experimenter reached 
toward the bucket, the chimpanzee knew where to find the food. That is, conveying 
meaning requires some routine of shared interaction (Racine & Carpendale 2007a, 
2007b, 2008). The role of social experience is shown in a study comparing differently 
reared groups of chimpanzees and bonobos (Lyn, Russell, & Hopkins 2010). Lyn et al. 
found that the groups of apes reared in a sociolinguistically complex environment 
showed better performance in understanding declarative communication compared 
to the  standard-reared group.
In an experimental exploration of the need for shared interaction in order to under-
stand others, Liebal, Behne, Carpenter & Tomasello (2009) found that 18-month-old 
infants could understand the different meanings conveyed by a pointing gesture to the 
same object but made by different experimenters with which the infants had shared dif-
ferent experiences. In a second study 14-month-old infants were successful on a some-
what simpler procedure. Another series of studies can be interpreted in this light (Moll & 
Tomasello 2007b; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello 2007). These studies were designed to 
investigate what young infants know about what others have experienced. Fourteen- 
and 18-month-old infants interacted with an experimenter with two new objects, then 
when this first experimenter left the room the infants interacted with a second experi-
menter and a third object. The first experimenter returned and excitedly said, “Wow! 
Look! Look at that one!” and then asked, ambiguously, for the infant to hand “it” to 
her. The infants tended to respond by giving the third object, which, although not new 
for them, was new for the first experimenter. That is, the infants made sense of, or 
understood, the utterance as requesting the object that was new to the experimenter. 
But they were not successful in a condition in which the adult was merely on-looking 
from across the room. This evidence that such indirect interaction was insufficient fits 
with a view of knowledge as first rooted in practical interaction. As well as being able to 
understand an adult’s ambiguous request in the case of an object that the adult had not 
experienced, 14-month-olds can also understand ambiguous requests when an experi-
menter has experienced 3 objects with the infant but has experienced one of the objects 
in a special way (Moll, Richter, Carpenter, & Tomasello 2008).
This sort of research exemplifies Wittgenstein’s claim that language is an extension 
of action. “An extension, that is, of certain action patterns that underlie the earliest uses 
of language” (Canfield 1995: 197). From this perspective, language is a
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collection of conceptually isolable language-games – mini-customs in which 
words play a role. To see what language is, examine – observe – language-
games. To do that, begin by observing the simplest ones the child comes to 
master. This agenda leads to the roots of language – to certain presymbolic 
interaction patterns, ones that come to light also in studies of ape language. 
 (Canfield 1995: 197)
An example of a form of interaction on which an early language-game can come to be 
based
consists in a mutual recognition of child and mother or other primary group 
member, and a subsequent mutual engagement of the two…. The mother may 
be ‘greeted’ by smiles and happy excitement, strangers by cries and fear.… 
Such actions and reactions arises from the cellular depths of human nature. 
Clams don’t behave that way. So sustaining language-games of greetings is 
a proto language-game of mutual recognition and concern. It is indubitable 
that the child recognizes the mother, and obvious that we could not have a 
language-game of greeting if we were organisms incapable of such recognition. 
 (Canfield 1995: 198)
From this perspective, language is based on, or is an extension of, such patterns of 
activity. The body and emotions are involved in setting up these action patterns or 
social routines, and it is these patterns of routine shared activity that are essential in 
infants coming to develop expectations/understandings of particular social situations, 
like greeting, requesting, feeding, washing, playing, or directing attention. Gestures, or 
words, can then come to refer to such activities and can be used to direct others’ atten-
tion based on these “proto language games”. We could still say that the body and emo-
tions are important because they may structure or require the various sorts of shared 
activity or constrain these activities, but the focus must come back from the individual 
or individuals interacting, to the shared practices, their history of interaction. It is 
experience within the various roles of such shared practices that make gestures recip-
rocal; that is, experience in taking the different roles in shared social routines allows 
children to understand the gesture from multiple perspectives. (Mead 1922, 1934).
6.  From conversations of gestures to significant gestures
Mead made a distinction between conversations of gestures and “significant” or self-
conscious gestures. This means that the gestures have the same meaning for the self 
as they do for the other. Mead’s explanation is that the self has the same tendency to 
respond as the other. Mead stresses that the vocal dimension is important because the 
individual making the gesture can hear a vocalization, and thus can respond to it as the 
individual receiving it would. He suggests that this is particularly the case with vocal 
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gestures, although he acknowledges that, “this is also true in a less degree of those of 
one’s own gestures that he can see or feel” (Mead 1922: 160).
Mead describes the transition to significant gestures and how it might be explained. 
But we suggest that there are several issues with his proposed solution. First, some ani-
mals, such as birds singing duets or even dogs growling, also use vocal gestures and yet 
it is not clear that they develop significant or reciprocal gestures. So it seems that vocal 
gestures cannot be sufficient for the development of self-conscious awareness. Also, 
infants acquire gestures such as pointing that are not in the vocal dimension. These 
may at first be one-sided – not reciprocal – but gradually these gestures do become 
reciprocal and significant. Thus, perhaps the vocal dimension is also not necessary.
Another issue with Mead’s approach, and another way in which he attempts to 
qualify his claims, is by saying that the first animal tends to respond as the second 
animal would. If a dog growls the meaning of this action for the second dog, or the 
response, may be to run away, particularly if this second dog is smaller. If it is bigger, 
however, it might growl back. But retreating is not the way that the first dog does react 
when growling at another dog. When a person makes or utters a threat he knows it is a 
threat but he does not react to his own threat in that way. For Mead (1910b: 178), “To 
cry out in fear is an immediate instinctive act, but to scream with an image of another 
individual turning an attentive ear, taking on a sympathetic expression and an attitude 
of coming to help, is at least a favorable condition for the development of a conscious-
ness of meaning.” That is, the second example involves some anticipation of how the 
other will respond to the gesture.
Mead recognized the problem of explaining the emergence of human forms of 
self-conscious meaning, and this is an essential transition that must be accounted for. 
We could call a gesture significant or self-conscious if the first organism knows – that 
is, has an expectation or can anticipate – how the other organism will, or is likely to, 
respond to the gesture. How, then, do significant gestures develop? What seems neces-
sary is enough experience within that pattern of interaction and the capacity to learn 
about others’ typically responses. Further, how is it that children acquire reciprocal or 
double-ended understandings of gestures and words so that they can both produce as 
well as comprehend them? One possibility is that infants learn both halves separately 
and then gradually combine them or coordinate them. In Piagetian terms this would 
involve acquiring various action schemes, personal schemes or practical knowledge of 
what happens in interaction with other people, and then combining this knowledge 
of such patterns of interactivity. This is Piaget’s notion of the reciprocal assimilation of 
schemes. The way this works in the context of infants’ knowledge of physical objects, 
is that an infant goes through a process of developing various schemes or patterns of 
activity to do with an object such as grasping, sucking, dropping, squeezing, etc. These 
are all potential actions on the object. They are all centered on the object and constitute 
knowledge of the object – i.e. things that can be done with it. Examples in the area of 
social cognition include taking the different roles in giving and taking, or being able 
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to produce pointing gestures versus being able to understand such gestures. A gesture 
becomes significant or self-conscious for infants when they can incorporate their par-
ent’s typical response to their gesture into an action.
7.  Conclusion
With the goal of explicating the roles of the body and emotions in the development 
of human forms of thinking and consciousness we have argued that this develop-
ment occurs within social interaction. The body and emotions structure and make 
possible regularities in the forms of interaction in which communication and then 
thinking can emerge. This, then, has required tracing out the gradual development 
of such forms of interaction in infant development. This progression is reflected 
in our title, “reaching, requesting and reflecting: From interpersonal engagement 
to thinking.” Reaching begins as an individual action or bodily movement – an 
attempt to obtain a desired object. For human infants, though, such action tends to 
be embedded in activity with others because they are relatively helpless and must 
be cared for. The infant’s action has meaning for her parents because it indicates her 
interests and desires, and parents may respond to this action. Through a history of 
such responding the infant will learn about the way her parent typically responds. 
When this sequence of interactions becomes integrated into the infant’s behavioural 
repertoire others see it as a request. This interaction is a way in which the social 
act of making a request might arise from individual action. What is clear is that 
the development of this form of meaning requires the reactions of other people 
(Carpendale & Carpendale 2010).
The ground on which language can be built requires these patterns of activity 
or microcosms of interaction that we could refer to as proto language games, shared 
practices, traditions, or mini customs (Canfield 2007). Within these situations infants 
understand others’ actions, and then words can be added. Thus, the “locus of the mind 
is not in the individual. Mental processes are fragments of the complex conduct of the 
individual in and on his environment” (Mead 1977: 100). The human body and emo-
tions are necessary for setting up the regularities in the social process through which 
mind and thinking emerges. Language then makes other forms of thinking possible. 
After becoming competent at communicative interaction children can then imagine 
such interaction as a form of thinking.
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Intuitive meaning
Supporting impulses for interpersonal life  
in the sociosphere of human knowledge,  
practice and language
Bodo Frank & Colwyn Trevarthen
University of Zurich / University of Edinburgh
What is the foundation of social meanings, the cultivation of motives and 
beliefs in a community of human minds? How does meaning and collaborative 
intentionality emerge in intimate human relationships of early childhood and 
how does it grow in society? This article begins with an account of the origins 
of shared intentionality and intersubjective cooperation of feelings and ideas in 
infancy and early childhood. Then, the enquiry extends to the concepts of the 
social sciences, drawing ideas from the relational sociology of Pierre Bourdieu 
and the social philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. It attempts to elaborate the 
transition between the primary psychobiology of human sympathy, of proto-
conversation and early intersubjective play and cooperation, and more abstract 
socio-philosophical concepts of the articulate and technically complex adult 
world. An important conclusion is that the same motives that make the creation 
and propagation of meaning possible in early childhood and the successful 
mastery of adult competence can be responsible for social marginalization or 
exclusion when the experiences of individuals or communities diverge from 
those of the larger society. We attempt to indicate how a recovery of the original 
intimate motives by sympathetic intervention can assist a deviant individual to 
gain a more meaningful place in the social group.
Keywords: intersubjectivity; motives; emotions; sympathy; meaning; habitus; 
culture; marginalization; special education; therapy
We live, work, learn and talk in a sphere of meaning made by persons sharing actions 
and experiences, passing on knowledge, techniques and beliefs about the world in 
ritual and symbolic ways. Our fates as individuals, our unique ‘personal narrative his-
tories’, depend upon the health and pride of this sharing, on the affections and poetry 
or ‘making’ of life – how our families and communities appreciate and support us 
262 Bodo Frank & Colwyn Trevarthen
through all stages of development, and what we give to them in return (Trevarthen 
2006). Human beings are intuitive collaborators.
The life of culture requires sympathetic response to hopes and fears and eager 
transfer of ideas, methods and explanations. It is not just a commerce of products in 
the form of objective information in texts and material objects of technology. Noth-
ing meaningful can be achieved or sustained without human sympathy for the pro-
cess of psychological states and narrations – without us taking part in the relating of 
stories that give shared purpose to what we do, and common value to what we per-
ceive. In this chapter we develop this idea that all of practical and realistic meaning in 
human communities, and all cultural rituals, rules of conduct and languages, depend 
upon intimacy in action and experience – on the kind of trust, mutual affection, pride 
an appreciation shown in Figure 1. And we consider the consequences of marginaliza-
tion or exclusion from intimacy of understanding.
Figure 1. A family in an affectionate and meaningful world about to undergo transforma-
tion; one culture confronting another much larger one with pride in itself. Sampson and 
Leah Beaver with their daughter Frances Louise in the year 1907 in Canada. As Blackfoot 
Indians they lived with little technology, not even using canoes. They are close to nature, 
rich in art, and well in trustful relationship, as they are recorded by an alien photographic 
machine (Kipp 1996)
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1.  The psychobiology of culture in infancy and early childhood
1.1  The contribution of a natural science of infancy
Research on the behaviours of infants recorded in near natural circumstances, where 
their actions are spontaneous and adaptive to surrounding events, has demonstrated 
that humans are motivated from birth to act and learn as persons who intend to relate 
to other human beings (Trevarthen 1977, 1979, 1998, 2010). Innate impulses to move 
as coherent intentional and conscious selves in emotional engagement with the sensi-
tive responses to the intentions of other persons in inter-subjectivity, eventually lead 
the child to learn the socially accepted meanings that constitute a ‘culture’ with its 
traditional practices and language (Trevarthen 1988, 1992).
The intentions and emotions of infants are entirely expressed in how their bod-
ies move in self-centred time and space, and how they willfully assimilate external 
‘affordances’ for future action by orienting their attention (Gibson 1977). The rhyth-
mic prospective control that equips infants with this self-awareness of moving makes 
their intentions, interests and feelings ‘public’, such that sufficiently attentive other 
persons may experience what the infant intends, experiences and feels by a process of 
‘sympathetic resonance’ or ‘attunement’ in mutual awareness (Stern 1984; Thompson 
2001; Bråten 2009; Bradley 2009). They have a productive self-other-awareness, know-
ing other minds ‘intuitively’, and with feelings that rest the quality of intimacy, need-
ing no ‘theory of mind’ (Reddy 2008). This interpersonal awareness of ‘significant 
others’ who give emotional support (Lüdtke, this volume) has priority in develop-
ment, actively guiding growth of experience, even from before birth as the foetus can 
hear and learn to identify the prosody of the mother’s voice, and taking the lead over 
any ‘objective’ engagement with physical objects or events.
To prove this theory of the innate personality and cooperative awareness of 
infants, and to understand its implications, developmental psychologists have, in the 
past 40 years, found that it is not sufficient to observe only what the infant and child 
learns. Nor is enough to demonstrate the construction by the child of cognitive proce-
dures and schematic models of objects and of their potentials for use (Piaget 1954). A 
new genetic epistemology seeks evidence that the process of human knowing, as dis-
tinct from the content of knowledge, presupposes actively motivated human sympa-
thy and intersubjective collaboration. An innate prefunctional morphogenesis builds 
the adaptive anatomy of the body and brain of the embryo and foetus in human form, 
with the special sensory and motor organs adapted for communication. Within the 
embryo brain stem the emotion defining Affective Nervous System (Panksepp 1998), 
which will regulate actions throughout life, develops before the cognitive mechanism 
of the cerebral cortex, and its neurons guide the growth and differentiation of cortical 
circuits (Trevarthen & Aitken 1994; Trevarthen 2001) (Figure 2).
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1.2   Agency and cooperation: How animal individuals move  
and communicate
A psychobiology of human consciousness in infancy and it cultural elaboration 
requires a grounding in the physiology or neuroscience of intentional animal move-
ment, the science that attempts to explain how the integrated central nervous sys-
tem of an animal may, with ‘extero-ceptive’ awareness, command coordinated and 
regulated animation of the complex somatic sensory-motor system of a mobile body 
with its vitality-sustaining internal visceral processes. In addition, a scientific account 
of the cooperative intersubjective powers of communicating animals has to accept that 
there is a process of transmission, or ‘resonating with’, the rhythmic energetics of self-
regulation between individuals. These powers, evident even in social coordinations of 
primitive forms of animal life, require an ‘altero-ceptive’ sensitivity for the ‘proprio-
ceptive’ and ‘viscero-ceptive’ regulations made apparent in other individuals – by how 
they move to seek and choose objects, how they make themselves comfortable, how 
they act to maintain internal well-being through selective appropriation of what the 
environment affords as essential sustenance, and how their bodies may be sensed to 












































Map of motives & emotions
Figure 2. The innate anatomy of human motives, anticipating a life in communication.  
Left: The Intrinsic Motive Formation in the core of the brain (Trevarthen & Aitken 1994) 
coordinates the vital states of a human being, directs engagements of the embodied Self (S) with 
the environment, and regulates collaborative cultural learning of technical and artistic skills. 
(Trevarthen 1998).  
Right: The basic emotions systems (Panksepp 1998; Panksepp & Trevarthen 2009) are 
indicated as they relate to the body, to the experience of physical objects or to communication 
with other subjects. Three systems of emotion regulate movements and perceptions: proprio-
ceptive for feelings of the well-being of the body (B); extero-ceptive for feelings of engagement 
with the objects (O) of the physical world; and altero-ceptive for sympathetic feelings for the 
intentions and emotions of other persons (P)
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A core principle for both effective action and sustained vitality of any animal 
is prospective control of movement with self-assessment by an integrated brain. One 
hundred years ago Charles Sherrington, the founder of modern neurophysiology, 
proved, by systematic experimentation with the functions of peripheral nerves that 
link body and brain, a comprehensive theory of ‘the integrative action of the nervous 
system’ (Sherrington 1906). He explained conscious voluntary action as the product of 
extero-ceptive ‘projicience’ that perceives the location and form of objects and ‘knows’ 
what they are good for – the anticipation by ‘distance receptors’ of the satisfaction of 
vital needs. What eyes or ears detect may guide motor activity of a body made united 
in its biomechanical powers by an intense and constantly tuned proprio-ception of 
muscular forces in dynamic postural or kinematic equilibrium. Furthermore, both 
exteroceptive and proprioceptive sensory realms of the integrated self are guided by 
the ‘affective appraisals’ of viscero-ceptive senses, which measure the values of objects 
taken up by the body.
Subsequently others, notably Nikolai Bernstein (1896–1966; Bernstein 1967), 
Karl Lashley (1890–1958; Lashley 1951), Eric von Holst (1908–1962; von Holst 1936; 
von Holst & Mittelstaedt 1950) and Roger Sperry (1913–1994; Sperry 1952), adduced 
evidence for the capacity of the brain to predict the consequences of movement with 
‘images’ of the internal effects and the eventual engagements with environmental 
media and objects. David Lee has extended James Gibson’s theory of prospective per-
ceptual control with a precise mathematical formulation of how the brain ‘models’ 
the course of every unit movement by controlling the speeds and accelerations of 
action to close the body on goals with elegant precision, and Lee’s ‘tauG’ guide process 
has been detected in the brain activity that formulates a movement (Lee 1998; Lee & 
Schögler 2009).
Animal intentions evolve and grow, from the start, with potentialities for inter-
subjective social collaboration, making their intelligence communal. The brain-
generated dynamic ‘motor images’ (Bernstein 1967), which define cadences and 
transformations of movements in specific rhythmic ways, can be read by another sub-
ject as expressing the conscious expectations of the mind that forms them. They can 
serve to communicate mental actions and emotional states. This is how one animal 
can ‘get inside the skin’ of another and engage in willful cooperation or competition 
with their intentions. The evolution of social signaling has been the subject matter 
of ethology from its beginnings early last century (von Frisch 1923; Lorenz 1966; 
Tinbergen 1951). Physiologists’ demonstrations in recent decades that brain actions 
predictive of the consequences of moving can be used not only to guide movements of 
the self, but also to detect and evaluate the motivation of another individual’s move-
ment, has revolutionized psychological theory of both subjective and inter-subjective 
regulations (Gallese 2003; Jeannerod 2006).
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In the course of animal evolution, actions of the brain within the body to regu-
late its purposeful movements, the ‘ergo-tropic’ actions that are projected to displace 
and navigate the body in engagement with the environment, or the ‘tropho-tropic’ 
ones that regulate the well-being, comfort or appetites of the body, are made more 
‘explicit’ or ‘ritualised’ for purposes of social communication (Tinbergen 1951; Hess 
1954; MacLean 1958). Efferent commands that evolved to move the organs of the body 
in self-regulating functions of breathing, circulation of the blood, feeding and selective 
attending have become elaborated to make social signals that ‘tell’ to other individuals 
what an animal feels, needs, wants, or will do, and with what urgency or care (Porges 
1997; Panksepp 1998; Trevarthen 2001). Inner emotional states of any kind become 
transmissible to sympathetic partners; that is, other subjects may experience and 
engage with one’s emotions, positive or negative, by what, in humans, we recognize as 
‘moral sentiments’ (Smith 1759).
1.3  Intersubjectivity with newborns
Newborn infants, contrary to the classical reductive assumption that they lack subjec-
tive coherence of movement and an integrated awareness, have been proved, by detailed 
analysis of their actions, to have extero-ceptive, proprio-ceptive and viscero-ceptive pro-
spective control of their movements, which are highly efficient and variable in force and 
form (Trevarthen 1984). The orientations of their receptors are guided by interest that 
can direct them to select nearby objects located outside their bodies. They show, by this 
psychological control of activity, primary subjectivity (Trevarthen 1979, 1998).
Infants also have well-differentiated manifestations of emotions that relate either 
to the regulation of their attempts to focus on environmental events of a physical kind, 
or, and most conspicuously, to their interactions with other persons, and these emo-
tions powerfully influence the affective responses of their parents (Trevarthen 1979 
1993, 1998, 2001). Most obviously infants express the four different poles of emotion 
that define ‘pleasure in sharing’ or ‘fear and anger of opposition’, and ‘interested focus 
on a task in hand’ that may become ‘anxiety’ if the task is too difficult, or irritable ‘bore-
dom’ if it is too easy – that is, if the ‘flow’ of effort is not optimal (Csikszentmihalyi 
1990). Piaget, with exclusive interest in the formation of cognitive schemas for coping 
with the objective world, distinguished in infants expressions of pleasure in mastery, 
when experience is ‘assimilated’ in ‘play’ onto a strong and clearly conceived schema, 
and serious intent when the schema is in need of ‘accommodation’ by ‘imitation’ 
(Piaget 1962). Papoušek (1967) made the important observation that infants, when 
trying to anticipate and engage with a series of events triggered by their movements 
in an experimental set-up, show pleasure when they predict correctly and concern 
or sadness when they fail. Such expressions have obvious potential to coordinate the 
actions and experiences of different subjects.
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Laughter in humans is an expression of excitement stimulated by sharing physi-
cal or expressive play, and it has powerfully beneficial effects on individuals’ states 
of mind, and on affiliation or liking between them, especially in childhood. Pank-
sepp, who observes that, “laughter is the clearest signal that natural play urges are 
being engaged” (Panksepp 2007: 58), has demonstrated that similar vocal displays of 
enjoyment by juvenile rats have an affiliative function (Panksepp & Burgdorf 2003). 
Moreover, he claims that hyperactivity in young children may be regulated by playful 
activity that stimulates energetic social enjoyment, and relieves frustration from lack 
of adventurous companionship (Panksepp 2007).
Sympathetic engagement, ‘in time’ with the dynamics of another person’s move-
ments and feelings, sensing their ‘vitality dynamics’, has a strong innate foundation 
enabling transfer of intentions and feelings (Stern 2004, 2010). Newborns’ movements 
exhibit both the same basic rhythmic ‘musical’ parameters of adult movement, and a 
capacity to engage, by eye contact, facial expressions, vocalizations and body attitudes 
and gestures, in reciprocal ‘dialogue’ with the expressive actions of another person 
in an intimate playful exchange in which new expressive acts are learned and used 
as mutually known conventions (Osborne 2009a; Trevarthen 2008, 2010). They also 
show the beginnings of immediate responsiveness to other person’s expressions of 
affectionate interest, and interest in sharing experiences. Newborn hands, especially, 
express states of arousal and moods, thoughts, sympathy for others’ thoughts, and 
are ready to share adventures in imagination and memory with attention to another 
person’s hands moving in sympathy (Trevarthen et al. 2010) (Figure 3).
The readiness with which some newborns imitate expressions of another per-
son’s face (Maratos 1973, 1982; Meltzoff & Moore 1977, 1983; Field et al. 1983; Field 
1985; Kugiumutzakis 1998, 1999) is evidence that they have what Stein Bråten (1998; 
2009) has defined as a “virtual other” in their cerebral system for communication. 
Following a period in which neonatal imitation was pronounced impossible, experi-
ments have led to the idea that newborns imitate to test their similarity to other 
persons, by matching the form of demonstrated body movements, perhaps to iden-
tify with them (Meltzoff & Moore 1999). However, this imitative ‘matching’ is not, 
as widely assumed, merely a detection or feeling of similarity between the body of a 
Self and that of an Other. In natural spontaneous interactions between infants and 
attentive adults, the imitative behaviour of each of them is fundamentally a test of the 
purpose and affective quality of dynamic states of mind in the other, which may or may 
not be reflected upon consciously (Damasio 1999; Gallagher 2008). It enables the 
generating and exchange or ‘dialogue’ of expressions and mutual intention and affec-
tion in ‘felt immediacy’ (Bråten 2009). It is from the outset inter-subjective in this 
sense (Trevarthen 2010). Experimental tests of the capacity of newborns to imitate 
formally presented gestures, vocalizations and oral and facial actions generally do 
not allow estimation of the infant’s motivation and emotions, and they can easily fail 



































Figure 3. Above: Newborns less that an hour after birth in a clinic in India, participating in 
imitation of tongue protrusion, and reciprocal ‘demonstrations’ of hand gestures. (Photos by 
Kevan Bundell)
Below: An infant, recorded by a motion capture camera in the hospital about 36 hours after 
birth, regulates her arm movement (measured as the tangential velocity of the wrist) to 
synchronise with the pattern of syllables in an adult voice. The infant’s arm lies at rest before 
and after the adult moved toward the table to say, “I’ll give you one… if it’s okay”. The two 
phrases make up a complete sentence with a ‘relaxed’ conclusion. The infant extended her 
left hand from an at-rest flexed position with the hand close to the head, down toward her 
waist, and then back again to a flexed resting position. The outward stretch matched the first 
phrase, “I’ll give you one.” There was a slight pause in the arm movement anticipating one 
in the speech (shaded) near 20.5 seconds before the conclusion, ‘if it’s okay”, when the arm 
was brought back to flexion. Syllabic boundaries are marked by vertical lines to show their 
correspondence with velocity shifts (the dark curve). The stresses in speech on ‘give’, ‘one’ 
and ‘kay’ are separated by approximately 500 milliseconds, which corresponds to allegro 
moderato. (Trevarthen et al. 2010)
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to support an engagement – hence the reports of ‘failure to replicate’ (e. g. Anisfeld 
1979). More descriptive and ‘permissive’ approaches with less regulated observation 
lead to a much richer conception of the process and purpose of the ‘copying’. The 
infant acts with the adult to provoke and co-regulate an interpersonal interaction, 
and the act of making the imitated action is accompanied by emotions of interest and 
pleasure (Nagy & Molnàr 2004). The infant and adult play an imitative ‘game’.
1.4  Protoconversations with two-month olds
Micro-analysis of face-to-face communication between mothers and two-month-old 
infants has revealed the following important features of behaviours motivated for 
interpersonal communication: they are composed of rhythmic elements or steps that 
are combined in phrases; they express affective melodies of a ‘courteous’ emotional 
‘attunement’; and they are regulated over longer intervals by ‘narrative envelopes’ or 
energy cycles (Bateson 1975, 1979; Stern 1985, 2010, Trevarthen 1977, 1979, 1988, 
1999; Jaffe et  al. 2001). These forms of infant expressive activity and engagement 
(Trevarthen 1986, 1999) are the same as characterize all human body movement, 
thought and speech with gesture (Langer 1953; Key 1980; Fonagy 2001; Kühl 2007). 
They prepare the way for learning language in live communication (Ryan 1974).
In a protoconversation, the 2 month old and mother both act to make a “dialogue” 
of visible and audible expressions (Figure 4, and Malloch & Trevarthen 2009). The 
mother’s vocalizations and other expressions show the coherence and emotive dynam-
ics of “intuitive motherese”, a register of speaking that is immediately responsive to 
the infant’s equally coherent and emotive dynamic expressions – of face movements, 
coos or frets, hand gestures and body movements. The physiognomic and kinematic 
patterns of this motherese, like its reception, are universal and unlearned (Fernald & 
Simon 1984; Fernald 1989; Papoušek 1994; Grieser & Kuhl 1988).
Comparison of the behaviours of infants and mothers with the elements of song 
and performances with musical instruments makes clear that there are fundamental 
temporal and affective principles at work in music and protoconversation, and that 
the infant shares expectations of how these principles should be shared to make a dia-
logue or duet (Papoušek & Papoušek 1981; Papoušek 1994; Stern 1984, 1985). A com-
mon rhythmic sense or ‘Intrinsic Motive Pulse’ (Trevarthen 1999; Osborne 2009a), 
the appreciation of a scale of pitch, and sensitivity to the timbre or quality of vocaliza-
tions are all shared by infant and adult (Malloch 1999: Malloch & Trevarthen 2009; 
Marwick & Murray 2009; Powers & Trevarthen 2009). Further observation shows that 
the dynamics of vocal expression are reflected in hand gestures as well, so the infant 
can ‘dance’ with hand gestures to accompany a mother’s song or share performance of 
an action game such as clapping song (Trevarthen 1999; Trevarthen et al. 2010).

























Tell me some more then.
INFANT INFANT
INFANT
Oh yes, is that right. Well, tell me some more then.
INFANT
Oorh. Come on. Ch ch ch ch. Ch ch. E-goo. Goo
11 12 13 14 15 (16) 17
Come on. Come on then. That’s cleverAgain.
1 2 3 4
Figure 4. Protoconversation with a six-week-old. (Malloch & Trevarthen 2009). 
Above - She looks at her mother speaking and smiles; she coos; and she gestures with her right 
hand.
Centre - Pitch plot and spectrographic analysis made by Stephen Malloch (1999), showing 
the melody of the mother’s voice and vocalizations of the infant, both based on Middle C 
(C4). The regular bars lasting approximately 1.5 seconds are numbered. They are marked by 
accented components of the mother’s speech and serve to give timing to the infant’s utterances.
Below - The text of the mother’s speech with the bar numbers placed in relation to the 
consonants that define them
Adults giving care for infants use rhythmic body movements, chants and songs to 
regulate or share the mood of an infant, varying the energy to excite or calm. Action 
songs and lullabies show similar dynamic and melodic features in different cultures 
with different languages (Trainor 1996; Trehub 1990; Trehub et  al. 1997). A young 
infant is responsive to and influenced by the mother’s emotional state. Depressed 
mothers fail to engage their infants and cause them to be depressed. Two-month-olds 
are sensitive to the immediate ‘contingent’ responsiveness of a partner. Perturbation 
experiments, such as the ‘blank’ or ‘still’ face test, or replay of a video of the mother 
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communicating, demonstrate that the infant is motivated to participate in a mutually 
responsive exchange, live (Tronick et al. 1978; Murray & Trevarthen 1985; Trevarthen 
1998; Marwick & Murray 2009). The infant’s responses are not simple reactions to 
stimulation. As with neonatal imitation, they are seeking reciprocal communication 
with two-way exchange of expressions.
Even though the infant has no comprehension of the words a mother may use, 
the melodic/gestural narrative is appreciated in the way she combines phrases of 
a song or poetic recitation in stanzas or verses that last several tens of seconds 
(Trevarthen 1999). Evidently the patterns of expressive sound stimulate expecta-
tions in the infant’s mind and attract their participation at particularly marked 
moments, such as rhyming syllables. Finally, infants show rapid learning of the 
ritual of a repeated song or action game with recitation, and become highly moti-
vated participants.
1.5   Increased playfulness, teasing and the performance of rituals  
and jokes for others’ appreciation: Making imitative art
As the infant’s body becomes stronger and the head and trunk are more self-supported 
around 3 and 4 months, they become more playful and seek more lively exchanges 
with strong emotions. With this increasing self-other-aware liveliness comes a capacity 
to engage in intensely sympathetic positive and negative engagements not only with 
the mother or other adult, but with unfamiliar infants, in groups (Bradley 2009). The 
infant is not merely capable of conversational play in a dyad, with a single partner – 
he or she is ‘sociable’ and can participate in the exchange of feelings and making of 
meaning in ‘concert’. In games with persons of any age they negotiate at the boundaries 
of shared purpose and creativity, ‘teasing’ the other or others by varying timing and 
form of actions in exchange with powerfully expressed emotions of joy, surprise, and 
‘mock’ annoyance and aggression (Reddy 2008). They can compose celebratory events, 
or learn the provocative rituals of traditional body games and songs and delight in 
repeating them, watching others’ reactions closely (Eckerdal & Merker 2009; Powers & 
Trevarthen 2009). They make a communicative art of “ceremonial ritual” (Dissanayake, 
2000, 2009; Miall & Dissanayake 2003).
Tests of reactions to mirrors and playful teasing prove that infants of this age 
have a strong self-awareness, and this ‘self-consciousness’ comes with sensitivity 
to the appraisal of others for actions they perform (Reddy 2008). By six months an 
infant who is well-supported by affectionate parents has a performer’s personality or 
‘identity’, which demonstrates pride and is sensitive to the identity of any person who 
attempts to share play, showing shyness with intrusive approach of a stranger, and 
shame, when unable to sustain a familiar performance to elicit approval (Trevarthen 
1998, 2005).
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At the same time as these social abilities are showing increased subtlety and 
power, around four months, infants also gain in manipulative dexterity and in interest 
in objects of manipulation (Trevarthen 1984). With increased control of their limbs 
they begin rhythmic banging of objects with their hands, and jumping, and they also 
start babbling with the same rhythms. At this age they may become intensely occupied 
with their investigations of objects of movements of their body, and while concentrat-
ing on the task they will close off their responses to persons who seek communication 
(Trevarthen & Hubley 1978; Trevarthen 1998).
1.6   Sharing tasks with person-person-object awareness  
or secondary intersubjectivity
At 9 months the interest in objects for individual interest and manipulation becomes 
open to direction by another person’s intentions and emotional appraisals, and this 
new cooperative awareness leads to performance of shared tasks regulated by com-
pliance with requests, directives, and instructions and demonstrating affective con-
trol of compliance or refusal (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978; Hubley & Trevarthen 1979; 
Trevarthen 1998). The infant can combine gestures and vocalizations to perform ‘acts 
of meaning’ in a ‘protolanguage’ (Halliday 1975, 1979). At this age games involving 
objects may become more serious or ‘business like’, more concentrated ‘cognitively’ 
and methodical or, as Halliday puts it, more ‘mathetic’.
Habits for use of mannerisms, objects and situations become part of a cultural 
‘proto-habitus’ with familiar playmates – parents, siblings etc. This prepares the way 
for learning of a many new symbolic gestures and words to name agents, actions and 
objects of shared interest in the growing culture and language of the home community.
Table 1. How motives of infant change in the course of infancy
Developmental stages in inter subjectivity with infants
Months 1–2 Primary intersubjectivity:
Direct sensitivity to the expressions of feeling 
in intimate contact with an other. “Dialogic 
closure” in protoconversation sustained 
by two-way transmission of emotions. 
Identification of familiar affectionate partners.
(1) PROTOCONVERSATIONS
I M
Months 3–6 Games I:  
Exploration of surroundings and manipulation 
of objects. Pleasure in body-action and in object 
manipulation is shared, and imitated, in play, 
including musical-poetic play. Laughter, mirror 
self-awareness and “showing off ’ as a “social 
Me” appear.
(2) GAMES & JOKES
I M
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Months 6–9 Games 11: 
Lively socio-dramatic play and self-confident 
presentation with family increase, as does fear 
of strangers. The first ritualized ‘protosigns” 
are learned in play. First “emotional 
referencing” and joint orientation to a locus 
of interest aided by pointing. Increased social 
awareness and self-consciousness as ‘knower’.








Months 9–14 Secondary Intersubjectivity:  
Shared interest in tasks and the uses of objects; 
infant produces “protolanguage”. Learning 
of the conventional meanings of things. Use 
of objects to whch others have given value 
“recreatively”, in fantasy play. I M
O
The diagrams summarise the changes communication and expressions of play-
ful enjoyment or interest in objects described above. I = Infant, M = Mother, O = 
Object. Plain arrows indicate intentional movements or expressions. Arrows with a 
bar at the beginning indicate active perception of an object, or of a person’s expres-
sions or actions. Shaded arrows are ‘meta-communicative’ expressive ways of moving 
that convey joy, tease or make a ‘joke’. The question mark indicates a request made by 
the mother as the infant observes her action toward an object, to elicit a cooperative 
response.
1.7   Narrative awareness of infants and toddlers leading  
to imaginative culture and its inventions
The inter-subjective and mimetic powers of infants prove that, before there are any 
words or propositions that refer to objects, agents or events in the world, the human 
mind in the human body is inherently ready for a ‘story telling’ society, imagining 
and remembering events and experiences for and with others beyond the psychologi-
cal present (Bruner 1983, 1990; Donaldson 1992; Gratier & Trevarthen 2008). The 
rhythms and expressions of an infant’s voice and gesture seeking sympathetic response 
engage with the purposes and concerns of a parent in intrinsically motivated narrative 
cycles of enthusiasm, anticipation and satisfaction. The child is motivated to learn and 
practice approved rituals of performance. Their experiences are regulated by aesthetic 
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and moral emotions that evaluate the quality of messages sent and received and the 
‘courtesy’ or ‘respect’ of the response from the other. Thus messages come to be sto-
ries that are believed, exchanged, imagined and recalled, and valued, in traditional 
forms, linking those that tell or receive them in imaginative as well as affectionate 
companionship (Trevarthen 1992, 1994, 2008).
Rigorous analysis by musical acoustic techniques of the sound patterns cre-
ated when an affectionate and responsive adult evokes infant calls proves that even 
a premature newborn has the time sense and emotional appraisal required to meet 
the adult as a partner in an improvised ‘proto-conversation’ (Trevarthen 2008). This 
has led musician Stephen Malloch (1999; Malloch & Trevarthen 2009) to formulate a 
theory of innate ‘Communicative Musicality’, to explain how non-verbal narratives are 
shared. In the first weeks after birth infant-adult communication coordinates all the 
expressive organs; eyes, face, mouth and voice, head and hands, in rhythmic patterns 
modulated by emotions.
Thereafter baby songs and action games build dramatic cooperation within tra-
ditional rituals with properties of music, poetry and dance. The young child’s mastery 
of meaning in this play is regulated by the moral emotions of pride and shame, which 
evaluate how acquired knowledge and skill are appreciated by known others, and how 
misunderstandings can arise (Trevarthen 1999, 2008).
Near the end of the first year the child turns his or her confidence in sharing pur-
poses to invite interpretations from others of the usefulness of objects and the accepted 
meanings of actions. This co-operative ‘secondary inter-subjectivity’ or ‘person- 
person-object’ awareness, finding other’s goals to have compelling interest, lays the 
foundation for cultural learning, and for all sorts of symbolic ways of acting and 
believing language. It also animates new play with meanings in toddlers that can be 
shared with peers in ‘imaginative play’ (Nadel & Pezé 1993; Nadel, et al. 1999) which 
is intensely creative, poetically and musically, opening the door to ‘children’s musical 
culture’ (Bjørkvold 1992). It is more than the acquisition of joint attention to objects 
in a ‘common ground’ of experience and the imitation of intentions towards signified 
goals (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner 1993).
Infants lack all external knowledge of special or artificial things, but have inter-
nal or ‘intuitive’ knowledge which they can share as a ‘universal language’ with other 
humans – they sense tastes and odours that please or offend, see brightness and colour 
in light or radiant substance, hear pitch, loudness and timbre, feel soft or hard, hot or 
cold. They perceive form and space and measure change in time. All these perceptions 
are most sensitive to the qualities that identify the animate presence and sympathetic 
responsiveness of a person. This leads to intimate sharing of thoughts, imaginative 
experiences and memories, before these are put into words, by appreciation of their 
expressions in action.
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1.8   First steps to proficiency in meaning need good  
company in a community
In the second year a toddler is highly expressive and intensely interested in the traffic 
of meanings for and with others (Trevarthen & Marwick 1986). When observed with 
the mother in a new place, he or she does not take interest in objects just as accessories 
to sensory-motor schemata; they have creative symbolic attributes that are evaluated 
in transactions with the mother who also knows what the objects are usually for. His 
or her attention is caught quickly by any thing that makes this shared kind of sense. 
Dolls, toy animals, cars, cups, hats, books, food, etc. are noticed because they are living 
company or used to do something. Though the actual objects may have never been 
seen before, they are quickly recognized as representing beings or tools in daily life. 
This ‘representation’ is a product of shared and remembered intentions and emotions. 
It precedes a symbolic verbal code acquired by imitation, and the capacity to respond 
correctly to verbal interrogations (Ryan 1974; Halliday 1975).
It is obvious that the sociability of the toddler’s curiosity depends on who is pres-
ent. Even though 18 month olds exhibited strong-willed independence, often refusing 
to take advice or directions, they are guided by what is brought to their attention by 
a trusted companion and they understand many words used to name objects, as well 
as those that convey interpersonal attitudes. If the mother leaves, or if some event in 
the unfamiliar place frightens the child, play stops and the mother is sought. With 
a stranger the play is desultory, uninspired and uninventive. Many of the seemingly 
avoidant or ‘disobedient’ responses to the mother take the form of playful showing-off 
jokes that both infant and mother recognise as such. The child boldly asserts a right to 
choose how to act in a meaningful way, showing an independent pride in this confi-
dence, but does so under the assumption that the mother is there and approving, or at 
least condoning what is going on.
Thus there are two sides to this relationship between child and mother. Usually 
it guides and supports the child’s use of meanings, but it can weaken it. The negative 
aspect, called maternal insensitivity, has received examination by the attachment theo-
rists. Mary Ainsworth’s technique of watching the behaviour of children at one year 
when with their mother or alone in a strange room with toys, and watching what they 
do when the mother returns after absence, or when a stranger appears in her place, has 
shown that a good affective quality of the relationship is positively linked to the child’s 
motivation to “explore” objects (Ainsworth & Bell 1970). In the normal, happy life of 
a mother with a child of this age, the meaningfulness of surroundings and actions is 
continuously shared. This is as much part of the relationship as the emotional quality 
of their communication under stress; indeed it explains the role of ‘companionship’ in 
meaning in the child’s mental growth (Hubley & Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen 2005). 
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There is increasing evidence that the ability to communicate about experience requires 
an intuitive response from affectionate caretakers that will give specific emotional 
reinforcement or “attunement” (Stern 1984, 1985, 2010) to initiatives and interests of 
the infant, and to expressions of self-consciousness and self-confidence.
At this stage, corresponding to Halliday’s Phases I and 2 of language development 
(Halliday 1975), there is an great increase in a securely attached child’s competence for 
dealing with the mini-culture of life at home, or in the well-known social contexts of the 
community (such as church, the garden, a park, a supermarket, a friend’s house), places 
that are frequented by the child with the familiar caretaker, who may now, in many 
cultures, be an older sibling (Weisner & Gallimore 2008). Cross-cultural studies show 
that even with very different styles of “mothering” and domestic life, this same rapid 
development in curiosity about the meaningful world is manifest in the second year.
In the transition between language Phases 1 and 2, at 18–20 months, there is an 
increase of the attachment to the caretaker as well as a peculiar awareness of oddness 
or defects in things that will have been given emotional evaluation by the significant 
adults, and a heightening of fear of a stranger who will not comprehend the protolan-
guage level of discourse, and who cannot grasp the significance of favourite “games” 
or “performances” (Kagan 1982). This increase of emotionality compares with an ear-
lier increase of sensitivity to the threat posed by a stranger who cannot share mean-
ings, at 7–8 months, just before the start of Phase 1 and secondary intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen 1998; Trevarthen & Aitken 2003). Cross cultural studies show evidence 
for a change in children’s motives and abilities at 5 to 7 years, when there is increased 
structure and discipline with expectation that the child will have more ‘sense’ and be 
able to take responsibility for care of others (Rogoff et al. 2008). This is when schooling 
in intellectual and social ‘skills’ starts in complex industrial cultures, and the socio-
linguistics of imaginative peer culture is very rich and passionate (Blum-Kulka 2005).
‘Critical periods’ in development, and including adolescence, where the young 
person’s temper seems most vulnerable and most demanding of support from famil-
iar companions, give evidence of major transformations of motives that are being 
produced from inside the growing mind (Trevarthen & Aitken 2003). They are, 
as Brazelton says, ‘touch points’ important in the changing relations with parents 
(Brazelton 1993). Each “emotional” phase is followed by a new level of mental integra-
tion, new friendships, and a new power in “meaning”. Gradually the child is gaining 
freedom from particular relationships, but only by depending upon those relation-
ships to give the required “leg up” when this is needed. The mastery of meanings is by 
an interpersonal symbiosis, regulated by feelings of affection. When relationships are 
stressed and caretaking is unsympathetic of the child’s needs, mastery of meanings 
and of the language that communicates them will suffer.
The early language of a child is clearly sensitive to the habits and beliefs of the 
human environment. Both cultural and social class differences in children’s speech 
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give evidence of the dependence of this learning on the style of cooperation that the 
children find. There are also marked differences that appear to relate to intrinsic tem-
peramental characteristics of the children themselves, and psychologists are finding 
consistencies between the features of early mother-infant communication and the 
speech of three and four-year-olds (Bruner 1983; Locke 1993; Nelson 1981, 1996). 
Now it is clear that such correlations cannot be explained just as consequences of 
differences in “mothering”. The active contribution of the child to early prelinguistic 
communication, the fact that infants exhibit differences in expressiveness and self-
sufficiency in exploration of their surroundings and the marked differences children 
show in their taking of roles as toddlers, all testify to a source of individuality that is in 
the child’s own constitution, as well as in the accidents of experience and the guidance 
of companions. Study of early language offers valuable evidence for both sides of the 
control in relations with caregivers. For example, as infants in different social worlds 
begin to grasp acts of meaning in the second six months of life, they may receive dif-
ferent responses from their mothers.
Trevarthen and Marwick compared two working class and five upper-middle 
class mothers in Edinburgh over the period from 16 to 41 weeks when their infants 
were gaining the capacity to share a task (Trevarthen & Marwick 1986). Between the 
30th and 40th weeks, when the infants became more cooperative, mothers increased 
their directive or command forms of utterance, reduced their statements and asked 
fewer questions about what the infant was interested. The change in illocutionary acts 
showed the mothers’ communicative intentions, or intuitions, were getting more spe-
cific in response to the changing motives of the child. Mothers varied widely in play-
fulness, as infants varied in liveliness, and some were more oriented to the objects 
while others made more references to feelings, interests or intentions of the infant. 
Working class mothers were much more ready to praise or criticise their infants than 
were middle-class mothers, but middle-class mothers made many more Statements of 
Fact and they asked more Questions, especially Tag Questions that mask declarative 
or imperative statemens. Thus, in Halliday’s terms, working-class mothers were being 
more active and “interpersonal”, middle-class mothers were more “ideational”, encour-
aging experiences of the environment.
In their second year, individual toddlers show different orientations towards 
expression of their interests in words, some referring to interpersonal engagements 
and personal feelings, others tending to refer more to objects (Barrett 1981; Nelson 
1981; Dore 1983). It seems evident that such differences and how they relate to the 
social or human environment prove that the child as a seeker after meanings by engag-
ing with what other human beings offer in the way of interest and appreciation. Social 
roles, artifacts, instruments, rituals and occasions offer so many possibilities for spe-
cialization. It would appear likely, also, that there are inherited mechanisms in human 
beings that would favour growth of individual differences in knowing how to mean.
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Language and its acquisition is most comprehensively understood, not from a 
systematic analysis of the rules for skilled use of text, but in terms of functions that 
regulate of mutual awareness and cooperative action in human society (Mead 1934; 
Vygotsky 1962; Rommetveit 1968; Searle 1969; Habermas 1970; Bruner 1990; Brandt 
2009). The motives for intersubjectivity evident in the behaviours of infants question 
a traditional bias to explain mental activities in terms only of the facts of individual 
experience, or rational systems that “process” information about reality outside the 
mind. They offer a better understanding of culture and how it is transmitted, and of 
the part language plays (Reddy 2008; Bråten 2009).
1.9   The human brain is motivated for relational interpersonal life,  
and for cultural learning
The behavioural evidence of the infant’s motivation for entry into meaningful communi-
cation is supported by remarkable findings from neurophysiology and functional brain 
imaging, which require a new map of the cerebral systems adapted for inter-subjective 
contact between humans, and new interpretations of the intentional, perceptual and 
emotional foundations for the learning of cultural conventions and language. Now we 
know there is a rich resonance of intentions and consciousness of acting between minds 
by entirely intuitive ‘mirroring’ of cerebral processes evident in movements, which 
includes an emotional evaluation of the effort and satisfactions associated with pros-
pects of acting, all in the natural time of moving (Jeannerod 2006). This physiology of 
intersubjectivity and the evidence of its power in infancy make together a new psychobi-
ology of human sympathy – the harmonisation between persons of conscious intentional 
states of moving, and of thinking about moving (Varela et al. 1991; Clark 1997; Gallese & 
Lakoff 2005; Gallese 2003; Schilbach et al. 2006; Rizzolatti et al. 2006). The theory of 
‘communicative musicality’, which offers an account of the primary temporal and affec-
tive dimensions of human sympathy (Malloch 1999; Malloch & Trevarthen 2009), is 
changing concepts of how information is exchanged by means of body movement (Sacks 
2007; Brandt 2009; Panksepp & Trevarthen 2009; Turner & Ioannides 2009).
However, the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ that transfer instrumental inten-
tions between minds illuminates only a part of the problem of how a young infant 
can enter so efficiently into an experience of moving in playful sympathy with an 
adult partner, exchanging and compounding motives, and sharing consciousness 
of meaning in activity with different companions. The perception and action of 
communication is richly active before language (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002). Cul-
tural learning depends on interpersonal ‘moral’ communication, for which infants 
show powerful adaptations, as well as on the sharing of intentions to use objects 
in cooperative ways (Adolphs 2003; Decety & Chaminade 2003). It is essentially 
intersubjective (Bråten 2009).
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2.   The socio-sphere: The emergence of mature intimate  
and responsible cooperation
2.1   The collaborative life as the acquired habitus of meaning  
and identity
“Moreover, they involved in their structuring at every moment and phase not 
simply thought structuring, but the whole human vital repertoire of thinking, 
willing, desiring, and feeling, subtly and varyingly interpenetrating on many 
levels” (The anthropologist Victor Turner discussing Wilhelm Diltheys distinction 
between ‘experience’ and ‘having an experience’. Turner 1986: 35)
To understand what the ‘meaning of life’ of a person is, how it emerges from sympa-
thetic human interaction, and how the languages and other “tools of meaning” can 
grow in society, is to enquire into the intricate relationship between “common sense” 
(Reid 1764/1997) and “habitus” (Bourdieu 1990) and how they are already present in 
the “field of interaction” or “proto-habitus” between mother and infant. This original 
interpersonal awareness is grounded in turn on an innate “field of emotions”, by which 
the actions and intentions of human contact are regulated (Macmurray 1959, 1961; 
Kellerman 1980; Trevarthen 1993) (Figure 2). The proto-habitus, the developmental 
source of habitus, can be defined as the awareness of a mutual level of knowing evident 
when babies are smiling, recognising songs or playful routines, or collaborating in cre-
ative tasks with their parents (Trevarthen 1994; Gratier & Trevarthen 2008, Gratier & 
Apter-Danon 2009).
‘Habitus’ is a term used by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu for a certain kind 
of “embodied attitude” to the affordances of the social surroundings, rooted in the struc-
ture of what Bourdieu calls “space of social dispositions” (Bourdieu 1998). He defines it 
as a generative principle of ‘distinct and distinctive practices’, for example practices of 
eating, doing sports, and especially the way these practices are done, the socially aware 
manner of their performance and display, or their grace and skill. Habitus is an intri-
cate part of a social “structuring of structured structures”, which has influence on itself, 
sustaining the social structure (Bourdieu 1998). These practices are different between 
persons living in various ways of life, in distinct positions of social stratification among 
shared activities and roles: “Life-styles are thus the systematic products of habitus, 
which, perceived in their mutual relations through the schemes of the habitus, become 
sign systems that are socially qualified (as ‘distinguished’, ‘vulgar’ etc.)” (Bourdieu 1992). 
Habitus is a classificatory scheme for social status and social tasks. It contains “princi-
ples of vision and division”, of different tastes and responsibilities (Bourdieu 1998). For 
the owner of a certain position or level within the social stratification, habitus makes 
distinctions between what is ‘good’ and ‘what’ is bad for this person in this position, and 
ideas are given authority in laws and rules of procedure (Bruner 2002).
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To explain how a culture or society develops through time we must seek for the 
emotional and motivational preconditions of human intersubjectivity, which are evi-
dent in early intersubjectivity when relationships and states of responsibility are naive 
and inarticulate (Trevarthen 1993, 1998). Human collective understanding has its 
intrinsic source in the sympathetic impulses of human brains in human bodies inter-
acting, imitating and complementing one another’s experience and capacity to act. 
Stein Bråten identifies the essential foundation for human intersubjectivity, all com-
munication between persons who relate through their ‘virtual others’ in ‘felt imme-
diacy’, with processes that are innate and already complex in the earliest phases of 
postnatal life (Bråten 1998, 2009). By this basic sympathy or resonance of purposes 
and feelings we may feel in relationship to another person, an intimate connection 
similar to the critical ‘present moment’ in psychotherapy described by Daniel Stern: 
“…when people move synchronously or in temporal coordination, they are partici-
pating in an aspect of the other’s experience. They are partially living from the oth-
er’s center” (Stern 2004: 81) and elsewhere he says: “Intersubjectivity is not simply a 
capacity, it is a condition of humanness from the phenomenological point of view.” 
(Stern 2007: 36). It is also the process by which a person’s identity and personality are 
established in relationships.
Figure 5. Three degrees of family intimacy. At home in Edinburgh, Scotland, in1979, three 
months old Laura attends to her mother, Kay, in ‘proto-conversation’. Her three-year-old sister 
Louise wishes to join in and seeks contact with Laura. Father, Ben, is a proud onlooker. Laura 
and Kay are the subjects of the recording shown in Figure 4, which was made in Edinburgh 
University two months previously. (Photo by Penelope and John Hubley)
A complete theory of human intersubjectivity and of its growth and elaboration 
must explain not only the transitory events of immediate human relating, but how 
they are sustained to become the emotional and political forces of society in their full 
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complexity (Trevarthen 1992). Any human society and its field of social relations is 
 structured by conventional practices and productive forces, that make up the “life-
world”, or Lebenswelt, as defined by the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1987). 
In all levels of this creation of a human social world, emotions are not only psycho-
logical effects of stimuli from encounters with the reality of objects and events, as 
they are seen to be in a rationalists perspective. They are the regulators of all kinds 
of human discovery and learning in social activities from their earliest beginnings 
(Trevarthen 1993).
Intimacy in families, and the negotiation of affections in relationships between 
children and their parents and siblings, has many implications for understanding how 
the lifeworld or social sphere of cultural practices is structured in the adult community 
(Figures 1 and 6).
“To understand how the family turns from a nominal fiction into a real group 
whose members are united by intense affective bonds, one has to take account 
of all the practical and symbolic work that transforms the obligation to love into 
a loving disposition and tends to endow each member of the family with ‘family 
feeling’ that generates devotion, generosity, and solidarity. This means both the 
countless ordinary and continuous exchanges of daily existence - exchange of 
gifts, services, assistance, visits, attention, kindnesses - and the extraordinary 
and solemn exchanges of family occasions, often sanctioned and memorialized 
by photographs consecrating the integration of the assembled family.... The 
structures of kinship and family as bodies can be perpetuated only through a 
continuous creation of family feeling, a cognitive principle of vision and division 
that is at the same time an affective principle of cohesion, that is, the adhesion that 
is vital to the existence of a family group and its interests.” (Bourdieu 1998: 68)
The social sphere of cultural and intercultural activities embraces and accompanies 
all initiatives and experiences we can have with objects and other humans, whether 
cooperative or competitive. Its narratives begin in adult-infant interactions with the 
‘dynamic contours’ of Daniel Stern’s proto-narratives envelopes (Stern 2010). Devel-
opmental science demonstrates that every narrative or story-telling structure that 
is eventually adopted as a grammatical convention in language and literature is 
“inherent in the praxis of social interaction before it achieves linguistic expression.” 
(Bruner 1990).
Human experience includes not a mere “stark confrontation” of then and now, 
between “collective then and existential personal now” (Turner 1986: 34). At every 
stage of cultural social and political practice inherent motives and feelings transmit-
ted between persons are structuring the whole “human vital repertoire of thinking, 
willing, desiring, and feeling, subtly and varyingly inter-penetrating on many levels” 
(Turner 1986: 35). The present, past and future, and the meanings they carry, flow at 
different paces and intermingle in the ‘stream of consciousness’ (James 1890/1981). 
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The habits of society bring separate consciousnesses into productive relationships and 
cooperative works.
2.2  How semiosphere and sociosphere interact
The signs and symbols of communication sustain and shape cultural practices. What 
Lotman calls the “semiosphere” (Lotman 1984; also see Lüdtke in this volume) is the 
subject matter of “sociosemiotics”, the natural science of the intersubjectivity of lan-
guage (Halliday 1978; Trevarthen 1992, 1994; Thornborrow & Coates 2005; Zlatev et al. 
2008; Brandt 2009). For Lotman the semiosphere is inseparable from the social sphere 
which has a real practical and historical structure. He studies dialogue as a generator 
of meaning, and, with Bakhtin (1986), presumes thought to be dialogic in nature. The 
semiotic mechanisms of “art and, more broadly, culture, which are meaning genera-
tors, fulfil a function for the social body that is analogous to the brain’s functioning in 
the individual.” (Lotman 1984: 41).
But, the sociosphere includes all the real and conceptual ‘tools’ or ‘toys’ of the col-
lective human enterprise, not just language and other coded systems of signalling. It 
results from all the dispositional forces and experiences that connect members of a 
society, both stemming from and reflectively influencing the many intersubjective and 
interpersonal relations within it. It is, therefore, both the dynamic origin and the prod-
uct of habitus and proto-habitus, of the ‘trajectory of the dynamic change’ of emotion, 
affect and meaning within that what Bourdieu calls the space of social dispositions. “The 
social space is indeed the first and last reality, since it still commands the representa-
tions that the social agent can have of it.” (Bourdieu 1998: 13). It is the living field of 
interpersonal relations that configures a particular community. It includes the truth 
value of what Habermas calls the trans-subjective claim of validity, referring not only to 
the objective aspect of reality, but more fundamentally to the ideas or beliefs that arise 
from intersubjective negotiation, in which ‘feelings’ about what social reality is, and what 
are the ‘identities’ or ‘personalities’ of individual players are always important.
The sociosphere of a child and the first mastery of language should be per-
ceived as that sphere of intimate relationship in which guiding regulations or the 
encouraging influences of the adult ‘significant other’ (see Lüdtke, this volume) 
can aid development within the ‘zone of proximal development’ of the child’s own 
will and experiences and urgent desire to speak (Vygotsky 1962, 1967, 1978). It 
is the ‘playground’ of discovery where the ‘companion’, be they parent, teacher or 
therapist, ‘scaffolds’ the efforts of the child to move, and climb and manipulate – 
 in reality, in imaginative conceptions, and in speaking (Bruner 1983; Wood et al. 1976), 
making learning in ‘intent participation’ with others (Rogoff 1990). It is the synonym for a 
field of shared intentions called meaning that creates culture. And it is also a synonym for 
that what Mead named ‘the generalized other’. (Mead 1964, see also Habermas 1987: 37)
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Taking a perspective on human speech from the evolution of vocal communica-
tion in birds and mammals, Bjorn Merker, a neuroscientist, explains how the ability 
to make language emerged as a development, unique to humans among primates, in 
the intentional and intersubjective parts of the brains – the ability for vocal learning. 
This evolutionary change “…turns the cerebral territories centered on Wernicke’s and 
Broca’s areas from their non-language uses in other primates to the service of human 
language by recruiting them to the generative production and intergenerational trans-
mission of culturally learned vocal lore. To it we owe not only our developmental trajec-
tory for language learning, infant babbling included, but our propensity for imitation 
and ritual culture more generally.” (Merker 2009a: 461, emphasis added). This is the 
cerebral key to the semiosphere, the sociosphere of language.
2.3  Language and interpersonal life
Affect and emotion give the innate driving force to early language and grammar 
development. But the affects and emotions of this early stage are also shaped by the 
acceptance of social standards and norms. With attention to acceptable ways of com-
municating by ‘correct’ signs, symbols and grammatical rules, and to their cognitive 
mastery, the importance of the core capacity of early emotional-affective connected-
ness, the roots of innate human sympathy, may be obscured, and then language learn-
ing is not understood.
The socio-linguist Michael Halliday has put it this way:
The important issue at the moment is not so much the particular intellectual 
model we choose to impose on the language learning process, as the search for 
a greater understanding of the nature of early infancy, as we try to interpret the 
ontogenesis of language: how children begin to exchange meanings,. to make 
sense of their experience and organize it into a picture of the world that is likewise 
shared with the others. In understanding this we also begin to see more deeply 
into the nature of language itself, since ultimately language has been shaped by 
the functions it has to serve in the actions and reflections on reality by a child. 
 (Halliday 1979: 181)
Halliday explains the semiotic process as a consequence of adaptive processes in lan-
guage use, and these are tightly interwoven with the structure und conditions on the 
social level. In short: “The system of natural language can best be explained in the light 
of the social functions which language has evolved to serve” (Kress 1976: 17; see also 
Halliday 1978).
Human social functions, including language, depend on how persons perceive 
one another (Bråten 2009). In studies of early mother-infant interaction it has been 
shown, that the motivating processes for emotional and sympathetic interaction are 
innate and may be active in the first day of life. Newborn babies not only imitate in 
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interaction with other persons, by mimesis of the face, hands or voice; they able to 
provoke their partner to engage in a reciprocal dialogue (Nagy & Molnar 2004). A core 
ability that makes this intuitive sympathy of expressions is the sensitivity for dynamic 
features of movement that Stern names ‘vitally affects’. The “grammatical” structure 
inherent in early human transactions, later elaborated in speech and language, has 
its basis in sympathetic affective response to emotionally expressive movement. The 
grammatical structure of a language itself has no meaning and no function without 
this evaluation of intimate responsiveness, be it positive (pride) or negative (shame) 
(Trevarthen 1992).
This ‘human sense’ (Donaldson 1978, 1992) emerges in every-day life and is cre-
ated within every interaction and accompanies the generation of every meaning. For 
Habermas, humans are using “dialogue-constitutive universals” for regulating inter-
personal contracts and necessary requirement of a speaker’s capacity to communi-
cate (Habermas 1970, 1987) There are different views of these constitutive universals: 
must they have a “formal quality” (in a more rationalists perspective) or are they more 
deeply grounded in the origins of intimate sympathetic human relationship?
The role and moral value of interpersonal feelings in sharing purposes and inter-
ests is made clear from the way infants “offer” learned “signs” in two situations where 
human contact is broken or strained. If the mother of an infant 6 months old or older, 
who has been behaving as the familiar loved playmate, is asked to keep still, compose 
an inexpressive face and cease to engage in response to the baby, her infant will often 
put on a “performance”, repeating a learned trick or a funny expression with insistence 
and looking hard at the mother as if expecting to excite some reaction, thereby making 
it very difficult for the mother to keep sober and unresponsive. She averts her gaze and 
struggles not to laugh. Similar challenging performances or displays may also appear 
when the baby is with a stranger, the “showing off ” being made as a brief impulsive 
emission of friendliness in the course of an awkward, embarrassed or fearful con-
tact with the stranger, who is usually puzzled and uncomfortable. Almost always the 
infant’s brave challenges or “jokes” receive a mixed, amused or sarcastic response that 
tends to decrease, rather than increase, their mutual confidence and pleasure.
The above learned fragments of behaviour, offered to others to motivate a shared 
understanding as well as to invite appreciative response, thus have the motive and 
function of “protosigns” (Trevarthen 1994; Trevarthen et al. 2010). They are conven-
tional in the mini-society of the family where they confirm a bond of understand-
ing. Their use with strangers, while inappropriate, is particularly interesting, because 
it demonstrates that these acts are, for the baby, something that may be exchanged in 
a wider social context. The presentation of these “messages” or “offerings” in a difficult 
social encounter with an unfamiliar person, or as “jokes” to tempt an unresponsive 
mother reveals that they possess a special psychological character. They are oriented 
towards the partner and they tend to capture the partner’s interest and feelings (see 
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Trevarthen 1992: 114–115). They prove that the infants are sociable, culture seek-
ing, human beings who want meaningful engagement of purposes and pleasures 
with other persons (Reddy 2008; Merker 2009b). This is an essential foundation for 
learning language.
2.4   Genesis of sociosemiosis in intimate, affect-rich interaction: 
Concentration and marginalisation of meaning
There is an endless circulation of meaning, of relationships, and of social status or 
validity between persons in society, between more ‘orthodox’ and ‘regulated’, ‘ratio-
nal and reasonable’ codes and practices, and more spontaneous and ‘instinctive’ 
forces of sympathy, or ‘moral sentiments’ (Smith 1759). The totality of all meaning- 
transmitting signs of body language, the visual and musical arts as well as verbal lan-
guage, constitutes a trans-individual semiotic space – the “semiosphere” (Lotman 
1984), in which manifold communicative structures and processes are generated, 
shown and regulated. This dynamic space or process of meaning in society may be 
conceived to have a hierarchical, concentric organisation – consisting of a centre, a 
periphery and an intermediate or transitional zone (see Lüdtke this volume, and Fig-
ure 6). In the education of language and advanced social skills or tools of meaning 
(Lüdtke & Frank 2007), the purely cognitive and “affect-free” conventionalised semi-
otic structures, e.g. grammars and norms, become active and validated in the cen-
tre. The primary “affect-loaded” relational systems of embodied social life, with their 
inhomogeneous, amorphous motivated organization, are relegated to the periphery.
Consider, for example, the slang of marginalized social groups with their insecure 
affective configurations, loyalties and conflicts, which can be the result of longstand-
ing traumatizing processes – the so-called “relational traumata” (Schore 2003). The 
permanently ongoing fractures, experiments and violations of semiotic and linguistic 
norms, conventions and grammars generate accelerated, dynamic and creative pro-
cesses of communication in ‘felt immediacy’ (Bråten 2009). The linguistic discourses 
of marginalized youth can be defined socio-linguistically as an ensemble of specific 
registers and styles, which display their ‘post-modern’ character, for example by inject-
ing sampled fragments of the centre in a diffuse, eclectic way, which in turn act as a 
catalyst for the de- and re-construction of linguistic centre-structures. Between border 
and centre in every society exists a kind of bilingual or multilingual area of transition 
in which the agents (e.g. teachers, pedagogues, therapists, systems of social care) are 
mediating between the domains of the semiosphere, between practical and interper-
sonal realities and the ideal rules of legality and governance (Keeffe 2003).
Building on this general socio-semiotic concept and considering the rela-
tional development of speech and abilities for communication of a child, it becomes 
increasingly clear in research on speech and language development that the 
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intuitive socio-semiotic forces – attitudes, habitus, the need for trans-subjective 
claim of validity as an organizing force within a given social situation – can have 
effects at all stages of a person’s development (Trevarthen et al. 2006). They can 
influence the foetus of pregnant women who occupy low socioeconomic levels in 
the hierarchy of a institution, and this influence may persist in varying manner 
through the whole of the child’s development. If a mother suffers from postnatal 
depression, which is often related to a difficult pregnancy, this is likely to affect 
the progress of the child in early infancy and through school years (Murray & 
Cooper 1997; Gratier & Apter-Danon 2009)
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Figure 6. The developmental stages of the Self in early intersubjectivity, through infancy 
(Left), and in the life-time socio-semiosis of human interaction in society (Right), generate 
cultural forms. The motives of a person in an increasingly complex social world are closely 
interwoven with manifold influences from this world. Shared meaning grows and proliferates, 
first with amphoteronomic regulations (mutual physiological or autonomic state control as 
between mother and foetus), then through synrhythmic engagement (joint dynamic control of 
the rhythm of moving in ‘mind time’) to the mastery of symbolic communication and the  
mastery of words to describe the shared cultural world (Trevarthen et al. 2006). It is a 
development from an intimate the proto-habitus to individual forms of habitus within what 
Bourdieu (1998) calls the space of social dispositions. The more ritualized behaviours of each 
particular cultural practice ensure the interactional background for each trans-subjective 
claim of validity (Merker 2009b; Habermas 1987) giving rise to the intersubjective qualities of 
overlapping lifeworlds (see Table 2 on Levels of Intimacy and ‘Structure’: Practices and Rules)
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The main sociosemiotic processes described in Lotman’s terms are marginaliza-
tion towards the exterior regions (e.g. as the consequence of speech and language-
disorder, or mental handicap) and integration towards the interior region (as in the 
effects of adequate and compensatory education or therapy). Processes of marginal-
ization take place e.g. in immigration situation of mothers living in foreign countries 
and disconnected from society or community: the very often have serious problems 
to create the kind of belonging for their child which is necessary for normal psychological 
development (see Gratier 2003).
Table 2. Developmental stages of the social human mind, see also Table 1 and Figure 6
Intersubjectivity in Human Society Levels of Intimacy and ‘Structure’ (Practices and Rules) 
(Trevarthen 1992)
Level One: In Intimate Intersubjectivity, self-related emotions of persons interact directly. The 
inherent “self-other” duality of the individual’s affect and motivation shown at birth remains 
as a foundation for later intimate relationships: in family life, in direct emotional and physical 
attachment or conflict, when changes occur in close attachments, and when the sick or weak 
are given sympathetic care. 
Level Two: Playful intersubjectivity and Ritual Performance In secure trust, a humorous 
testing of interaction, communicated by teasing with affection, creates “communitas” (Turner 
1986) in art, drama and ritual, strengthening and defining the bonds of community. Awareness 
of the body in play, leads to expression of the rhythms and accents of gymnastics, dance and 
music. Attention to the sharing of control of contingencies in action on physical objects and 
events generates competitive sport. Infants show the beginning of playful ritual performance 
with ‘musicality’ from the second month (Malloch 1999; Malloch & Trevarthen 2009). 
Level Three: Socially Conscious Self-Presentation. Human beings learn a social “me” (James 
1890; Mead 1934), and perceive others as “personalities” with identity and character. Self-
referred expressions and initiatives present a personal identity and define “roles” and “offices” 
in society. Each self creates a ‘personal narrative history’ by ‘auto-noesis’ (Tulving 2005). 
Regulated pretence and deception, separate one’s own consciousness from others. Difficulties 
in presentation cause timidity, shame or guilt, unstable, painful and potentially destructive 
emotions most acute with unfamiliar persons. Artists explore their own experience and 
creations, making “aesthetic objects”, representations that appeal to others’ feelings of their 
experience. In the culture of art, beauty and aesthetic excitement are recognized collectively, 
negotiated and codified. Self-conscious mannerisms and sensitivity to their appreciation are 
evident in infancy after 4 months (Reddy 2008). 
Level Four: World-Knowledge and Material Culture depend on pragmatic communication 
about reality and how to act on it. This peculiarly human kind of person-person-object 
communication, or secondary intersubjectivity, appears at the end of an infant’s first year. 
Cooperation in action, seeking to understand the interests and evaluations others are giving 
to objects, and learning how instruments and practices are to be used require an enquiry 
into all kinds of motive in other people, including those whose lives are in other places and 
other generations. It is enriched by language that can refer accurately to aspects of reality 
not present, and that can define possible actions and the effects they will have. It leads to 
the proliferation of structures of culture that may limit individual freedom by conformity of 
actions in work and beliefs in educated society.
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3.  Reduced social and cultural development, loss of belonging  
and how companionship of the generalized other may be discovered
As an example of what it means to belong to a habitus or sociosphere of meaning-
ful relationships and activities, and particularly what it means to lose this ‘validity’, 
studies of immigrant mothers and of mothers diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder have shown that the experience of loss of belonging causes a woman to be 
unresponsive and highly predictable end repetitive in her interactions with her baby. 
In both cases the mothers’ communication is ‘devitalised’ and they have the feeling of 
living in a ‘disconnected world’ with a ‘confused perception of self ’ (Gratier & Apter-
Danon 2009). This causes a type of dysfunctional ‘proto-habitus’ or weakened ‘nar-
rative of living together’ to emerge, generated by mother and baby together, and this 
carries an “implicit relation” to the larger social world. “A sense of belonging, or of 
sharing implicit and embodied ways-of-being-together, constitutes the springboard 
from which creative variations can take form; and at the same time, it is through new 
and efficient forms of expression that belonging and what we have called ‘protohabitus’ 
are dynamically renewed.” (Gratier & Apter-Danon 2009: 322).
To inquire for the origins for the feelings a person may have of living in a “dis-
connected world” in which social and cultural development are more and more 
restricted we consult the “Critique of Functionalist Reason” (Habermas 1987) to see 
how Habermas delineates the ‘decoupling’ of a social and political system and the 
“implicit and embodied ways-of-being-together” in the time of a lifeworld.
Habermas understands social evolution as “second-order-process of differentia-
tion” in which “lifeworld” and “system” grow in different ways. Lifeworld, the sphere 
of more immediate human relations, responsibilities, of actions in every-day-life, 
becomes more and more complex as the “rationality” of the social and political system, 
the “system” that sustains society and that includes institutional forces, is constructed.
“It has become conventional for sociologists to distinguish the stages of social 
evolution as tribal societies, traditional societies or societies organized around a 
state, and modern societies (where the economic system has been differentiated 
out). From the system perspective, these stages are marked by the appearance 
of new systemic mechanisms and corresponding levels of complexity. On 
this plane of analysis, the uncoupling of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ is depicted 
in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first coextensive with a scarcely 
differentiated social system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem 
among others. In the process, system mechanisms get further and further 
detached from the social structures through which social integration takes place.” 
 (Habermas 1987: 153 f.; italics added)
With this analysis, reasons for the disconnection lifeworlds described above become 
apparent. The problem for modern societies is that they are attaining a “level of system 
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differentiation” in which “increasingly autonomous organizations are connected with 
another via delinguistified media of communication”: the system mechanics are more 
and more constituting a social intercourse “that has been largely disconnected from 
norms and values” (Habermas 1987: 154) thus constituting a social intercourse that has 
reduced the possibilities of human interaction based on moral feelings. But at the same 
time the lifeworld remains, “the subsystem that defines the pattern of a social system 
as a whole. Thus, system mechanics need to be anchored in the lifeworld: they have to 
be institutionalized” (Habermas 1987: ib.). Institutionalizing is based on authority that 
has the power to define rules for multiple connected lifeworlds. This raises the question 
of the directional quality of institutional forces.
This institutionalization of “new levels of system differentiation”, which can also 
be perceived from the “internal perspective of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1987: ib.), 
includes conditions and pre-conditions of social dispositions, of habitus, and they 
have influences down to the emerging proto-habitus in intimate mother-infant-dyads. 
There is an institutional side to the problem of belonging in immigrant mother-
infant-interaction. As institutions grow social process in the lifeworld, reducing of 
the negative effects of institutionalization requires attention to the question of the 
moral quality of human activity to help combat social desintegration, for example in 
immigrant populations, or of youths traumatized by war where life situations discon-
nected from the surrounding world lose dynamic coherence or ‘narrative musicality’ 
(Osborne 2009b).
3.1   Disorders of action and awareness in infancy may disturb  
the learning of meaning
Observations of the development of very early signs of autism (Trevarthen & Daniel 
2005; St. Clair et al. 2007), of the effects of deafness and blindness, of neglect and abuse, 
or of severe atrophy or malfunction of the brain (Dawson & Fisher 1994; Trevarthen & 
Aitken 1994; Merker 2007), as well as studies of the effects of emotional illness that 
limits communication of a mother with her infant (Murray & Cooper 1997), lead to 
two complementary conclusions. First, the rapidly growing brain of an infant can be 
changed by a deficient or toxic environment, as well as ‘genetic’ faults in regulation 
of development and differentiation, and early changes can lead to permanent weak-
ness or disorder. Secondly, the intrinsic ‘epigenetic’ self-organising and developmental 
powers of the young brain, even that of a premature infant (Als 1995), have remarkable 
power to respond to benefits that compensate for deficiencies or insults. Most impor-
tant are benefits that result from human care that seeks to sustain the affective ‘moral 
quality’ of communication in spite of handicaps. Attempts to stimulate or train com-
pensatory behaviours as desirable ‘structures’ for living may have negative effects. The 
best therapy or treatment acts to find ways that release motives of the child, or adult, to 
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share experience and achieve sympathetic engagement with other persons in creative 
activity. Remarkable results can result from such practice (Hughes 2006; Trevarthen & 
Aitken 2001; Trevarthen et al. 2006; Caldwell 2008; Zeedyk 2008).
3.2  Intersubjective therapies
What we have learned about the interpersonal talents of infants can be applied to help 
children with developmental disorders. However, many regimes for professional inter-
vention with psycho-affective problems of children do not directly or overtly address 
the interpersonal and expressive functions. They rely more on the traditional medical 
concept of treatment for organic disease by medication to a patient, or educational 
models of instruction to the child as a pupil. In statistical assessment required by clini-
cal trials, data on many individuals is grouped to provide a description of a popu-
lation based on what are inevitably rather limited measures of psychological status 
and performance. At the same time, it is the experience of practitioners and families 
that benefits may be obtained by directly addressing, for each child and for their par-
ticular condition, the quality and receptivity of immediate and direct communication 
in treatment or teaching, and its management in the family or school. Adherence to 
‘regulations’ may not suffice (Keeffe 2003).
Cognitive or behavioural therapies are aimed to control behaviour and establish 
acceptable routines or ‘structure’ to benefit the child’s physical and emotional health 
and to facilitate easier relations with family caregivers, teachers and school partners. 
It is recognised that learning in such regimes depends on positive motivations, but 
the range of pleasurable rewards is generally not sensed from the ‘patient’s’ position. 
Appreciation of emotive ‘subjective’ experiences of communication requires special-
ised methods of continuous and repeated observation and qualitative assessment 
that are capable of identifying what characterises most effective practice, and that is 
responsive or ‘respectful’ (Selby & Bradley 2003; Zeedyk 2008). The theory of non-
verbal communication with emotionally disturbed or cognitively disorganised chil-
dren is not explicit. We believe that evidence from the study of how infants enter 
communication and progress to language has given valuable pointers to the kind of 
models and techniques required.
There is considerable disagreement concerning the efficacy of therapies for 
autism, and differences in the estimation of the improvement which can be gener-
ated (Howlin 1997; Trevarthen, et al. 1998). Nevertheless, it is accepted that earlier 
interventions are likely to produce greater improvement than the same approaches 
used at a later stage. The Lovaas method of behavioural training (Lovaas 1987) has 
been demonstrated to have beneficial effects in a number of independent studies (e.g. 
Fenske, et al. 1985; Harris et al. 1991; Birnbauer & Leach 1993), but there is uncer-
tainty concerning in what way it is effective, and how general and lasting the benefits 
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are. It is also not clear how far the expressive manner of communicating reinforce-
ments and negotiating routine procedures is critical to success, though ‘high affect’ 
speech by therapists is encouraged. A wide range of other approaches focus more 
specifically on early aspects of interaction (Alvarez 1996; Trevarthen, et  al. 1998; 
Waterhouse 2000). Most of these have not received controlled assessment. Their 
operation is not captured by measurements of performance on pre-defined mea-
sures of intelligence, rational beliefs or cognitive flexibility. In the study of special 
education for autism, instruction in speech and language is naturally given great 
importance. However, speech therapy is not, by itself, generally effective, except for 
high-functioning cases who need assistance with semantic and pragmatic difficulties 
(Jordan 1993).
For children with greater problems in communication, an approach that addresses 
the underlying interpersonal problems is more effective. Emotional engagement and 
joint attention appear to have a more fundamental role in furthering language devel-
opment in autism than instrumental use of language (Rollins 1999), and this approach 
may be applied for clinical intervention to enhance communication skills in autistic 
children more effectively than any training in thinking or beliefs (Rollins et al. 1998; 
Astington & Jenkins 1999). Improvisation music therapy is gaining acceptance as a 
remarkably effective way of gaining and regulating communication with even the most 
recalcitrant autistic youngsters (Robarts 1998; see also Robarts 2009). It employs tech-
niques of mirroring and enhancement or modulation of expression with the benefit 
of a trained musician’s sensitivity for pulse and expression in gestures made by the 
patient. Imitative responses are found to be attractive to autistic children and can act 
as a bridge to collaborative play or communication, and improving the child’s access 
to language (Tiergerman & Primavera 1981, 1984; Dawson & Galpert 1990; Nadel & 
Pezé, 1993). The intensive training of parents by the Option method in responsive care 
and education of autistic children, which has proved of great benefit to many families, 
employs systematic imitation to achieve joint attention and motivation to learn col-
laboratively (Kaufman 1994)
Play means interaction with any impulses for adventurous and enjoyable move-
ment and experience. It means sharing expressions of joy and surprise (Panksepp & 
Burgdorf 2003). It taps a basic emotion in social sharing, on that is close to a support-
ive of the basic emotions for pleasure in attachment. As the ethologists have discovered 
by studying the instinctive movements of young animals casing and ‘pretend fighting’, 
play is affiliative (Bekoff & Byers 1998). It strengthens and develops social bonds while 
sorting out social hierarchies. Play therapy draws on these psychobiological principles 
in a systematic way (Jernberg & Booth 2001). For a troubled child making happy and 
trusting friendships in playful and intimately affectionate responsive ways is a key to 
positive learning and emotional security. The play is creative by means of an interper-
sonal improvisation in which partners are at the same time free to be expressive in 
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themselves and instantly reactive to what others do, and therefore open to guidance 
and learning. Real intuitive engagement is necessary for the emotions between them 
to flourish, as with infants (Reddy & Trevarthen 2004).
Specific memories and verbal explanations guide awareness and direct interests. 
In normal life, these cognitive components, built up through experiences in established 
relationships, strengthen the prospective control of attentions and intentions and lead 
to more knowledgeable and skilful action. In psychopathology, the cognitive contents 
of memory intrude in imagination and carry affective material that blocks effective 
consciousness and action. Therapy for adults requires work with these contents. At the 
same time, engaging with the emotions and a clear focus on the interpersonal motives 
that direct movements in the present can regulate disturbing or inhibiting material 
from memory and imagination, finding a path to more rewarding and creative pur-
poses in relationships that are affectionate and trusting (Kohut 1984; Kerr 2005).
A therapist aiming to help a child with developmental psychopathology by inter-
subjective or interpersonal means has responsibility to stay with the child through 
periods of resistance or rejection to find this path (Archer & Burnell 2003), he or she 
has responsibility to find a path to create the “generalized other”1 anew, to change the 
conditions of and for a changed “shared lifeworld”.
3.3   An example of sympathetic engagement for autism: Re-Discovering  
the ‘generalized other’
Berusz is a young man with autism who has had severe problems living in a institution 
for mental handicapped people in Germany. He seemed to be isolated from the world, 
frequently showing highly stereotypic behaviour, and sometimes destroying what took 
his attention. Berusz often sat on the floor of the corridor or in his chamber ripping 
paper with slow movements. He seems to be in a trance, recognizing nothing in his 
immediate surroundings but the paper, making no reaction to communication offered 
by the staff. After a couple of hours a pile of paper lies about him with no apparent 
meaning for him or for any other person.
When I (B.F.) placed myself on the floor next to him, Berusz did not notice me at 
first and he continued tearing paper. After trying to gain eye contact with him, I turned 
attention to the paper and did the same as he was doing, attempting to match my 
posture and movements to his. After around 30 minutes Berusz paid some attention 
to my imitative actions. I was sitting very close to him, and 10 and 20 minutes later he 
touched the piece of paper I was holding in my hands intending to put on my own pile 
1.  See also Lüdtkes therapeutic concept of the “significant other” in this book.
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of paper. He did this several times, then, instead of just touching my piece of paper, he 
grasped it and put it on his pile.
Then I touched the hand in which he held the piece of paper taken from me, before 
he threw it on his pile. I repeated this, trying to mirror the shape of his movements as 
he took each piece of paper from me. He paused for a moment and slowly gave back 
to me the piece he had just taken out of my hands, and I then placed it on my pile…
We can suggest that in the circumscribed socio-sphere of intimate interaction 
with Berusz, making a kind of intersubjective claim of validity for the shared moment, a 
social event was created in which objects gained new meaning. It was a validity not just 
for the actions of one subject, but of actions validated by both of us in this situation. 
After this event Berusz stopped tearing paper. He made a transition into the “world of 
meaning” of the staff members and the other handicapped persons in the institution, 
broadening step by step his claim of validity.
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Relational emotions in semiotic and linguistic 
development
Towards an intersubjective theory of language 
learning and language therapy
Ulrike M. Lüdtke
Leibniz University Hannover
This chapter explores the crucial role of relational emotions in children’s language 
learning and argues for an intersubjective theory of language development. 
To demonstrate the need for this approach, first a review of different classical 
theories of language acquisition as well as of more recent emergentist approaches 
is given. From this it is obvious that in all discussions about the opposition or the 
interplay between nature, nurture and culture and therefore the primary motives 
for children’s language development, no prominent theory explicitly focuses 
on the importance of emotions in language or in prelinguistic and linguistic 
development. Only in the interactionist and psychoanalytic models do we find 
implicit concepts about affective influences on language constitution. In response 
to this lack, evidence is given for the semiogenetic power of emotions from recent 
semiolinguistic and neuropsychological research, both of which employ the 
concept of ‘intersubjectivity’. The findings from these two fields of investigation 
are summarized in an application to children’s semiolinguistic development. Four 
major milestones of affect and meaning attunement in the child’s trajectory from 
emotional regulation of interpersonal contact and cooperation to cognitive mastery 
of experience in the intersubjective construction of signs are described. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the concept of ‘Relational Language Therapy’ – a 
therapeutic approach to language learning, which views as central the emotion-
based influence of a ‘Significant Other’ in both parental and professional support 
of children’s semiolinguistic development. Finally as a vision for future theorizing, 
these paradigm shifts are taken to pave the way for fully incorporating the concept 
of intersubjectivity into linguistic theory and its various fields of application.
Keywords: relational emotions; neurobiology of early communication; infant 
intersubjectivity; sign development; language development; meaning-attunement; 
mirror-mechanisms; Relational Language Therapy
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1.   Cognition or emotion: What drives children’s language  
development?
Do emotions play an important role in the language development of a child? Though 
most mothers and fathers would definitely say “yes”, we have not found any promi-
nent theory of language acquisition that focuses explicitly on the prelinguistic and 
linguistic importance of emotions. In reviewing well-known classical theories of 
language acquisition it becomes obvious that they answer the question about the 
primary driving force of children’s language development quite differently. Accord-
ing to their epistemological background – e.g. ‘internalist mentalism’ (Chomsky 
1965, 1966) versus ‘externalist materialism’ (Vygotsky 1986 [1934], 1996) –, or 
according to their preferred view of language function – e.g. ‘rational referential-
ity’ (Bühler 1990[1934]) versus ‘subjective expression’ (Bloom 2002) – they focus 
either on individual cognition or on inter-individual social exchange. Discussions 
about the primacy of nature vs. nurture or culture take therefore two diametrically 
opposed positions.1
On one side we have the individual-centred or cognition-centred view of the 
‘nativistic’ (e.g. Chomsky 1965, 1966, 1968, 1986; Lenneberg 1967), ‘cognitivistic’ 
(e.g. Piaget 1929, 1963 [1936], 2001 [1963]; Nelson 1974; Clark 1975; Sinclair 1975; 
Slobin 1985) and ‘neo-nativistic’ (e.g. Clahsen 1996; Pinker 1985, 1995, 1999) theo-
ries. Their internalist view is obvious in their shared idea of building up individual 
mental representations (R1) during the process of language acquisition. As informa-
tion-processing individual cognition is here considered as the primary organiser of 
development, the central concept of this ‘nature’ position on the process of language 
learning is ‘autoregulation’ (Klann-Delius 2008: 136) (see Figure 1a).
1.  Although the emergentist position tries to integrate conflicting approaches and taken as 
well into account that some internalist positions have moved in time towards more interper-
sonal approaches (e.g. Nelson (1996) & Clark (1996)) I stick here to the classical polarity to 
clearly distinguish between the underlying fundamental difference between ‘autoregulation’ 
and ‘reciprocal interpersonal regulation’.
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Objects (O) of linguistic
conceptualization:
















[R1 = individual representation]
Figure 1a. Autoregulation: Individual cognition as the primary organiser of language 
acquisition in the nativistic, cognitivistic, and neo-nativistic theories (modified from Verhagen 
2005, Figure 1.1)
On the other side we find a group of more inter-individual or social approaches, 
which accept that other individuals and therefore nurture and culture have a major 
influence – e.g. the ‘behaviouristic’ (Skinner 1957; Osgood 1957), ‘interactionist’ (e.g. 
Bruner 1983, 1990; Bloom/Capatides, 1987; Bloom/Beckwith, 1989; Bloom 2002; 
Papoušek/Papoušek 1987; Papoušek et al. 1990; Papoušek 1992; Tomasello 1992, 2006) 
and ‘psychoanalytic’ (Winnicott 1965; Spitz 1966; Klein 1998 [1932]; Lacan 1990; 
Kristeva 1998, 2002a, b) theories. Though there are clear differences between these 
three approaches, and to some degree also between the individual theories within 
them,2 they basically all share the view that social exchange and thus reciprocal inter-
personal regulation is the primary organiser of language learning.3 Such reciprocity 
influences also the view of the linguistic representation: the individual representation 
(R1/2) implies in different ways constitutive traces of the other individuum, which are 
created e.g. during the process of meaning attunement (see Figure 1b).
2.  The very complex theoretical position of the culture-historical school of language acqui-
sition (e.g. Vygotsky, Luria, Leont’ev) cannot be described here in detail. But it should be ac-
knowledged that while cognition-centred aspects are emphasized, this school must be accepted 
as preparing the way for the more recent interactionist theories (see Klann-Delius 2008).
3.  I use the term ‘interpersonal’ here, because these approaches lack fundamental concepts 
necessary for being ‘intersubjective’, as here understood.
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O1
“Objects” (O) of linguistic
conceptualization:
























R1/2 = the individual representation implies constitutive traces of the other individuum
           (e.g. during the process of meaning attunement)
Figure 1b. Reciprocal, interpersonal regulation: Interindividual, social exchange as the 
primary organiser of language learning in the behaviouristic, interactionist and psychoanalytic 
models (modified from Verhagen 2005, Figure 1.2)
Though the more recent emergentist approaches (e.g. Hollich et al. 2000) try to 
overcome this classical polarity, still no prominent concept of the emotional turn in 
linguistics is here taken into account (Lüdtke 2010, 2012). As will be shown next only 
the interactionist and psychoanalytic models give some more or less explicit hint to 
the specific developmental importance of emotions, and they could be considered as 
precursors towards a genuine emotion-centred theory of language acquisition.
2.   Theoretical precursors: Implicit emotional concepts  
in classical models of language acquisition
Familiar keywords employed by interactionist and psychoanalytic theorists, such as 
‘attachment’, ‘bonding’, ‘intentionality’, ‘mutuality’ and ‘attunement’, as well as the terms 
‘subject in process’, ‘signifying practice’, ‘displacement’ and ‘drives discharged in represen-
tation’, imply in varying degrees emotional aspects of infant communication. But even in 
these selected interindividual approaches the role given to emotion in language learn-
ing and development seems still to be peripheral and somehow ‘hidden’. Accordingly, 
in the following analysis, all underlying implicit emotional concepts shall be extracted 
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in  crystallized form from each of these quite divergent language acquisition models, to 
assess what is missing from a coherent interpretation of the work of emotions.
2.1   The emotional nourishment of the mother-child dyad  
in the interactionist theories
The interactionist theories that dominated in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the 
social interaction between mother and child as the indispensable base for language 
learning. Though this approach, with its refined attachment and bonding concepts 
(e.g. Brazelton et al. 1974; Bowlby 1978; Grossmann 1999; Thompson et al. 2005) was 
not specifically linguistic in the sense of setting out to explain the development of 
semantic or morpho-syntactic structures, the following aspects surely indicate a theo-
retical connection between the socio-emotional support in the caretaker-infant dyad 
and (semio)linguistic development.
2.1.1  Intentionality
Mental representations, coloured with communicative motives, purposes and aims, 
are always part of the ‘intentional state’ of an individual (Bloom 2002: 6). Emotions, 
as part of any intentions to relate to other persons, must be a factor in the motiva-
tion of language learning, because the child is always constructing anew those com-
municative signs, which are able to be transformed into verbal signifiers that will 
transport intentional meaning from him– or herself to the other (e.g. Bruner 1990). 
In strong opposition to the behaviouristic focus on passive or automatic imitation as 
the primary means of language acquisition, the concept of intentionality emphasizes 
the very active self-organization of the child’s learning – a competence for intelligent 
agency which Nagy & Molnár (2004) have lately emphasized by empirically proving 
the existence of provocative communicative acts even in newborns.4
4.  Nagy & Molnar (2004) show how the searching for the mechanism of neonatal imitation 
resulted in the discovery of an innate neonatal initiative capacity, called ‘Provocation’. Under 
controlled conditions newborns (3–54 h) spontaneously produced previously imitated ges-
tures, waiting for the experimenter’s response. A psychophysiological analysis revealed that 
imitation was accompanied by heart rate increase, while gesture initiation or provocation 
by heart rate deceleration, suggesting different underlying mechanisms: Heart rate accelera-
tion is associated with preparatory arousal for the imitative act; heart rate deceleration is 
an index of orientation, attention and expectation of the ‘provoked’ response. Results imply 
that besides imitative capacity, newborns also have the capacity to provoke a communicative 
response, thus sustaining interaction and communication. From our point of view these find-
ings and the notion of ‘provocation’ in reciprocal dialogues with newborns deeply enriches the 
theory of the Virtual Other, giving the real other the developmental responsibility to fulfill the 
innate need of the newborn for matching emotional and communicative responses to sustain 
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2.1.2   Expressive function
For some, the emotionally coloured intentionality evident from birth is the driving 
force, which animates and regulates the basic human need for both nonverbal and 
verbal expression (e.g. Bloom & Capatides 1987; Bloom & Beckwith 1989). According 
to Bloom (2002), not Bühler’s (1990 [1934]) ‘referential function’, but the ‘expressive 
function’ in language development is not just one out of many linguistic functions, 
but the primary one, underlying all others. The need to share emotionally important 
meanings, not the function of referential, denotative description, is the first goal of 
communication (Bloom 2002: 6).
2.1.3   Iconic origin
In opposition to the cognitivist models – for which language development is identified 
with verbal development and starts with the acquisition and mastering of the denota-
tive, emotion-free symbolic linguistic signs5 – interactionist models locate the origin 
of language in the nonverbal, pre-linguistic competences for communication by means 
of signs of affectively loaded ‘meaning’ (Bateson 1979; Papoušek 1992). The nonverbal 
competence of the infant depends on the inherent capacity of multimodal communi-
cative displays – of facial expressions, gestures, voice and other sounds of moving – all 
of which convey emotive states. As semiotic behaviours they have an iconic-analogous 
character, resembling the form of the referent immediately and apprehended as such, 
and they are especially adapted for the transfer of affective information and emotion-
charged meaning. This capacity of movements to specify a rich display of feelings 
which are a core part of mental life is emphasised by Daniel Stern’s theory of ‘Vitality 
Dynamics’ (Stern 1985, 2010).
2.1.4   The Virtual Other
Within a broader range of the interactionist theories, recent approaches hypothesize 
the existence of a reciprocal representation of a ‘virtual self ’ and a ‘virtual other’ in each 
partner of a communicating pair (Bråten 2002, 2009) – and these may be discerned in 
rudimentary form within the provocating newborn who is participating in an imita-
tive exchange. On the one hand this concept of ‘altercentric perception’ recognises 
an ongoing rich dialogue (see Section 5, for further application of the virtual other into the 
concept of the ‘Significant Other’ in Relational Language Therapy). 
5.  I refer here and in the following mainly to a Peircean classicication of signs according to 
their degree of emotional markedness of the signifier: the signifiers of ‘icons’ are very strongly 
emotionally marked, those of ‘indexes’ are moderately marked, and ‘symbols’ almost not 
marked by emotion (see in detail 3.1). For the learning child the ability to comprehend and 
use them is dependent on the degree of emotional markedness (see Figure 15).
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that, especially within the caretaker-infant dyad, successful communication is depen-
dent on an emotionally positive representation of the real other: from the child’s point 
of view its lovingly responding mother or father. But on the other hand it also implies 
that in difficult developmental contexts – e.g. in conditions of psychopathology, abuse, 
migration or poverty – there could be a disturbed reciprocity between the representa-
tions of the child and its partner(s) in dialogue (Aitken & Trevarthen 1997), which 
may lead to impairments of the infant‘s cognitive development and learning, as has 
been demonstrated, for example, following maternal postnatal depression (Murray & 
Cooper 1996; Gratier & Apter-Danon 2010).
2.1.5  Mutual representations
In further refinement of this train of thought, we consider not only that the general self-
other representations are reciprocal, but the intersubjectively constructed meanings as 
well. Bloom, from an interactionist perspective (2002: 9), posits ‘mutual representa-
tions’. Verhagen (2005: 1–27) – though from a more cognitivist perspective – supports 
this view by describing ‘mutual management of cognitive states’ (see Figure 1b); and 
Ruthrof (2000) proposes in his ‘Corporeal Semantics’ meaning as a combination of 
an arbitrary signifier with a pre-linguistic concept made up of iconic mental materi-
als (with sensory and emotional ingredients) under the community guidance of ‘suf-
ficient semiosis’, such that ‘at the level of the signified we are iconic beings’. All these 
authors emphasize that each and every act of communication – in body movement, 
verbal expression or written language – is primarily an act of intersubjective creation 
of meanings, which are mutually developed via intersubjective construction, negotia-
tion and validation, grounded in the body and multimodal perception of the world.
2.2  The inscription of affect in psychoanalytic theories
Within the last century, different theories of language, which also imply concepts 
of language development, have been derived from psychoanalysis. Explicitly turn-
ing away from the structuralist (Saussure 1916) and nativistic (Chomsky 1965, 1966) 
theories such models recognized the role of drives and affect in language learning 
(e.g. Klein 1998 [1932]; Spitz 1966; Lacan 1990).
Most prominently Kristeva (1998, 2002a, b) opposes the rationalistic Cartesian 
conception of language by emphasizing that all the interdependent constituents of 
language – mainly the speaker (the ‘subject’), his or her verbal productions (the ‘text’) 
and their inner ‘meaning’ – are influenced and processed by affects and are therefore 
permanently “in process” (see Figure 2).
2.2.1   Subject-in-process
In Kristeva‘s (1986a) complex theoretical approach, the ‘speaking subject’ is defined 
as constituted through emotion by first introducing the concepts of body and time (t). 
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By understanding drives and affects as temporal and corporeal processes the lifeless 
‘transcendental ego’ (1986a: 27) of the Cartesian conception of language is freed from 
its ‘paralysed numbness’, and a continuously changing ‘subject-in-process’ is born. 
With this processually conceptualised subject the predominant orientation of syn-
chronic linguistics in preoccupation with the static forms of the language system is 
replaced by a focus on the live generation of language driven by affective dynamics – a 
focus especially concerned with the role of ‘signifying practices’ and their disruption 
and repair in the establishment of language forms and norms.
2.2.2  Text-in-process
By introducing a second theoretical concept of space in the affect-integrating perspec-
tive, Kristeva (1986b) makes the verbal production or ‘text’ of a speaking subject take 
a processual function. As emotions develop in a time-space-continuum words are no 
longer static fixed points, and sentences are no longer linear additive chains lacking 
a flow through time and space. A verbal enunciation becomes instead an indefinite 
signifying process permeated and transformed by dynamic emotions. This so-called 
‘textual productivity’ does not mean the output of the subject in form of a material 
text, but the affectively generated productivity of the text-making itself as an indepen-
dent generator of new texts – produced in playful permutation through unconscious 
processes of condensation (metonymy) and displacement (metaphor) of the signified.6
2.2.3  Meaning-in-process
Last but not least also the third constituent of language – the inherent meaning – 
is also constituted ‘in process’ by addition of the concept of context. Either under-
stood as the inner affective state of the subject, or the external socio-emotional set 
or relationships of the subject, the actual or historic context is able to change the 
relation of signifier to the signified, by ‘contextualization’ of the signified. This per-
spective strictly opposes the theoretical denial of emotion in the mentalist or isola-
tionist conceptions of meaning of Saussure or Chomsky with their de-spatialization 
and de-temporalization. Drawing on Bakhtin’s concept of language as ‘dialogicity’ vs. 
‘monologism’ (1965, 1981), Kristeva (1986b) proposes that a signifier of a word or 
sentence is no longer to be conceived as a passive arbitrary ‘container’ for a fixed, 
objective and denotative affect-free meaning, which can be decoded from the sub-
ject independent of its actual or historic context. For the decoding subject words, 
sentences or pre-linguistic signifiers such as gestures are not any longer ‘Aristotelic 
chains’ (Kristeva 1986a) but are instead treated as significant, meaningful ‘nodes 
6.  Sometimes I have to come back to Saussurean terminology as the European poststructur-
alist positions mostly refer to that and not to the Peircean.
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within a network’ (Foucault 1966) of relational (‘Self-Other’ as well as ‘Virtual Self 
[VS]-Virtual Other [VO]’) and fluctuating constructions of meaning, and are in this 





















































Virtual Self Virtual OtherVS VO
Figure 2. Temporalisation, spatialisation and materialisation (‘embodiment’):  
Re-conceptualising language as dialogue by focussing its emotional generation7 and processing 
(mediation, regulation) (following Kristeva 1986a/b, 1998, 2002a/b)
7. For further explanation of Simonov’s (1986) ‘emotion formula’ see Figure 6.
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2.2.4  Materiality: Inscribing drives in symbols
One more concept introduced by Kristeva (2002b) – the concept of body-based 
materiality (here especially the maternal body) – underlines the importance that 
this general affective constitution of the speaking subject, its textual productions and 
their meaning in a socio-emotional context has for a specific psychoanalytic model 
of language acquisition.
Within her material approach Kristeva assumes with her genuine concept of the 
affect-loaded semiotic “chora”, as opposed to the realm of the affect-free symbolic, the 
origin of linguistic development very early in the ‘pre-oedipal’ period, where mother 
and child live in bodily, affective and polysemiotic communion.8 Referring to Melanie 
Klein (1998 [1932]) she further strengthens with that the importance of the mother for 
the child’s semiolinguistic development. This opposes the classical Freudian and Laca-
nian psychoanalytic theories which associate language development with the estab-
lishment of a rational ‘symbolic function’ controlled by the father.
According to Lacan (1990) the child masters the symbolic function during 
the oedipal period by learning to suppress natural affects and to subdue expressive 
impulses to the paternal law of a purely rational symbolic order.
Kristeva instead hypothesises, referring to the Freudian concepts of ‘orality’ and 
‘anality’, that these two basic bodily processes of ‘incorporation’ and ‘rejection’ may 
be associated with analogous linguistic processes of ‘identification’ and ‘differentia-
tion’, which are essential for every signification. With this reference she is emphasizing 
the maternal and not the paternal law, as both these body processes of the child are 
embedded in the corporeal, affective and vocal unity with the mother, as she becomes 
involved in assisting the regulation of the anal and glottal sphincters of the infant.
Within this an important milestone of further linguistic development, according 
to Kristeva, is the ‘thetic’ phase in which the child separates the signifier (Sn) from the 
signified (Sd) by means of the thetic act of dissection (/):
Sign = Sn/Sd.
By freeing the sign from the material object and by repression (displacement) of 
unwanted affects this ‘thesis’ or proposition, by establishing a fixed ‘abstract’ mean-
ing, enables the creation of a pure emotion-free signifier: the symbol. But unlike 
Lacan, Kristeva regards this thesis as never fully established, as the affective dynamic 
of the inner semiotic space, the ‘chora’, in which communication comes to life, is 
always able to inscribe traces of the generative or nurturing emotion into the signi-
fier. Because the affective semiotic and the emotion-free symbolic realm continue, 
8.  From my understanding the idea of the semiotic chora could go hand in hand with 
Trevarthen’s concept of amphoteronomic (physiological) and synrhythmic (psychic) regulation 
between mother and child in early multimodal dialogues (see Trevarthen 2010).
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due to unconscious powers (the subject-in-process as a so called ‘unary split subject’), 
to oscillate in each speaking subject as the two inseparable modalities of the signify-
ing process, the affective (maternal) foundation of language is not lost in later steps of 
language development.
Thus, in sum, meaning occurs when the affect dynamic of a subject linked with 
others is inscribed as an emotional marker from the unconscious into the linguis-
tic surface structures: “That is, the semiotic element makes symbols matter; by dis-
charging drives in symbols, it makes them significant.” (Oliver 2002: xv).
For further discussions, a comparable theory, less tied to primitive body func-
tions and their regulation by maternal care than in psychoanalytic theory, is proposed 
by Susan Langer (1942, 1953) in her analysis of the ‘art’ of philosophy, music and 
language (see Kühl 2007), which could enrich an emotion integrating approach of 
language learning.
3.   Intersubjectivity: The crucial role of relational emotions  
in infant semiogenesis
After analysing how the connection between emotions and language development has 
been conceptualised in the nurture/culture pole of language acquisition theory, where 
emotional factors are given more importance, let us now consider what kind of support 
there is for the impact of emotions on the infant’s semiogenesis from recent semiolin-
guistic (see 3.1) and neuropsychological (see 3.2) research (Lüdtke 2005, 2006 a/b). 
By summarizing and combining evidence from these complementary directions of 
research, I will propose that the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’ seems to be the frame 
that best bridges them (see Section 4).
3.1  Support from semiolinguistic research
Historically, developmental literature is well developed in the field of linguistic stud-
ies, whereas little published work has focused on semiotic development. Outstanding 
exceptions are Trevarthen’s early “Signs before speech” (1990) and “Infant semiosis” 
(1994), as well as Zlatev and Andrén’s recent “Stages and transitions in children’s semi-
otic development” (2009). They all point at directions for future theoretical, as well as 
empirical based work.
3.1.1   Two linguistic modes of emotion representation in early communication: 
Internal state language and infant directed speech
From either a semiotic or a general linguistic perspective, feelings of communicating 
subjects can be represented as the immediately perceivable surface of signification in 
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two different linguistic modes (following Konstantinidou’s (1997) terminology): in an 
emotional mode, in which emotions are explicitly denoted e.g. as by the words ‘sad’, 
‘happy’ or ‘pleasure’, and in an emotive mode, in which they are implicitly connoted by 




Language as direct means of
naming of or labeling emotions
( = Denotation)
Emotive mode:
Language as indirect means of
expressing of or evoking emotions
( = Connotation)
Figure 3. The two linguistic modes of emotion representation
Focussing on the developmental impact of emotions these two modi can be clearly 
identified in early communication.
The first emotional mode has been recently analysed by research of the so-called 
‘internal state language’ (e.g. Kauschke & Klann-Delius 1997) (see Figure 4), which 
focuses on two aspects. First, identifying the stages of acquisition of lexical-emotional 
categories in children between 18–36 months, which start from very body-based cat-
egories, such as feeling unwell or physiologically stressed or weak, moving towards 
denotation of volition, affects and capability and finally moral feelings and judge-
ments. Second, the functional stages of acquisition become more and more clear: in 
the beginning the simple but clear denoting of own, other und relational emotions 
(e.g. ‘I am angry’; ‘you are sad’), followed by talking about past and future emotions 
and then about triggers and consequences of emotions (e.g. ‘I am happy, because this 
afternoon we are having ice-cream’) and finally referring to emotions to change some-
one else’s feelings and pretending of emotions in play (e.g. talking, as if I’m anxious).
Furthermore, psycholinguistics, referring to classical rhethoric mechanisms, pro-
vide many insights into implicitly inscribed emotional traces9: the second emotive 
mode (see Figure 5). In the early dialogues between mother and child these traces can 
become obvious at all linguistic levels of the mother’s infant directed speech, ‘moth-
erese’. For example, at the phonetic level through specific intonation combined with 
9.  For early works on this issue see e.g. Jakobson (1960), Starobinski (1971).
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onomatopoeia in phonetic mimesis (e.g. ‘splash’, ‘buzz’), alliteration (e.g. ‘beddy-bye’, 
‘din-din’) or vowel stretching (e.g. ‘peek-a-boo’), at the morphological level by use of 
diminutive suffixes (e.g. ‘jammies’), reinforcing prefixes (e.g. ‘super-…’), abbreviations 
(e.g. ‘nana’) or rhyming (e.g. ‘humpty dumpty’), at the lexical/semantic level through 
Figure 4. Emotional mode: Lexical and functional stages of acquisition of ‘internal state 
language’ (ISL)
Stages of acquisition of lexical-






Functional stages of acquisition
(18–36 months):
– Denoting of own, other
und relational emotions
– Talking about past and
future emotions
– Talking about triggers and
consequences of emotions
– Refering to emotions to change
someone else’s feelings 
– Pretending of emotions in play
Emotional mode: ‘internal state language’
Emotive mode: ‘infant directed speech’








→ Beddy-bye (go to bed, bedtime), din-din
















→ Pigs, dogs, cows






→ Oh yeah… oh yeah that’s right!
→ Oopsie–daisy!
→ One ….– two ….– three …. –
Pragmatic
level




→ I don’t think you can do it!
→ I ain’t done that. Why you say that?
→ Are we hungry?
→ Now it’s time for your siesta, mi amor!
Figure 5. Emotive mode: Emotional traces on different linguistic levels of infant directed 
speech (IDS)
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use of de-personification (e.g. ‘pigs’, ‘dogs’, ‘cows’) and metaphors (e.g. ‘The crayon is 
blue like the sea.’), at the ‘syntactic’ level through repetitions (e.g. ‘Oh yeah… oh yeah 
that’s right!’) or even perseverations, exclamations (e.g. ‘Oopsie-daisy!’), and pausing 
(e.g. ‘one …. – two ….– three ….–‘) and at the pragmatic level by teasing or playful 
provoking (e.g. ‘I don’t think you can do it!’), dialect or sociolect (e.g. ‘I ain’t done 
that.’, ‘Why you say that?’), rhetoric questions (e.g. ‘Are we hungry?’) or bilingual code-
mixing (e.g. ‘Now it’s time for your siesta, mi amor!’).
3.1.2  Emotional regulation of the signifying process
By applying Simonov’s (1986, 1991) model of the emotional regulation of behavioural 
activity to analyse the act of signification or the speech act we can examine how these 
implicit emotive signs can become manifest at the surface, since every part of the invis-
ible signifying process is processed and regulated in depth by relational emotions: by 
the need and the motive to communicate meaning, the emotionally coloured memory 
of previous means and acts of signification, and of course the overall goal of com-
munication to share something meaningful to somebody meaningful and to receive 
contingent and stimulating responses (see Figure 6).
In general the category of ‘emotion’10 is defined by Simonov as the hypothetical 
positive or negative result of evaluating how necessary and available information may 
satisfy a need at the given moment in a given context. In the case of the ‘relational emo-
tions’ within a communicative dyad, the emotional monitoring and evaluation of the 
real other in communication plays a particularly important governing role as the result 
is reflected in the virtual other (VO) and the underlying ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’. Mainte-
nance or disturbance of the signifying process with any person is strongly dependent on 
a positive or negative representation of the virtual other who is to receive and accept it.
This model with its deeply intersubjective character shows how the meaningful 
emotional relationship with the communicative other can become manifest in verbally 
10.  In his book The Emotional Brain: Physiology, Neuroanatomy, Psychology, and Emotion 
Simonov (1986, 20–21) outlines the “reflective-evaluative” and therefore social and interper-
sonal functions of emotions by giving the following definition and formula:
“In its most general form, the rule for the development of emotions can be 
represesnted in the form of a structural equation:
E = f[N, (In – Ia)…]
Where E is emotion, its degree, quality and sign; N is the magnitude and quality of 
actual need; (In – Ia) is the evaluation of probability (possibility) of satisfying the 
need on the basis of innate and ontogenetic experience; In is information on means 
predictably necessary for satisfying the need; Ia is information on means that the 
subject has available to him at the given moment.”
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or pre-verbally materialized signs and it gives clues how a child’s negative representa-
tions of the virtual other, e.g. in the developmental context of a mother with borderline 
symptoms and her idiosyncratic sign production, can disturb the signifying process of 
the child on deep emotional levels due to non-contingent and non-satisfying responses 


































Figure 6. Emotional regulation of the deep levels of the signifying process (modified from 
Simonov 1986, Figure 4)
3.1.3  Emotion in the three constituents of the child’s signs
If we consider any sign the child may manifest as a product of an emotionally regu-
lated signifying process addressed to an other person, whether coded in body gesture, 
aesthetic or moral expression, or in spoken or written language, we must take into 
account that in all three constituents of the sign emotion can be present in varying 
ways and degrees (see Figure 7):
1. the manifested material form, either as a phone, a morph, a whole word or a letter, 
can be emotionally marked in various ways, e.g. in the emotional or the emotive 
modus on different linguistic levels (see Figure 4, 5);
2. the used object(s) referred to, can be embedded in shared more or less intense 
emotionally coloured virtual or real narratives;
3. and the meaning, an abstract entity either as phoneme, morpheme, lexeme, 
grapheme, can contain meaningful intersubjective emotional traces related to the 
communicative other(s) and dependent on the emotional quality of their Virtual 
Other (VO) representation, with whom this meaning was intersubjectively con-
structed (see Figure 11a–d).
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Form
(phone, morph, word, letter)
with varying










(phoneme, morpheme, lexeme, grapheme)
mutual representation (R1/2) with
intersubjective emotional traces
of the signifying process
(e.g. dependent on emotional quality of the
virtual other (VO) representation)
Virtual Self Virtual OtherVS VO
Figure 7. Presence of emotion in the three constituents of a child’s sign
3.1.4   Developmental primacy of intersubjective meaning
In a deeper emotion-related analysis of how the meaning of signs emerges in early child-
hood we can see that in the reciprocal processes of negotiation and validation by which 
intersubjective meaning-attunement is achieved, there is a ‘meaningful’ mutual virtual 
self-other-representation inherent, and this representation is emotionally charged for 
each subject in quantitatively and qualitatively varying degrees (see Figure 8).
If we take as an example mother and child or a child and a speech-language ther-
apist playing with a doll, whose name to be learned is <Katy>, then the joint attention 
of both interacting and communicating partners is the reference object “Katy”, which 
is nonverbally and verbally embedded in a shared emotionally coloured narrative. In 
the learning process neither the abstract meaning of/kati/nor the material articulative 
form of [kati] is learned by an instant and static cognitive ‘intake’ (R1, see figure 1a) 
of the presented auditive ‘input’ into the individual phonemic and/or lexemic 
 repertoire of the child. Instead this process can rather be conceptualised as a slow and 
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dynamic process of meaning constitution by intersubjective construction, negotiation 
and validation, where polyphonic starting models are transformed step by step into 
mutual phonemic and lexemic representations (R1/2, see figure 1b) with intersubjec-
tive traces of the signifying process during play.
Signs as a whole seem therefore to be body-, perception-, interaction- and emotion- 
based. And as the ultimate goal of a growing child’s communication is not only to 
mean something but to be ‘meaningful to someone meaningful’ (Trevarthen 2004a) 
we conclude that the intersubjective construction of signs within the mother-child-
dyad is led by the sharing of intersubjective meaning, because only in this constituent 
is the emotionally important other present.
Meaning, form and use are closely interrelated in constituting a sign, semiogenesis, 
and hence language development starts with establishing the contextual inner inter-
personal ‘feeling of meaningfulness’ before the correct outer form of either linguistic 
level (e.g. phonetics) is accepted by convention. As we will see later (see Section 5) 
Evaluation Evaluation
Monitoring Monitoring
Dynamic constitution of meaning
by intersubjective construction, negotiation and validation
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of the signifying processs
(e.g. depending on emotional qualitity of the
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Figure 8. Developmental primacy of intersubjective meaning due to mutual representation  
of the emotionally important other
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this fact is very relevant for early language intervention, as in those developmental 
disorders where a disturbance of relational emotions is at its heart this developmental 
primacy has to become a therapeutic primacy. Only then language intervention for 
developmental communicative and/or language disorders is able to start at the inter-
subjective core and not remain at the periphery of training formal linguistic correct-
ness (e.g. training of correct articulation or sentence patterns).
3.1.5  Decreasing emotional markedness of the child’s “signifiers”
If we turn away from meaning or the “signified” and move instead towards an analy-
sis of the sign’s material form or the “signifier” then we can make the very important 
observation that even though the developmental primacy of meaning stays throughout 
the whole period of language acquisition (see Section 4), the emotional markedness of 
the child’s signifiers gradually decreases in course of time, along with its ‘disembodi-
ment’ (Ruthrof 2000) and, I would add, with its ‘de-emotionalisation’. This develop-
mental journey of the signifying child can be described as a trajectory from embodied 
and emotionally charged iconicity to disembodied and purely informative and rational 
symbolicity (see Figure 9a–c). According to Ruthrof, though, natural language mean-
ing as never fully symbolic (Ruthrof 2010).
In a more detailed semiogenetic analysis, which includes the model of the emo-
tionally regulated signifying process (see Figure 6), we imagine a child who has a need 
and a motive to communicate and who wants to express and share meaning via ver-
bal and nonverbal signs. Following Peirce (1931–58) we can define and classify these 
signs according to their degree of emotional markedness of the signifier: the signifiers 
of ‘icons’ are very strongly marked, those of ‘indexes’ are moderately marked, and 
‘symbols’ almost not marked by emotion.
– In an iconic mode the child realizes its need to communicate with analogical signs, 
which represent their objects by means of ‘similarity’ in the form or amplitude of 
often strongly emotionally marked or ‘value laden’ signifiers – for instance, very 
open, wide and expanding facial, gestural, vocal and phonetic expressions, which 
resemble, as an outer expression, the equivalent quality and emotional properties 
of the inner sensations of ‘open’, ‘wide’ and ‘expanding’ psychophysiological sensa-
tions of ‘joy’. Or they portray, in aesthetic form or ‘shape’, the object in mind, as in 
the drawing of a ‘sun’ that looks like the sun in the sky with its rays radiating from 
a centre (see Figure 9a). It can be seen in these two examples that icons facilitate 
communication by conveying similarity; they have universal comprehensibility 
by immediate direct reciprocal meaning-attunement (see Figure 15).
 – In an indexical mode the child chooses certain signs as ‘expressions of intention’ 
to communicate a certain meaning – for instance making a specific vocal gesture 
to indicate hunger, a specific manual gesture to indicate the urge to have and hold 
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a ball or a doll, or a drawing of a sequence of dots, lines and curves on a piece of 
paper to indicate a sun or house (see Figure 9b). Though in Figure 9b the sun has 
some iconic features – it is rounded – and it has aesthetic ones – as the rays are 
spike-like – this representation is abbreviated and has more synoptic coding that 
depends on sharing of ‘conventions’ or ‘habits. Child and mother “know” those 
ways of showing the sun from many previous communicating contexts.
  The index indicates something by intending a direct physical or causal con-
nection of the signifier with the signified – an intentional link that can be observed 
or inferred by the decoding subject. As the emotional qualities of the signified are 
conveyed via a causal association by contiguity the signifier is here only moder-
ately emotionally marked. In all these examples it is obvious that the comprehen-
sibility of indexes becomes much more difficult, because the meaning can only be 



























Figure 9a. The sign as icon: High emotional markedness of the signifier due to similarity with 
the reference objects
Figure 9b. The sign as index: Little emotional markedness of the signifier due to a causality 
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the mother might understand and respond to the child’s signs in the expected way 
but an accidental visitor or somebody from another cultural context could not 
(see Figure 15).11
 – If a child articulates his/her first words or verbal phrases or if he or she draws his/
her first letters of the alphabet to spell a word (see Figure 9c) then they are able 
to use the symbolic mode to convey meaning. These signifiers in the form of sym-
bolic signs have almost none of the emotional markers, because they represent the 
signified object by pure arbitrarity, learned convention, which may lack all ana-
logue emotional properties and, as Ruthrof (2000) points out, are disembodied 
signifiers which lack as well their perceptual grounding. Signs become symbols by 
being ‘abstracted’ from what can be perceived from or felt in the ‘concrete present’. 
The use and the comprehension of symbols is a skill that must be learned ‘prop-
erly’ – the link between signifier and signified is established in a certain language 
community by conventional law alone. Due to this purely indirect cognitive media-
tion, symbols in spoken or written language are highly culture specific as both 
encoding and decoding subjects need to share the relevant normative knowledge, 
i.e. the child who speaks or writes a word like ‘sun’ has to have learned the specific 




























Figure 9c. The sign as symbol: Almost none emotional markedness of the signifier due  
to an arbitrary relation with the reference objects
In summarizing this trajectory within the language continuum we recall that (fol-
lowing Peirce) symbols do not come into existence de novo – they develop from ‘icons’. 
11.  In future discussions Halliday’s (1975) account of the development of ‘acts of meaning’ 
in ‘proto-language’, especially his definition of the functions of vocal expressions of feelings in 
combination with intentions to act expressed in gesture should be considered as well.
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This important conclusion clarifies two complementary developmental tendencies in 
semiolinguistic development (see Figures 10 and 12):
 – In the course of development, the emotional markedness and the corporeality of 
the signifiers decreases as their degree of abstraction increases.
 – At the same time the initial inter-semiotic and multimodal means of communica-
tion – the parallel existence and merging of vocal language, body language and 
aesthetic/emotional language decreases and becomes focused and concentrated 
in an entirely oral or written linguistic medium.
SEMIOLINGUISTIC SIGN-CONTINUUM








































Figure 10. Developmental trajectory: The decreasing semiogenetic impact of relational 
emotions during language acquisition
The initial overflowing of communication with a wealth of emotional markers 
on all levels leading to the final mastery of the symbolic function by the child might 
be explained as due to growing cognitive control, an explanation in terms of shared 
intentions and emotional evaluations of actions which is complementary to the pre-
viously described psychoanalytic interpretation based on a reduced theory of basic 
bodily functions or drives.
3.2  Support from neuropsychological research
The primary importance of relational emotions in children’s semiogenesis has become 
clearer with the advent of new findings from neuroscience. A fundamental shift of 
understanding of the innate foundations for communication has come from the 
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insight that cognition and emotion are not isolated but closely integrated within the 
functional organization of the brain (e.g. LeDoux 1998, 2000; Borod 2000; Lane/
Nadel, 2002; Nelson/Luciana, 2001). This insight has not been recognized by the Car-
tesian mainstream of Western science of the mind: Descartes argued for the existence 
of ‘pure reason’ (see Damasio 2005) and Chomsky (e.g. 1966) urged to view language 
primarily as a ‘mirror of [rational] mind’.
3.2.1   Emotional influence on cortical differentiation and the child’s  
cognitive-linguistic skills
Direct evidence for the interplay between emotion and cognition may be found in 
neuroscientific research on the development of cognitive and emotional systems in 
the brain of a child (Trevarthen 1998, 2001). Trevarthen & Aitken (1994) for instance, 
reviewing the psychophysiological foundations of learning, propose the existence of 
emotion generating structures, the so-called ‘Intrinsic Motive Formation’ (IMF), in 
which motive states direct the process of development of actions and awareness to 
eventually communicate relational emotions such as affection, love, pride or anxiety. 
The neural organization of this formation can already be detected among the first grow-
ing connections in the core of the central nervous system of seven weeks old embryos, 
and these primordia of affective neural systems influence early brain differentiation via 
neurochemical projections into the neo-cortical regions (Joseph 1999; Cicchetti 2002; 
Nadel/Tremblay-Leveau, 1999; Lane/Nadel, 2002; DiPietro 2004; Tucker 2001; Tucker 
et al. 2000). As this emotional influence on the brain’s plasticity and capacity for cogni-
tive learning is confirmed for later stages of development (e.g. Cicchetti 2002) many 
neuroscientists have come to the conclusion that the cultural learning that finally 
results in elaborate cognitive skills – including language – is fundamentally dependent 
on a socio-emotional context set up in how the brain grows (Panksepp 1998, 2003; 
Damasio 2000, 2005; Freeman 2001; Porges 2001).
3.2.2   Communicative mother-child dyad as psychobiological dyad
The primary socio-emotional context in early development is usually the mother-
child-dyad. According to Schore (1994), Panksepp (1998, 2003) and Trevarthen (2001, 
2010), this dyad should be conceptualised as a psychobiological dyad constituted 
by reciprocal neurochemical parameters of function. Based on the prenatal psycho-
biological dispositions, the intersubjective communication of relational emotions 
between mother and child manifests itself even before birth and becomes rapidly more 
elaborate after birth (see Figure 11a/b). This happens via the co-construction of mani-
fold narrative12 rhythms, patterns and structures, which are merged with equivalent 
12.  For further discussion of the concept of „narrative“ see e.g. Bruner’s (1983, 1990) state-
ment that we are ‘story-making creatures’, Stern’s (1985, 2010) ‘protonarrative envelopes’ of 
vitality and Malloch’s (1999) definition of ‘musical narrative’.
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psychobiological rhythms, patterns and structures, so that in the course of postnatal 
development an emotional-narrative dyad is established which regulates both develop-
ment of the intentional self and a psycho-social awareness of action in relationships. In 
extension of the attachment theory of Bowlby (1978), this shared space – established 
by ‘brain-brain-conversation’ mediated through body movements and their percep-
tion (Trevarthen 2012) – is found to be not only a space of affective bonding adapted to 
secure the protection, comfort and nurturing of the infant, but a developmental space 
that provides the socio-emotional background for the child’s cultural learning, and in 
particular the learning of conventions in pre-linguistic and linguistic communication.
3.2.3   Communicative function of mirror neurons and mirror systems in early 
childhood development
In the 1980s the research group of Rizzolatti discovered, in monkeys, the so-called 
‘mirror neurons’, and then systems of homologous neurone assemblies were identified 
in the human brain (Rizzolatti et al. 1996, 2002). These neuronal systems are active 
not only when a monkey or a human being performs a certain action by themselves, 
but also when they merely observe how another subject performs an action with that 
intention. Building on this discovery, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) proposed the origi-
nal thesis13 that, given the ability to mirror actions as a prerequisite for the intersub-
jective construction of communicative signs, ‘mirroring’ of such intentional actions 
as manual gestures could be the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of language 
development (see also in Li/Hombert 2002; Stamenov/Gallese 2002;  Vihman 2002; 
Studdert-Kennedy 2002; Gallese et al. 2004; Hari/Nishitani 2004).
Trevarthen (e.g. 2004b, 2001), applying the knowledge gained by detailed obser-
vation of the reciprocal imitation in proto-conversations between mothers and young 
infants (e.g. Akhtar & Tomasello 1998; Kugiumutzakis 1998; Malloch 1999; Bråten 
1998, 2002, 2009; Gratier 2003; Oster 2005; Reddy 2005), extends this socio-motor 
approach by integrating the subcortical socio-emotional aspect. His thesis is that not 
just the mirroring of manual or oral gestures but the mirroring of emotions must be 
the primary organizer in the brain of a child’s semiolinguistic development. To under-
stand this we have to go back to the IMF-concept and connect it with a second concept: 
the ‘emotional motor system’ (EMS), which consists of the fibres and nuclei of the 
cranial nerves I-XII and their associated sensor-motor areas 1–12, which generate and 
regulate the expressive movements of mouth, face and eyes (Trevarthen 2012).
In the communicative process the EMS has the function to transform information 
about internal self-sustaining motive states generated by the IMF and their associated 
affective regulations into externally perceivable emotional expressions of the EMF, 
13.  For further discussion it should be taken into account that this brief original paper has 
since been criticized, defended and extended. 
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for instance via facial, gestural and vocal expressions. These signal internal states and 
intentions to others enabling ‘co-regulation’ of both emotional and cognitive/inten-
tional states of mind (Tronick 2005; Trevarthen 1993, 1994, 2001, 2009).
3.2.4   Innate intersubjectivity as psychophysiological anticipation  
of an emotionally responding other
Though Trevarthen’s model describes in detail the inherent competence of even a new-
born to mirror, express and share relational motives and emotions with a sympathetic 
partner, this is not the main purpose of his research. Rather his ‘Innate Intersubjectiv-
ity Theory’ attempts to explain the psychophysiological predisposition of the child to 
be a social and relational human being or ‘person’, who not only needs a communica-
tive other for cultural learning, but who can anticipate his or her emotional responses 
intuitively, from birth (Trevarthen 2010, 2012 and Frank/Trevarthen in this book).
4.   Meaning-attunement: Children’s trajectory from emotional  
to cognitive dominance in the intersubjective constructions of signs
The previous section argued for the crucial role of relational emotions in infant semio-
genesis with support from recent semiotic and neuropsychological research. Here I 
show how these ideas can be combined in the analysis of children’s semiolinguistic 
development. In describing four major milestones in the interpersonal attunement of 
affect and meaning I present a model of the children’s trajectory from emotional regu-
lation to cognitive dominance in the intersubjective construction of signs.
4.1  The intrauterine stage: Primordial intersubjectivity
Already during the intrauterine stage the foetus appears to have the capacity and moti-
vation to ‘communicate’ with the mother actively by means of body movements that 
can stimulate her and with growing proprioceptive awareness by self-touching and 
posture changes that may engage with the actions and feelings of her body (see Fig-
ure 11a) (Piontelli 2002, 2010). The intersubjective exchange of emotionally important 
proto-narratives in this earliest stage of the development of communication, which 
operates here as a ‘primordial intersubjectivity’, is constituted by means of a shared 
inner ‘object of reference’: the individual, but shared, psychophysiological, ‘proprio-
ceptive’ and ‘autonomic’ self. The mode of communication of motive impulses and 
self-feelings is iconic, because the child’s movements, in so far as they may function 
as semiotic ‘signifiers’ conveying similarity in communication with the mother’s body 
activities, are permeated by archaic manifestations of bodily discomfort and stress or 
well-being in mutual ‘amphoteronomic’ (shared autonomic) regulation (Schore 1994; 
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Trevarthen et al. 2006). Meaning attunement from the mother’s side takes place via 
permanent monitoring- and evaluating-processes between the real or ‘felt’ and virtual 
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Figure 11a. The intrauterine stage: Iconically mediated meaning attunement
4.2  The infant stage: Primary intersubjectivity
After birth the neonate expands this intentional communication as action and aware-
ness, open to a much bigger and potentially more ‘intelligent’ sign repertoire medi-
ated by auditory, visual and tactile ‘distance receptors’. The intersubjective exchange of 
emotionally important narratives,14 in ‘primary intersubjectivity’ (Trevarthen 2001) 
is now mediated by a shared ‘object of reference’ at the interface between the inner 
14.  ‘Narrative’ here has the ‘aboutness’ of a cycle of animation and emotional regulation as in 
a musical or poetic verse or stanza. The neonatal mind has these cycles and they may engage 
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and outer worlds, with a human partner: the quality and timing of every expressive 
gesture/vocalisation/expression and their ‘narrative sequencing’ in the mutual inter-
semiotic display of facial, manual, vocal and eye expressions between mother and 
infant (see Figure 11b). Meaning attunement between mother and child is now a pro-
cess of iconic and indexical referring within an inter-semiotic display. Each response 
to the expressed form (‘signifier’) of the other can either be ‘similar’, as in the case 
of the mimetic imitation (see e.g. Kugiumutzakis 1998; Meltzoff/Moore 1997; Nagy/
Molnár 2004; Reddy 2005) of a smile, or ‘indicating’, as by looking at the other in a 
questioning or challenging way.
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Figure 11b. The infant stage: Iconically and indexically mediated meaning attunement
with homologous and rhythmically commensurate of the adult motivations, without reference 
to outside specifics (as described by Kühl 2007 & by Malloch 1999; Malloch/Trevarthen 2010).
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4.3  The toddler stage: Secondary intersubjectivity
Around the first year with the emergence of the first proto-words, such as “mama” or 
“dada”, the transition from the prelinguistic-semiotic towards the protolinguistic stage 
takes place with new cognitive control. The intersubjective exchange that comes about 
in the development of ‘secondary intersubjectivity’ (Trevarthen 1977; Trevarthen & 
Hubley 1978) leads to a shared concrete and real object of reference, such as a doll 
or other ‘toy’, which is attended to in a complex and emotionally animated playful 
narrative (see Figure 11c). Meaning attunement between toddler and caretaker may 
now be mediated symbolically (see Halliday 1975; Trevarthen 1990; Reddy 2005), if a 
linguistic ‘signifier’, such as the word ‘doll’ is used to name the object of shared interest. 
Disregarding any accompanying indexical signs of eveluation of mutual attunement, it 
is arbitrary, accepted as a social convention that may claim meaning without subjective 
emotional markers connected with the reference object.
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Figure 11c. The toddler stage: Indexically and symbolically mediated meaning attunement
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4.4  Primary school children: Tertiary intersubjectivity
The completion of basic linguistic development is reached around the age of 4 when 
cognitive control has been more or less firmly established in culturally accepted forms. 
The intersubjective exchange may now be distinguished as ‘tertiary intersubjectivity’, 
which requires the construction of complete linguistic enunciations constituted to 
describe a shared abstract object of reference – e.g. the concept of ‘tidiness’ or ‘punc-
tuality’ (see Figure 11d). Meaning attunement is here entirely symbolic, as the ver-
bal linguistic ‘signifier’, for example the uttered word ‘tidiness’ is made up of complex 
morpho-syntactical structures, all of which are entirely arbitrary without any neces-
sary emotional traces (though the signified concept of tidiness, perhaps applied to the 
‘bedroom’, is of course individually, interpersonally and even culturally marked and 
will have emotional connotation).
Dynamic exchange of intentional meaning through
intersubjective construction, negotiation and validation
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Figure 11d. Primary school children: Symbolically mediated meaning attunement
4.5   Summary: Intersubjectivity and relational emotions as the primary 
organiser of children’s semiolinguistic development
If we summarize both the models arising from the findings of semiolinguistic and 
neuropsychological research, as well as our considerations regarding the four different 
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stages of meaning attunement in childhood, then we can come to the conclusion that 
the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’ with its underlying relational emotions and motive 
changes could be considered as the primary organiser of language learning and lan-
guage development (see Figure 12).
Hence we propose a distinct intersubjective theory of language development, 
which focuses primarily on the semiogenetic potential of relational emotions. Two 
theoretical innovations which are implied in this new intersubjective attempt to 
explain language development should be mentioned briefly: First, in opposition to the 
nativist and cognitivist theories of language development we perceive language devel-
opment as a trajectory within a semiolinguistic continuum which does not reduce 
language to a logocentric system of arbitrary linguistic symbols; second neither birth 
nor the utterance of first words are regarded as the beginning of symbolic commu-
nication, but, in accord with the psychoanalytic perspective and Kristeva’s concept 
of the thetic separation, the affective and embodied roots of signification are from 
that decisive point onwards subdued to the cognitive control of the ‘symbolic order’, 
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Figure 12. Intersubjectivity and relational emotions as the primary organiser  
of language learning
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5.   The ‘Significant Other’: From relational emotions to  
‘Relational Language Therapy’
Infant semiosis is emotional, not just representational or referential. It is 
fundamentally “self-with-other-referred” […]. Cultural exploitation of the 
environment is entirely dependent on the innate mirroring mechanisms that 
link human minds which have different age, experience, and skill. Educational 
practices depend on this intersubjective system and the collaborative learning it 
makes possible. (Trevarthen & Aitken 2001: 16–25)
I wish to conclude by outlining the concept of ‘Relational Language Therapy’– a thera-
peutic language learning approach, which views the relational emotions and especially 
the emotion based impact of a ‘Significant Other’ as central for the professional sup-
port of children’s semiolinguistic development.
5.1  Definition and aim of a Relational Language Therapy
Relational Language Therapy can be defined as a therapeutic approach which focuses 
on the relevance of relational emotions because it views children’s semiolinguistic 
development and therefore many developmental communication and/or language 
disorders (e.g. parts of autism spectrum disorders or severe deprivation) as based 
on or influenced by emotionally imbalanced intersubjective developmental contexts 
(e.g. influenced by poverty, migration or severe illnesses of the mother or important 
caretakers).
As dialogue can be defined as the intersubjective co-construction of information 
bearing and meaningful verbal and non-verbal signs, generated, regulated and pro-
cessed by affects, and their exchange in all codes and modalities the focus is on build-
ing or improving the dialogue capacity through intersubjective constitution of mutual 
representations within emotionally important narratives.
The general aim is the transformation of idiosyncratic signs (e.g. multimodal 
autostimulation, unintelligable verbal neologisms) into conventional semiotic and/or 
linguistic signs.
5.2   Relational roots of developmental communication  
and/or language disorders
Referring to Trevarthen’s (Aitken & Trevarthen 1997) considerations about imbal-
anced Self-Other-representations in mother-infant-dyads (e.g. children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders, Williams-Beuren-Syndrome, Down-Syndrome, Rett-Syndrome 
and ADHD, or mothers with Borderline-Syndrome, Postnatal Depression or Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder) we would like to explain and illustrate with an example (see 
Figure 13) the relational roots of a distorted semiolinguistic development which may 
lead to different developmental communication and/or language disorders.
 Relational emotions in semiotic and linguistic development 335
For instance in Postnatal Depression the Self-Other-representation of both communi-
cative partners may be affected and can lead to a distortion of dialogicity.
On the mother’s side, her internal model of Self and self-expression (CS) may be 
distorted, and the caregiver’s experience of the infant (cs/i) is both indistinct from the 
Self and distorted (Figure 15, left). This emotional context can lead to idiosyncratic 
changes in one or all three constituents of the signs the mother is communicating 
towards her child:
 – The transmitted meaning can be shifted towards emotionally altered contents (e.g. 
emotional regression, broken taboos, violated norms); therefore the mutual repre-
sentation of meanings can be shadowed by negative emotions due to traces of a 
distorted Virtual Self and an indistinct Virtual Other within.
 – The manifested outer form of the mother’s communicated signs can be affected 
by an altered display in one ore several codes (facial expressions, gestures, voice, 
verbal language) either through a huge emotional markedness, which can show 
up as being ‘flooded’ by negative markers or as perseverations and stereotypes, or as 
well through an emotional ‘blankness’, ‘emptiness’ or ‘coldness’.
 – Finally also the shared use of the reference object(s) can be negatively altered 
through the absence of joined playful activities and/or missing joint attention; fur-
thermore existing play activities could be embedded in narratives emotionally 
negatively coloured by sorrow, depression, lethargy or heaviness.
Consequently, the infant’s experience does not fit well the natural model or ‘Vir-
tual Caregiver/Companion’ and is thus confused (IC?). This will weaken the infant’s 
Expressed Self (IS) (Figure 15, right). On the child’s side this can lead as well to idio-
syncratic changes in one or all three constituents of the signs it is transmitting in 
return towards the mother:
 – The meaning transmitted by the child can be shifted as well towards reciprocally 
emotionally altered contents (e.g. repulsion or neediness) and therefore the mutual 
representation of meanings can be shadowed accordingly by negative emotions 
due to traces of a distorted Virtual Other and a weakened Virtual Self.
 – The manifested outer form of the child’s communicated signs can display as well in 
one ore several codes (facial expressions, gestures, voice, verbal language) a huge 
emotional markedness, which could be expressed on one hand side as loud crying 
or screaming maybe accompanied by heavy banging, on the other side gradually as 
a ‘mirrored’ or ‘copied’ emotional blankness or emptiness.
 – Finally also on the child’s side the shared use of the reference object(s) can be neg-
atively altered e.g. through withdrawal from the negatively coloured narratives, 
increasing nervousness combined with decreasing joint attention or by developing 
autocentric, isolated, non-dyadic, monologous play activities and narratives with 
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Figure 13. Relational roots of a distorted semiolinguistic development eventually followed 
by Relational Communication and/or Language Disorders (upper part of the figure modified 
from Aitken & Trevarthen 1997, Figure 6/I)
5.2  From the ‘Virtual Other’ to the ‘Significant Other’
To re-balance such distortions of dialogicity a rebalancing of the relational emotions 
has utmost priority. We propose that in therapeutic processes the Virtual Other has 
to become a ‘Significant Other’ (see the ‘Generalised Other’ Frank & Trevarthen, this 
volume) – referring here to our outlined concept of signification, where primarily the 
affective traces of signs makes them significant. The Significant Other has to become 
the embodiment of a dialogic partner who helps to restore dialogicity by creating and 
offering the relational emotional bases for the intersubjective construction, negotia-
tion and validation of meaning and their verbal and nonverbal expression.
5.3  Didactic relevance of relational emotions and the Significant Other
To succeed in the transformation of idiosyncratic signs (e.g. multimodal autostimula-
tion, unintelligable verbal neologisms) into conventional semiotic and/or linguistic 
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signs, which was identified as the overall aim of Relational Language Therapy, the most 
important decision is to diagnose on which level of semiolinguistic development the 
child is stuck or led astray and where it needs to be met to be supported towards his or 
her zone of proximal development (Vygotsky 1986 [1934]).
All of the earlier described and analyzed semiotic features of communicative 
signs, e.g. motivatedness, emotional markedness, enculturation, mutual construction, 
variability of interpretation, in their appearance as icons, indexes or symbols have high 
didactic relevance (see Figure 15). In contrast to many other therapies decisions about 
therapeutic materials, such as sensory stimuli, picture books, talker or word cards, are 
here viewed as secondary, because they are deeply interrelated or even dependant on 
the Significant Other:
 – Work on the iconic level of the child is highly dependant on the Significant Other 
as the learning of iconic signs is embedded into the communicative dyad and their 
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Didactic relevance of semiolinguistic development
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Figure 15. Didactic relevance of relational emotions and the Significant Other for supporting 
the semiolinguistic development in relational communication and language disorders
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multimodal body- and affect-based generation, construction, transmission and 
interpretation processes. The core medium is therefore joined sensory stimulation 
and perception with contingent responses.
 – Work on the indexical level of the child is not so dependant anymore on the Sig-
nificant Other as the learning of indexical signs is still based on shared experi-
ence, but now combined with inference and deduction. Teaching therefore must 
imply socio-cultural shaping.
 – On the symbolic level the Significant Other becomes less and less important 
because now the individual cognition leads the way to mentally acquire knowl-
edge. In final stages of language development the communicative partner can 
even be replaced for short teaching sequences by a computer and computer-based 
language learning programs as far as a good relational bases is there.
In general, in therapies with relationally based or influenced communication and lan-
guage disorders the role of the therapist as the important Significant Other always 
needs to be the focus during planning, working and evaluation – the more as we meet 
and support the child on a very early stage of his or her semiolinguistic development 
which is emotionally regulated. In this way, merely treating superficial semiotic or 
linguistic symptoms can be avoided.
6.  Conclusions
We may conclude by proposing that paradigm shifts need to be initiated and com-
pleted on three recursive levels, if a sustainable implementation of the theoretical 
‘emotional turn’ and the concept of intersubjectivity into the field of applied linguistics 
can take place:
 1. on the level of epistemiology (research methodology),
 2. on the level of semiotics and linguistics (theory)
 3.  on the level of applied linguistics and speech and language pathology 
 (application, didactics, therapy).
As a vision for future theorizing as well as daily practice we would like to emphasize 
that the described role and impact of relational emotions in semiotic and linguistic 
development, supported by many findings from semiolinguistic and neuropsycho-
logical research, could help to pave the way for fully incorporating the concept of 
intersubjectivity into linguistic theory and its various fields of application.
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The relevance of emotion for language and linguistics is considered from 
three perspectives: (a) the conceptualization of emotions, (b) the expression 
of emotions and (c) the grounding of language. As to the conceptualization 
perspective, research on the emotional lexicon is discussed. Not only content 
words (N, V, A), but also prepositions are relevant (to long for, hate against). From 
the expression perspective, it is claimed that the expression of emotions takes 
place on all linguistic levels: phonological, morphological, lexical, syntactic, and 
on the level of figurative language use (metaphor and metonymy). ‘Grounding’ 
of language in emotion means that emotion is one of the preconditions for the 
functioning of language (emotion is part of the embodied grounding) and for its 
coming into existence, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.
Keywords: language; emotion; conceptualization; expression; figurative language; 
grounding; embodiment
1.  Introduction
In Cognitive Linguistics, it is a basic assumption that language and cognition interact. 
The way human cognition works has an influence on the structure of human language, 
and language influences human cognition. How strong the latter relation holds, is a 
question that dominates discussions concerning research in linguistic relativity, see, for 
example, Slobin (1996), Pinker (1997),  Majid et al. (2004), and Casasanto (2008). Cog-
nition, in its turn, interacts with emotion (Damasio 1994). If cognition is strongly con-
nected to both language and emotion, how should we see, then, the relation between 
language and emotion? There are four possibilities: 
 – There is no direct connection between language and emotion: cognition stands as 
an intermediate between them (emotion is conceptualized in cognition and cog-
nition is reflected in language, for example in the lexical differentiation between 
emotions),
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 – Language has a direct connection to emotion (emotion can be expressed in a 
direct way in verbal utterances),
 – Language has both a direct and an indirect link to emotion (language reflects 
conceptualization of emotion and expresses emotion),
 – The relation between language and emotion varies, depending on the types of 
emotion. For example: A belief-dependent emotion like surprise is typically 
expressed in language, whereas anger or fear is only conceptualized in language 
but expressed in non-verbal ways.
In previous work (Foolen 1997), I proposed that the third option holds: People have 
the ability to conceptualize emotions, not only their own, but also those of others, 
and in this respect cognition serves as intermediate between language and emotion. 
But a speaker also has the possibility of expressing his/her own emotions directly via 
language, resulting in expressive (also called emotive or affective) language. To illus-
trate the difference: One can become aware of one’s emotions and say I find that food 
disgusting or one can express the same emotion directly by uttering yuk! These two 
different ways of communicating the same feeling differ semiotically in a fundamen-
tal way: the first one is symbolic, using words with relatively context-independent 
meaning (the indexicals I and that need of course context to be interpreted), and 
the second is a ‘symptom’, a reflex, showing that the speaker in the here-and-now 
has a specific emotion (disgust). Emotional interjections are prototypical cases of 
emotive/expressive language, but there are many other forms, for example exclama-
tive sentence types or constructions like ‘an N of an N’ (a bear of a man, a castle of a 
house, etc. cf. Foolen 2004).
In the present chapter, the distinction between conceptualization and expression 
is taken as a point of departure. It will be argued that not only the conceptualization 
of emotion (Section 2) but also expression of emotion (section 3) is a natural function 
of language. In Section 4, special attention will be paid to figurative speech in relation 
to emotion. I will argue that the expressive function of emotional figurative speech 
(I nearly exploded) is as important as its conceptualizing function. In Section 5, the 
foundational role that emotion plays in processing language and in its ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic development will be discussed, and Section 6 contains some concluding 
remarks.
2.  Conceptualization of emotions: Fluidity and relational properties
With nouns like love, anger, surprise, we can talk about emotions. But other parts 
of speech also contain words that pertain to emotions, in particular verbs (to love, 
hate, fear) and adjectives (happy, sad, angry). In what follows, we will have a look 
at nouns and verbs, leaving out adjectives, but we will add prepositions, as they 
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play a role in the relational (love for something) aspects of the conceptualization of 
emotions. 
2.1  Nouns
Wierzbicka (1999) and others have shown that languages differ in the way they cut up 
the emotional field. German distinguishes between Eifersucht and Neid where Dutch 
uses jaloezie (‘jealousy, envy’) for both. The difference in German has to do with what 
the other person has that the experiencer of the emotion would also like to have: a 
relation with someone else (Eifersucht) or a certain material possession (Neid). Greek 
seems to lack an expression for ‘frustration’ (Pavlenko 2008) and the African language 
Dholuo (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic) has a word maof, which is “the feeling of desiring to 
see relatives and friends that have not been seen for too long and is by extension trans-
ferred to other things” (Omondi 1997: 97). Do such differences between languages 
have an effect on how speakers perceive or experience their own and other’s feelings? 
Yes, according to Lindquist (2009), who calls this view a ‘constructivist view on emo-
tion’. And Colombetti (2009: 20) defends this view as follows: “Labels for emotions 
have causal force. They can act as catalysts for a complex of feelings that may otherwise 
go unnoticed. Also, they can channel and structure expressive resources towards a 
specific type of experience”.
It might very well be that there is more lexical variation between languages in 
the emotional field than in the field of concrete objects, as the distinctions between 
emotions are less clearly given in advance (more fluid) then, say, in the field of ani-
mals or artifacts. As Daneš (2004: 31) states it: “Perhaps it would be more adequate to 
use the metaphor of a field or space of fluctuating fuzzy elementary emotional states, 
i.e. a ‘diffused continuum’ … with relatively ‘condensed islands’, more or less differ-
ent in various cultures and identified by them by means of particular labels.” This 
opens up interesting possibilities to compare the emotional vocabularies of languages, 
cf. Dem’jankov et al. (2004) and Dziwirek & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2010), who 
found, for example, that in English, the distinction between positive and negative 
emotions is salient, whereas in Polish the inside-outside distinction plays an important 
role in categorizing emotions. 
Within one language, the conceptualization of emotions can develop through 
time (cf. Bloem this volume). An early diachronic study (on anger) is Geeraerts & 
Grondelaers (1995). More recently, Fabiszak & Hebda (2010) looked at pride in medi-
eval English, Trim (2010) studied the degree of salience of different metaphorical 
models for love in English, and Tissari (2010) looked at word pairs like happiness-
sadness, love-hate, hope-fear, pride-shame, calmness-anxiety, and excitement-respect 
in Early Modern (ca. 1500–1700) and Present-Day English. Such linguistic studies are 




Emotions may share with snow and colors the lack of sharp distinctions, but one clear 
difference has to do with temporal complexity: Emotions are processes, they begin, 
get stronger and fade away (cf. Zlatev et al. this volume), and this aspect is conceptu-
alized in a natural way with verbs, being ‘process words’. In emotion verbs, four dif-
ferent ‘roles’ are involved: Causes (‘that noise’ in that noise irritates me), Experiencers 
(the person who experiences the emotion, like me in the example just given), Targets, 
like that sound in I hate that sound, and (bodily) Effects (trembling in he trembled 
with fear). 
There is a whole line of research on mental verbs (psych verbs) (cf. Croft 1993; 
Jackendoff  2007: Chapter 7), in which the central question is how we can explain 
the variable distribution of the semantic roles of Cause, Experiencer, and Effect over 
the syntactic subject, object, and predicate. West-Germanic languages have at least 
3 classes of mental verbs: (1) Causative verbs: That noise irritates / frightens me, where 
the Cause is subject and the Experiencer is direct object; a passive paraphrase is possible 
(I am frightened by that noise), (2) Unaccusative verbs, which don’t allow a causative 
paraphrase or a passive. The Experiencer object has the syntactic role of indirect object. 
German has a dative here (Das gefällt mir, ‘that pleases me’), whereas it has accusative 
in combination with verbs mentioned under 1 (Das beängstigt mich, ‘that frightens 
me’), and (3) Experiencer-subject verbs: I like/hate/fear that sound.
Three questions are relevant here: 
i. Can we predict which feelings are conceptualized by which pattern? If there is a 
pattern, it is not absolute, as some feelings can occur in two patterns: That animal 
frightens me versus I fear that animal; that pleases me versus I like that. Moreover, 
we see changes through time with the same verb, where the Experiencer shifts 
position from object to subject, cf. the Dutch examples in (1) and (2).
 (1)  a.  Dat irriteert mij
   That irritates me
   ‘That irritates me’
  b. Ik irriteer mij daaraan
   I irritate me thereon
   ‘That irritates me’
 (2)  Behalve aan de regels rond tijdelijke aanstellingen irriteren docenten uit het 
wetenschappelijk onderwijs zich aan regels over urenregistratie.  
 (Vox 15: 9, April 2, 2009, p. 6)
  ‘Besides about regulations concerning temporary appointments academic 
teachers are annoyed [literally: ‘irritate themselves’] about rules dealing with 
the administration of working hours.’ 
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ii. Can we say that the emotional relation is conceptualized differently in the three 
different verb-argument patterns? Can we say, for example, that if the Experiencer 
is positioned in the subject position, the construction implies some control of the 
Experiencer over the emotion? There is no empirical evidence available, however, 
pro or contra such claims.
iii. Do different ways of conceptualizing emotional processes have an impact on the 
way the emotions are experienced? If one believes in the constructivist view on 
emotion, the answer is ‘yes’. But empirical proof of this position will be hard to 
provide.
2.3  Prepositions
NPs that refer to emotions often occur together with a preposition: P + emotion (in 
love) or emotion + P (love for something). The prepositions link the emotion to a 
Cause or a Target, or they indicate that the Experiencer is in the state of that emotion 
(cf. Dirven 1997; Osmond 1997; Radden 1998). 
Vardi (2008) analyzed the use of prepositions in relation to emotion words, com-
paring Dutch and Hebrew prepositions. One of her findings was that Dutch emotions 
are more often conceptualized as companions, using the preposition met ‘with’: met 
blijdschap, ‘with joy’, where Hebrew used in, be-simxa, ‘in gladness’, where the emo-
tion is conceptualized as a container. When we compare Dutch with English, however, 
we see cases where English conceptualizes the emotional cause as a ‘companion’, as 
implied by the preposition with: to tremble with fear, pale with fear whereas Dutch uses 
the ‘source’-like preposition van: bleek van angst, lit. ‘pale from fear’, trillen van woede 
lit. ‘tremble from anger’. It thus seems that languages differ in their construal of the 
relation between emotions and their Cause. 
Besides nouns, verbs, and prepositions, languages use adjectives (sad, happy, angry, 
etc.) and adverbs (luckily, sadly, etc.) in the lexicalization of emotions. Only on the basis 
of a full description of the vocabulary of specific languages (cf. Vainik 2004 on the Esto-
nian emotion vocabulary) may a balanced comparison between languages be possible 
in the future. Such descriptions should preferably be based on real language use, i.e. 
corpus data, as has been done, for example, in Oster’s (2010) study on fear in English.
3.  Expressive linguistic forms
In linguistics, expressive linguistic forms have been studied less intensively than the 
conceptual-descriptive emotional vocabulary. This is probably due to the rational 
orientation of traditional linguistics, elegantly formulated in Sapir (1921: 38–39): 
“Ideation reigns supreme in language, (…) volition and emotion come in as  distinctly 
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secondary factors”. And Sapir (1921: 217) repeats his position by the end of the book: 
“[T]he emotional aspect of our psychic life is but meagerly expressed in the build of 
language”.
However, when one starts to look for expressive forms in language structure, 
one quickly discovers that there is more than what Sapir and the linguistic tradition 
assumed. I mentioned already emotional interjections and the construction exempli-
fied by the phrase a bear of a man. Expressive linguistic forms can be found on all 
linguistic levels, as the following short overview shows.
 – Prosody, see for example Wendt (2007) and Hancil (2009).
 – There is expressive morphology, for example diminutives. Taylor (1989: 144 ff.) 
analyzes the different connotations of the diminutive in Italian and in other lan-
guages (cf. also Steriopolo 2008 on Russian diminutives). In Dutch, the suffix – sel 
often implies a negative evaluation (schrijf-sel, ‘a bad piece of writing’).
 – Interjections like wow, and intensifiers like terribly, horribly, etc. often have an 
emotive effect (cf. Jing-Schmidt 2007).
 – On the lexical level there is connotation (emotion-laden words): a word with ref-
erential meaning evokes, at the same time, certain feelings (cancer, death). With 
euphemism, we try to save the referential meaning and get rid of the (negative) 
feelings: Afro-American, rest in peace, etc.
 – Many constructions have expressive meaning, like the a bear of a man- 
construction, the ‘Incredulity response construction’: Dutch Hij en lezen?, ‘He 
and read?’ (cf. Lambrecht 1990), the nandao-interrogation in Chinese (Jing-
Schmidt 2008), dependent clauses used independently (cf. Evans 2007, who 
called this phenomenon ‘insubordination’), like To think that I once was a mil-
lionaire! and the Dutch examples in (5).
 (5) a. Vuil dat het was!
   dirty that it was
   ‘It was terribly dirty!’
  b. Dat je dat durft!
   That you that dare
   ‘I am amazed that you dare to do that!’
  c.  En of ik het durf!
   And whether I it dare
   ‘For sure I dare to do that!!’
To the extent that expressive linguistic forms have been studied at all, this was 
mainly based on constructed examples and intuitive judgments. More recently, how-
ever, the study of expressive language forms has found a stronger empirical basis in 
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conversational analysis, cf. Selting (2010), who studied how affectivity is managed 
in interaction by using swear words, short utterances, and specific vocal phonetic-
prosodic cues. Whereas conversational analysis uses a qualitative method, taking 
an in-depth look at limited data, corpus analysis prefers a quantifying approach, 
see for example Bednarek (2008) and Potts & Schwarz (2008). In this latter study, 
a corpus of 100,000 reviews was put together; half were book reviews on Amazon.
com and half were hotel reviews taken from the website Tripadvisor.com. In each 
review, the book or hotel was graded (from 1 to 5 “stars”). Potts & Schwarz checked 
the distribution of the exclamative ‘what a …’ across the reviews. The distribution 
showed a nice U-curve: high for the 5 star reviews, going down for the middle values 
and going up again for the low values. In a second step, they let the computer search 
for expressions that correlated with ‘what a …’, in order to detect other expressive 
forms. Correlations were found with universal quantifiers like ever, absolutely, all, 
and interjections like wow. Potts & Schwarz also searched for forms with a reversed 
U-shape distribution, forms that were typically used in the reviews with average 
 ratings (3 stars). Potts & Schwarz called these ‘Unexclamatives’. Here, they found 
forms like pretty, some, decent, mostly, quite, and basic.
Cultures vary in the degree of emotional expressivity, verbally and non-verbally, 
as anthropological research has shown (cf. Wilce 2009). This raises the question of 
the impact of behavior on ‘inner life’, a Whorfian-type of question, now applied to 
language use in relation to emotion. Wilce (2009: 9) proposes to “historicize our treat-
ment of the language-culture-emotion nexus. … [H]istorians of emotion have quite 
exclusively focused on macroforces … to the neglect of fine-grained analyses of lan-
guage deployed in real-time interaction.”
With respect to expressive linguistic forms, there is still a lot of descriptive work 
to do. The more descriptive results become available, the more interesting questions of 
a general character can be raised, such as the following.
1. How specific are the emotions that are connected with expressive linguistic 
forms? Do we have love- or fear-constructions, or only constructions which indi-
cate ‘emotional involvement’, leaving it to the context to determine which emotion 
is intended. A possible answer could be that interjections and lexical connotations 
imply specific emotions (disgust, love, fear), and that morphological and syntactic 
means convey schematic aspects of emotions: positive or negative attitude, or still 
more general: involvement, without positive or negative polarity.
2. Are there formal characteristics that differentiate expressive from non-expressive 
forms? Here the notion of ‘markedness’ seems useful (see Battistella 1996). At 
least some of the expressive forms are marked in relation to the unmarked non-
expressive forms. Take, for example the a bear of a man-construction. Normally, 
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in NPs of the form a N of a N, the first noun is the head of the construction, like 
in a wheel of a car, which is about a wheel. But a bear of a man is about a man. 
Another example of marked language use is insubordination (Evans 2007). Nor-
mally, subordinate clauses are dependent on a main clause, but in the examples 
given in (5), they are used independently. 
In the end, we would like to embed the descriptive work on expressive forms and the 
more general questions just stated in a theoretical framework. In Cognitive Grammar, 
a few remarks have been made that could be expanded into an integrated part of the 
theory. As to connotation, Taylor (2002: 202) states that “[o]n the Cognitive Grammar 
view, ‘connotation’ is not a distinct (and secondary) level of meaning, but is fully incor-
porated into the semantic structure of a word”. He illustrates this with a comparison 
of the connotations of bachelor and spinster. The derogatory connotation of the latter 
word can be explained against the domain-specific knowledge against which bachelor 
and spinster are understood. 
Langacker (2008) devotes a short Section (13.2.4, p. 475–477) to, what he calls, 
‘Expressives’. He uses ‘expressives’ as a cover term for interactive routine formulas like 
hi, thanks, yes, and expressive forms like damn, wow. They all involve, in Langacker’s 
model, subjective construal (p. 476): 
What do expressives profile? Perhaps nothing, at least in a narrow sense of the 
term. An expression’s profile is the onstage focus of attention, objectively construed 
by definition. But at least from the standpoint of the speaker, expressives are not 
about viewing and describing onstage content. In using one, the speaker is either 
performing a social action or vocally manifesting an experience – rather than 
describing a scenario, he enacts a role in it. For the speaker, then, the action or 
experience is subjectively construed.
The distinction between objective and subjective construal is also relevant for other 
linguistic phenomena like descriptive versus performative use of speech act verbs, 
indirect versus direct speech, and modal auxiliaries (see Verstraete 2001). In perfor-
mative utterances, direct speech, and utterances with subjective modal auxiliaries, the 
speaker is personally involved or committed, like in emotion-based expressive ways 
of speaking. Following this line of research, expressive language use could be stud-
ied in the broader perspective of subjectification and intersubjectification in language 
(cf. Davidse, Vandelanotte & Cuyckens 2010).
4.  Abstractness of emotions in relation to figurative speech
Besides fluid boundaries between different emotions (i.e. more color-like than object-
like), and besides more relational complexity than in colors or animals (there are 
Causes, Experiencers, Targets and Effects involved), there is a third property that 
 The relevance of emotion for language and linguistics  357
makes emotion a favored object of cognitive linguistic study, namely the often claimed 
“abstractness” of emotions. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) have argued that abstract entities 
are often conceptualized with the help of metaphor. Abstractness is, however, a contro-
versial notion. One possible view is that something is abstract if it cannot be perceived 
by one of the five senses with which we perceive ‘the outer world’. In this perspective, 
emotions are indeed abstract: We perceive them ‘within’, not with the eyes, ears, etc. 
although an emotion can have effects in the body which then become perceivable by 
the senses.
It has been claimed (Kövecses 1990) that the property of abstractness explains the 
abundant use of figurative speech (in particular metaphor) in discourse about emo-
tions. In this view, we need the figurative descriptions because otherwise it would be 
difficult to talk about such abstract phenomena like emotions. This would explain the 
use of expressions like He exploded, where anger is seen as a fluid in a container, Dutch 
hij was in de wolken, lit. ‘he was in the clouds’ (‘he was very happy’), etc. And as emo-
tions are strongly linked with the body, it comes as no surprise that many of the figu-
rative expressions for emotions are metonymical in character, using body parts and 
inner organs to refer to emotions: My knees trembled, his eyes narrowed, my heart sank 
into my boots, Dutch mijn haar stond recht overeind ‘my hair stood straight’. These are 
cases of ‘effect for cause’ metonymy. 
A special group of ‘somatisms’ (bodily based figurative language) is related to the 
fact that feelings are typically seen as located in an inner organ, for example the (inner) 
ear, the heart, the bladder, cf. (3), and the liver (Malay hati), cf. (4).
 (3) Ik voel het aan mijn water (Dutch)
  I feel it in my water [i.e. urine in the bladder]
  ‘I have an intuition about this’
 (4) a. Sakit hati (Malay)
   Aches liver (‘It hurts’)
  b. Bagai hempedu lekat di hati
   ‘As the spleen stick to the liver’ (referring to deep affection)
In many languages the heart is a rich source of semiosis, in particular for emotions 
(cf. Foolen 2008): my heart pounded in my throat, Dutch m’n hart zonk me in de 
schoenen, lit. ‘my heart sank into my shoes’, mijn hart sloeg over van vreugde, lit. ‘my 
heart missed a beat out of joy’ (‘my heart missed a beat’), etc. Again: the physiological 
effect stands metonymically for the emotional cause.
But is it really the case, that we need these figures of speech to talk about 
emotions because, due to their abstractness, we don’t have direct language for the 
emotions? We have nouns, like fear, hate, love, etc. and verbs and prepositions to 
conceptualize emotional processes. So why use the figurative ways of talking about 
emotions? 
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Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings (2005: 133) raise this question with respect to 
abstract concepts in general: 
Some theorists have argued that the meanings of abstract concepts are grounded 
in concrete domains (…). For example, the abstract concept ANGER is grounded 
in concrete phenomena, such as boiling water exploding out of a closed pot. 
We agree that metaphors often augment the meanings of abstract concepts, and 
make certain aspects of their conceptual content salient (…). Nevertheless, direct 
experience of abstract concepts appears central to their content. (…) One reason 
is that people have considerable amounts of direct experience with abstract 
concepts (…). Direct experience of abstract concepts is important for another 
reason. A concrete metaphor can not be mapped into an abstract concept, if the 
abstract concept doesn’t have its own structure (…). If an abstract concept has no 
structure based on direct experience, the concrete metaphor would have nothing 
to map into.
In the same perspective, Crawford (2009) argues against Lakoff & Johnson (1980)’s 
claim that the use of the physical domain to conceptualize the emotional domain is 
motivated by the concreteness of the former and the abstractness of the latter. Accord-
ing to Crawford (2009: 136)
[O]ur cognition about affect seems to be on firmer ground than our cognition 
about its source domains, such as space. For example, people are remarkably good 
at remembering the affective tone of their experiences, even when many details 
of those experiences have been forgotten. In addition, perception of location, 
brightness and size is subject to a variety of biases and context effects, which 
suggests that these may not be such a stable foundation for grounding affect.
I agree with Crawford when she concludes (p. 137) that “[g]iven the qualitative dif-
ference between affect and the physical domain used to describe it, to order them 
in terms of which is more or less abstract, primary, or sharply delineated, is to over- 
simplify. A more promising approach might be to consider what advantages these 
source domains offer the representation of affect”.
What are then, in Crawford’s view, the advantages of the physical source 
domains to represent affect? “Affect may capitalize on source domains such as space 
and brightness because they provide powerful ways to represent and manipulate 
information for the self and for others (…). Spatial cognition in particular is often 
recruited to support reasoning about non-spatial information. (…) Thus we may 
think of affect in terms of other physical dimensions not because affect is abstract or 
poorly delineated and has no clear representation of its own, but because doing so 
allows us to exploit advantages that these dimensions have for reasoning and com-
municating”. A similar function of “motion-emotion” metaphors is suggested by 
Zlatev et al. (this volume).
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Crawford’s functional explanation of the use of figurative speech to conceptualize 
affect and communicate about it might be right or partly right, but in my view, there 
is another functional explanation which might even have more explanatory value, 
namely the need for expressivity. Emotions are typically not a neutral topic of con-
versation. When we talk about emotions, in particular when we talk about our own 
emotions that we have felt in critical situations, we are emotionally involved, and this 
stimulates the use of expressive language. Crawford (2009: 130), referring to Ortony & 
Fainsilber (1989), states: “Metaphors are used in discourse about any topic, but they 
appear to be especially frequent when the topic is emotional, and their frequency 
increases with emotional intensity”.
If it is true that involved speech contains much figurative language, then we may 
infer that figurative speech has expressive value. Why does figurative speech have this 
property? Here, my answer would be: Strong images, like that of an explosion, evoke 
emotions because part of the representation of explosions in memory is strongly emo-
tional. When there is an explosion, we typically get scared. So via the image (of an 
explosion), we become conscious of the emotion, with the consequence that physical 
reactions are stimulated: the word explosion →image of an explosion →feeling of fear → 
impulse to run away.
 With somatic figurative (metonymic) speech, like trembling knees or cold feet, 
the link to emotional consciousness might be even more direct: when emotion cor-
relates with certain physical symptoms, then talking about those physical symptoms 
stimulates the motor image of trembling knees and this, in its turn, stimulates the con-
scious perception of the emotion. This is a kind of James-Lange reasoning (proposed 
by William James & Carl Lange): bodily experience is primary and the mental feeling 
is caused by it.
 The view defended here, namely that the use of figurative speech contributes to 
expressive language has already been hinted at by Fussell & Moss (1998) and more 
recently by Cameron (2008: 13): “Affect is fundamental to why and how people use 
metaphor (…). This being so, the affective cannot be just added on to the conceptual 
but should be seen as a driving force in the use and evolution of metaphors through 
real-time talk.”
Simone Schnall (2005), discussing this issue, refers to Gibbs et al. (2002), when 
she writes: “Gibbs and colleagues (2002) noted that figurative expressions such as I 
totally exploded are understood differently than literal expressions such as I was totally 
angry. One reason why metaphors are so powerful in emotion language is because they 
have the potential to evoke vivid accounts that tap into actual physical experience, 
such as the experience of emotion. (…) Figurative expressions of specific emotions 
reflect aspects of the bodily experience of those emotions.”
 The general argument of this section is, then: Figurative speech is often used 
in relation to emotions. It has been claimed that we do this because emotions are 
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“abstract” and hard to talk about without metaphor and metonymy. Without deny-
ing the role of figurative speech in the conceptualization of emotions, I would like to 
stress its expressive function here. Emotions belong to the class of non-neutral refer-
ents, about which one often talks in an involved way. Figurative speech contributes to 
involvement. Types of language use that aim at emotional effects, such as literature or 
product advertisement, will typically contain figurative speech in a higher frequency 
than texts that have purely rational purposes (news reports, academic lectures, or 
instructions for the use of a machine, for example).
5.  Language and emotion in the perspective of grounded cognition
In its first years, Cognitive Linguistics was inspired by studies in cognitive psychology 
like those of Rosch (1973) on prototype effects in categorization processes. These ideas 
proved to be productive for the analysis of linguistic meaning. It seems that Cogni-
tive Linguistics has to face, for a second time, a development in cognitive psychology, 
namely the new ideas about embodied cognition, cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1999) for a 
contribution from linguistics to this new line of research. What is embodied cogni-
tion, or grounded cognition, as Barsalou (2008) calls it? In Barsalou’s view, cognitive 
processing of conceptual knowledge does not take place in a separate conceptual part 
of the brain, dealing with ‘abstract knowledge’. Neuro-imaging studies show that when 
people process knowledge about animals, visual areas are especially active, and when 
people process artifacts, motor areas become active (as if one wants to use the ball, 
knife, bike, or other artifact in an activity). “Similarly, when people process foods con-
ceptually, gustatory areas become active.” (Barsalou 2008: 627). 
In recent years, embodiment views on processing information have been extended 
to the processing of linguistic information. Words are not processed in a nicely encapsu-
lated mental lexicon. When participants simply read the word for an action, the motor 
system becomes active to represent its meaning (cf. Pulvermüller 2005; Pulvermüller & 
Fadiga 2010). Thus, not only areas in the brain are stimulated, the stimulation continues 
outside of the brain, in the body. When you hear a description of a good meal, some-
times your saliva glands are activated, cf. the Dutch expression het water loopt me in de 
mond, lit. ‘the water runs in my mouth’ (‘I would like to eat it’). And when you hear about 
‘walking’, one can measure activation in your feet, which is, luckily, ‘deactivated’ by the 
brain, otherwise we would act out everything we say and hear. Speech-accompanying 
gestures embody (part of) the content that supports successful communication. 
Embodied grounding also takes place when words with emotional meaning are 
used. Psycholinguistic research has shown that processing emotion-laden words dif-
fers from processing ‘neutral’ words (cf. Scott 2009). Emotion-laden words activate 
the limbic system, the complex of emotional centers in the brain, in particular in the 
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right hemisphere, which is strong in processing prosody, gesture, and emotion words 
(words with a connotation). Landis (2006) performed experiments with emotion-
laden words (fear, kill, pain, dead, love, hate, rage, weep, slap, stab, rape, nude) versus 
non-emotional words (time, view, form, half, fact, main, pile, unit, span, core, dual, gist). 
When presented in the left visual field, and thus processed in the right hemisphere, 
there was an advantage for emotion-laden words: they were processed (recognized) 
more quickly than non-emotional words. This shows that the right hemisphere plays 
a role in the processing of emotional words. Apparently, the resonance between the 
connotation of the word and the emotional part of the brain speeds up the processing. 
Landis also reports that aphasic patients with lesions in the left hemisphere displayed 
a characteristic pattern: “When shown a non-emotional word, patients often struggled 
when trying with effort to articulate the word. (…) When emotional words were pre-
sented the reaction was very different, patients frequently smiled, leant back and pro-
nounced the word without the slightest hesitation” (p. 824). 
Another ingenious experiment on processing emotional language is that of 
Glenberg et al. (2005). They showed that the positive or negative emotional state of 
a subject plays a role when processing sentences with emotional content. Subjects 
had to read pleasant and unpleasant sentences on a computer screen. Sentences with 
pleasant content were, for example: “The college president announces your name, 
and you proudly step onto the stage”, and “You and your lover embrace after a long 
separation”. Unpleasant sentences were “The police car rapidly pulls up behind you, 
siren blaring” and “Your supervisor frowns as he hands you the sealed envelope”. 
Subjects had to judge whether the sentence was pleasant or unpleasant by pressing a 
button for pleasant or the one for unpleasant.
But how to induce a positive or negative emotional state in the subjects? Here 
the experimenters used embodiment theory in an ingenious way. The reasoning is 
as follows: When a person is happy, he will smile, when he is unhappy, he will frown. 
As emotions are strongly connected with bodily posture and facial expression, the 
causing chain might also work the other way around (“facial feedback hypothesis”). 
As Darwin (1872/2009: 333) remarked: “The free expression by outward signs of an 
emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of 
all outward signs softens our emotions.” Glenberg et al. implemented this idea in the 
so-called pen task: subjects had to hold a pen between their teeth or between their lips 
while reading the sentences. The teeth condition produced a smile and via that smile 
a happy feeling, whereas the lips condition caused a frown and through that unhappy 
feeling. The results supported the supposed causal link from body to emotion: Under 
the teeth condition, the sentences with pleasant content were judged more quickly 
than the unpleasant sentences and in the lips condition the result was reversed. Reso-
nance between mood and sentence content facilitated judgment on pleasantness, non-
resonance took an extra step (establishing the difference) to get to the right judgment. 
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The experiment also shows that sentence content is not a purely cognitive content (as 
has often been assumed implicitly in linguistics), the content is automatically loaded 
with emotion, and this emotion plays a role in the processing of the sentence. These 
findings are in accordance with statements that can be found already in Osgood et al. 
(1957: 21): “[S]timuli from several modalities, visual, auditory, emotional and verbal, 
may have shared significances of meanings – cross-modality stimulus equivalence.”
Recently, the grounding of emotional words has become a topic of interest in 
second language acquisition research, cf. Pavlenko (2008). The first (L1) and second 
(L2) language differ in the strength of their link to emotions, both on the level of the 
language in general and on the level of individual words. It has often been reported 
informally that people who acquire a second language later in life and speak it rather 
well, nevertheless feel that it is easier for them to talk about emotional issues in their 
first language. This observation is reflected in experiments. In general, L2 words 
take more processing time in experimental tasks than L1 words (in a lexical decision 
task, etc.); however, the difference between L1 and L2 is even stronger when emotion-
laden words are involved. Apparently, the L1 emotional words have strong links with 
the emotional system, which facilitates processing, whereas the L2 words do not. This 
difference between L1 and L2 may be caused by the way they were learned. L2 is often 
learned in a more rational context (school), with the consequence that it takes time 
(years may be) for L2 emotion words to get linked to the emotional system. Harris 
et al. (2003) have shown the differential impact of emotion words in L1 and L2 by mea-
suring skin conductance by which one can measure how well electricity is conducted 
between two electrodes on the skin. In general, emotional “agitation” leads to stronger 
skin conductance. Subjects had to read taboo words and reprimands in L1 and L2 and 
showed stronger skin conductance for the L1 words. Processing words, in this case 
emotion words, is, apparently not an isolated, encapsulated, process.
In Cognitive Linguistics, it has been argued that language (structures and mean-
ings, in short: constructions) should be grounded in cognition, cf. Croft & Cruse 
(2004: 3), who refer to Langacker’s slogan ‘grammar is conceptualization’. Cogni-
tion, in its turn, has been increasingly considered as being grounded in motion and 
action, cf. Fischer & Zwaan (2008). The present chapter is in agreement with this 
view, but proposes that, besides motion, a second foundational pillar must be added, 
namely emotion, to get a balanced, solid grounding of the higher functions of cogni-
tion and language. In recent literature, the foundational role of emotion is explicitly 
acknowledged. 
Vigliocco et al. (2009) support the core assumption of embodied cognition the-
ories “that the representation and processing of semantic information automatically 
recruits, in some form or other, the same neural systems that are engaged during per-
ception and action”. But at the same time, they emphasize “the role of affective, or emo-
tional, information as another type of experiential information that is foundational 
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(i.e. primary and necessary) in learning and representing meanings, especially for 
abstract words” (p. 220). From their review of experimental research they conclude 
(p. 228) “that the primarily subcortical system engaged in processing emotion from 
non-verbal stimuli (i.e. faces) is also engaged in processing emotional valence of 
words. This suggests interactions between language processing and the limbic system 
along similar lines as it has been argued above for sensory-motor system, thus, sup-
porting the idea of a foundational role of affect”. 
From an ontogenetic perspective, Doan (2010: 1071) states this view as follows:
While there is very little research examining how affective understanding in the 
first year of life may facilitate language acquisition, these studies are suggestive 
in pushing the idea that since emotion is such a fundamental mechanism for 
communication in early life, it may lay the foundations for language acquisition 
in the first year. Affect, whether expressed in language, or through behavioural 
interactions between mother and child, may facilitate children’s understanding 
through the mechanism of engagement.
Finally, we may take a short look at phylogeny. From this perspective, motion has 
been identified as an important basis for the origin of language, cf. Arbib (2005: 34): 
“[B]rain mechanisms supporting language evolved from the mirror system for grasp-
ing in the common ancestor of monkey and human, with its capacity to generate and 
recognize a set of manual actions”. Increasingly, the role of social cognition in human 
evolution is acknowledged, and in that perspective, the foundational role of emotion 
for language comes in perspective, cf. Tomasello (2008: 210): “[T]he desire to cultivate 
affiliations with others forms the basis for one of the three basic motives in the coop-
eration model of human communication: the desire to share emotions and/or attitudes 
with others.” (the two other motives are requesting and informing, which have a more 
practical orientation). In summary: In early humans, motion (action) and emotion 
were important ingredients of practical and social life and both were strong stimuli, or 
even necessary prerequisites, for language to emerge.
6.  Conclusion
Shanahan (2007: 2) states that “the more formal kinds of understanding we have devel-
oped in the last half-century and more largely ignore the fact that feelings inform lan-
guage as much as the cognitive features that have come to dominate the study of it.” The 
preceding sections have made clear, I hope, that emotion gradually receives its proper 
place in research on linguistic meaning. The way emotions “inform language” is at least 
threefold, as I have tried to show in this chapter. Emotions are (a) conceptualized in 
languages by a variety of word forms, with “literal” and figurative meaning, (b) can be 
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expressed in a more direct way by prosody, morphology, syntactic constructions and 
by the use of figurative speech, and (c) are foundational for processing language and 
its ontogenetic and phylogenetic genesis and development. 
I conclude with the question whether insights from research on the relation 
between language and emotions can be transferred to practical contexts. I mention a 
few areas where such insights could be relevant:
 – Language teaching: if the link to emotion is relevant for learning to speak a lan-
guage, the L2 should be taught in ways that allow emotional involvement, cf. 
Schumann (1997). 
 – Psychotherapy: The use of an L2 might protect, in an early phase of therapy, 
against evoking too strong emotions related to traumatic experiences. Switching 
to L1 later in the therapy can have a ‘breakthrough’ effect (cf. Pavlenko 2005).
 – Alexythymia (from the Greek a = lack, lexis = word, thymos = emotion). Alex-
ithymic people are hardly able to talk about their emotions, neither with direct 
vocabulary nor in figurative or other expressive speech.
 – Product advertisement: Putoni et  al. (2009) showed that advertisement in L1 
and L2 have a differential emotional impact. International firms should think 
twice before automatically choosing English as the one and only language for 
advertisements across the world.
 – Intercultural communication, cf. Dem’jankov et al. (2004: 177): “The use of ‘emo-
tional formulae’ in negotiations is efficient to different degrees in different European 
and non-European societies.” 
The ‘emotional revolution’ that took place in psychology 15 years ago, has finally 
reached linguistics. I hope to have shown that linguistics cannot neglect the emotions 
anymore and, for that matter, that emotion research cannot neglect linguistics. Deeper 
insight in the relation between language and emotion can only be reached if the inter-
disciplinary contacts that have been signaled in this chapter are strengthened in future 
research. 
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From pre-symbolic gestures to language
Multisensory early intervention in deaf children
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In this article we will discuss the early development in deaf children and the 
interaction between linguistic, cognitive, and emotional factors. In this context we 
will consider the model of Piaget (1962), in which the early stages of development 
are stated and a pre-linguistic-symbolic form of a toddler’s intelligence is 
recognised. In addition to Piaget’s initial ideas we will focus especially on the 
function of gestures in mother-child-communication, which also occur in a 
hearing toddler’s development and have been dubbed Baby Signs by Acredolo and 
Goodwyn (2002). These gestures will be discussed as pre-symbolic signals that 
enable early communication and have a distinctive function in the transitional 
process towards language acquisition. Subsequently it will be argued that a 
holistic perspective on the development of deaf children should include all 
means of early communication in order to provide a cognitive, linguistic, and 
emotional environment as stimulating as possible. We will conclude that an early 
intervention philosophy, which includes signs or sign languages, embraces such a 
perspective on deaf children’s linguistic and cognitive development and can help 
to address their psycho-emotional needs.
Keywords: deaf children; early communication; social-emotional development; 
language acquisition; early intervention; baby signs; sign language; bilingual 
education
1.  Introduction
Over the last decade major developments have occurred in deaf education: Many 
countries, like Germany and the USA, are developing newborn hearing screenings in 
order to be able to identify a hearing loss at an earlier stage (Sass-Lehrer & Bodner-
Johnson 2003; Bundesministerium 2008), there are more sophisticated hearing devices 
available, i.e. digital hearing aids and cochlear implants. On top of that, intensive early 
intervention programs have been established in many places. Despite these efforts, the 
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classical problem of deaf education remains, whereby 40 to 65 percent of the congeni-
tal deaf children show a clear developmental disorder in spoken (and consequently 
written) language (Günther, i.p.). This is linked to a permanent crisis in communica-
tion and leads to problems in the social-emotional development: Deaf children are 
three to six times more likely to develop child-psychiatric disorders than their hearing 
counterparts (Meadow & Trybus 1979: 402; Kammerer 1988: 193; Hintermair 2009).
Also, more recently a deeper understanding of the nature of sign language has 
been established, which has lead to its recognition as a regular language and the evalu-
ation of its cultural and social benefits for the deaf community (Heßmann 2001: 2; 
Marschark et al. 2006: 9). Sign language has become more accepted in deaf education 
in recent years and is nowadays included in some teaching concepts in schools for the 
deaf (Karchmer & Mitchell 2003: 26; Günther et al. 2009), because of results indicating 
that sign language serves as a functional base for the acquisition of verbal language 
(Chamberlain & Mayberry 2000; Günther & Schäfke 2004; Günther & Hennies 2011). 
Furthermore, it has been discovered that language development in spoken language 
and in sign language show strong resemblances when learned from a caregiver who 
primarily uses the language. Research has proven that the language acquisition in 
both languages undergoes similar milestones in the same timeframe, from the syllabic 
babbling state to the first words and two-words-structures (Petitto 2000: 43; Masataka 
2008: 201), as well as in the acquisition of semantic, morphological, and syntactic 
structures (Schick 2003). But especially in early intervention programs profession-
als – i.e. medical personal and special need educators – often advise parents against 
the use of sign language or do not include sign language in their concepts (Diller et al. 
2000: 58; Meadow-Orlans et al. 2003: 22), following the argument that the use of sign 
language would harm the successful acquisition of spoken language.
2.  Language development in deaf children
Language skills of deaf children have traditionally been tested by examining reading 
or writing. These pioneering studies on literacy can be found in the first two decades 
of the 20th century, linked to names like Rudolph Pintner in the USA (Chamberlain & 
Mayberry 2000: 222) or Rudolf Lindner in Germany (Günther 1985: 27). Although 
their results already foreshadow the findings of later studies, the seriousness of the 
deaf students’ problems in written language has become evident in larger studies 
since the 1980ies: Conrad (1979) shows that 50% of deaf students and 25% of hard-
of-hearing students of a specific graduation year in England and Wales leave school 
as functional illiterates. For the western part of Germany these findings have been 
confirmed by Günther and Schulte (1988). In the USA the reading literacy of deaf 
and hard-of-hearing students has been tested on a regular basis since in the 1970ies, 
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using a special standardized version of the Stanford Achievement Test (Paul 1998: 67). 
Despite the general early identification and supply with hearing aides or cochlear 
implants, the results of the reading segment in the 9th edition of 1996 remains poor: 
The median score of deaf and hard-of-hearing students at the end of their entire school 
career is comparable to what hearing children achieve in the last years of primary 
school (Gallaudet Research Institute 1996; Holt et al. 1997; Traxler 2000; Karchmer & 
Mitchell 2003: 31). Although hard-of-hearing students outperform the deaf students, 
they nevertheless show a substantial delay in their reading development compared to 
the hearing norming sample. Therefore, it is plausible that the underlying reason for 
the delayed literacy skills is a very limited ability in spoken language, influenced by the 
degree of hearing loss (Marschark & Spencer 2006: 13).
Since more recent studies have concentrated on the early language development, 
especially under the condition of early cochlear implantation, it can be demonstrated 
that the origin for poor results in reading and writing lie in the delayed language 
acquisition in early childhood.
The current situation of deaf children cannot be discussed without addressing the 
question of the benefit of cochlear implants. A cochlear implant is a medical device 
that replaces the damaged function of the inner ear, when hair cells do not transform 
acoustic information into neural stimulation (NIDCD 2007). It picks up sound out-
side the ear and sends it to electrodes in the cochlear, directly stimulating the acoustic 
nerve. In the case of a functioning acoustic nerve deaf people will experience auditory 
sensations immediately after the adaptation of the speech processor, thus being able 
to “to hear” in a broader sense. Cochlear implants have been in use since the 1980ies 
for those who lost their hearing later in life; in the 1990ies children who were born 
deaf started to receive cochlear implants. Currently about 50% of the congenital deaf 
children undergo this operation often at a very young age because of the early identifi-
cation of their hearing loss during a newborn hearing screening. However, even under 
the improved circumstances of early identification, cochlear implantation and speech 
therapy, a successful language acquisition of deaf children is by no means guaranteed, 
as shown in the following paragraph:
In Germany there has been one major study that documented the language devel-
opment of a representative sample of early identified deaf children (N = 91) with hear-
ing aids or a cochlear implant in oral communication programs (Diller et al. 2000: 133). 
The study relies on the assessment by parents of their offspring’s development in given 
categories: About 50% of these children show delays in their language acquisition, 
in the subgroup of children with a cochlear implant there are 40% with language 
delays and in the subgroup of children with hearing aids about 60%. After these initial 
findings there have been several studies with smaller groups of cochlear implanted 
children, like the first one also stressing oral communication programs and exclud-
ing children with first languages other than German or additional handicaps. All of 
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these studies, although different in methodology and scientific approach, suggest that 
about half of the early identified deaf children with a cochlear implant show language 
delays, without a predictor previously indicating for which of the deaf individuals this 
is to be expected (Szagun 2001a, 2001b; Lürßen 2003; Graser 2007; Szagun 2010). The 
study by Szagun (2001a/b) is important even for the international discussion, because 
it includes a strictly controlled group of 22 deaf toddlers, who had received the implant 
at a very young age (mean age: 02;05 [yy;mm]; earliest age: 01;02; latest age: 03;10). 
None of them had had additional handicaps and they all came from monolingual 
backgrounds and were in a professional early intervention program. 22 hearing tod-
dlers served as a control group, with an age comparable to the “hearing age” of the 
deaf children (the time period since the implantation). Based on periodically recorded 
spontaneous utterances the language acquisition was analysed with regard to the lexi-
con, the MLU (mean length of utterance in morphemes) and the morpho-syntax. 12 of 
the 22 deaf children only produced MLUs of 2.3 morphemes about three years after the 
implantation. Because these children had already reached an age of five to seven years, 
Szagun (2001: 136) doubts that they will ever will catch up with their peers. In the USA 
studies have shown similar results with 40% to 70% of cochlear implanted children not 
undergoing a language acquisition comparable to hearing children  (Geers 2006: 263). 
Results of a longitudinal study with Australian deaf children support these find-
ings, that cochlear implanted children achieve higher average scores in language 
related tests than children with hearing aids, but still show language delays and do not 
reach the same language acquisition rate as hearing children (Blamey et al. 2006: 89). 
Furthermore, there is a broad variety of results within the sample of implanted chil-
dren, with language delays between one and six years, when age equivalent of test 
scores and real age are compared  (Blamey et al. 2006: 94).
But these problems do no affect deaf children (with or without cochlear implant) 
alone: A long-time documentation of the development in a German clinic leads to the 
assumption that even a significant portion of less-than-severe hard-of-hearing chil-
dren is facing similar obstacles in their language acquisition (Kiese-Himmel 2006).
It has been argued that “a range of outcome levels is to be expected in any hetero-
geneous sample, whether or not the children use cochlear implants” (Geers 2006: 263), 
but since the group of deaf and hard-of-hearing children is not likely to become more 
homogeneous in the future, this should lead to a reconsideration about how early 
intervention programs can react adequately to this challenge.
3.  Consequences for the socio-emotional development
As for the question on the possible consequences that delayed language acquisition and 
the reduced communication skills of the deaf children have on their socio-emotional 
development, only a limited number of studies is available. There is a groundbreaking 
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study by Kammerer (1988), in which he discusses the ability of 10 to 13 year old stu-
dents in schools for the deaf (N = 274) to express themselves and communicate: More 
than 40% of these deaf and hard-of-hearing teens describe their chances to commu-
nicate with their families as low or non-existing, while the parents, and especially the 
mothers, see their offspring’s chances to communicate with them overwhelmingly posi-
tive (Kammerer 1988: 123). When it comes to communicating with strangers a majority 
of the hearing-impaired children say that they have limited abilities, including about 
75% of the deaf children (Kammerer 1988: pp.130).
These communication problems lead to equally severe emotional consequences, 
with studies indicating that deaf and hard-of-hearing students are in great risk of 
developing psychological problems, the percentage being about three to six times 
higher than for the hearing population (Kammerer 1988: 193; Meadow & Trybus 
1979: 402). In the mean time these findings have been supported by most studies 
about the social and emotional situation of deaf and hard-of-hearing children, most 
recently by a number of studies in German, using the “Strengths and Difficulties Ques-
tionnaire” (SDQ-D) (for an overview, see Hintermair 2009): In their CHEERS-study 
in Austria Holzinger et al. (2007: 449) confirm that there is a significant relationship 
between child-psychiatric problems and the ability of deaf and hard-of-hearing stu-
dents (n = 116) to communicate with their families.
However, although these findings about the socio-emotional development are 
highly likely to be rooted in the early childhood, the link between the deaf infant’s 
upbringing and the deaf adolescence’s and adult’s condition has not been conceptu-
alized. In addition to this, the emotional and linguistic development is rarely inves-
tigated in a single framework. There is only one longitudinal study focusing on 
different aspects of the development of deaf and hearing infants (N = 80) between 6 and 
18 months (Meadow-Orlans 2004: 26). Based on a number of studies a model of spe-
cific developmental aspects at the age of 9, 12 and 18 months could be established, in 
which the mothers’ hearing status and their choice of communication serve as predic-
tors for the deaf children’s early social interaction and subsequently have an impact 
on their language development (Spencer et  al. 2004: 216): “[A] uniquely significant 
contributor” to the “[q]uality of interaction” in deaf children at the age of 12 months 
proved to be the “[m]others’ production of sign and/or gestures”, regardless of the 
mothers’ hearing status (Spencer et al. 2004: 211). The “mothers’ production of sign/
gestures at 12 months” is also “[t]he only unique predictor” for the 18-month language 
level of these children (Spencer et  al. 2004: 210), including measures of signed and 
spoken language skills (Spencer 2004: 152). This study provides important insight into 
the relationship between social, emotional and linguistic developments. It shows that 
“[t]he entire set of mother and child 12-month measures contributed to prediction of 
deaf children’s language” (Spencer et al. 2004: 216) and highlights the importance of 
the early social and emotional development in a deaf child. Although there is no deter-
mined result of any choice of communication, the inclusion of signs or gestures has 
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a positive impact – or one can argue that it is also their exclusion that has a negative 
impact – on the social development. A stable social interaction with ones mother is a 
necessary precondition for a flourishing language acquisition.
These findings indicate that it is not the diagnosis shock of hearing parents alone 
which lead to the social and emotional difficulties in a deaf child’s upbringing, but rather 
the way intervention programs deal with these initial emotions. In their study Hinter-
mair et al. (2000: 119) find less than a quarter of 217 parents of deaf children mention-
ing a pedagogical or medical professional as a supportive force in their lives. This is 
an astonishingly low number and raises the question, if all of these programs provide 
the best suitable environment for the upbringing of a deaf child. Part of the problem 
might be the preference for a certain choice of communication and the biased pressure 
to concentrate on spoken language, nowadays very often linked to the advice for an early 
cochlear implantation. Because of this, other important aspects of a caregiver’s behav-
iour are likely to stay underdeveloped. In Germany only one private initiative offers 
(early) intervention with the participation of deaf and hearing professionals. There is 
only feedback from a limited numbers of families participating in this program, but this 
has been very positive (Hintermair & Lehmann-Tremmel 2003).
Pisoni et al. (2008: 89) add to the mentioned results a neuropsychological perspec-
tive: Deaf children with cochlear implants show “evidence of disturbances in cognitive 
and emotional control, monitoring behavior, self-regulation, planning and organisa-
tion“ (89 – see also Luria 1973). They argue with Clark (1998) for viewing “develop-
ment and use of speech and language as embodied processes linking brain, body, and 
world together as an integrated system” (94).
The cited research on language skills, communication, and social development 
merely presents pieces of a puzzle that has not been fully investigated. It is evident, 
though, that the crisis concerning these aspects of a deaf or hard-of-hearing person’s 
life already starts in the early infancy and is not solely linked to the ability to acquire 
spoken language. Early intervention programs should be designed in such a way that 
they address all aspects of early development instead of focusing primarily on spoken 
language skills and medical procedures. In the next paragraph we will discuss the pre-
conditions for such a holistic early intervention philosophy during the first years.
4.  From pre-linguistic gestures to language
We will choose the works of Piaget (1951; 1952; 1962) as a fundamental basis for 
the discussion because he provides a single semiotic framework, in which the early 
development of recognition, cognition, and language can be discussed. According 
to Stern (1990) and Dornes (1993) an infant displays more competences than Piaget 
(1951) had assumed. Although they give a more differentiated picture about the 
 From pre-symbolic gestures to language 375
sensorimotor intelligence in early childhood, they basically support Piaget’s ideas. 
For the period of the first two years his model offers particularly notable insight. 
This period is also at the centre of the first broader longitudinal study on deaf chil-
dren’s emotional and linguistic development (Spencer et al. 2004) that may help in 
understanding about how the early social and emotional behaviour is linked to the 
first measurable linguistic skills. Therefore, we will concentrate on the transitional 
aspects towards language in this period, meaning the processes which lead to what 
William Stern (1971: 133) called the “discovery of the general symbolic function of 
the language”.
According to Piaget a child undergoes its sensorimotor stage, roughly during the 
first one and a half years of its life. In this period it has a dominant visual attention, 
shows manual competences (touching/grasping), has an episodic cognition and grad-
ually enriches its cognitive schemes in order to combine different sensual sensations 
about a single object. The infant does not yet have an iconic-symbolic representa-
tion. In this stage spoken language is recognised in form of its phonological patterns 
(Dittmann 2002: 20), but it is comparatively less stimulating than the dominant visual 
and sensorimotor sensation.
The second period of Piaget’s model is the preoperational stage. In the transitional 
processes between the sensorimotor and the preoperational stage certain conditions 
for the ability of symbolic representation are being developed: Especially the discov-
ery of object permanence and playful imitation contribute to this competence. This 
discovery that “everything has its name” (Stern 1971: 132) can also be described as 
“permanence of meaning”, which Lüdtke (2006: 281) sees as a first climax in early child 
development, in which the interaction with the mother enables a child to gradually 
enrich its understanding of the others’ communicative motives through imitation. In 
this transitional period meaningful interaction and shared use of communicative sig-
nals are linked to the emotional connection with the caregiver, because both are neu-
rologically based on mirror neurons or mirror systems. Tomasello (2005: 21) points 
out that “joint attentional frame and common ground“ between mother and child as 
well as the ability of the child to understand “communicative intentions“ are central 
aspects of the movement towards language.
During this period we find even in hearing children gestures in the communi-
cation between caregivers and children (Acredolo & Goodwyn 2002), which can be 
seen as an expression of the emerging understanding of symbolic systems. Such deic-
tic and iconic gestures precede the hearing child’s language and are replaced by the 
first words (Volterra & Erting 1990). When a deaf child is raised by a deaf caregiver, 
hence by a native signer, it shows pre-linguistic gestures before actually acquiring the 
sign language system in the same way hearing infants do (Petitto 2000: 43, Masataka 
2008: 213). Together with manual babbling in deaf and hearing children (Petitto 2005; 
Masataka 2000: 18; 2008: 201) and vocalic babbling in hearing children these gestures 
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are part of the early dominance of a manual-vocal communication. At the age of 14 
months a “gestural-vocal ‘equipotentiality’” (Volterra et  al. 2005: 34) is reached and 
spoken language is established as main means of communication.
These are strong indications that pre-linguistic gestures are part of the natural 
development towards language, especially since they cannot be conceptualized with-
out addressing the emotional binding between mother and child. In the case of deaf 
children of hearing parents one can assume that these natural components of the 
language development are neglected or even suppressed when parents are advised to 
concentrate on spoken language and not to use signs or sign language. Horsch (2004) 
documents the case study of a deaf toddler and compares it to a control group of hear-
ing children of hearing parents. She investigates the role of early dialogues between the 
mother and the infant. She finds that the deaf infant’s early communication attempts, 
including vocalization, occur even more often than in the hearing control group 
(Horsch 2004: 127). The mother of the deaf child produces communication in form 
of motherese less often than the mothers of the control group (Horsch 2004: 133). If 
these findings can be reproduced on a larger scale, it could lead to the assumption that 
the focus on spoken language and the exclusion of early signs and gestures might even 
hinder parents to support the first steps towards an acquisition of spoken language 
by not reacting to early phonetic utterances as part of an early acquisition of dialogue 
structures. The results of Spencer et al. (2004) that the social development of a deaf 
child in this age group is influenced by the mothers’ choice of communication suggest 
that the exclusion of a communication system is more likely to result in a mother-
child-relationship in which the emotional base for an early dialogue is less given.
Finally, when we take into consideration the parallelism of spoken language and 
sign language acquisitions, where the role of speech motherese in the first dialogues 
between hearing parents and their hearing children is very similar to the way signed 
motherese is used by deaf parents of deaf children (Grieder 2000; Masataka 2000: 4; 
2008: 191), it is evident that sign language and spoken language develop inside the 
same milestones of development. A holistic and multisensory approach to the early 
intervention might prove valuable to match a deaf child’s developmental needs. Such 
an approach could be considered as part of a larger, multilingual intervention concept 
that includes signs or sign language.
5.  Benefits of early bilingual intervention
In the USA there is an ongoing scientific debate comparing the results of oral com-
munication programs (OC) and total communication programs (TC), but the find-
ings have been inconclusive (Geers 2006: 256). One reason might be that the way 
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“[c]ommunication mode (...) is (...) dichotomized into OC approaches and TC 
approaches” (Geers 2006: 256) is a too broad concept for comparative studies. Especially 
the variety of concepts that fall under the term of total communication can emphasize 
different visual communication systems and include them in a variety of ways (Geers 
2006: 256). Therefore, often only case-studies support the idea that a deaf cochlear 
implanted child can benefit from a sign language including early intervention programs: 
In a study of three children Yoshinaga-Itano (2006: 323) demonstrates how spoken lan-
guage can be based on a sign language, comparable to a “piggyback ride”.
It is useful to turn to the Scandinavian countries when the possible benefits of 
bilingual early intervention are being discussed, the use of sign language having been 
traditionally less controversial in these countries. Preisler et  al. (2002) follow the 
development of 22 deaf toddlers and preschoolers with cochlear implants who are 
between 2 and 5 years old, by periodically video-taping their interaction with par-
ents, educators, and peers: The children with good oral skills also demonstrate good 
sign language skills due to the fact that they “live in a stimulating communicative 
environment” (413). It is also remarkable that one of the few studies about the social-
emotional development, in which deaf students do not show significantly worse results 
than the control group, is a representative evaluation of 379 Finnish hearing-impaired 
students among whom the use of sign language is common (Sinkkonen 1994). Future 
early intervention research with the focus on language abilities in different modali-
ties might confirm these findings, especially because in school settings the positive 
influence of sign language skills or a bilingual teaching method has been described in 
several studies (Günther & Schäfke 2004; Günther & Hennies 2011; Chamberlain & 
Mayberry 2000).
6.  Implications for early intervention
The development of an early diagnosis due to the establishment of newborn hearing 
screening has led to the fact that congenital deaf children are increasingly identified in 
their early infancy. Despite this fact the portion of deaf and hard-of-hearing children 
with massive problems in the acquisition of spoken language and subsequently of writ-
ten language, as well, remains high. Consequently the social and emotional develop-
ment of these children has to be seen as highly problematic. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to reconsider and re-evaluate the methods of early intervention. There is obviously a 
new need to include the knowledge about early psychological processes in intervention 
programs. But the long-term social-emotional consequences of these developments 
are not clear, neither have professionals in the field of early intervention programs 
been prepared for this kind of challenge. Traditionally the major concern expressed by 
378 Klaus-B. Günther & Johannes Hennies
these professionals is the early stimulation of biological pathways in order to acquire 
spoken language. This concern has lead to a massive implantation in deaf children, 
often at an age of less than two years. As shown above such a biased perspective bears 
the danger of failing deaf children in their overall development, which may also pose 
a great burden on their families. It is very likely that the strong advice not to use a cer-
tain way of communication and to focus on one sense primarily hinders the parents, 
who are already emotionally destabilized, in their ability to apply intuitive parenthood 
even further. In extreme cases the focus on spoken language might become one of the 
obstacles to actually acquire it.
Marschark and Spencer (2006: 5) describe how “[b]uilding (...) spoken language 
skills can range from unisensory (...) to bilingual-bicultural programs”. In the light 
of Piaget’s model it might be more adequate to speak of a range from unisensory to 
multisensory methods during the pre-symbolic phase. The term of “monoligual” and 
“bilingual programs” are useful in the post-symbolic phase.
A multisensory early intervention philosophy could include pre-linguistic signs 
and could lead to a bilingual preschool setting, offering deaf and hard-of-hearing chil-
dren all possibilities for a functional language development. If this turns out not to be 
necessary, a monolingual language acquisition can easily be built on a multisensory 
early intervention. However, to apply a multisensory approach with the declared goal 
of a monolingual language acquisition is an inconsistent model.
In an early intervention program the parents’ choice of communication should 
be respected, however, there should nevertheless be obtainable information about 
the role of spoken language in a deaf or hard-of-hearing individual’s life as well as an 
insight into the life of deaf sign language users and the signing community. An equal 
cooperation of deaf, hard-of-hearing and hearing professionals in the field of early 
intervention would contribute to such a holistic perspective.
7.  Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the linguistic, emotional, and social development of 
deaf and hard-of-hearing children. The results of the available studies indicate that a 
notable part of these children suffers from a massive retardation of spoken language 
and reduced possibilities in their means of communication, and shows disturbances 
in the social and emotional development. Only recently more studies focus on the 
early years. They support the suggestion that these problems start in the infancy of 
the hearing impaired child. Using Piaget’s stages of development we have discussed 
the transition of the sensorimotor stage to the pre-operational stage when the func-
tion of symbolic communication is discovered by the toddler. The importance of this 
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period has been highlighted by Spencer et al. (2004). They link the mothers’ choice 
of communication to the social and emotional interaction between mother and 
child during the sensorimotor stage, and to the first language expressions in the pre-
operational stage. In this transitional process towards language we find pre-linguistic 
gesture as a first expression of the symbolic function of language, during the same 
time in which Piaget describes the occurrences of the object permanence and playful 
imitation in children to take place.
In order to assist deaf children in these crucial moments of early development 
intervention programs should apply a holistic and multisensory philosophy, which is 
open to all forms of communication. We would argue that the advice to exclude signs, 
gesture or sign language from the communication with deaf children does not corre-
spond to the needs of these children. It contributes to the parents’ problems to develop 
attachment to and a satisfying early communication with their deaf children. All these 
are factors that might influence the language acquisition of deaf children in a negative 
way. This leads us to the conclusion that a holistic and multisensory early intervention 
with the option for a later bilingual education would rather serve the developmental 
needs of a deaf child.
References
Acredolo, L. & S. Goodwyn (2002). Baby signs: how to talk with your baby before your baby can 
talk. Chicago: Contemporary Books.
Blamey, P., J. Sarant & L. Paatsch (2006). Relationships among speech perception and language 
measures in hard-of-hearing children. In P.E. Spencer & M. Marschark (Eds.), Advances in 
the spoken language development of deaf and hard-of-hearing children (85–102). New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2008). Bekanntmachung eines Beschlusses des Gemeinsa-
men Bundesausschusses über eine Änderung der Kinder-Richtlinien: Einführung eines Neuge-
borenen-Hörscreenings. ·http://www.g-ba.de/downloads/39–261-681/2008-06-19-Kinder-
H%C3%B6rscreening_BAnz.pdf Ò [2010-2-7].
Chamberlain, C. & R. Mayberry (2000). Theorizing about the relationship between American 
Sign Language and reading. In C. Chamberlain, J.P. Morford & R.I. Mayberry (Eds.), Lan-
guage acquisition by eye (221 - 259). Mahwah (NJ)/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Clark, A. (1998). Being there – putting brain, body and world together again. Cambridge (Mass.)/
London: MIT Press.
Conrad, R. (1979). The deaf school child: language and cognitive function. London: Harper and Row.
Diller, G., P. Graser & C. Schmalbrock (2000). Hörgerichtete Frühförderung hochgradig hörge-
schädigter Kleinkinder. Heidelberg: Winter.
Dittmann, J. (2002). Der Spracherwerb des Kindes: Verlauf und Störungen. München: C.H. Beck.
Dornes, M. (1993). Der kompetente Säugling: die präverbale Entwicklung des Menschen. Frankfurt 
a.M.: Fischer.
380 Klaus-B. Günther & Johannes Hennies
Gallaudet Research Institute (1996). Stanford achievement test, 9th Edition: norm booklet for deaf 
and hard-of-hearing students. Washington (DC): Gallaudet University.
Geers, A. (2006). Spoken language in children with cochlear implants. In P.E. Spencer & 
M. Marschark (Eds.), Advances in the spoken language development of deaf and hard-of-
hearing children (244–270). New York: Oxford University Press.
Goodwyn, S., L. Acredolo & C. Brown (2000). Impact of symbolic gesturing on early language 
development. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 24, 2, 81–103.
Graser, P. (2007). Sprachentwicklung bei Kindern mit Cochlear Implant. Heidelberg: Winter.
Grieder; S. (2000). Brabbeln und Babysprache: Erwerb und Entwicklung von Gebärdensprache 
und gesprochener Sprache bei hörenden und gehörlosen Kindern. Zürich: VUGS.
Günther, K.-B. (1985). Schriftsprache bei hör- und sprachgeschädigten Kindern. Bedeutung und 
Funktion für Sprachaufbau und Entwicklung; dargestellt am Beispiel gehörloser Kinder. 
 Heidelberg: Groos.
Günther, K.-B. (2012). Hörbehinderung als Sprach- und Kommunikationsstörung. In 
U. Lüdtke & O. Braun (Eds.), Enzyklopädisches Handbuch der Behinderung: Vol. 8: Sprache 
und Kommunikation. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Günther, K.-B. & J. Hennies (2011). Bilingualer Unterricht in Gebärden-, Laut- und Schriftsprache 
mit gehörlosen SchülerInnen in der Primarstufe: Zwischenbericht zum Berliner  Bilingualen 
Schulversuch. Hamburg: Signum.
Günther, K.-B., J. Hennies & M. Hintermair (2009). Trends and developments in deaf education 
in Germany. In D. Moores & M. Miller (Eds.), Deaf people around the world: educational, 
developmental and social perspectives. Washington: Gallaudet University Press, 178–193.
Günther, K.-B. & I. Schäfke (2004). Bilinguale Erziehung als Förderkonzept für gehörlose Schül-
erInnen – Abschlussbericht zum Hamburger Bilingualen Schulversuch. Hamburg: Signum.
Günther, K.-B. & K. Schulte (1988). Berufssprachbezogene Kurzuntersuchung (BSK) – Konjunk-
tionale Verbindungen und Prädikatskonstruktionen als Indikatoren für berufssprachlich 
geforderte Kompetenz. In K. Schulte; C. Schlenker-Schulte & K.-B. Günther (Eds.), 
 Fortentwicklung berufssprachlicher Fähigkeiten Hörgeschädigter: Forschungsergebnisse 
(246–329). Bonn: Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung.
Heßmann, J. (2001). Gehörlos so!: Materialien zur Gebärdensprache: Band 1: Grundlagen und 
Gebärdenverzeichnis. Hamburg: Signum.
Hintermair, M., G. Lehmann-Tremmel & S. Meiser (2000). Wie Eltern stark werden: Soziale Unter-
stützung von Eltern mit hörgeschädigten Kindern. Hamburg: Verlag hörgeschädigte kinder.
Hintermair, M. & G. Lehmann-Tremmel (2003). Wider die Sprachlosigkeit. Beratung und För-
derung von Familien mit gehörlosen Kindern unter Einbeziehung von Gebärdensprache und 
gehörlosen Fachkräften. Hamburg: Signum.
Hintermair, M. (2009). Ver(haltens)störungen bei hörgeschädigten Kindern: Anmerkungen zur 
sozial-emotionalen Entwicklung von Kindern und ihre Relevanz für Entwicklungen unter 
der Bedingung “Hörschädigung”. dfgs forum,, 32–51..
Holt, J., C. Traxler & T. Allen (1997). Interpreting the scores: a user’s guide to the 9th edition Stan-
ford achievement test for educators of deaf and hard-of-hearing students. Washington, DC: 
Gallaudet University.
Holzinger, D., J. Fellinger; B. Hunger & C. Beitel (2007). Gebärden in Familie und Schule. 
Ergebnisse der CHEERS-Studie in Oberösterreich. Das Zeichen, 77, 444–453.
Horsch, U. (2004). Frühe Dialoge als Element der Hör- und Sprachentwicklung. In U. Horsch 
(Ed.), Frühe Dialoge: Früherziehung hörgeschädigter Säuglinge und Kleinkinder: Ein 
Handbuch (121–137). Hamburg: hörgeschädigte kinder.
 From pre-symbolic gestures to language 381
Kammerer, E. (1988). Kinderpsychiatrische Aspekte der schweren Hörschädigung. Stuttgart: 
Enke.
Karchmer, M. & R. Mitchell (2003). Demographic and achievement: characteristics of deaf and 
hard-of-hearing students. In M. Marschark & P.E. Spencer (Eds.), Oxford handbook of deaf 
studies, language and education (21–37). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kiese-Himmel, C. (2006). Eine Dekade Göttinger Hör-Sprachregister: Persistierende periphere 
Hörstörung und Sprachentwicklung im Kindesalter. Heidelberg: Median.
Lüdtke, U. (2006). Intersubjektivität und Intertextualität: Neurowissenschaftliche Evidenzen für 
die enge Relation zwischen emotionaler und sprachlicher Entwicklung. Sonderpädagogische 
Förderung, 3, 275–297.
Luria, A.R. (1973). The working brain: an introduction to neuropsyhology. New York: Basic 
Books.
Lürßen, U. (2003). Untersuchung zum Wortschatz und phonologischen Gedächtnis bei Cochlear-
Implant-versorgten Kindern. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang.
Marschark, M., B. Schick & P.E. Spencer (2006). Understanding sign language development. In 
B. Schick; P.E. Spencer & M. Marschark (Eds.), Advances in the sign language development 
of deaf children (3–19). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Marschark, M. & P.E. Spencer (2006). Spoken language development of deaf and hard-of-
hearing children: historical and theoretical perspectives. In P.E. Spencer & M. Marschark 
(Eds.), Advances in the spoken language development of deaf and hard-of-hearing children 
(3–21). New York: Oxford University Press.
Masataka, N. (2000). The role of modality and input in the earliest stage of language acquisition: 
studies of Japanese Sign Language. In C. Chamberlain, J.P. Morford & R. Mayberry (Eds.), 
Language acquisition by eye (3–24). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Masataka, N. (2008). The onset of language. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meadow, K. & R. Trybus (1979). Behavioral and emotional problems in deaf children: an 
overview. In L. Bradford & W. Hardy (Eds.), Hearing and hearing impairment (395–403). 
New York: Grune & Stratton.
Meadow-Orlans, K. (2004). Participant characteristics and research procedures. In K. Meadow-
Orlans; P.E. Spencer & L.S. Koester (Eds.): The world of deaf infants: a longitudinal study 
(24–39). Washington, D.C: University Gallaudet Press.
Meadow-Orlans, K., D. Mertens & M. Sass-Lehrer (2003). Parents and their deaf children: the 
early years. Washington, D.C: Gallaudet University Press.
NIDCD - National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (2007). Cochlear 
implants (NIH Publication No. 00-4798). <http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/hearing/coch.
htm> [2009-03-01].
Paul, P.V. (1998). Literacy and deafness: the development of reading, writing and literate thought. 
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Petitto, L.A. (2000). The acquisition of natural signed languages: lessons in the nature of human 
language and its biological foundations. In C. Chamberlain, J.P. Morford & R.I. Mayberry 
(Eds.): Language acquisition by eye (42–50). Mahwah (NJ)/London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Petitto, L.A. (2005). How the brain begets language. In McGilvray, J. (Ed.), The Cambridge 
companion to Chomsky (84–101). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Piaget, J. (1951). Psychology of intelligence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Piaget, J. (1962). Play, dreams and imitation in childhood. New York: Norton.
382 Klaus-B. Günther & Johannes Hennies
Pisoni, D.B., C.M. Conway; W.G. Kronenberger; D.L. Horn; J. Karpicke & S.C. Henning (2008). 
Efficacy and Effectivness of Cochlear Implants. In M. Marschark & P.C. Hauser (Eds.), 
Deaf cognition. Foundations and outcomes (52–101). New York/London: Oxford University 
Press.
Preisler, G., A.-L. Tvingstedt & M. Ahlström (2002). A psychological follow-up study of deaf 
preschool children using cochlear implants. Child: care, health & development, 5, 403–418.
Sass-Lehrer, M. & B. Bodner-Johnson (2003). Early intervention: current approaches to family-
centered programming. In M. Marschark & P.E. Spencer (Eds.), Oxford handbook of deaf 
studies, language and education (65–81). New York: Oxford University Press.
Schick, B. (2003). The development of American Sign Language and manually coded English 
systems. In M. Marschark & P.E. Spencer (Eds.), Oxford handbook of deaf studies, language 
and education (219–231). New York: Oxford University Press.
Sinkkonen, J. (1994). Evaluation of mental health problems among Finnish hearing impaired 
children. Psychiatria Fennica, 25, 52–65.
Spencer, P.E. (2004). Language at 12 and 18 months: characteristics and accessibility of linguistic 
models. In K. Meadow-Orlans; P.E. Spencer & L.S. Koester (Eds.), The world of deaf infants: 
a longitudinal study (147–167). Washington, D.C: University Gallaudet Press.
Spencer, P.E., K. Meadow-Orlans; L. Sanford Koester & J.L. Ludwig (2004). Relationships across 
developmental domains and over time. In K. Meadow-Orlans; P.E. Spencer & L.S. Koester 
(Eds.), The world of deaf infants: a longitudinal study (205–217). Washington, D.C: Univer-
sity Gallaudet Press.
Stern, D. (1990). Diary of a baby. New York: Basic Books.
Stern, W. (1971). Psychologie der frühen Kindheit. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.
Szagun, G. (2001a). Wie Sprache entsteht: Spracherwerb bei Kindern mit beeinträchtigtem und 
normalem Hören. Weinheim; Basel: Beltz.
Szagun, G. (2001b). Language acquisition in young German-speaking children with cochlear 
implants: individual differences and implications for conceptions of a "sensitive phase". 
Audiology & Neuro-Otology, 6, 288–297.
Szagun, G. (2010). Einflüsse auf den Spracherwerb bei Kindern mit Cochlea Implantat: Implan-
tationsalter, soziale Faktoren und die Sprache der Eltern. hörgeschädigte kinder – erwach-
sene hörgeschädigte, 1, 8–36.
Tomasello, M. (2005). Constructing a language – a used-based theory of language acquisition. 
Cambridge (MA)/London: Harvard University Press.
Traxler, C. (2000). The Stanford achievement test, 9th Edition: national norming and perfor-
mance standards for deaf and hard-of-hearing students. Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf 
Education 5, 4, 341–348.
Volterra, V. & C. Erting (1990). From gesture to language in hearing and deaf children. Berlin: 
Springer.
Volterra, V., M.C. Caselli; O. Capirci & E. Pizzuto (2005). Gesture and the emergence and 
development of language. In M. Tomasello & D.I. Slobin (Eds.), Beyond nature – nuture. 
Essays in honor of Elizabeth Bates (3–40). Mahwah (NJ)/London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Yoshinaga-Itano, C. (2006). Early identification, communication modality, and the develop-
ment of speech and spoken language skills: patterns and considerations. In P.E. Spencer & 
M. Marschark (Eds.), Advances in the spoken language development of deaf and hard- 
of hearing children (298–327). New York: Oxford University Press.
The challenge of complexity
Body, mind and language in interaction
Edda Weigand
University of Münster
In our post-Cartesian times we can assume that human abilities are integrated 
abilities and that body, mind, language and emotion interact. We can finally open 
up the ‘black box’ and observe how the brain works, at least to some extent. ‘New 
Science’ has been developed on the basis of consilience or the unity of knowledge 
of the natural and social sciences and the humanities. The challenge is to describe 
how human beings address the complexity of life, which includes the issue of how 
we can move others by moving ourselves.
The chapter starts from human beings and their abilities, which are 
determined by human nature, the environment and culture. On a sociobiological 
basis it proposes a holistic approach that aims to explain how human beings act 
and react in ever-changing surroundings. Different theses on the relationship 
between the individual and the species are discussed, resulting in the view of 
human beings as social individuals who need to go beyond the shared mind and 
to interact in dialogue. The Mixed Game Model is introduced as a holistic model 
that starts from the natural object and derives methodology from it. The object 
is the complex human ability of ‘competence-in-performance’, which requires 
an adequate methodology based on Principles of Probability. A few authentic 
examples are analysed in order to illustrate how different human abilities interact 
in language use, especially the abilities of speaking, thinking, having emotions 
and perceiving, and to show how they enable us to move others by moving 
ourselves.
Keywords: emotions; integration; consilience; sociobiology; holism; the Mixed 
Game Model; competence-in-performance
1.  Living in post-Cartesian times
How is it possible that ‘moving ourselves’ can lead to ‘moving others’, those we do not 
even know, those who might live at the opposite side of the world? Many actants are 
involved: words in language use such as to move, modern communication technology, 
and at the core the internal relatedness of ourselves and others. The “New Science” 
addresses the issue of “how we connect with others” (Iacoboni 2008). The connection 
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certainly is made in our minds but is not restricted to our minds. Can it make sense to 
consider the human species as beings destined to understand each other? The human 
species is a species of individuals who need to interact in dialogue. The mental ability 
of ‘understanding’ in the hearer’s mind is only the first step in the interactive process 
of ‘coming to an understanding’. From the very beginning, mirror neurons point to 
action and not only to understanding (Weigand 2002a). Dialogic action presupposes 
dialogic mental orientation. ‘Intersubjectivity’ or ‘the shared mind’ can be considered 
a precondition of interaction (Trevarthen 1999; Zlatev et al. 2008). The issue is: how 
are we to conceive of this step from intersubjectivity to dialogic action?
The ‘New Science’ starts from the natural object, living beings, and tries to 
describe their behaviour and actions by means of goal-directed observation. Accord-
ing to Feynman (2001: 173), “making observations” must not omit “the vital factor 
of judgment about what to observe and what to pay attention to”. Such an endeavour 
cannot accept the limits of disciplines nor can it be restricted to abstraction and reduc-
tion. What is abstracted from is lost forever. The complex object inevitably requires a 
holistic theory if it is to be adequately described and explained. It does not evolve from 
addition of methodologically separated parts but from interaction of sub-complexes 
(see also Zlatev 2003: 8). As a whole it is more than the sum of all the interactions. A 
few voices, like Austin (1962) and Simon (1962), emphasized that the starting point 
has to be the complex whole. They did however not get a great deal of attention in 
the past. Recent neurological experiments on mirror neurons, for instance, eventu-
ally demonstrated that there is no ‘simple’ starting point (e.g. Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; 
Damasio 1994; 2000): the physiological object cannot be separated from its function 
(cf. Weigand 2002: 230). From the very outset, body and mind, perception and inten-
tion are directed towards dialogic interaction.
Body, mind, and language interact, as is also testified by language use if analysed 
without methodological blinders. For instance, we have the phrases the inner eye, 
their mind’s eye “das geistige Auge” or we can move the audience as well as move the 
chairs. Of course, we can construct artificial theories and describe such phrases as fig-
urative or metaphorical use of language. However, separating in this way the concrete 
from the mental contradicts routines of language use. The concrete and the mental 
are connected as interacting components in the “architecture of complexity” (Simon 
1962) which allows us to explain how physical motion can cause physiological (e)
motion and vice versa. All our senses, cognitive abilities and emotions are embodied 
senses and abilities. How else could we, for instance, explain blushing as an exter-
nal marker of embarrassment? Even our sense of being a self is anchored in a body 
(Ramachandran 2003: 125). Embodiment of cognition and emotion seems to be a key 
concept to human behaviour.
Human beings need specific capacities in order to cope with ever-changing 
surroundings, basically the capacity of adaptation. Adaptation means grasping the 
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complex from the very outset as a whole by any ability and means available, and by 
changing the course of action whenever necessary. Human abilities are used in the 
way they are neurologically programmed. As we know in post-Cartesian times, they 
are internally connected and used in integration. The mind or cognition inevitably 
interacts with other human abilities. What science has separated over the centuries in 
the wake of Descartes by postulating, for instance, an area of reason separated from 
emotion, turns out to be the result of a methodological fallacy (Damasio 1994).
Starting from human beings and their abilities is an inevitable consequence for 
any scientific endeavour if it seriously reflects the insight that whatever we think and 
perceive is dependent on our abilities. This insight might seem banal but it is crucial 
in respect of analysis: human abilities are capacities as well as restrictions. The world as 
such or any so-called absolute truth is beyond our reach. We are at the centre of the 
complex whole, we live in the world, not outside the world. What we perceive and think 
is not the total range of what can be perceived and thought. There are, for instance, 
animals which can see and hear what human eyes and ears cannot perceive. In the end 
any statement of truth remains a claim to truth, or as Wittgenstein (1972: 32e) puts it: 
“Mustn’t we say at every turn: ‘I believe this with certainty’?”
If we try to develop a theory which accounts for the complex whole, we need to 
go beyond traditional theorizing and to start from our natural object of study ‘human 
action and behaviour’ by means of ‘goal-oriented’ observation. Observation is thus 
combined with evaluation according to the benchmark of crucial criteria. Crucial 
criteria for human action and behaviour are, in the end, evolutionary criteria. In this 
way we can set up premises that circumscribe the complex object and describe how 
it works. The methodology of such a holistic theory can then be derived from the 
premises (see Section 3).
2.  The individual human being and the species
The complexity starts with human beings’ double nature as individuals as well as social 
beings (Weigand 2007). The relationship between the individual and the species has 
been the object of various theses:
 – human beings as selfish individuals (Dawkins 2006)
 – human beings as symbolic beings (Deacon 1997)
 – human beings as intersubjective beings (Trevarthen e.g. 1999; Zlatev, Racine, 
Sinha & Itkonen 2008)
 – human beings as social individuals (Weigand e.g. 2007)
These will be, in turn, discussed in this section.
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2.1  Human beings as selfish individuals
Nobody would object that human beings are selfish beings. I am however reluctant 
to follow Dawkins’ thesis (2006: 2) that we misunderstand how evolution works if we 
assume “that the important thing in evolution is the good of the species (or the group) 
rather than the good of the individual (or the gene)”. Of course, such a view and the 
catchword of the “selfish gene” excite attention. Dawkins’ arguments however are not 
always convincing. He explains the selfish gene as follows (p. 88):
It is trying to get more numerous in the gene pool. Basically it does this by helping 
to program the bodies in which it finds itself to survive and to reproduce. But 
now we are emphasizing that ‘it’ is a distributed agency, existing in many different 
individuals at once.
To my mind, Dawkins’ argumentation turns the chain of reasoning upside down. He 
rightly points to the survival of “the bodies”. However, he considers the bodies to be 
individuals and contradicts the statement that they are programmed as members of 
the species. I think this precisely makes the difference: according to Dawkins, human 
individuals are genetically programmed as individuals and can learn altruism by cul-
ture (p. 3): “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.” 
Even if he thus concedes “a limited form of altruism” (p. 2), his overall tenet stands as it 
is: evolution is directed towards “the good of the individual (or the gene)” rather than 
“the good of the species (or the group)”. To my mind, however, it is hardly sufficient, in 
terms of evolution, to believe that the individual counts as an individual. In terms of 
evolution, the individual counts insofar as it counts for the species.
According to Lipton (2008: 15), “we need to move beyond Darwinian Theory, 
which stresses the importance of individuals, to one that stresses the importance of 
the community. […] Evolution becomes a matter of the survival of the fittest groups 
rather than the survival of the fittest individuals.” Wilson (2004: 157ff.) imagines “a 
spectrum of self-serving behavior” ranging from benefiting the individual to ben-
efiting “the highest sociopolitical units”. He considers human beings as having an 
“innate predisposition” to social behaviour and assigns them a position “on the spec-
trum somewhere between the two extremes”. For him it is not self-contradictory that 
“true selfishness […] is the key to a more nearly perfect social contract”; or to put it 
like Gordon (1975): “man defending the honor or welfare of his ethnic group is man 
defending himself ”.
The individual has been at the centre of philosophic interest since antiquity. 
Stressing now the selfish gene as an argument for the selfish individual, goes beyond 
philosophical thought and introduces evolutionary criteria. Talking about the selfish 
gene throughout a whole book however seems to me exploiting a single phrase inap-
propriately. Genes as well as human individuals are interacting members of complex 
networks. Genes distributing themselves as “replicators” or “distributed agencies” are 
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not really interacting. Interaction needs some shared basis, for human individuals 
‘the shared mind’, which is laid down in our genetic blueprint. Our consciousness is a 
double consciousness that of being individuals as well as social beings. Human beings’ 
double nature is differently weighted in any individual on a scale that ranges from 
extreme selfishness to seemingly total social orientation. Evolution certainly needs 
the individual’s selfishness because otherwise the species could not survive. Trying to 
attract attention by the catchword of the selfish gene may have an effect for a moment 
but in the end does not stand up to close examination.
The goal of describing and explaining human actions and behaviour points, at 
its core, to the ultimate question of who we are, a question which seems to go beyond 
the reach of human cognition. We can explain our self-consciousness, according to 
Damasio (2000), by our ability to connect our actions and behaviour with ourselves, 
but the question of who we are ultimately seems to be inaccessible to our conscious-
ness and understanding. What does it really mean when we all think of ourselves in 
terms of ‘ego’? We seem to have consciousness about what we are doing, what we are 
feeling, and about being dependent on what our fellow beings are doing. But, in the 
end, the ego, our own ego, remains an elusive concept. Perhaps the last illusion? Cer-
tainly an illusion or at least a question of faith if we believe that our own personal self 
will have some existence after our lifetime. Why should it be of interest to biology that 
the individual survives as an individual? Evolution is interested in the survival of the 
species. The species survives if the individual struggles to survive. This is the reason 
why the individual has to be a selfish individual. There is no contradiction between 
the selfishness of the individual and the advantage for the species. On the contrary, 
it is in the interest of the species if individuals are to some degree selfish individuals. 
It is not a question of ‘either or’ but a question of ‘as well as’. If the individual’s selfish 
ego acts exclusively in its own interests, it will, in the end, destroy the species as well 
as itself. Acting exclusively for social concerns, on the other hand, is basically nothing 
other than masking the individual’s selfish interests with social terms. Human beings 
are neither individuals in the sense of hermits nor cogs in the social machine. The 
species flourishes if the individual flourishes. Consciousness of our own self implies 
consciousness of our social embeddedness, of the self as being the self of the other 
human being.
2.2  Human beings as symbolic beings
The thesis of human beings as the symbolic species also draws on the individual even 
if it uses the term “species” (e.g. Deacon 1997; Wilson 1999). Deacon’s book on “The 
symbolic species” stimulated intensive discussion among linguists as it concerns a 
central linguistic issue, the issue of word meaning and reference. Although Deacon 
and Wilson depict a reasonable network of the co-evolution of social and biological 
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processes, their view of language and communication is restricted to what they call 
“symbolic communication”. We might be content that they include communication, 
but their focus is on the feature “symbolic”. It is not so easy to understand what they 
really mean by these terms. According to Deacon (1997: 22), “language is not merely 
a mode of communication, it is also the outward expression of an unusual mode of 
thought – symbolic representation …”, or more precisely (p. 41):
I mean language in the following very generic sense: a mode of communication 
based upon symbolic reference (the way words refer to things) and involving 
combinatorial rules that comprise a system for representing synthetic logical 
relationships among these symbols.
According to Wilson (1999: 146f.) “concepts and their symbols are usually labeled 
by words. Complex information is thus organized and transmitted by language 
composed of words.” The background of such theses is a view of language as trans-
mitting information by means of words. With respect to the progress brought 
about by the view of ‘coevolution of genes, mind, and culture’ (Lumsden & Wilson 
2005), the view of language as symbolic language can be interpreted as a relapse 
into orthodox models of sign theory. Symbolic representation as a mode of thought 
characterizes human beings as thinking individuals. Nothing is really said about 
communication if it is reduced to symbolic reference by words and to information 
transfer.
As a linguist I wonder what symbolic reference as “the way words refer to things” 
is intended to mean. Deacon combines symbolic reference with “combinatorial rules 
that comprise a system for representing synthetic logical relationships among these 
symbols”. Reference in the narrow linguistic sense of identifying objects as individual 
or generic objects is not achieved by words but by noun phrases which are in part 
constructed by combinatorial rules. In Deacon’s “generic sense” of “the way words refer 
to things”, word meaning can be understood as evoking concepts independent of the 
speech situation in a process which is unique to human communication. However we 
interpret the “everyday miracle of word meaning and reference” (p. 43), the term “sym-
bol” is obviously used in a broad sense, not in the literary sense of creating a symbol 
which by means of the concrete points to something figurative.
Symbols play an important role in mainstream linguistics, not only in models 
of language as a sign system but also in pragmatic models that try to arrive at per-
formance by starting from competence. The meaning of a word is claimed to be a 
concept in our mind, a ‘symbol’ for its ‘real’ meaning in the external world. It is 
attached to and described as a defined part of the sign. In performance, however, 
meanings are not defined by signs but negotiated by human beings. The symbolic 
model is based on methodological exigencies of reduction and abstraction, not on 
the complex natural object.
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Reference to things not present in the situation is certainly a very important 
component of interaction, which increases the effectiveness of language for commu-
nicative purposes. The evolution of the species however does not primarily depend 
on its ability to refer to things but on its ability to negotiate communicatively, i.e. 
for dialogic purposes including reference. Language plays a major role in this pro-
cess of negotiating meaning and understanding, not as a system of symbols but as an 
integrated component that is in part determined by biology and in part by culture 
(Weigand 2007).
One might wonder whether the concepts of language as a system of symbols 
and language as an integrated component in the process of negotiating meaning and 
understanding really exclude each other. Couldn’t we revise the theory of signs with 
the aim of arriving at natural language use? The question is to be posed in principle: 
could there be a semiotic theory of performance? A theory of signs might be part of a 
semiotic-pragmatic theory; however, such a pragmatic theory cannot cope with per-
formance as it is artificially constructed by the addition of parts, which do not exist 
as separate parts in natural language use. Using the terms ‘component’ versus ‘part’ 
underlines the issue at stake. Integration of components does not come about by the 
addition of parts; integration means the interaction of components that are intercon-
nected from the very beginning. Including a system of symbols in a theory of perfor-
mance inevitably represents an artificial step that affects the whole theory.
A revised theory of signs, such as Ruthrof ’s ‘corporeal pragmatics’ (2009 and 
forthc.), is based on two parts: language and perception. There is however no language 
as such, no signs which have meaning on their own. Rather, there are human beings 
and their abilities of speaking and perceiving which are from the very outset inte-
grated as components of the complex whole of human behaviour (Weigand forthc.). It 
is human beings who communicate by the use of their abilities; all their abilities, from 
emotions to self-awareness, are inevitably embodied abilities. Perhaps Ramachandran 
(2003: 125) is right in suspecting mirror neurons to be “at least partly involved in gen-
erating our sense of ‘embodied’ self-awareness as well as our ‘empathy’ for others”.
Semiotics, in general, and Ruthrof ’s corporeal pragmatics, in particular, does not 
go beyond structuralist methodology. They start by claiming the existence of two sign 
systems, of verbal expressions and non-verbal ones. Furthermore, the ‘perceptually 
oriented theory of language’ needs to be humanised (Weigand 2002b). It is from the 
very outset human beings’ needs and purposes, not simply perception, from which 
communication starts. Communication as interaction means more than “information 
control” (Ruthrof 2009: 6), namely making claims to truth and volition and interac-
tively negotiating these very claims (see below). Some remarks by Ruthrof (forthc.: 
Chapter 8) can be read as pointing to ‘interaction’ and the need to go beyond a ‘cor-
poreal pragmatics’. The issue however cannot be settled by ‘complementation’ but by 
changing the core of description.
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2.3  Human beings as intersubjective beings
A dialogic perspective is put forward by Trevarthen (e.g. 1999: 415) and his view of 
human beings as intersubjective beings
Intersubjectivity is the process in which mental activity including conscious 
awareness, motives and intentions, cognitions, and emotions is transferred bet]
ween minds.
But ‘transfer between minds’ is not yet dialogic action. For Trevarthen (1999: 416) 
“human linguistic dialogue … rests on intersubjective awareness”. ‘Mental activity’ and 
‘linguistic dialogue’ thus remain to some extent separated, the one being the basis for 
the other. ‘Linguistic dialogue’ in the sense of dialogic action however does not mean 
transferring thought into action. Nor is it the case that we ‘do things with words’. We 
‘do things’ with our abilities to talk to one another and to share our minds and percep-
tion in interaction. What I would like to stress is the intrinsic interconnectedness of 
body, emotion, mind, and language from the very beginning, as for instance, suggested 
by research on mirror neurons (e.g. Weigand 2002a; Bråten 2007). Emotion and men-
tal activity are not something in the air but from the very outset are embodied in the 
brain. Only in this way are we able to feel empathy and compassion and are moved by 
perceiving what happens to other people, be it in everyday life or in the arts.
Trevarthen’s position of the intersubjective being is an important step forward 
as it goes beyond the limit of the individual being and takes account of the individ-
ual’s dialogic orientation. The mind is a mind we share in part. The same view is, for 
instance, taken by Humphrey (2002: 176): “We are beings with a unique capacity to 
mind, to mind what we are and to mind what other people are.”
Zlatev et  al. (2008: 6) define the notion of intersubjectivity as “the sharing and 
understanding of experiential content”. Whereas Trevarthen (forthc.) considers inter-
subjectivity to be also shared by animals, according to Zlatev et al. (2008: 12) inter-
subjectivity points to the complex phenomenon of “what it means to be human”. ‘The 
shared mind’ however cannot be the pivot of the survival of the species any more than 
can ‘transfer between minds’. Living together means we need to talk and act together 
practically. Moreover, what does ‘the shared mind’ or ‘sharing experiential content’ 
mean precisely? Human beings are social individuals. They are able to share experi-
ences in part but do not act on totally common ground. Meaning and understanding 
are different for different individuals and are negotiated in dialogue. Some common 
ground and the ability to share experiences are a necessary precondition; the pivot 
however is human beings’ needs and purposes, which drive them to act communi-
catively and practically. Human beings are not destined to think dialogically but to 
interact dialogically.
There is one point in the work of Zlatev (2003) which is particularly worth mention-
ing. In his sketch of a “meaning-as-value theory”, he suggests seeing the driving force for 
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human action in an internal value system which “is intimately connected to emotion 
and feeling” (p. 258). Even if ‘notions of moral obligation’ were already included in 
Trevarthen’s notion of intersubjectivity (1999: 417), Zlatev relates values more directly 
to human action. Although he considers meaning in a very general sense that goes 
beyond linguistic meaning, it is enlightening to see that his hierarchy of meaning sys-
tems starts from value systems. His tenet that “life implies the presence of intrinsic 
value” (p. 255) coincides with my assumption of evaluation as the basic and intrin-
sic first step in human action (e.g. Weigand 2007). According to Zlatev (2003: 258) 
“internal value systems signal to the organism that some action needs to be taken. 
They thus give rise to motivation and various degrees of intentionality, in the sense of 
goal-directedness.” The issue however remains how the term ‘action’ is to be conceived.
2.4  Human beings as social individuals
Intentionality and goal-directedness are indeed crucial features of human action that 
need to become the centre of attention. If we try to justify our view by evolution-
ary criteria, I doubt whether humankind’s evolutionary development can be solely 
based on intersubjectivity and sharing our minds. Intersubjectivity is rooted in the 
double nature of human beings as social or dialogic individuals. Trevarthen (2008: vii) 
rightly points out that human beings are not “single heads processing information, 
storing it up in memory for reprocessing, and transferring it symbolically”. Nor are 
they restricted to having minds that can share mental activity. There is no independent 
theory of the mind. The dialogic mind calls for dialogic action. All the abilities and 
concepts discussed so far – self-interest, symbols, intersubjectivity and value systems – 
are essential components in human dialogic interaction but are not crucial in them-
selves as far as evolution is concerned. Humankind is not limited to intersubjectivity; 
human beings could not survive if their intentions only referred to sharing experience. 
Human beings are destined to interact. They are social individuals who act in their 
own interests but inevitably have to take account of social concerns. In this sense, it is 
not the dialogic mind but dialogic interaction that characterizes human beings as the 
dialogic species. Evolution cares for the individual only insofar as it is a member of the 
species. Evolutionary concerns of the human species require dialogic interaction and 
the emergence of language when the purposes and goals of interaction become more 
and more demanding.
3.  How to deal with complexity
Progress in science requires going beyond the limits of traditional approaches. 
Nowadays, we recognize limits in various respects: the limits of individual disci-
plines, of the individual human being, of the mind and of language if considered as 
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separate independent fields. The view of human beings as social individuals faces 
the challenge of addressing complexity with a genuinely holistic approach which 
crosses the limits of disciplines, goes beyond the level of the mind and places indi-
vidual beings at the centre of the dialogic action game. Let us see what conclusions 
can be drawn for the architecture of a holistic theory that is capable of describing and 
explaining human beings’ action and behaviour.
The theory of dialogic action games or the Mixed Game Model (MGM) addresses 
complexity in two steps. The first step aims to achieve an understanding of the com-
plex whole by a set of premises which are the result of goal-directed observation. An 
understanding of the whole includes understanding how it works. Thus the method-
ology of the theory has to be derived from the object, i.e. from the premises about 
the complex whole, not vice versa. A holistic theory only works in this direction: the 
starting point has to be the complex natural whole from which methodology has to 
be derived. Starting from methodological exigencies will inevitably ‘damage’ the natu-
ral object and result in a reductionist model (Martinet 1975: 10). Having expounded 
premises and the resulting methodology of the MGM in various recent publications 
(e.g. Weigand 2006a; 2007; 2009; 2010), I can restrict myself here to focusing on how 
the model deals with the interaction of body, emotion, mind, and language.
3.1  Premises
Let me start with premises which circumscribe the complex whole and identify the key 
or driving force for how it works.
 – The object-of-study or the complex whole can be grasped as a dialogic action 
game with human beings at the centre. Human beings do not find themselves out-
side the world or detached from what happens in the game but live in the world, 
act in the game. Physical ‘reality’ is dependent on the instruments used to measure 
it. What we consider as concrete, visible or audible depends on our senses. The 
world could be a different world looked at with different eyes and apprehended 
with different minds. The world as such is beyond our reach.
 – Human beings have needs and desires, which are the driving force for their actions 
or the key to opening up the complex whole. As dialogic beings their demands are 
dialogically directed and negotiated in dialogic interaction.
 – Human beings are not the ‘victims’ of complexity; they are able to cope with the 
mixed games of life by their extraordinary ability of ‘competence-in-performance’ 
which can be paraphrased in Sampson’s words (2005: 193) as “being capable of 
coming to terms with whatever life throws at us”.
 – Competence-in-performance consists of many integrated abilities, among them 
the abilities that draw on the mind and body, i.e. cognition, emotion, perception, 
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and speech, which are used as dialogic means for dialogic purposes. There is 
no separate object language, only the ability to speak which interacts with other 
abilities and is influenced by emotions (cf. Weigand forthc.). As a consequence, 
linguistic models that address performance by the separation and addition of 
parts, such as the speaker, discourse, and the situation, cannot claim to describe 
competence-in-performance.
 – Complexity as a whole is more than the sum of individual components and abili-
ties (Simon 1962). Sociolinguistic models based on the addition of components, 
such as ‘language’ and ‘interaction’ (e.g. Gumperz 2003: 111ff.), will not solve the 
issue of complexity (Weigand 2004a). Language use is more than a sign system put 
to use. Linguistic signs and conditions of performance are incompatible and resist 
any reasonable combination.
 – Complexity is ever-changing and requires human beings to act as adaptive beings 
under conditions of uncertainty according to Principles of Probability. Human 
beings apply rules and conventions as far as they go and rely on individual infer-
ences when the game turns out to be played as a game beyond standard conditions.
The Theory of the Mixed Game thus starts from human beings as dialogic individuals 
and aims to explain how physics and physis interact, how moving ourselves can cause 
others to be moved, how reason is influenced by emotion, or, in general, how body, 
mind and language interact. Human beings’ consciousness is a consciousness of these 
various abilities in their mutual dependencies that cannot fully be controlled. Human 
beings can question their abilities but cannot go beyond them. Human cognition 
inevitably remains restricted to human capacities.
3.2  Methodology
As mentioned above at the beginning of Section 3, the methodology of a holistic theory 
is to be derived from the premises about the complex object. Competence-in-perfor-
mance does not arise from an independent system of rules, conventions or norms nor 
from a methodology of ‘anything goes’. The contrast between semantics and pragmat-
ics, between a coded system and inferential use, is a contrast constructed by ortho-
dox theory and inadequate to explain language use. The methodology we are looking 
for has to conform to the way human beings come to grips with the uncertainty of 
life (Toulmin 2001). Explicit and implicit means of communication, the use of rules 
and inferences, complement each other. In simple cases, where everything seems to be 
explicitly said, suggestion will not be needed. In complex cases where nothing seems 
to be clear, human beings proceed tentatively by referring to particularities of the game 
that might help to clarify what is going on. In general, they address the uncertainty of 
life by adapting to ever-changing conditions on the basis of Principles of Probability. 
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The bridge between competence and performance which linguistics has searched for 
for decades is not a step that combines different methodologies but a step taken in 
human beings’ minds. Principles of Probability are applied to the decision of individual 
interlocutors and are changed in accordance with the conditions of the game.
Before starting to introduce the individual principles in more detail, I would like 
to shed some light on the very first step in this process of adaptation to the com-
plex architecture of the game. This first step is a simple mental action that is often 
neglected: the step of focusing attention. Being at the centre of the mixed game, we 
first focus attention on some sub-complex. In this way we start with complexity from 
the very outset. Usually we first focus attention on standard conditions and in a sec-
ond step broaden our view towards particular conditions if understanding cannot be 
achieved by reference to standard cases.
From this view of human beings as dialogically interacting beings, constitutive or 
basic principles can be derived. These are the Action Principle, the Dialogic Principle 
proper and the Coherence Principle which is of special interest to the issue of body, 
emotion, mind, and language in interaction. Examples that illustrate the principles are 
given in Section 4.
The Action Principle gives an answer to the question of what makes up an action 
in general. Having intentions does not yet necessarily mean carrying out an action. 
Actions of any type, communicative, mental and practical actions, are based on 
the correlation of purposes and specific means by which the purposes are attained. 
Depending on the type of action, the specific means are communicative, mental, or 
practical means. Dialogic actions can be double-layered actions, i.e. behind openly 
expressed purposes they can pursue different hidden interests. Consequently Searle’s 
(1969) formula F(p) has to be extended by including interests as dominant predicate 
(e.g. Weigand 2006a):
Action Principle
Interest [purpose (reference + predication)]   ↔   communicative means
Figure 1. Action Principle
Communication does not proceed by means of a concatenation of single autono-
mous speech acts but by means of sequences of internally related initiative and reac-
tive speech acts. The features ‘initiative’ versus ‘reactive’ are not only formal features 
dependent on the position in the sequence but primarily qualify the speech acts 
as functionally different speech acts: initiative speech acts make a dialogic claim, 
reactive speech acts fulfil this very claim (e.g. Weigand 2006a). Dialogic action is, 
in the end, based on two fundamental claims, a claim to truth and a claim to voli-
tion, which conform to the basic mental states of belief and desire (Weigand 1991). 
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The connection between the processes in the brain and language action that has been 
searched for extensively becomes manifest and emotion plays a fundamental role: 
action starts from beliefs and desires.
The dialogic nature of every single speech act and the resulting basic structure of 




Figure 2. Dialogic Principle proper
In this way dialogue is constituted at the level of interaction by action and reac-
tion. Only by action and reaction can the interactional purpose of the dialogue ‘com-
ing to an understanding’ be attained. The correlation of action and reaction goes 
beyond the correlation of meaning and understanding at the level of the shared mind 
or intersubjectivity. An utterance is meant by the speaker and more or less under-
stood by the interlocutor. Understanding or sharing our minds is never total, always 
gradual. Understanding is a mental action by the hearer and related to the utterance of 
the speaker. However, due to the intrinsic integration of our abilities we are unable to 
stop with understanding and cannot help taking a position, i.e. reacting, in general by 
accepting or objecting, i.e. basically evaluating the speaker’s position.
The third constitutive principle, the Principle of Coherence, relates to the dialogic 
means by which dialogic action is performed. Dialogic means rely on abilities of the 
body, mind and language and are used as integrated means which complement each 
other. Coherence of dialogue comes about by understanding how the dialogic means 
interact. The Coherence Principle thus represents the crucial principle for the interaction 
of body, emotion, mind and language:
Coherence Principle
Interest [purpose (reference + predication)]    ↔    communicative means 
(speech, perception, cognition)
Figure 3. Coherence Principle
The term ‘coherence’ was initially introduced as a term that exclusively related to the 
text, i.e. to verbal means. In the meantime the level of the text has lost its autonomous sta-
tus: coherence of the text changed to coherence in the mind (Givon 1993; Weigand 2000). 
Speaking or verbal means are intrinsically intertwined with other communicative 
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means, mainly those of thinking and perceiving. Feelings as a physiological phenom-
enon have a bodily expression that becomes manifest without or even against the inten-
tion of the speaker. They can take the role of communicative means in so far as they are 
intentionally demonstrated. The basic tenet of speech act theory of ‘doing things with 
words’ can be considered very generally a catch phrase. We do not act by speaking alone; 
we act with utterances which are a combination of different communicative means. By 
making an utterance we speak and at the same time we see what is going on in the 
speech situation and we make assumptions about the conditions of the game. Our com-
municative abilities interact when producing the utterance as the carrier of the action.
As a consequence of such a view of coherence, we have to change our traditional view 
of language and speaking. There is no separate object ‘language’, only the ability to speak 
which is an integrated part of human competence-in-performance (Weigand 2009). 
The nature of language manifests itself in language use as it happens in dialogic inter-
action. Language is used by individual human beings. Of course, there must be some-
thing common in their use, not only rules, conventions or norms but also techniques 
such as inferences; otherwise language would be of little help in coming to an under-
standing. It is however the speakers who decide whether to conform to these norms 
or not. “Common knowledge” is only in part common knowledge and above all not 
equal knowledge. The species is made of individuals who do not precisely know what 
is behind the face of the other individual. As social, intersubjective individuals, we 
are able to share knowledge, in principle and in part. Shared knowledge is, in the end, 
individually shaped knowledge and is negotiated in dialogue. Negotiation of meaning 
and understanding presupposes intersubjectively oriented minds.
Constitutive Principles are combined with Regulative and Executive Principles. 
Regulative Principles mediate between different and even contradictory abilities 
and interests. They are, for instance, responsible for how we match our self-interest 
with respect for the other human being as well as for how we deal with emotions. 
Principles of Emotion mediate between emotion and reason. Methods of regula-
tion are dependent on cultural conventions (Weigand 1998a, 2007). Whereas in 
Northern Europe we often follow a principle such as “Hide your emotions in pub-
lic”, such a principle does not seem pervasive in southern countries or in America 
(Weigand 2004b: 18f.). Emotions are only in part intentionally controlled. They 
are strong enough to cancel rationality whereas the “controlling power of reason is 
often modest” (Damasio 2000: 58).
The eminent role of emotion in human beings’ behaviour is in fact no longer in 
doubt (e.g. Lüdtke 2006). According to Foolen (1997: 26), “emotions are an important 
part of our self-experience, and they cannot be left out of an enterprise that aims to be 
experiential”. How could such an experiential enterprise be reconciled with a view of 
language as determined by norms? The result would invariably be an artificial concept 
of language incompatible with human self-experience.
 The challenge of complexity 397
Executive Principles finally refer to cognitive processes and strategies with which 
we try to successfully pursue our interests and purposes. Executive Principles are thus 
part of a rhetoric of dialogue which evaluates communicative means with respect to 
their effective use in specific dialogic action games (Weigand 2008a).
4.  Sample cases
Having sketched the theoretical basis of the mixed game, I am now going to illus-
trate the interaction of language, emotion, mind, and body by a few obvious examples. 
They clearly manifest our competence-in-performance as a complex integrated abil-
ity if looked at without methodological blinders. Even if “pragmatics allows humans 
into the analysis” (Yule 1996: 4), one might still be burdened by the traditional view of 
language as an independent object. Yule thus considers it a “problematic case” when 
he passes other people and is unable to understand what they are talking about even 
though they are speaking the same mother language. There is nothing to be surprised 
at if we take into account that discourse or spoken language is not an autonomous 
object. We communicate by simultaneously speaking, thinking, and perceiving. It is 
therefore a natural consequence that as observers we often cannot understand what 
other people are talking about even if they speak the same language; we simply do not 
share their minds. We have to be insiders of the game, and not even as insiders can we 
see what is going on behind the face of our interlocutors. In the end, in problematic 
cases only the speaker knows what he/she meant.
Such a view of the complex integrated whole is beyond the reach of clear-cut rule-
governed models where understanding is conventionally or normatively defined and 
presupposed as the equal understanding between speakers of the same mother lan-
guage. Methodological claims of this type cannot be our starting point if we aim to 
come to grips with human beings’ competence-in-performance. We have to start from 
the complex whole and try to find coherence at the level of interacting components. 
Understanding then turns out to be a never-ending process that can only gradually be 
attained.
The first type of examples we are going to analyse illustrates the interaction 
between speaking and thinking or language and cognition. I take the well-known 
example of Brown & Yule (1983: 196):
 (1) a. There’s the doorbell.
  b. I’m in the bath.
These two utterances show no sign of textual coherence; nonetheless they are con-
nected. Obviously we understand their internal relationship even without any descrip-
tion of the situation. We do not need, like Brown & Yule, to resign, or need to assume 
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a zero connector, like Stati (1990). Coherence comes about by the Dialogical Principle 
proper and by the interaction of verbal means with cognitive means. Our actions are 
dialogically oriented: with the initiative utterance of our example the speaker makes a 
dialogic claim to truth, and indirectly to volition, and expects a reaction that addresses 
this claim from the interlocutor. The initiative and reactive utterance are thus connected 
at the cognitive level by making and fulfilling the same claim. That is precisely what is 
represented by the Dialogic Principle proper, which is not in need of any verbal sign 
because it is based on human beings’ nature as intersubjective, i.e. dialogical individuals.
Cognition comes to play in this example in another respect, too. The claim to 
volition of the initiative utterance is not explicitly expressed by verbal means but left 
to inferences. It is a characteristic of indirect speech acts that the real claim remains 
uncertain, in the balance of probabilities and is thus to be negotiated: someone has to 
open the door, if possible the interlocutor (also Weigand 2002b).
Speech not only relies on sharing our minds; it is also intrinsically connected with 
shared perception as we can see with the following authentic example (Weigand 2002b):
 (2) a. One for her.
  b. Eve, too.
Without a description of the speech situation we will not really understand what is 
going on in this action game. We might be baffled and ask: Where have all the ‘sen-
tences’ gone? We do not find sentences; we find utterances, i.e. communicative means, 
not just verbal ones. Verbal means are integrated with perceptual means in a way that 
go beyond language rules or norms. It is necessary to perceive what is going on in 
order to understand. In our case we can observe that B, the father, is cutting willow 
branches for the son, and A, the mother, asks him to cut a branch for the daughter: one 
for her, which is accepted by the father: Eve, too. Integration in the sense of interacting 
dialogic means – verbal, perceptual, and cognitive – is a constitutive feature of human 
competence-in-performance.
Perception cannot be separated from speech. This is in part the reason why oral 
and written language cannot be directly compared. Perception in the speech situa-
tion and perception in the written medium are completely different and consequently 
result in different ways of constructing utterances.
There is also another issue that finds its genuine explanation in the integration 
of speaking, thinking, feeling and perceiving: the issue of human beings’ ability to 
produce ever-new utterances never produced before. It can no longer be considered 
an astonishing event but the natural consequence of the fact that meaning is created 
through the eyes of individuals and is not only expressed by the use of verbal means. 
The complexity of meaning and understanding is, in principle, without limits. Neither 
Chomsky’s recursive rules (1965) nor the infinite possibilities of variation in spoken 
language touch upon the real issue.
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The following authentic example illuminates once more very clearly the complex 
network of communicative means that we use without any effort in everyday com-
munication (see also Weigand 2004c). I will first present this example without any 
description of the speech situation, i.e. as if we could ‘trust the text’ (Sinclair 1994) or 
accept a concept of language as autonomous object:
 (3) H: Lassen Sie sich nicht anstecken!
  (Don’t let yourself get infected!)
  E: Sind Sie krank?
  (Are you ill?)
  H: Haben Sie nicht das Wasser gesehen? Jeder hat sein Hobby.
  (Didn’t you see the water? Everyone’s got a hobby.)
  F: Das würde ich nie machen, wo wir soviel bezahlen allein fürs Putzen.
  (I’d never do that when we pay so much just for the cleaning.)
   E: Ah, jetzt verstehe ich. Sie haben recht. Nein, da lasse ich mich nicht  
anstecken!
  (Ah, now I understand. You’re right. No, I won’t let myself get infected!)
I am quite sure that you will not understand what is going on in this action game. You 
may try to find some thread running through the text and arrive at an approximate 
partial understanding by guessing. But are we guessing in language action? On the 
contrary, we do not need to guess because as human beings we not only use our ability 
to speak but inevitably bring in other integrated abilities, namely perceiving, feeling 
and thinking. In order to understand what is going on in language use, we have to 
participate in the action game and to analyse it from inside, addressing the complex 
directly and not reducing it to the empirical level of the text.
Consequently language action is not action by speaking but by integrated dialogic 
means including verbal means. In the action game we approach each other as indi-
viduals with different cognitive backgrounds and cannot therefore presuppose under-
standing. Sharing our minds does not mean knowing what is in the mind of other 
people nor does it mean that meaning and understanding would be pre-given by rules 
or norms and thus be the same for every participant in the game. Sharing our minds 
means the possibility of opening up our minds and of coming to an understanding by 
negotiating meaning and understanding and this also includes tackling problems of 
understanding. In our example, the first utterance, Don’t let yourself get infected! is not 
immediately understood by the interlocutor, instead he/she is the victim of a misun-
derstanding. Language-in-use can accept the risk of misunderstandings because they 
are normally immediately repaired, as in our example.
It thus becomes evident that we have to go beyond the empirical level of the text 
and have to add a description of the cognitive, emotional and perceptual background 
from which the interlocutors derive their cognitive and perceptual means of com-
munication. Clearly, they do not trust the verbal text alone but trust cognitive means, 
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associations and allusions, which an observer cannot understand. Thus in our example 
H refers to a person not present in the action game without explicitly expressing it, a 
person who, some days ago, had spilled water on the ground when cleaning the roof 
of the house entrance: Didn’t you see the water? The action game takes place near the 
entrance of the house. It is therefore enough for H to raise his head and to look and move 
his body in the direction of the entrance hall thus alluding by perceptual means to what 
had happened a few days ago, and ironically commenting on it Everyone’s got a hobby. 
He deliberately only uses the anonymous term everyone and takes it for granted that 
the interlocutor will understand. His wife F, too, uses an anonymous phrase: I’d never 
do that trusting that E will understand because they are supposed to share knowledge 
as a result of the fact that all three live in the same house. She adds a critical comment 
on the price they have to pay for the cleaning of the hallway. All these means together, 
verbal, perceptual and cognitive ones, are necessary for E to come to an understanding 
and to arrive via negotiation at the right meaning of to be infected, namely ‘to be infected 
by a mania for cleaning’. There is no explicit disambiguation by the verbal environment.
I think the conclusions to be drawn from this example are evident. Linguistics 
as a science of language alone is not capable of addressing language action. Yule is 
right when he writes that as observers we can only understand simple examples that 
are mainly based on verbal means. Trusting the text in a corpus does not lead to an 
understanding of the interaction. On the other hand, corpus linguists who consider 
the corpus as a record of our behaviour, like Stubbs (1996: 233), are wrong because 
only part of our behaviour is recorded in the corpus.
Example (3) also shows how body movement is deployed as perceptual commu-
nicative means. Perception is directed at the body, at gestures and any other body 
movements. Whereas gestures have already been dealt with at length in the literature 
as an important dialogic means (e.g. Nash 2007), body movement still needs to be ana-
lysed in more detail. Not every body movement can be conceived of as communicative 
means, only movements that are intentionally carried out, as in our example where 
moving forward indicated the place of the event.
After these three basic examples which demonstrate the nuts and bolts of the 
interaction of body, emotion, mind and language, I want in addition to focus on some 
special components and consequences of the complex interplay between them. It is 
as a consequence of the intrinsic interaction of language, emotion and body that the 
notion of text must be questioned. The written text sometimes includes graphic or pic-
torial images which are not simply a complement to the written text but interact with 
it in an essential way. This combination of visual and verbal means exerts a particularly 
strong persuasive force and evokes powerful emotions. Such textual compositions are 
therefore frequently and readily used for advertising messages or any other appeals to 
action (see Roque 2008; Weigand 2004c).
Body movements are not only deployed to indicate the place or direction of an 
event but also to strengthen our dialogic claims and express emotions. We can, for 
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instance, intimidate our interlocutor by hitting the table or by using paralinguistic 
devices such as increasing the loudness of our voice. Physical motion indicating poten-
tial violent action sometimes seems to be the last resort for demonstrating power and 
imposing our claims on our opponents. We know how this can result in waging wars 
in order to achieve political and religious goals even those of social order, democracy 
or Christian faith.
The correlation between facial expressions and emotions is another very clear 
example of the internal, biologically determined interdependence of body and 
mind. Ekman’s numerous publications (e.g. Ekman 1999) clearly demonstrate that 
there are typical universal facial expressions, including activities such as crying, 
from which we can deduce the corresponding emotion. These facial expressions are 
only in part intentionally controlled and can thus reveal emotions we do not wish to 
show. They may however also be feigned and thus intentionally used for manipula-
tive purposes.
Emotions are a strong force that can be used to move other people’s minds. On the 
basis of our shared minds, appeals to compassion are a powerful persuasive technique. 
Whether these appeals will have any effect depends on the individual actants in the 
particular game. Politicians know the power of compassion and use it in their own 
interests. George W. Bush, for instance, in his famous speech in Congress on the State 
of the Union of January, 28, 2003, deployed this technique in picturing in detail a terror 
scenario by using a sequence of typical utterances in order to get acceptance for a pre-
emptive war against Iraq:
 (4)  Iraqui refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained: by torturing  
children while parents are made to watch. 
   International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in 
the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping 
acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. 
If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning. [Applause]
At the literal level, he uses the phrase torturing children while parents are made to watch 
as an argument to excite compassion, and he lists violations of human rights as further 
arguments by using phrases such as electric shock, burning with hot irons, etc. all of 
which are designed to provoke indignation. He thus evokes powerful emotions in this 
indirect directive game in order to move his audience.
There is a nice story on the Italian internet which once again demonstrates the 
power of words and of indirect speech acts (cf. also Weigand 2008b). It is the story of 
an anonymous author, not the description of an authentic case. The story compares 
two ways of asking for help in the case of a blind beggar. The beggar first writes directly 
and explicitly on the sign beside his hat:
 (5) I am blind. Please help me.
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He directly expresses the fact that he is blind as an argument why people should help 
him, and gets very few coins. A copywriter passes by and changes the text: the argu-
ment of blindness is now expressed as an appeal to compassion and the claim to act is 
left verbally unexpressed:
 (6) Today, it’s springtime, and I can’t see it.
And the hat fills up with coins. People are more likely to be moved by persuasive 
appeals to their emotions than by direct demands telling them what to do.
Finally let us have a look at some lexical phrases, which clearly confirm the intrin-
sic connectedness of body and mind, as already mentioned in Section 1. We must how-
ever again abandon traditional theorizing in order to cope with the way the interaction 
of body and mind is conventionalized in the lexicon. Phrases like those in (7) suggest 
that the lexical unit is the phrase, the way-of-use, or collocation (e.g. Sinclair 1998; 
Weigand 1998b), which is in most cases unambiguous between bodily and mental 
readings.
 (7) the inner eye − das geistige Auge
  I see what you mean − ich sehe/verstehe, was du meinst
  as far as the eye can see − soweit der Blick reicht
  to be moved − gerührt sein
To start with single, often highly polysemous words and to claim that they would be 
disambiguated by the context amounts to an artificial manoeuvre which contradicts 
language use. Traditional views, for instance, by Sweetser (1990), separate the field of 
perception from cognition and explain diachronic change by a change from concrete 
perception to figurative cognition or from body to mind. They are based on meth-
odological hypotheses that ‘damage’ the natural object. Language change does not 
start with human beings separating their abilities. On the contrary, there is evidence 
that earlier historical periods did not make the distinction between their bodily and 
mental abilities but instead considered concepts of the mind as perceptual concepts. 
This can be seen with the Greek examples thumós relating mind to fumes and psyché 
relating mind to breath (Weigand 2006b: 98). Kronasser’s comment in this respect 
(1968: 188f.) that it is often difficult to distinguish between the meanings of these 
words is very instructive. The separation between these two domains has been made 
by linguists in an attempt to divide the simple concrete area from the more difficult 
cognitive one.
The lexicon is rife with phrases of this type that easily cross over from physical 
perception to cognition and emotion. We can stir the dough as well as stir somebody to 
pity. Emotion influences everything, cognition is bound to perception and vice versa. 
Instead of artificially constructing lexical theories as codes that divide the multi-word 
lexical units into words and describe use by a transformation from literal to figurative 
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meaning, we should accept that language represents a network of phrases used by 
human beings in combination with other communicative means in order to negotiate 
meaning and understanding.
5.  Conclusions and outlook
The conclusions to be drawn from the examples given above are clear: if we want to 
understand human beings’ actions and behaviour, it is of no help to refer to a con-
cept of language as a code. Signs carrying meanings that are defined by a code are 
constructs of reductionist theories of language. An adequate theory of human beings’ 
actions and behaviour in performance has to cope with the complexity of its object. 
Motion and emotion, moving our body and moving the minds of other people, are 
not completely separated but interrelated and interdependent actions. Human beings 
as dialogic individuals aim to move other people’s minds in their own interests but 
simultaneously they need to take account of the fact that they live in a community. 
Consciousness of our own self is at the same time consciousness of the other self. As 
individuals we differ in the way we position ourselves between the extremes of egocen-
tricism and social self-sacrifice.
Genuine interdisciplinary research is research on the same complex object from 
different perspectives and with different scientific interests. Any scientific endeavour 
is in the end related to human abilities. Our abilities allow us to proceed some steps 
within the hierarchy of complexity. They also allow us to point to mysteries that are 
beyond our explanatory reach. Mysteries such as the fact that matter does not have to 
be visible or that there is not only a single geometry (du Sautoy 2004: 110f.) once again 
question the distinctness of matter and energy, of body and mind. However, in order 
to shed some light on these dark areas, we must not take refuge in the simple but must 
dare to undertake an adventure of the complex which we ourselves are part of.
Emotions play a crucial role on the switchboard of human behaviour and 
action. They are however not completely controlled by reason and can show up in 
our physiological reactions even against our intentions. Like any other human abil-
ity they are invariably embodied and can be purposively deployed as communica-
tive means. Emotions are not superfluous abilities but fit the evolutionary schema of 
survival needs. In this sense, ‘fear’, for instance, indicates the need for protection. In 
the end, it is the interests and advantages of human beings, which induce and guide 
human behaviour.
Attempts at defining emotions demonstrate another specific feature: emotions 
resist being explicitly described. They are to some degree the inexpressible. This 
is why they are often talked about by means of metaphors or symbols. Emotions 
thus cross the limits of verbal communication; on the basis of intersubjectivity, they 
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are emotion and motion at the same time and can be comprehended without and 
beyond words.
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(E)motion in the XVIIth century
A closer look at the changing semantics of the French 
verbs émouvoir and mouvoir
Annelies Bloem
University of Ghent
According to Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995: 176), “the medieval physiological-
psychological theory of the four humors and the four temperaments has left its 
traces on our emotional vocabulary”. In this study, we would like to go a step 
further by showing how the changing conceptualisation in the era of Descartes 
also influenced our emotional lexicon. The XVIIth century can be considered as 
a key moment in the origin of modern emotive consciousness (see Bloem 2008). 
For instance, from this period on, the term émotion is used more frequently in a 
rather abstract sense instead of the “mouvements de l’ame”, which was commonly 
used until then in order to refer to emotional changes. In our analysis, we 
confront the semantic and syntactic profile of the verbs émouvoir and mouvoir 
in order to study their uses within the XVIIth century. Therefore, the attested 
occurrences are analysed in a semasiological way, inspired by Geeraerts’ (1997) 
prototype semantics. I especially peruse some encyclopaedic treaties like for 
instance Le tableau des passions humaines (1620), Les charactères des passions 
(1640), De l’usage des passions (1642) and Les passions de l’âme (1649). These 
works provide us with very important testimonies regarding the changing 
conceptualisation of emotions. In other words, I examine the evolution of 
émouvoir and mouvoir within reflections about the nature of emotions in order to 
demonstrate the close connection between culture and lexicon (see also Kövecses 
2005; Gevaert 2005).
Keywords: Descartes; metaphors; cultural and diachronic perspective; semantic 
and syntactic profile; verbal analysis of mouvoir and émouvoir
1.  Introduction
In order to better understand the historical origin of our (linguistic) concept of emo-
tion, and its close connection to that of motion, this chapter examines the relation 
between culture and lexicon by investigating how the changing conceptualisation of 
emotions in the era of Descartes influenced our emotional lexicon. One of the main 
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questions is whether we can perceive the diminishing influence of the theory of the 
four humours, in inverse relation to a rising influence of the encyclopaedic treaties 
within the XVIIth century.
Within the literature, some references to the influence of humoral theories on 
the emotive lexicon can be found. First of all, according to Geeraerts & Grondelaers 
(1995: 176), “the medieval physiological-psychological theory of the four humors and 
the four temperaments has left its traces on our emotional vocabulary”. More specifi-
cally, they propose that:
As the original literal motivation gradually disappears, the elements of our 
emotional vocabulary could receive a new interpretation as figurative expressions 
of the physiological effects of particular emotions.
 (Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995: 171)
Such a take on our metaphorical language concerning emotion seems contrary to that 
of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, CMT (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 
1987) which takes a rather opposite approach stating that, rather than cultural concep-
tions, (universal) bodily experiences ground metaphorical language (see also Zlatev 
et al. this volume). According to CMT, conceptual metaphors are based upon bodily 
source domains:
Thought is embodied, that is, the structures used to put together our conceptual 
systems grow out of bodily experience and make sense in terms of it ; moreover, 
the core of our conceptual system is directly grounded in perception, body 
movement, and experience of a physical and social character.
 (Lakoff 1987: xiv)
However, as argued by Quinn (1991), Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995), Gibbs (1999) and 
Gevaert (2007), the impact of supposedly universal and ahistorical metaphors needs to 
be put in a cultural perspective. In this chapter, I investigate whether the disappearance 
of the humoral pathology had an impact upon the emotive lexicon. In other words, the 
role of cultural influence will be further explored by showing how the changing concep-
tualisation in the era of Descartes influenced the emotional lexicon in French.
How to study the Cartesian influence upon the emotive lexicon? I will focus on the 
semantic analysis of the verbs mouvoir and emouvoir, two prototypical verbs of emo-
tion in Old and Middle French. I will especially present in detail their behaviour within 
theoretical and encyclopaedic treaties within the XVIIth century. The XVIIth century 
can be considered as a key moment in the origin of modern emotive perception (see 
also Bloem 2008). For instance, from this period on, the term émotion is used more 
frequently in a rather abstract sense instead of the “mouvements de l’ame” (‘movements 
of the soul’), which was commonly used until then in order to refer to (strong) feelings. 
By examining here the linguistic evolution of émouvoir and mouvoir within reflections 
about the nature of emotions, the chapter will argue for a close connection between 
culture and lexicon (see also Kövesces 2005; Gevaert 2005, 2007).
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If we take a closer look at the global evolution of mouvoir and émouvoir, we see 
that these verbs have been subject to different patterns of semantic change. The fol-
lowing sections will present the results of different corpus studies which show some 
intriguing tendencies.
2.  Patterns in the semantic “evolution” of mouvoir and émouvoir
In Old and Middle French, mouvoir and émouvoir are often found in similar con-
texts and domains, especially within those of movement and emotion (see also Bloem 
2007). The following sentences show that in Old and Middle French, mouvoir and 
émouvoir can be used in very similar contexts. In the following sentences, both verbs 
are possible in order to refer to the concrete movement of heaven and the movement 
of the firmament:
 (1)  Et il covient ke le ciel et le firmament se tornent et muevent tozjors; et s’il 
ne fust reont, quant il se tornoie il covendroit a fine force k’il revenist autre 
point ke au premier dont il estoit esmeus. Carmody éd., p. 86.
 (2)  […] & il convient que li ciel & le fermament si tornent & se muent tousjor, & 
s’il ne fust reont quant il se tornoie il convendroit a fine force que il revenist a 
autre point que a premier dont il estoit meus. Baldwin & Barrette éd., p. 67.
In the next contexts, again, both émouvoir and mouvoir can be used in order to say 
that somebody is moved to anger and hate (esmu a ire et a haine) or to joy or sadness.
 (3)  Sachiés que lor est il damages dou parleor a dire le fait selonc ce que il a esté 
quant celle chose desplaist as oïans & que il en soient contre lui esmu a ire & 
a haine, se il ne adousist por le bons argumens que conferme sa chause. 
Baldwin & Barrette éd., p. 328.
 (4)  Car les grans fortunes qui adviennent a nos amis nous doivent notablement 
mouvoir a joie ou a tristece. Frantext.
In Modern French, however, we observe a strict division between the uses of those 
two verbs. Mouvoir for instance is almost exclusively used in order to express concrete 
and often physical movement whereas émouvoir expresses emotional change. In other 
words, we could say that the verb émouvoir underwent a process of “psychologisation”.
3.  Corpus and categories
For the purpose of the study, a corpus from various registers such as literary texts 
and encyclopaedic texts was compiled. Different attestations of the verbs mouvoir and 
émouvoir from various sources were selected. For Old French, the database Frantext 
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and Laboratoire de français ancient was used. I also selected occurrences from various 
scientific texts such as the editions by Francis J. Carmody (1975 [19481]) and by Spur-
geon Baldwin & Paul Barrette (2003) of Li livres dou tresor and Sydrac le philosophe. 
Besides this, Le livre de la fontaine de toutes sciences, edited by Ernstpeter Ruhe in 2000 
was studied. For the XVIIth century, I used the database Frantext and included ency-
clopaedic treaties such as Le tableau des passions humaines from Nicolas  Coeffeteau 
(1620), Les charactères des passions from Cureau de la Chambre Marin (1640), De 
l’usage des passions from Jean-Francois Senault (1642/1987) and Les passions de l’âme 
from René Descartes (1649)1. These works provide us with very important testimo-
nies regarding the changing conceptualisation of emotions. The analysis examined 
the semantic profile of the verbs émouvoir and mouvoir in order to study their uses 
within the XVIIth century. These uses were confronted with the uses of the verbs in 
Old French in order to identify patterns in their historical evolution.
The attested occurrences were analysed in an empirical and semasiological way,2 
inspired by Geeraerts (1997) diachronic prototype semantics. More precisely, 809 contexts 
from Old French and 1674 contexts from the XVIIth century were gathered, analysed 
and categorised. In this way, five main categories based on the number and nature of 
complements and on their encyclopaedic reality were established, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The five major categories of analysis
Uses of mouvoir and émouvoir
Concrete Abstract
















in which the 
experiencer has to 
be inanimate and 
psychophysiologic, 








somebody to do 
something, to 
exhort to/to  
incite to/to urge 
to, to stimulate/ 
to excite…
1.  I used the edition of Rodis-Lewis (1970) of Les passions de l’ame and the editions of Les 
charactères des passions, Le tableau des passions humaines and De l’usage des passions that have 
been published on the website Gallica of the Bibliothèque nationale de France.
2.  This means that I used the different verbal occurrences as a starting-point for the 
delimitation of the different semantic categories, shown in Table 1.
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The first category we can distinguish is the one of physical, concrete movement (PM) 
in which all concrete cases of movement are gathered, such as those in (5) and (6), 
which deal with movement of water:
 (5)  Et c’est pource que la lune […], quant elle vient en orient et qu’elle com-
mence a monter sur la terre, esmoet adonc la mer de ses rais. Problèmes.
   ‘‘And that’s why the moon […], when she comes from the east and when she 
begins to rise above the earth, she thus moves the sea with her rays’’.
 (6)  […] en la maniere que l’yaue quant on y giete aucune pierrete se moet de 
toutes pars […] Problèmes.
   ‘‘[…] the way in which water moves everywhere when one throws a  
stone in it […]’’
Within this category, we also find many cases in which a directional movement, or 
“bounded translocation” (cf. Zlatev et al. this volume) from A to B is expressed:
 (7)  Ceste .ix.e espere donc se meut de sa propre nature de orient  
en occident […] EAM.
  ‘‘This 9th sphere moves itself from the east to the west […]’’
 (8)  En la contree de Asyam vers le Levant un moult tres durement grant  
ost s’esmovra et encontre son annemi ira et il perdra. Syderac.
   ‘‘In the region of Asyam towards the east, a very big army will move  
and it will go towards his enemy and he will lose.’’
The second category is that of physiological movement (PHM), that is, movements 
within the body which deal with movement of humours (les melancolies), movement 
of the heart and veins (coeur and arteres) and phlegm (flegme):
 (9)  […] et pource dit ausy Ypocras que u prin tans les melancolies  
se esmoeuvent. Problèmes.
   ‘‘[…] and that’s why also Hippocrates says that during spring  
the humours move.’’
 (10)  […] et pource se moet en ceste passion la chaleur naturele au  
dehors du cors impetueusement […] Problèmes.
   ‘‘[…] and that’s why in this passion the natural heat moves violently  
outside the body […]’’
The third category involves psychophysiological movements (PP), such as those 
expressed in sentences (11) and (12). In these cases, the experiencer has to be inani-
mate3 and psychophysiologic, such as the heart or the soul. In other words, these 
3.  Within this chapter, ‘‘animate’’ is exclusively used for persons or animals. Therefore, terms 
such as soul and heart are considered here as being ‘‘inanimate’’. 
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contexts are necessarily ambiguous because they deal with the physiological conse-
quences of emotive changes.
 (11)  Et ausi se moet li coers ausi diversement et inordeneement en peur  
pour la commotion de la chaleur qui se depart de li […] Problèmes.
   ‘‘And also the heart moves so differently and disorderly in fear for the  
concussion of the heat which comes from it.’’
 (12) C’est la cause qui le courage fait a ire esmouvoir. Problèmes.
  ‘‘That is the cause that moves courage to anger.’’
It was not always easy to establish a strict division between this category and the former 
one. Therefore, it is necessary to study the broader contexts in which the attestations 
are found. When the sentence is embedded in a clearly medical context, the attesta-
tions were classified within the category of physiological movement (PHM). When the 
contexts rather deal with emotional changes as a result of physiological actions, they 
were placed within the third psychophysiological category (PP).
Within the fourth category, i.e. “psychological movement or emotion” (E), all 
abstract contexts were assembled, such as those in examples (13) and (14):
 (13) De ces choses et de moult d’autres muevent les hainnes. Syderac.
  ‘‘Hatred originates (lit: moves) from these and many other things’’.
 (14)  Car les grans fortunes qui adviennent a nos amis nous doivent  
notablement mouvoir a joie ou a tristece. Frantext.
   ‘‘Because of the big fortune who touches our friends we have notably  
to move us to happiness or to sadness.’’
The fifth category of ‘‘stimulation’’ (S) is defined by contexts which deal with an agent 
being stimulated, or “moved” to perform something, or otherwise to change his moti-
vational state such as: to give [somebody] an appetite, to encourage somebody to do 
something, to exhort to/ to incite to/ to urge to, to stimulate/to excite…:
 (15) […] ris se esmeut […] Frantext.
  ‘‘[…] laughter arises […]’’
 (16)  […] aucun en sont esmeu a toussir, et c’est de l’oele de olive  
dont Aristote parle. Problèmes.
   ‘‘[…] some are inclined (lit: moved) to cough, and it is the  
olive oil of which Aristotle talks.’’
Besides these five categories, there were some instances which could be classified in a 
sixth one in which the source or the origin of a legacy is mentioned (O), such as in ‘‘le 
seigneur de qui li eritages muet’’ (Frantext) (“the lord of whom the heritage comes”). 
However, this is a very limited category, only attested for some minor attestations of 
mouvoir in Old French.
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4.  Quantitative analysis
The following figures provide us with a semasiological overview of all the uses for 
each verb within Old French and the XVIIth century. As we can see, in Old French 






















Figure 1. A semasiological overview of mouvoir and émouvoir in Old French
Within the XVIIth century period (Figure 2), however, each verb is specialised in 
a different domain: mouvoir expresses in most cases a concrete, physical movement 
(PM) whereas émouvoir is mostly used in order to express emotion (E). 
The semantic changes that have taken place between the two periods become 
even clearer if we compare the proportions of the six categories for the same verb. 
Comparing the semantic behaviour of mouvoir in Old French to the situation in the 
XVIIth century (Figure 3), we can see that in both periods mouvoir is mostly used in 
order to refer to a concrete and physical movement. However, while the proportion of 
(PM) increases, the other two more significantly represented categories in Old French, 
(S) and (O) decrease, while (E) and (S) remain marginal. We also notice a decrease 










































Figure 3. The global semantic change of mouvoir
The semantic evolution of the verb émouvoir (shown in Figure 4) tells us a com-
pletely different story. First of all, we observe a spectacular decrease in the number of 
cases expressing concrete, physical movement (PM). In Old French, still 45% of the 
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cases refer to concrete movement4 and only 16% refer to emotions. Until the XVIth 
century, there is still a high amount of “stimulation” (S) uses. From the XVIIth century 





















Figure 4. The global semantic change of émouvoir
5.  Cultural influences on semantic change
How can the patterns described in the previous section be explained? We can begin 
by considering the importance of encyclopaedic information for semantic change, 
emphasized by Geeraerts (1997: 70):
In the context of prototype theory, however, the synchronic observation is made 
that the borderline between semantics and world knowledge is inherently ill 
defined. Diachronically, this is reflected in the fact that alleged encyclopaedic 
information may at any moment be the starting-point for the birth of a new 
reading, and, as such, has to be taken into account when studying semantic 
changes.
4.  More precisely, we see that in Old French, 40,06% of the cases of émouvoir refer to phys-
ical movement and 5,2% refer to physiological movement. 
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Furthermore, according to Grondelaers and Geeraerts (2003: 68), the reason why 
a term is chosen in a particular context depends upon its semasiological salience 
in which the prototypicallity of the semantics of the term is being considered and 
upon its onomasiological salience (i.e. the term’s relation to other related terms). 
Besides these two factors, it is also important to take into account the sociolinguistic 
context.
In other words, we need to take a closer look at the encyclopaedic reality, i.e. 
the nature of encyclopaedic ‘‘world’’ knowledge within the XVIIth century in order 
to explain the attested tendencies. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse the ency-
clopaedic treaties of that period because those works are a good indication of how 
emotions and bodily movements were perceived at that time. For instance, we do 
find many reflections upon the metaphorical status of “mouvement de l’ame”. In 
the following passage, taken from Descartes’ “passions de l’ame” from 1644, we see 
that, instead of talking about “mouvements de l’ame”, he prefers to use the term 
“emotion”. In other words, it seems that the term “movement” is not convenient any 
more in order to talk about emotional change. In fact, Descartes suggests to use the 
expression ‘‘emotions de l’ame’’ (translated as “excitations of the soul”, apparently 
to preserve the aspect of motion in English) because the term movement is too 
restricted in order to describe all the mutations and changes that can affect the soul 
(cf. also infra):
Mais on peut encore mieux les nommer des émotions de l’ame, non seulement à 
cause que ce nom peut estre attribué à tous les changements qui arrivent en elle, 
c’est-à-dire à toutes les diverses pensées qui luy viennent, mais particulierement 
pource que, de toutes les sortes de pensées qu’elle peut avoir, il n’y en a point 
d’autres qui l’agitent et l’esbranlent si fort que font ces passions. 
 (Descartes 1644: article 28)
‘‘But they may still better be named excitations of the soul, not only because this 
name may be attributed to all the changes that take place within it, that is, to all 
the different thoughts that come to it, but in particular, because, among all the 
sorts of thoughts that it can have, there are no others which agitate it and shake it 
so strongly as these passions do. (Voss (trad.) 1989: 34)’’
It must be underlined here too that within this period, the first uses of the substan-
tive “emotion” are attested in the abstract way it is used nowadays. In Old and Middle 
French, émotion was rather used to refer to uprisings, rebellions and riots (cf. DMF).
Furthermore, within different texts of the XVIIth century, we find several sections 
in which the authors stress the problem of gaps in the lexicon in order to refer to emo-
tional changes. For example, in the treatise “Les characters des passions” by Cureau de 
la Chambre, the author prefers talking about passions instead of using “mouvemens 
de l’Appetit naturel” and he criticises the fact that there are not enough proper terms in 
order to refer to emotional changes.
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6.  The conceptualisation of emotions in the XVIIth century
In order to approach an answer to the question posed in the previous section, we need 
to consider still more facts concerning the conceptualisation of emotions within the 
XVIIth century which would allow us to embed the evolution of the verbs mouvoir 
and émouvoir within its cultural context. First of all, the previous examples clearly 
show that, through the centuries, there have been some changes with respect to the 
term mouvement (‘movement’). More precisely, whereas in the past, mouvement 
referred to “power”, from the XVIth century onwards, mouvement becomes a near 
synonym of déplacement (‘displacement’), as also stated by Talon-Hugon (2002: 10). 
More importantly, from this period on, preclassical conceptions of movement and 
soul(s) are abandoned: instead of the aristotelic-thomist notion of the soul, the soul 
is considered to be a res cognita, (“thinking substance”) from the XVIIth century 
onwards (Desjardins 2001: 76).
My proposal is that these changes have gradually affected the lexical level. We find 
evidence for this in sections in which Cureau de la Chambre reflects upon the meta-
phorical status of the lexeme “mouvement de l’ame”. He literally says that the words 
used in order to specify what happens to the soul do not properly express what really 
happens and that they are rather “metaphorical”.
Les mots que l’on employe pour s’en expliquer, sont tous metaphoriques & ne 
designent point proprement ce qui se passe alors dans l’Ame.
 (Cureau de la Chambre, vol. V, p. 301)
‘‘The words used in order to explain this, are all metaphorical and do not properly 
point out what is then happening in the Soul.’’
In the following section, Cureau also mentions the lexical problem with respect to the 
classification of different passions. He stresses the fact that one should use the differences 
within movement in order to define various passions:
Quoy qu’il en soit, puisqu’en definissant la passion en general on se sert du mot 
de mouvement, il faut de necessité pour marquer les differences des passions, 
y employer les differences du mouvement, & trouver en chacune d’elles quelque 
agitation particuliere qui ait de la convenance & du rapport avec quelqu’un des 
mouvemens sensibles. 
 (Cureau de la Chambre, Vol. I, pp. 42–43).
‘‘Be that as it may, since defining passion in general one uses the word movement, 
it is necessary in order to mark the differences of the passions, to use the 
differences of movement, & to find in each of them some particular agitation that 
is convenient & that has a link with some of the sensible movements.’’
Thus, we may conclude that during the XVIIth centrury in France, considerable 
changes of the concept of emotions have taken place and that these changes have 
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caused many lexical problems with respect to the field of emotions. One factor seems 
particularly important to help explain what precipitated these changes: a Cartesian 
conception of mind and emotion which especially consists of a separation of body 
and mind and which in the XVIIth century overruled the galenic-medieval physi-
ologic and humoral conception. Whereas in older times, emotions were conceived as 
being the result of bodily movements and a humoral disproportion, from the XVIIth 
century onwards, emotions became rather abstract and metaphorical sensations, 
entirely disconnected from the body or movements of fluids. Besides this, it is also 
important to underline the development of anatomic and scientific analyses and the 
overall upcoming more rationalist worldview. It is thus within this framework that 
the increase of the abstract uses of the verb émouvoir can be situated.
However, we could wonder why it is especially émouvoir instead of mouvoir that 
is used in order to express abstract emotive changes? A possible answer lies within 
the meanings of the different uses of the two verbs. Although both verbs could be 
used in a concrete way in Old French, some subtle differences, even within the oldest 
attestations of these verbs do exist. First of all, within the category of physical move-
ment, the verb émouvoir was more often used in Old French in order to refer to water 
or to violent movements or even big changes (see also Section 3). On the other hand, 
mouvoir was mostly used in order to refer to directional movements from A to B and 
to refer to more neutral movements. The same is also true at the physiological level: 
whereas mouvoir was used to refer to neutral movements, émouvoir was used to refer 
especially to fluid substances such as humours, and more often than mouvoir to sub-
stantial changes such as bouillir (‘to boil’) or échauffer (‘to overheat’), as is the case in 
example (17) from the XIVth century.
 (17)  Et pource, quant en l’yver ces superfluités sont ataintes et estraintes de 
la froidure circonstant, elles se eschaufent par dedens et esmoeuvent a 
ebullition et putrefaction, Et ainsy font fievres, car fievre n’est autre chose 
que une excessive chaleur estendue par tout le cors. Problèmes.
   ‘‘And that is why, when during winter, these superfluities are affected and 
closed up by the surrounding cold, they overheat from the inside and they 
are moved to boiling and putrefaction, And make fever this way, because 
fever is nothing else than an excessive heat spread out all over the body.’’
Another possible motivation is that the prefix es- is used in Old-and Middle French 
as en intensifier such as in esgarder, (‘to look closely, to inspect’), garder (‘to see, to 
examine’).
In short, from the XVIth century onwards, the humoral theories were replaced 
by a far more analytical view in which body and soul are clearly separated and this 
was also reflected within the uses of the verb émouvoir. When we look at its comple-
ments, we can observe that, in older times, esmouvoir les humeurs (“movement of the 
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humours”) was very frequent. Gradually, psychophysiological movements such as 
esmouvoir le coeur a ire (‘to move the heart to anger’) were increasingly attested. 
Nowadays, we almost exclusively find constructions in which the effect upon the per-
son is stressed, as in émouvoir quelqu’un (‘to move somebody’). We could designate this 
process as a delitteralisation process, i.e. a semasiological chain from the spatial to the 
psychological uses by means of the physiological and the psychophysiological ones.
7.  Conclusions
The diachronic semantic analysis presented in this chapter revealed that, from the 
XVIIth century on, the verbs mouvoir and émouvoir have become specialised in 
French. Indeed, from this period onwards, the verb mouvoir is almost exclusively used 
as a verb of movement whereas émouvoir has become a real psychological verb. The 
evolution of the verb émouvoir can be considered a delitteralisation process because of 
the fact that we can observe a chain starting from the spatial to the psychological uses.
It has also to be stressed that the XVIIth century appears to be a very interest-
ing period for the study of the changing conceptualisation of emotions and its influ-
ence on the emotive lexicon. More precisely, within this century, encyclopaedic texts 
provide us with very explicit thinking on the psychophysiological level of emotions. 
What’s more, within these texts, we also find many reflections on certain linguistic 
“problems”. Cureau de la Chambre’s writings show clear evidence of metalinguistic 
reflection about the metaphoric status of the phrase “mouvement de l’âme”, which was 
probably typical of the time.
By studying the uses of the prototypical verbs of emotion, namely mouvoir and 
émouvoir, within encyclopaedic reflections revealing the changing conceptualisations 
of emotions during that period, I have stressed the relevance of taking into account 
cultural and historical influences upon the lexicon. This way, we observed that, besides 
the influence of the humoral doctrine, we also have to take into account the Cartesian 
impact in order to understand the evolution of the emotive lexicon in French. These 
findings allow us to underline the importance of cultural motivation for metaphor 
formation instead of focussing exclusively on universal bodily conceptualisations.
However, it has to be stressed that these changes are especially true for the French 
émouvoir, mouvoir and émotion. It is interesting to note that in English, the word 
emove and emotion have been borrowed from French. However, nowadays, emove is 
not attested anymore. It thus seems that, in English, motion and emotion remain more 
closely related to each other than it is the case for French. In other Romance languages, 
such as Italian, the Italian equivalent emozionare is used. Curiously, another verb, com-
muovere, is also used in order to designate emotional changes. The same is true for 
Spanish in which emocionar and conmover are used.
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To sum up, while Descartes may have contributed to separating motion and emo-
tion, both linguistically and conceptually, the close etymological relation between the 
two expressions parallels the close relationship between the two concepts, investigated 
within this volume. In both European and non-European languages (see Zlatev, this 
volume), we still metaphorically refer to feelings in terms of movements. In other 
words, emotions have not entirely cut off their “motion roots”.
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Metaphor and subjective experience
A study of motion-emotion metaphors in English, 
Swedish, Bulgarian, and Thai
Jordan Zlatev, Johan Blomberg & Ulf Magnusson
Lund University / Lund University / Luleå University of Technology
The concepts (or “domains”) of motion and emotion are closely related in both 
language and experience. This is shown by the presence of many metaphorical 
expressions (e.g. ‘my heart dropped’) across languages denoting affective 
processes on the basis of expressions originally denoting physical motion. We 
address the question why this is the case, and distinguish between three kinds 
of theoretical proposals: (a) (embodied) conceptual universalism, (b) (strong) 
language/culture dependence and (c) consciousness-language interactionism. 
After an “eidetic” analysis of motion informed by phenomenology, and to a 
more limited extent - emotion(s), we describe an empirical study in which 
115 motion-emotion metaphors in English, Swedish, Bulgarian and Thai 
were systematically analyzed and compared. The findings show considerable 
differences, especially between the Thai metaphors and those in three other 
languages, but also significant similarities. The results are interpreted as 
supporting a dialectical, interactionist relationship between language and 
consciousness, on the one hand, and between motion and emotion, on the other.
Keywords: consciousness; cross-linguistic analysis; culture; ‘inner’ vs. ‘outer’ 
motion; phenomenology; ‘private language argument’; translocation; Husserl; 
Wittgenstein
1.  Introduction
Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument (Wittgenstein 1953) states that the 
meaning of linguistic expressions cannot be determined by “private” experiences. The 
reason for this is that linguistic meaning is normative, in the sense of conforming to 
public criteria of correctness, and (radically) private experiences lack such criteria 
(cf. Itkonen 2008). This implies that the meaning of words such as pain and joy cannot 
be exhaustively constituted by the corresponding states (or processes) of affective con-
sciousness. Rather, their meaning must be at least co-determined by intersubjectively 
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observable phenomena such as “natural reactions” (cf. Racine, Wereha & Leavens this 
volume), along with features of the contexts in which these words are appropriately used.
We accept the validity of this argument, but we do not think that it excludes the 
relevance of subjective experience for the meaning of “mental” predicates; it only states 
that such experience is not sufficient. Indeed, one can argue that consciousness, as 
subjective experience as well as reflection, is a prerequisite for language (Zlatev 2008) 
without denying that language adds further dimensions to consciousness. The cogni-
tive advantages of a public symbolic system for communication and thought are many, 
and one of these is that language makes possible, or at least radically enhances the 
potential for narrative, and thus for autobiographical memory (Stern 1985; Nelson 
1996; Hutto 2008; Menary 2008; Gallagher this volume). On the most general level, the 
goal of this chapter is to investigate the relation between consciousness (understood 
as subjective, personal experience) and language. We propose to do this by examining 
linguistic expressions that denote both motion situations and emotions, i.e. motion-
emotion metaphors, in four languages (and cultures) which vary to different degrees: 
English, Swedish, Bulgarian and Thai.
The fact that the English words motion and emotion are so similar is not a coinci-
dence, as can be attested by a glance at their etymology. The word emotion is attested 
in English texts from around 1570–80, apparently borrowed from Middle French 
esmotion, derived from esmovoir ‘to set in motion, move the feelings’, which can be 
traced back to the Latin verb ēmovēre. Such intermixing of expressions for something 
that can be intersubjectively observed – the motion of objects and animate creatures – 
and what is subjectively experienced (feelings) is far from being restricted to English 
and other European languages. In fact, the use of expressions primarily denoting 
motion to talk about emotions is widely distributed in the world’s languages.1 What 
is less clear is why motion-emotion metaphors are so common. In particular, we can 
single out the following two questions:
 – What role does subjective experience play for establishing such metaphors?
 – What role is played by language-specific (and culture-specific) conventions?
Comparing motion-emotion metaphors in the four languages under investigation 
should allow us to evaluate three types of theoretical positions on the basis of the pre-
dictions following from them.
The first position is that of (embodied) conceptual universalism, proposing to 
ground linguistic meaning in pan-human bodily experiences, or their neural under-
pinnings. This is the case in Lakoff & Johnson’s (1980, 1999) Conceptual Metaphor 
1.  It may even be a so-called “universal” – though claims of linguistic universals have been 
much overstated in the past, and the empirical database for semantic universals is much too 
sparse at present (Koptjevskaja-Tamm et al. 2007; Evans & Levinson 2009). 
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Theory (CMT), according to which the meanings of non-concrete expressions are 
based on non-linguistic, and purportedly universal primary metaphors such as SIMI-
LARITY IS PROXIMITY IN SPACE (cf. Grady 2005; Johnson & Rohrer 2007). If the 
motion-emotion metaphors in the four languages under discussion can be shown to 
be more or less the same, this would lend support to theories of this type.
The second position claims that thinking in general, and metaphor formation 
in particular, depends crucially on language (or discourse). If motion-emotion meta-
phors turn out to vary extensively and “arbitrarily” across languages this would give 
credibility to the position that the meanings of emotion expressions are derived pri-
marily from their role in the linguistic-conceptual schemes provided by the languages 
themselves, rendering subjective experience largely irrelevant. In general, such a 
position was earlier held by representatives of structuralism, but has lost its appeal 
for most linguists. However, it has not yet done so for many analytic philosophers (cf. 
Dennett 1991), who tend to attribute a determinative role to language with respect 
to consciousness.2 A weaker form of this position, concerning metaphors specifically, 
predicts that conventional metaphors would be what Zinken (2007) calls “form- 
specific”, i.e. that the metaphorical meanings would be associated with specific expres-
sions, in the manner of idioms, rather than derive from systematic cross-domain 
mappings, as in CMT.
The third position can be referred to as consciousness-language interactionism 
(cf. Zlatev 1997, 2003, 2008). It accepts that emotions are indeed basically subjec-
tive, even “private” experiences, but proposes that when speakers need to talk about 
their emotional lives, they use expressions referring to intersubjectively observable 
phenomena. The latter are chosen since they are either analogous to or spatiotem-
porally associated with the emotions in question. With time such expressions can 
become conventional, and in the process, shaped by cultural beliefs and discourse 
practices, as in the scenario envisioned by Zinken (2007). The predictions from such 
an interactionist position are therefore that there will be a degree of overlap between 
conventional motion-emotion metaphors in different languages, but that such over-
lap will be higher for more closely related languages and cultures (e.g. English and 
Swedish, and to some extent Bulgarian) than for more distant ones, such as Thai. 
2.  Without disregarding the fact that analytic philosophy has aided in making our concepts 
clearer through an analysis of (ordinary) language, its practitioners have often been at error in 
extending the rigor of the method to a presumption of the rigidity of the “objects” of study. For 
example, just because we can define the concepts of mental states more precisely through se-
mantic analysis does not mean that this analysis can substitute for the phenomena themselves, 
or worse: be read off as a map to the workings of the mind. Taking this for granted has given rise 
to misguided debates, such as that concerning the relation between “mental representations” 
and “propositional attitudes” (cf. Dennett 1981; Fodor 1987).
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Furthermore, there should be a degree of “form-specificity”, but not to the extent 
proposed by Zinken (2007).3
In the study described in Section 4, we test the predictions from these differ-
ent (kinds of) theories on 115 motion-emotion metaphors from the four languages, 
derived above all through (near) native knowledge of the four languages, and a number 
of criteria specifying which expressions are to be considered, described in Section 3. 
But prior to this, we need to provide a conceptual analysis of the “source domain” 
MOTION. We do so, utilizing the analysis of motion situations offered by Zlatev, Blom-
berg, & David (2010). Such an exercise is necessary for two reasons. First, we will see 
that ‘motion’ is both pre-theoretically and theoretically an ambiguous term, and many 
misunderstandings derive from unclear or contradictory definitions of it (cf. Sheets-
Johnstone, this volume). The second reason is that we require a conceptual framework 
in order to be able to perform the comparison between motion-emotion metaphors in 
the four languages in a systematic manner.
If motion is a complex concept, emotion is even more so, and we will not attempt 
any such general classification as with motion. Thus, only emotion metaphors derived 
from expressions referring to motion of the self, or of something considered a “part 
of the self ”, will be considered. But we will need to define more clearly what we mean 
by motion-emotion metaphors for the sake of the empirical study, and we do so in 
Section 3. In the final section, we summarize our findings and relate them to the more 
general questions concerning the relationships between motion and emotion, and 
between language and consciousness discussed above.
2.   What is motion?
2.1  Motion: Kinds and perspectives
A dictionary is always a good place to start when dealing with conceptual issues since, 
however imperfect, circular and variant dictionary definitions are, they give us at least 
a rough idea of the “common sense” meaning (or meanings) of the words used in a 
community. The more general, frequently used (and updated) dictionaries are, the bet-
ter they are for this purpose, and with over 10 million searches daily, the free electronic 
dictionary of English available at dictionary.com is probably as good a place to start as 
3.  This is consistent with the general approach, if not with the specific analysis, of Kövecses 
(2000: 14): “In this work I propose that it is necessary to go beyond both the view that the 
concept of anger is simply motivated by human physiology and the view that it is simply a 
social construction. I will suggest that it is both motivated by the human body and produced 
by a particular social and cultural environment.” (emphasis in original)
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any. Its first four (and only relevant for our purposes) senses of the noun ‘motion’ are 
the following:
a. the action or process of moving or of changing place or position; movement.
b. power of movement, as of a living body.
c. the manner of moving the body in walking; gait.
d. a bodily movement or change of posture; gesture.
It is notable that senses (b-d) directly refer to ‘bodily movement’, while the first is 
intended to be more general, defining motion as ‘changing place or position’, and 
offering ‘movement’ as a synonym. In earlier work (Sheets-Johnstone 1999), and par-
ticularly in her contribution to the present volume, Sheets-Johnstone strongly criti-
cizes a definition of motion such as that in (a): “contrary to the dictionary definition 
and to popular thought, movement is not ‘a change of position’” (this volume, p. 38). 
Rather, on the basis of a phenomenological analysis of bodily movement from a first-
person perspective, Sheets-Johnstone argues for a holistic, qualitative concept of 
movement:
The qualitative structure of any movement generates a particular dynamic…it 
flows forth with a certain kinetic energy that may rise and fall in intensity, waxing 
and waning at the same time as spatializing and temporalizing itself in ways that 
contour the dynamic: making it explosive, attenuated, smooth, jagged, restrained, 
impulsive, magnified, narrowed and so on… (p. 38)
We would, however, suggest that Sheets-Johnstone’s analysis attempts to capture what 
is common to senses (b-d) above, while the change-of-position sense (a) is not so 
much a matter of what she calls “received ignorance”, but derives from a different per-
spective on motion: a third-person, observational one. Zlatev, Blomberg and David 
(2010) also attempt to provide a phenomenologically informed definition of motion, 
but departing precisely from such a third-person perspective:
From the perspective of the analysis of (the invariants of) experience – 
phenomenology (cf. Husserl 1999 [1907]), motion as such can be defined as the 
experience of continuous change in the relative position of an object (the figure) 
against a background, in contrast to stasis – where there is no such change – 
and in contrast to a dis-continuous change, as when a light suddenly lights up in 
position A, “disappears” and then appears in position B.”
 (Zlatev et al. 2010: 393)
By emphasizing the experience of the observer, this is no less experiential than 
the internal perspective argued for by Sheets-Johnstone. Such a perspective can 
also be applied to our own motion/movement, through the process of perspective 
change, well known in phenomenology (Zahavi 2001, 2003), and often mentioned 
428 Jordan Zlatev, Johan Blomberg & Ulf Magnusson
by cognitive linguists (Langacker 1987). Indeed, this is also acknowledged by Sheets-
Johnstone (this volume):
When we observe our own movement in this way, we precisely perceive it, 
perceive it as a force or effort to put forth in time and in space, a force or effort 
we are controlling or trying to control every step of the way. We do not feel 
our movement as an unfolding dynamic, a kinetic form-in the making…” 
(p. 40, emphasis in original)
There is a certain degree of similarity between this perspectival distinction (i.e. inner/
outer motion) and a distinction made in many of the world’s languages, observed by 
the French linguist Lucien Tesnière, as pointed out by Wälchli (2001: 298):
Tesnière (1959: 307–310) introduced in passing the semantic distinction between 
movement (“mouvement”) and displacement (“déplacement”). Movement is 
“inner” motion describing the kind of activity involved in motion (e.g. run, walk, 
jump, fly, swim). Displacement is “outer” motion and is concerned with how 
somebody or something changes its location in space, notably with respect to a 
given point of reference.
Tesnière noticed that Romance languages tend to express displacement (“outer” 
motion) with their verbs, while Germanic languages had more verbs expressing move-
ment (“inner” motion). Talmy (1985, 2000) came to the same conclusion (apparently 
independently), but generalized it and proposed that all languages need to choose 
between one of the two strategies. Since displacement (or what Talmy called “trans-
lational motion”) was argued to constitute the “frame” of a motion event, languages 
such as French were called “verb-framing”, encoding “path” in verbs such as monter 
and descendre, while expressing “manner” adverbially (e.g. à la nage, en nageant). On 
the other hand are “satellite-framing” languages such as English, rich in verbs express-
ing movement/manner such as rush, while using particles e.g. in, out of, up, down… 
to express displacement/path. However, far from being a “binary typology”, as Talmy 
claimed, it is becoming increasingly clear that all languages use a variety of means to 
express both the movement and the displacement aspects of motion (cf. Strömqvist & 
Verhoeven 2004; Levinson & Wilkins 2006). There is also experimental evidence that 
when observers categorize motion events spontaneously, both speakers of French 
(verb-framing) and Swedish (satellite-framing) may display a similar preference for 
movement/manner. However, if the two groups first describe what they see, a strong 
preference for displacement/path arises instead (cf. Zlatev, Blomberg & David 2010).
The point is that while languages may reflect the difference between inner/self-
contained motion/manner/movement, on the one hand, and outer/translational motion/
path/displacement on the other, and some constructions (and contexts) may focus more 
on one than the other, both perspectives on motion are relevant. Returning to phe-
nomenology, we would venture to propose that this has to do with the fact that a 
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so-called motion event can be experienced both as “changing place or position” – 
when observed from a third-person perspective (in time and space), and as move-
ment, when focusing on the “internal” qualitative dynamics. Of course, not all cases 
of observed motion involve the movement of an animate being (so-called “biological 
motion”), and even less so of a human being like oneself, but such motion is certainly 
a salient sub-type of motion in general. The terms ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ motion, used by 
Tesnière (cf. the quotation by Wälchli above) in fact correspond closely to the two ways 
of experiencing the lived body, as analyzed by Husserl: Körper (3rd person perspec-
tive) and Leib (1st person perspective). It has been argued persuasively that this duality 
of the body (corresponding in our proposal to the duality of motion) is essential for 
our self-consciousness, as well as for understanding others as being essentially “like 
us”, while still remaining others (Husserl 1989 [1952]; Zahavi 2003). We will return to 
this point, important for the theme of the present volume, in the final section.
2.2  A taxonony of motion situations
Given the distinctions made in the previous subsection, and acknowledging that we 
are taking above all an observational perspective, we can pursue the analysis of motion 
situations presented by Zlatev, Blomberg & David (2010). What we are presenting here 
is not a “conceptual analysis” based on the analysis of language, but an eidetic analysis 
in the sense of Husserl (1981 [1913]), and one that we would claim to be in principle 
independent of language. By this, we mean that the distinctions made should be per-
ceivable and understandable by, in principle, anyone. As pointed out in the introduc-
tion, such an analysis is a key prerequisite for comparing how different languages and 
speakers express these situations linguistically. For convenience, we will illustrate the 
analysis with English examples.
We can depart from the general definition of motion quoted from Zlatev, 
Blomberg and David (2010: 393) in the previous subsection: continuous change in 
the relative position of an object (the figure) against a background. As pointed out, 
this definition distinguishes motion from stasis, from change that does not involve 
motion, and from imaginary acts of Star Trek-like “teleportation”. Also following our 
previous analysis, we can distinguish between three different parameters according to 
which motion situations can vary.
2.2.1  Translocative vs. non-translocative motion
Translocative motion involves the perception of continuous change of an object’s aver-
age position according to a spatial frame of reference, while in non-translocative motion 
the figure maintains its average (perceived) position (as in the situation described by 
the sentence He waved goodbye). Here, the concept of spatial frame of reference (FoR) 
is central. It has been argued by Levinson (2003) that there are three universal frames 
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of reference, differentially prominent and linguistically expressed in the languages of 
the world. Levinson defines these for static relations and the horizontal plane. Here, 
we follow their generalizations to motion situations and the vertical plane, presented 
in earlier work (Zlatev 2005, 2007).
In the Viewpoint-centered FoR the perspective of the observer serves as a reference 
point, as in example (1). The second FoR is Geocentric, relying on geo-cardinal posi-
tions as reference points, as in (2–3). Finally, there is the Object-centered FoR, which 
can take as reference point either the position of the focused (and possibly moving) 
object, the figure, or that of an external object, a landmark, as in (4–5).4
 (1) Turn right.
  FoR: Viewpoint-centered
 (2) Drive West.
  FoR: Geocentric, Horizontal
 (3) The balloon flew up in the air.
  FoR: Geocentric, Vertical
 (4) The demonstration pushed forward.
  FoR: Object-centered, Figure
 (5) The horse walked into the stable.
  FoR: Object-centered, Landmark
A particular case of translocation can thus be specified according to one or more of 
these frames of reference, which provide the reference points allowing us (a) to judge 
whether the object/figure has indeed changed its average position and, if so (b) to 
determine its Path or Direction, as described in the following subsection.
2.2.2  Bounded vs. unbounded motion
The boundedness of a process undergone by the figure implies that it will inevitably 
(not just possibly or probably) lead to it undergoing a state-transition (cf. Vendler 
1967). This means that in expressions of bounded motion, the figure will depart from 
a Source (as in 6), pass through a mid-point (7), or reach a Goal (as in 5) – or all 
three as in (8). In unbounded motion, this is not the case, and in principle the motion 
of the figure can go on indefinitely, as in the motion situations described above in 
4.  Note that our use of the term figure (deriving from Gestalt psychology) corresponds to 
that of Talmy (2000) and Levinson (2003), and the term trajector used by others (Lakoff 1987; 
Zlatev 1997). On the other hand, our use of the term landmark, is more specific than that used 
in much of the cognitive linguistic literature (Langacker 1987), in referring to an object, which 
is typically expressed through a noun phrase in language (cf. Zlatev 2005, 2007).
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examples (1–4). In our analysis (and terminology) bounded translocative motion 
always involves the category Path, with one or more reference points being defined 
through the object-centred, landmark-defined FoR. In the case of unbounded trans-
locative motion, we have rather the category Direction, specified either as a vector 
according to one of the other FoR conditions (as in 1–4), or as a trajectory that can 
take particular shapes such as AROUND or ALONG.
 (6) I left the room.
 (7) He crossed the road.
 (8) The dog ran out of the barn across the field to the house.
Note, furthermore, that the two parameters discussed so far are independent. We have 
seen how translocative situations can be either unbounded, e.g. (1–4) or bounded e.g. 
(5–8). Non-translocative motion can be either unbounded, as (9–10), or bounded – if 
the motion involved leads to a state-transition, as in (11) or the Swedish equivalent 
(12), which involves an extended use of the motion verb gå (‘go’).5
 (9) John ran on the treadmill.
 (10) John ran in the park.
 (11) The vase broke (in pieces).
 (12) Vas-en gick  sönder.
  Vase-def go.past broken
2.2.3  Self-motion vs. caused motion
The final parameter concerns whether the figure is perceived to be moving under the 
influence of an external cause or not. The relevant notion of causality concerns the 
(naïve) human lifeworld, and not our scientific understanding of the universe. Thus, 
the situation described in (13) is one of translocative “self-motion” even though the 
motion of the raindrops is caused by gravity. On the other hand, (14) clearly represents 
a (translocative, bounded) caused motion situation.
 (13) Raindrops are falling on my head.
 (14) John kicked the ball over the fence.
This parameter is likewise independent of the other two, so it is possible to have caused 
translocative, unbounded motion situations (15), caused non-translocative bounded 
5.  One might counter that Examples (11) and (12) do not really express, but presuppose 
motion, but since the event described will (typically) involve a perception of physical change 
(against a stable background) these sentences do count as representations of non-translocative 
bounded motion, in the broad sense used here. 
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ones (16), and caused non-translocative unbounded ones (17). The self-caused coun-
terparts to these have already been illustrated.
 (15) Peter pushed the car forward.
 (16) Susan tore up the letter.
 (17) Mary waved the flag.
2.2.4  Summary
This analysis gives us the 8 types of motions situations in Table 1, illustrated with schematic 
representations in English.
Table 1. Illustration of the expression of 8 motion situation types in English;  
F = Figure, LM = Landmark, C = Cause, View-C = Viewpoint centred,  




F goes to LM C throws F into LM
+TRANSLOC  
–BOUNDED
F goes away (View-C)  
F goes up (Geo-C)  
F rolls forward (Obj-C)
C takes F away (View-C)  
C pushes F upward (Geo-C)  
C pushes F forward (Obj-C)
–TRANSLOC  
+BOUNDED
F breaks (up/down) C breaks F (up/down)
–TRANSLOC  
–BOUNDED
F waves C waves F
The tense in the examples in Table 1, the present simple, is only seldom used with 
any of these situation types (constructions) in English, but it is intentionally used in 
Table 1 in order to highlight the fact that the different situation types (i.e. specifying the 
values of the three parameters) can be expressed through one or more of the follow-
ing means: (a) the lexical semantics of the verb, (b) verb-satellite (particles or affixes), 
(c) adpositions (prepositions or postpositions), (d) the clause-level grammatical con-
struction (e.g. intransitive vs. transitive).
While tense and aspect markers can make the distinction between e.g. bounded 
and unbounded situations even clearer, i.e. by rendering the bounded ones in past sim-
ple tense as in (14), and the unbounded ones in present continuous as in (13), this is 
not necessary for making the parameter differentiations. Therefore, we would suggest 
that morphological aspect introduces an extra dimension of meaning over and above 
those expressed by (a)-(d), by allowing the profiling of motion situations (translocative 
or not) either as ongoing processes or as completed events – whether they are inherently 
bounded or not. Thus, (13) is also a representation of bounded motion (despite being 
ongoing), and (17) a representation of an unbounded motion (despite being “in the 
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past” and thus completed). Examples (18) and (19), taken from the British National 
Corpus (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/), show how fall, used in the past tense, can be 
used to express unbounded translocation, despite the fact that the events are being 
represented as taking place in the past, and thus as “completed”.
 (18) The wind blew and the snow fell, but it didn’t matter.
 (19) ... the devaluation of stock as component prices fell.
3.  Emotion and motion-emotion metaphors
As with the term ‘motion’, we can start by considering what a dictionary definition of 
‘emotion’ could tell us. The first three senses found in dictionary.com are:
a. an affective state of consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is  
experienced, as distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of consciousness.
b. any of the feelings of joy, sorrow, fear, hate, love, etc.
c. any strong agitation of the feelings actuated by experiencing love, hate, fear, etc. 
and usually accompanied by certain physiological changes, as increased heartbeat or 
respiration, and often overt manifestation, as crying or shaking.
As we can see in (a) and (b), the popular conception does not distinguish ‘emotion’ 
from ‘feeling’ along lines such as those of Damasio (2000), where the first term is 
reserved for a physiological reaction, and the second for the conscious perception of 
this reaction. Indeed, ‘physiological changes’ and ‘overt manifestation’, mentioned in 
(c) are regarded as occurring “usually” along with emotions, but not essentially. This 
common sense view may be criticized for being “dualistic”, and philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein have argued that it is mistaken. “Inner” and “outer” manifestations of 
emotion are intermingled in experience, and we do not use the second to infer the 
presence of the first in others, but perceive others’ emotions “directly”, as emphasized 
by phenomenologists, as well as Wittgenstein (Zlatev et  al. 2008; Racine et  al. this 
volume):
We see emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions 
and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face 
immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other 
description of the features. (Wittgenstein 1980: #570, emphasis original)
However, we are also capable of making the distinction between the feeling itself, and 
its “expression”. Experientially (and conceptually) when I feel angry from say, someone 
not replying to my greeting at the department in the morning, what I experience is 
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not in any obvious way ‘increased heartbeat and respiration’ but the emotion/feeling 
of anger, or at least irritation, itself. At the same time, I can notice such concomitant 
bodily processes, in myself as well as others, and refer to these, “metonymically” when 
I need to talk about my (or others’) emotions (cf. Kövecses 1990, 2000).
We can also notice that in (a), and implicitly in (b), emotion is regarded as a 
“state”, while (c) is closest to the etymological sense of emotion mentioned in Section 1, 
i.e. as a process, a ‘strong agitation of the feelings’. This ambiguity (state vs. process) of 
the concept of emotion is apparent both in experience and in language. Certain emo-
tions and emotion expressions appear more state-like: happy, sad, calm... Others like 
agitate, calm down, relax... are more process-like. Arguably, it is the latter that are more 
focal in consciousness: we typically notice the changes between intermittent states, 
not the states themselves – analogously to the way we tend to pay attention to motion 
rather than stasis in the external world. We will not try to make any strong claims for 
this here, but since it is motion-emotion metaphors that we investigate, we will pursue 
the (c) sense of emotion in the definition. To summarize, we will regard emotions as 
changes in affective consciousness.
In speaking of such changes, the self, or some relevant “part of the self ” can be 
described as if being set in motion, i.e. as the figure in the expression of motion situ-
ations, such as those given in Section 2. The difference is that in examples such as 
(20–22), where the metaphorically moving figure is highlighted, there is at best a kind 
of “metaphorical motion”, rather than actual perceived motion (from a third-person 
perspective).
 (20) My spirits are rising. 
 (21) My mood is sinking.
 (22) I was attracted by her smile.
These are the type of expressions that we compare cross-linguistically in Section 4, 
and refer to as motion-emotion metaphors. We can set up the following set of criteria, 
some of which were mentioned already, for singling them out in the languages under 
study:
a. If the figure-expression refers to the self (or part of it), there is no perceived 
motion in the “physical world”.
b. If the figure-expression (and the landmark-expression if necessary) is substituted 
for an expression referring to a physical object, the sentence would be a descrip-
tion of a motion situation (as defined in Section 2).
c. Motion is expressed by the verb-root (also), and not only in a verb-satellite (prefix 
or particle).
d. Both the motion and emotion interpretations (depending on the nature of the 
figure-expression) are present in the language synchronically (currently).
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According to criteria (a) and (b), examples (20–22) would qualify as motion-emotion 
metaphors, since examples (23–25) are indeed descriptions of motion situations, while 
there is no actual motion involved in the first set.
 (23) The moon is rising.
 (24) The boat is sinking.
 (25) The piece of metal was attracted by the magnet.
On the other hand, (26) is not a motion-emotion metaphor since apart from concern-
ing emotion it also describes actual (non-translocative) motion. Example (27) is dis-
qualified for another reason: it concerns emotion, involves metaphorical motion, but 
what is “moving” is not the self (or part of it), but the personification of the emotion 
itself, which is presented as if external to the self. The motivation for such a metaphor 
cannot obviously be in perceived motion of the self, or part of the self, and therefore 
this and similar cases of “external” metaphorical motion fall outside our analysis.
To the extent that there is any metaphorical emotion in (28) and (29) at all, it is 
connected to the English satellite up and the Bulgarian do- (‘by’, ‘to’), and not to the 
verb-root, and thus such examples are excluded by criterion (c). Furthermore, any 
possible motion interpretation in the Bulgarian example (29) would only be due to the 
etymology of do-volen (‘pleased’): do (‘to’) + volen (‘free’), and thus criterion (d) comes 
into play as well.
 (26) She trembled with fear.
 (27) He was gripped by fear.
 (28)  Mary was worked up.
 (29) Ivan  e  do-volen
  Ivan Cop.3p.SING  pleased.SING.MASC
  ‘Ivan is pleased.’
These criteria were essential for being able to perform the comparison between the 
motion-emotion metaphors in the four different languages.
4.  A cross-linguistic study of motion-emotion metaphors
4.1  Method and analysis
Initially, we identified as many motion-emotion metaphors as possible, primarily on 
the basis of our native (or near-native) speaker intuitions for Swedish, English and Bul-
garian, and those of a meta-linguistically aware informant for Thai. The method was 
basically to consider all possible expressions for emotion in the four languages, and 
then to eliminate those that did not fulfill the criteria described in Section 3. For Thai, 
extensive use was made of a compilation of “over 1,000 phrases which are connected 
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with the heart” (Moore 1998: 15): the word caj (‘heart, mind, spirit…’). Conversely, 
we made concordances of motion verbs in two corpora6, looking for uses extended to 
emotion.
In the next step, we grouped individual motion-emotion expressions into types. 
What characterized each type were differences in (a) the lexical semantics of the verb, 
(b) verb-satellite (particles or affixes), (c) adpositions, (d) the grammatical construc-
tion (e.g. intransitive vs. transitive) – the four means of expressing different motion 
situations presented in section 2.2.4. Specific sentences instantiating these could vary 
depending on the figure and landmark expressions and (in most cases) tense-aspect 
forms. Strongly idiomaticized expressions such as fall in love were not considered. The 
motion-emotion metaphor types were then classified according to the taxonomy of 
motion situations presented in Section 2, using only one situation type per metaphor 
(type), based on what appeared to be the basic (most unmarked) form of the metaphor.
This three-step procedure gave rise to 38 motion-emotion metaphors for English, 
27 for Swedish, 19 for Bulgarian (though see below) and 31 for Thai, a total of 115. 
In comparing the motion-emotion metaphors across the languages, we paid special 
attention to whether a given motion-emotion metaphor had a “near-equivalent” in 
one or more of the other languages, based primarily on overlap of the literal (motion), 
rather than the metaphorical (emotion) senses.
4.2  Results
In English we encountered the largest number of motion-emotion metaphors, 38, with 
the majority of these having corresponding expressions in one or more of the other 
languages. We found predominance for Caused motion expressions (25 vs. 13). In 
most cases (rendered in the simple present tense in Table 2) the metaphors were not 
limited to a specific form of the verb, but in several cases, they were limited to past 
participles.
The following 12 motion-emotion metaphors were found to be specific to Eng-
lish. Notably, only those exemplified in (30)–(33) express metaphorical translocative 
motion, while the others are non-translocative. The examples in (30–32) and (35) 
involve metaphorical self-motion, while the others imply caused motion, commonly 
(though not necessarily) expressed using a passive construction. Example (34) is inter-
mediate: the figure is expressed by the grammatical subject, and “breaking down” can 
be thought to occur for internal reasons, but typically, as in the example, an external 
cause is presumed. In terms of boundedness, half of the expressions involve a (clear) 
state-transition, and half do not.
6.  British National Corpus, http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/ and Thai Concordance, www.arts.
chula.ac.th/~ling/ThaiConc/
 Metaphor and subjective experience 437
Table 2. Motion-emotion metaphors in English, using the present simple tense (when 
the metaphor is not form-specific) and past participle (PART) when confined to a specific 
verbal form. F = Figure, LM = Landmark, C = Cause, (S) = corresponding expression in 
Swedish, (B) = corresponding expression in Bulgarian, (T) = corresponding expression in 
Thai, * = lack of corresponding expression (with example in the main text)
Self motion Caused motion
+Transloc/+Bound F falls into LM *  
F plunges into LM *
C moved F to LM (S)  
C drives F to LM (S, B)  
C brings F to LM (B)
+Transloc/–Bound F soars * 
F rises (S, B, T)  
F sinks (S) 
F creeps F (S)  
F drops (S, B, T)
F is downcast * – PART  
C pulls F (S, B)  
C attracts F (S, B)  
C repels F (S, B)  
F is uplifted (S, B) – PART
–Transloc/+Bound F breaks down *  
F breaks (S)  
F collapses (S)  
F explodes (S)
C puts F off *  
C throws F off F’s feet *  
C upsets F *  
C shatters F (S, B, T)  
C knocks F off F’s feet (S)  
C knocks F out (S)  
C floors F (S)  
C tears F apart (B)
–Transloc/-Bound F flutters *  
F swells (S)
C presses F *  
F is unperturbed * – PART  
C makes F shrink *  
C moves F (S)  
C shakes F (S, B, T)  
C stirs F (S, B, T)  
C agitates F (S)  
C calms F (S, B)  
C relaxes F (B, T)
Total 13  
(5*) (8S) (2B) (2T)
25  
(7*) (15S) (12B) (4T)
 (30) I fell into a state of depression. (–Caused, +Trans, +Bound)
 (31) He plunged into despair.  (–Caused, +Trans, +Bound)
 (32) My spirit soared. (–Caused, +Trans, –Bound)
 (33) She was sad and downcast at the party. (+Caused, +Trans, –Bound)
 (34) I broke down under the pressure.  (–/+Caused, -Trans, +Bound)
 (35) My heart fluttered.  (–Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
 (36) His bad manners put me off. (+Caused, –Trans, +Bound)
 (37) Their threats made me shrink.  (+Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
 (38) I was thrown off my feet. (+Caused, –Trans, +Bound)
 (39) She was upset by his rudeness. (+Caused, –Trans, +Bound)
 (40) I was pressed by the circumstances. (+Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
 (41) My uncle looked at me, unperturbed. (+Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
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Of the 27 motion-emotion metaphors found in Swedish and shown in Table 3 again 
there was a preference for Caused motion expressions. The majority of the metaphors 
were not confined to a particular verbal form, but a few “unbounded” ones required 
the use of a present participle. Only five, exemplified in (42–46) were found to be 
specific for the language.
Table 3. Motion-emotion metaphors in Swedish, using the present tense, when the meta-
phor is not form-specific, or else a present participle (PART). F = Figure, LM = Landmark, 
C = Cause, (E) = corresponding expression in English, (B) = corresponding expression in 
Bulgarian, (T) = corresponding expression in Thai, * = lack of corresponding expression 
(with example in the main text)
Self motion English gloss Caused motion English gloss
+Transloc/+Bound – C kastar ner F i LM *  
C rör F till tårar (E)  
C driver F till vansinne 
(E, B)
throws down in 
moves to tears 
drives to madness
+Transloc/–Bound F kryper (E)  
F stiger (E, B, T)  





C trycker ner F *  
C attraherar F (E, B)  
C är tilldragande  
(E, B) – PART  
C stöter bort F (E, B)  
C är frånstötande  
(E, B) – PART  
C är upplyftande  
(E, B) – PART
pushes down 
attracts  
is attractive  
 




–Transloc/+Bound F bryter ihop/
samman*  
F rasar (E)  
F brister (E)  






(‘flies up in the 
air’)
C golvar F  
 
C krossar F (E, B, T)  
C knäcker F (B, T)  
C knockar F (E)
knocks down  
(‘floors’)  
crushes  
breaks apart  
knocks down





C (om)skakar  
F (E, B, T)  
C lugnar (ner) F (E, B)  
C upprör F (E, B, T)  
C rör F (E)
shakes (up)  
 
calms (down)  
agitates (‘stirs up’) 
moves
Total 10  
(3*) (7E) (2B) (2T)
17 
 (2*) (14E) (11B) (4T)
 (42) Han bröt   ihop  under  begravning-en
  He broke.past  together  during   funeral-def
  ‘He broke down during the funeral.’ (–Caused, –Trans, +Bound)
 (43) Hon sväv-ar   av lycka
  She hover-pres of happiness
  ‘She is floating in happiness.’ (–Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
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 (44) Hans humör svaj-ar  på ett  oberäkneligt  sätt
  His mood swing-pres on a unpredictable  way
  ‘His mood changes in an unpredictable manner.’(–Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
 (45) Han  kasta-de-s  ner i en djup  depression
  He throw-past-passive down in a deep  depression
  ‘He was cast into deep depression.’ (+Caused, +Trans, +Bound)
 (46) Jag tryck-te-s  ner  av  omständigheter-na
  I press-past-passive down by  circumstances-def
  ‘I was burdened by the circumstances.’ (+Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
In Bulgarian, we similarly found that only 5 of the identified 19 motion-emotion meta-
phors, shown in (47–51), lack corresponding expression in the other three languages. 
Only the expression in (47), shown with PAST in Table 4, is limited to a specific verb form.
Table 4. Motion-emotion metaphors in Bulgarian, using the present tense, when 
the metaphor is not form-specific, and past tense (PAST) otherwise. F = Figure,  
LM = Landmark, C = Cause, (E) = corresponding expression in English,  
(S) = corresponding expression in Swedish, (T) = corresponding expression  
in Thai, * = lack of corresponding expression (with example in the main text)
Self motion English 
gloss
Caused motion English gloss
+Transloc/+Bound F pre-mina * Passed C do-karva F do (E, S)  
C do-vežda F do (E)
drives to  
brings to
+Transloc/–Bound F idva *  
F pada (E, S, T)
comes  
falls
C pri-vlicha F (E, S)  
C ot-blăskva F (E, S)  
C po-vdiga F (E, S, T)
attracts (‘drags to’)  
repels (‘push from’) 
raises
–Transloc/+Bound iz-buhva (E,S)  
F se V ←
expodes C raz-kăsva F (E)  
C raz-vălnuva F * - PAST  
C raz-biva F (E, S, T)  
C pre-chupva F (S, T)  
C raz-tărsva F (E, S, T)
tear apart  
rippled 
shatters  
breaks apart  
shakes up
–Transloc/–Bound F se V ← C po-bărkva F *  
C pod-tisva F *  
C u-bărkva F (E, S, T)  
C u-spokojava  
F (E, S)  
C ot-pusva F (E, T)






Total 4  
(2*) (2E) (2S) 
(1T)
15  
(3*) (11 E) (9 S) (6 T)
As with English and Swedish, Bulgarian seems to show a dominance for Caused 
motion, but here there is a complication: each one of the 10 non-translocative, caused 
motion metaphors can also be used to describe metaphorical self-motion of the figure 
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(F), using the reflexive construction with the particle se (see Table 4). In English and 
Swedish, the corresponding expressions can also apply to the figure, without mention-
ing the Cause, but in that case one would use a past participle (e.g. C presses F → F 
is pressed), thus implying external causation. In Bulgarian, on the other hand, the 
reflexive construction implies self-causation. If these “extra” 10 self-motion expres-
sions were considered, there would be a near complete balance between self-motion 
and caused-motion expressions.
 (47) Pre-mina  mi
  prf-pass.past  1p.SING.dat
  ‘Passed over for me.’ ≈ I feel better (–Caused, +Trans, +Bound)
 (48) Natroenie-to  idva-še
  mood-def  come-past.prog
  ‘The mood was coming.’ (–Caused, +Trans, –Bound)
 (49) Toj me  po-bărvka
  He 1p.SING.acc imp-stir.pres
  ‘He stirs me on.’ ≈ He drives me crazy. (+Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
 (50) Pesen-ta  me  raz-vălnuva
  Song-def 1p.SING.acc prf-ripple.past
  ‘The song rippled me.’ ≈ moved me (+Caused, +Trans, –Bound)
 (51) Samota-ta go  pod- tisna7
  Loneliness-def 3p.masc.acc under-press.past
  ‘Loneliness depressed him.’(–Caused, –Trans, –Bound)
In Thai, as shown in Table 5, the picture is markedly different from that of the other 
three languages. First of all, we can notice that most of the expressions appear in the 
category Self-motion. This has to do with the fact that the metaphors combine intran-
sitive or transitive motion verbs and the word caj (‘heart’, ‘mind’), which constitutes an 
important cultural concept in Thai. While related to the word for the biological heart, 
hûa-caj (literally ‘head heart’), it denotes not a body-part, but something like the cen-
tre of emotional life itself. Thus, the composite expressions can be used intransitively, 
for example applying to oneself. Therefore, all motion-emotion metaphors in (52–68) 
may constitute complete sentences, with an elliptic first person pronoun. All of these 
composite expressions also unambiguously refer to emotion; only without caj can the 
verbs be used to describe corresponding motion situations.
The second major difference is that only a handful of examples have “near 
equivalents” in the other languages – the only ones given as glosses in Table 5. The 
7.  This form, with the prefix pod- (‘under’), is incorrect according to prescriptive Bulgarian 
grammar and lexicon, and the correct form should rather be with the prefix po-. However, in 
spoken Bulgarian, as well as on the internet, the most common use is that with pod-.
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overwhelming majority, listed below, appear clearly “exotic” from a Western per-
spective. Let us consider these by motion situation type. In each of the examples we 
give a literal translation and approximate English gloss. In some cases (59–61), the 
glosses are identical, and it would take considerable cultural knowledge to under-
stand the appropriate uses of the different expressions (cf. Moore 1998).
Table 5. Motion-emotion metaphors in Thai, all of which involve the word caj (‘heart’, 
‘mind’). F = Figure, LM = Landmark, C = Cause, (E) = corresponding expression in  
English, (S) = corresponding expression in Swedish, (B) = corresponding expression in 
Bulgarian, * = lack of corresponding expression (with example in the main text)
Self motion English gloss Caused motion English gloss
+Transloc/+Bound F thɯŋ̌-caj *  
F klàp-caj *  
F caj-hǎaj *  
F aw-caj-ɔ̀ɔk-hàaŋ *
C sàj-caj F *
+Transloc/–Bound F tòk-caj (E, S, B)  
 





C taam-caj F *  
C aw-caj F *
–Transloc/+Bound F thalǎm-caj *  
F sàdùt-caj *  
F tàt-caj *  
F tam-caj *  
F bàat-caj *  
F thîm-teeŋ-caj *  
F ráŋáp-caj *  
F thɔ̀ɔt-caj *  
F caj-hǎaj-caj-khwâm*  
F caj-sàlǎaj (E, S, B)  
 













(‘break in two 
heart’)
C phûut dâj cɔ-̀caj F *  
C khàt-caj F *
–Transloc/–Bound F caj-têen *  
F caj-têen-mâj-pen-jaŋwà*  
F waaŋ-caj *  
F plɔ̀ɔj-caj *  
F sàtɯan-caj (E, S, B)  
 









C chák-cuuŋ-caj  
F * C klɔ̀ɔm-caj  




Total 23  
(17*) (5 E) (5 S) (6 B)
8  
(7*) (1 E) (1 S) (1 B)
Examples (52–55) would, in the source domain of the metaphor, express self-caused, 
bounded translocative motion.
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 (52) thɯŋ̌-caj
  reach heart ≈ feel gratified
 (53) klàp-caj
  return heart ≈ feel repentant
 (54) caj-hǎaj
  heart disappear ≈ feel very surprised
 (55)  aw-caj-ɔɔk-hàaŋ
  take heart leave far ≈ feel that you are betraying
A much larger number of metaphors involve actions that imply non-translocative 
motion. Those given in (56)–(64) concern actions with a state-transition, i.e. they 
are bounded. The examples in (57) and (72) may perhaps be considered metaphors 
for cognition rather than emotion, but especially in Thai the two phenomena are 
extremely difficult to separate, as seen by the glosses ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ for caj.8
 (56) thalǎm-caj
  trip heart ≈ feel mistaken in love
 (57) sàdùt-caj
  trip heart ≈ suddenly realize
 (58) tàt-caj
  cut heart ≈ feel discouraged
 (59)  tam-caj
  pierce heart ≈ feel betrayed
 (60) bàat-caj
  cut heart ≈ feel betrayed
 (61) thîm-teeŋ-caj
  stab-wound heart ≈ feel betrayed
 (62) ráŋáp-caj
  stop heart ≈ calm down
 (63)  thɔ̀ɔt-caj
  take-off heart ≈ give up effort to achieve something
 (64) caj-hǎaj-caj-khwâm
  heart disappear, heart overturn ≈ feel shocked
Examples (65)–(68) may be said to involve metaphorical unbounded, non-translocative 
motion.
8.  When speaking English, and saying something about “my mind”, Thai speakers com-
monly point to their heart (observation made by the first author, during three years of living 
in Thailand).
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 (65) caj-tên
  heart dance ≈ feel surprised
 (66) caj-tên-mâj-pen-jaŋwà
  heart dancing jerkily ≈ feel one’s heart to flutter
 (67) waaŋ-caj
  put down heart ≈ feel trustful (of your partner)
 (68)  plɔ̀ɔj-caj
  let-go heart ≈ be in a state of daydreaming
The transitive, “caused-motion” expressions concern actions that are performed with 
respect to someone else. The “heart” that is being moved (or acted upon) is metaphori-
cally that of another. Thus, these can be said to be “second-person” emotion expres-
sions, relying on empathy with the metaphorical figure, the experiencer (E). Examples 
(69)–(71) would express literal translocation in the absence of caj, with the first one 
bounded, and the other two unbounded.
 (69) sàj-caj E
  put in (someone’s) heart ≈ take care of someone
 (70) taam-caj E
  follow (someone’s) heart ≈ please someone
 (71) aw-caj E
  carry (someone’s) heart ≈ please someone
The final Thai motion-emotion metaphors (without corresponding expressions in the 
other three languages) build on non-translocative motion, with the first two bounded 
(72–73), and the last two unbounded (74–75).
 (72) phûut dâj cɔ-̀caj E
   make a hole (in someone’s) heart ≈ reveal something unpleasant about 
someone
 (73) khàt-caj E
  cut (someone’s) heart ≈ irritate someone
 (74) chák-cuuŋ-caj E
  drag (someone’s) heart ≈ persuade someone
 (75) klɔ̀ɔm-caj E
  cradle (someone’s) heart ≈ soothe someone in distress
4.3  Discussion
The presentation of the motion-emotion metaphors attested in the four individual 
languages showed both similarities and differences. We can now consider these 
findings in the light of the three theoretical positions on the relation between 
metaphor and subjective experience, outlined in the introduction: (a) conceptual 
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universalism, (b) strong language dependence/specificity and (c) consciousness-
language interactionism.
As a reminder, the prediction from (a) was that there would be extensive overlap 
between the metaphors in the four languages. In fact, a degree of overlap was indeed 
found, though relatively limited. Table 6 shows correspondences between five motion-
emotion metaphors in the four languages, i.e. involving 20 of the 115 expressions. 
Interestingly, these are fairly systematic: MOVE UP and MOVE DOWN are converse 
motions, and the target emotions can be subsumed under the headings POSITIVE 
and NEGATIVE, respectively, which are also “antonymic”. The (non-translocative) 
motions in the other three cases form a sort of hierarchy of intensity: BREAK UP > 
SHAKE > STIR and it seems that the emotions these map to do so likewise.9
Table 6. Cross-linguistic metaphor types attested with expressions in all four languages
Metaphor type English Swedish Bulgarian Thai
MOVE DOWN → 
NEGATIVE
F drops  
F sinks
F sjunker F pada F tòk-caj
MOVE UP → 
POSITIVE
F is rising F stiger C po-vdiga F F chuu-caj
BREAK UP →  
VERY STRONG  
NEG. EMOTION
C shatters F C krossar F C raz-biva F F caj-sàlǎaj
SHAKE →  
STRONG NEG. 
EMOTION
C shakes F C (om)skakar F C raz-tărsva F F sàtɯan-caj
STIR → NEG.
EMOTION
C stirs F C upprör F C u-bărkva F C kuan-caj F
At the same time, we should notice that the metaphors in Table 6 do not cor-
respond to one another completely, and are only near equivalents. English sinks 
and Swedish sjunker (‘sink’) imply downward movement through a liquid medium, 
while the other three verbs imply downward movement through air. tòk-caj in Thai 
denotes feelings of intense surprise, rather than emotional discouragement, “down-
heartedness” as in the other three languages. The Bulgarian metaphor for MOVE 
UP →  POSITIVE,  po-vdiga (‘raise’) is alone in referring to caused, rather than 
9.  A generalization, in the style of CMT, could perhaps be made for all these cases. The 
neutral state of the self, in both physical and emotional experience is that of BALANCE 
(which of course could be differently valued in different cultures). Various forces may dislo-
cate the self from this position (shake, stir) or even threaten its integrity (break). The negative 
character of downward motion can be associated with the loss of balance, as when one is 
overcome by the forces of gravity. What makes upward motion positive (rise) is the experi-
ence of being liberated from those forces, of increased mobility and thus a sense of “freedom”.
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 self-motion motion. Finally, the Bulgarian expression listed in the last row, u-bărkva 
is less clearly related to emotion than the corresponding ones in the other languages 
since it describes the “state of mind” of F in general.
Most problematic for conceptual universalism, however, is that a total of 46 meta-
phors (12 for English, 5 for Swedish, 5 for Bulgarian and 24 for Thai) were found to be 
language-specific. This, along with a certain degree of form-specificity, could be taken 
rather in support of language dependence. In the case of Thai, where we cannot use 
the criterion of a “frozen” tense-aspect form to determine form-specificity (i.e. strong 
idiomaticity), since the language lacks morphological tense and aspect, we can never-
theless attribute a high degree of conventionality to all the motion-emotion metaphors 
attested in the language, due to the obligatory conjunction of the word caj with the 
respective verbs and phrases.
At the same time, none of the 46 language-specific (and in a few cases form- 
specific) expressions can be properly called “arbitrary”, since in all cases a relation of 
similarity (or contiguity) could be found with corresponding motion situations. Oth-
erwise the examples would not have been analyzable according to the framework pre-
sented in Section 2, Table 1, into the categories in Tables 2–5. The glosses given for the 
24 Thai expressions lacking “near equivalents” in the other three languages (52–75) 
may give the impression that some of these metaphors are “exotic” (from a European 
perspective), but their motivation is certainly not incomprehensible.
So despite the considerable number of “language-specific” motion-emotion meta-
phors in the four languages, the overall impression is that there is considerable overlap 
between the languages – even between the genetically and geographically most distant 
ones (see Figure 1 below). And conversely, while the attested language-specificity con-
stitutes negative evidence for conceptual universalism, the cross-linguistic correspon-
dences, and systematicity shown in Table 6 are problematic for the thesis of (strong) 
language-dependence.
On the other hand, the findings can be naturally interpreted as supporting a 
dialectical theory of type (c), consciousness-language interactionism. It should be 
remembered that it also made the prediction that the degree of overlap between the 
metaphors in the four languages will correspond to the degree to which the languages/
cultures are related: English and Swedish are most similar, both genetically and cultur-
ally. Bulgarian, a Slavonic language from South-Eastern Europe is more distant, while 
Thai is clearly the “outlier” in the group.
As shown in Table 7, this prediction seems to be confirmed. 23 of the English 
metaphors were also represented in Swedish, while only 14 had a “near equivalent” in 
Bulgarian and 6 in Thai – despite that Thai had nearly as many motion-emotion meta-
phors as English. From the perspective of Swedish the situation was similar – extensive 
overlap with English (21 of 27 metaphors), less so with Bulgarian (11), and much less 
with Thai (6). Bulgarian overlapped nearly identically with English (13) and Swedish 
(11), with about two-thirds of its motion-emotion metaphors, and less so with Thai 
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(7). The degree with which Thai motion-emotion metaphors had counterparts in the 
other languages was relatively small, and nearly identical for all three languages.
Table 7. Degree of overlap between the motion-emotion metaphors in the four languages
Language-to- 
language overlap
English Swedish Bulgarian Thai
English 38 (12*) 23 14 6
Swedish 21 27 (5*) 11 6
Bulgarian 13 11 19 (5*) 7
Thai 6 6 7 31 (24*)
If we disregard the fact that relationship “overlap with language X” was not com-
pletely one-to-one – since several near synonymous expressions in one language can 
correspond to a single one in another – we can illustrate this degree of overlap between 





Figure 1. Graphical representation of the overlap between motion-emotion metaphors in the 
four languages
In fact, Thai overlaps less with the other three languages than what the tables and 
Figure 1 show, since similarity in the “source domain” meaning of several of the Thai 
metaphors listed as counterparts to those in the other languages were not matched 
with similarities in their metaphorical meanings. As with tòk-caj, mentioned above, 
hàk-caj (“break heart”) has a different conventional emotional meaning compared to 
the other three languages (to restrain oneself).
5.  Conclusions
In this chapter, we relied on cross-linguistic evidence in order to broach a difficult 
topic: the relationship between subjective experience and metaphorical expressions, 
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focusing on metaphors connecting the “domains” of motion and emotion. Departing 
from Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument, we pointed out that while 
the meaning of linguistic expressions cannot be reduced to subjective experience, the 
latter may, and indeed should be relevant for many expressions denoting states and 
processes of consciousness. Public criteria for the correct use of expressions provide 
“half the story”. While “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (Wittgen-
stein 1953: #580) to determine the conditions for appropriate language use, we could 
reverse this and say that “outward criteria stand in need of an inner process”, or else 
words denoting mental phenomena would be gutted of their experiential content, and 
their meaning reduced to use. Linguistic expressions of emotions appear as a prime 
“test case” for investigating this dialectics of the “inner” and the “outer”.
The study of motion-emotion metaphors in four differentially related languages 
(and cultures) here described gives support for a view according to which personal, 
subjective experience and language (use) closely interact in the formation of meta-
phorical expressions used to talk about, and at least to some extent think about, emo-
tions. In brief, this position implies a scenario on the “evolution” of emotion metaphors 
such as the following.
People can and do experience emotions (or feelings) of various sorts even inde-
pendently of language, but to be able to talk about them, these less “tangible” experi-
ences must be expressed by words whose meaning is public. The most natural way 
to do so is to use expressions which refer to publically observable phenomena, but 
which are in some ways either similar to (analogy, iconicity) or spatiotemporally related 
to (contiguity, indexicality) the subjective experiences. Expressions denoting motion 
situations are convenient for this purpose for two reasons, corresponding to the two 
kinds of motivation. First, due to their dynamic character, motion situations may be 
found to be (phenomenologically) similar to emotions (i.e. changes in affective con-
sciousness). Second, due to the close association between feelings and co-occurring 
bodily processes and sensations, the latter become “metonymic” or “indexical” of the 
first. Hence, in historical time some speakers could creatively use expressions referring 
to such analogous or contiguous (motion) events in the “external world” in order to 
describe their “inner worlds”, and hearers could understand them, due to the moti-
vated nature of the expressions. With cultural transmission, both within and between 
generations, such expressions become conventional (though still motivated) and thus 
convenient language-specific and culture-specific “moulds” for construing emotional 
experience.
The empirical findings and the theoretical position of this chapter are in har-
mony with the theme of the present volume – the fundamental roles of motion and 
emotion for “consciousness, intersubjectivity, and language”. First of all, emotion and 
(the perception of) motion were analyzed as central aspects of (human) conscious-
ness. Concerning intersubjectvity, however, a qualification to what has been said so 
far needs to be made. In referring repeatedly to “subjective experience” we may have 
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given the impression of emotions as fundamentally private phenomena, at least prior 
to their expression in language. While with Husserl, and phenomenology in general 
we would insist on the irreducible character of consciousness, (human) subjectivity is 
tightly connected to inter-subjectivity. Thus, we would maintain that our first-person 
experience of emotions (i.e. feelings) is indeed basic, but it is not radically “private” in 
the sense that Wittgenstein criticized, since our emotional capacities have evolved and 
develop through communal life. Bodily expressions of emotion such as postures, cries 
and facial expressions are intrinsically public, and through empathy, we are literally 
capable of “sharing into” the emotions of others (Gallagher, this volume). As pointed 
out in Section 2, the dual nature of the body – on the one hand perceived from the 
outside, and on the other, as a lived body, Leib, experienced subjectively, is probably 
fundamental for achieving this. However, this is done without thereby abolishing the 
distinction between self and other. As stated clearly by Zahavi (2003: 114): “To demand 
more, to claim that I only experience an Other the moment I gain access to the first-
person givenness of the Other’s experiences is a fundamental misunderstanding that 
far from respecting the transcendence of the other … seeks to abolish it.”
With language, however, the individual differences in subjectivity become less 
relevant than the collectivity of the common senses (meanings). The motion-emotion 
metaphors such as my heart dropped discussed in this chapter are of this kind: conven-
tional, without being arbitrary, since they are doubly grounded in both (inter)subjective 
emotional experience and in conditions for appropriate usage.
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“It is by natural signs chiefly that we give force and energy to language; and the 
less language has of them, it is the less expressive and persuasive. […] Artificial 
signs signify, but they do not express; they speak to the understanding, as 
algebraical characters may do, but the passions, the affections, and the will, hear 
them not: these continue dormant and inactive, till we speak to them in the 
language of nature, to which they are all attention and obedience.”
Thomas Reid (1764). An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense.
1.   Human nature, common sense and language: The motives  
of cultural learning
The problem of reconciling natural creativity and rational artifice in human affairs is 
endless. On the one hand there is the spontaneous actions, intuitive awareness and 
affections of the life of a human person in intimate relations with other known per-
sons, and on the other the complexity of factual explanations in a practical society that 
rules its membership with an impersonal logic of laws and symbols. Whitehead in his 
Science and the Modern World explored how this dilemma has been manifest through 
the history of European thought. It seems we must draw attention once again to the 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (Whitehead 1926: 68).
The contributors to this volume are convinced that many scholars of language, of 
the philosophy of mind, of the psychology of cognition, and of cultural patterns and 
social institutions are misguided by a modern tradition of rational explanation. Con-
sciousness and knowledge are proclaimed to be effects caused in single heads, impres-
sions in excitable cerebral matter of stimulating events, the ‘true’ nature of which is 
made clear by rules of educated thought and language, and by scientific instruction in 
laws of matter. Within this tradition it is taken as given that each young human mind, 
alone, after assimilating the forms of reality experienced as a result of its instinctive 
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actions, somehow infers or imitates a capacity for logical thought, acquiring ‘reason’ 
or ‘intelligence’, the communication of which depends on a special learning of how to 
articulate in language what is known. The body with its affections has a peripheral part 
in this mind’s work, as a sensitive instrument.
When turning attention to questions of how to educate the human computing 
‘system’, a cognitivist may admit that the child has some active ‘strategies’ or ‘devices’ 
for gaining practical schemata and symbolic knowledge, besides primitive means of 
communicating body-related satisfactions or displeasures. In explaining how mean-
ings are communicated, they attend first to the signalling of practical needs and regu-
latory practices of productive work – to the organisation of essential tasks in complex 
systems of technology, commerce and industry, and the pragmatic reasoning that rep-
resents, justifies and legislates them. Education is directed to instruction in technical 
knowledge and media for its communication.
Experts in this scientific theory of intelligence and its instruction do not suffi-
ciently appreciate the biological foundations, the adaptive nature of the child’s curi-
osity of being alive, and its seeking for company, which are evident in all human 
communities, no matter how advanced their civilisation and industry, or how ‘primi-
tive’. There is a creative spirit of agency inside every human body from birth, the move-
ments of which express a time of being, appreciated as a single self-consciousness by 
many modalities of sense, and the purposes and affections of this vitality demand to 
be shared. The rational theories cannot explain how this need to share affective life is 
open to artful cultivation in celebrations of community, or how every child is inspired 
to achieve, imagine and remember their purposes and projects with serious and socia-
ble playfulness. Rational theories of language structures do not explain how we find 
it compelling to communicate what we do, know and care about – whether we are 
speaking and hearing, writing and reading, or not employing words at all. We pursue 
our goals, even as infants, with great tenacity, and with very powerful feelings, and we 
share these intentions and feelings richly, in many ways. Those are some of the topics 
the authors of this book wish to clarify.
With different interests and for a variety of reasons, we believe the scholastic ‘gaps’ 
between mind and body, self and other, reason and emotion, are impediments to appre-
ciation of how human nature lives and grows, and how it responds to language and the 
other tools of culture. These gaps are sustained in cognitive science by claims about the 
structure, uses and origins of language, about discoveries about correlated activity in 
pieces of brain, and by philosophical analysis of an ideal, reflective consciousness that 
attempts to recall and explain experience as facts perceived outside the body, as an 
‘informatics’ system.
All the contributors to this book suggest, with evidence from different fields, 
that the confusion may be cleared, and the gaps of understanding ‘filled in’ – so they 
no longer trip us up or invite laborious detours of explanation – by attending to the 
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way each of our human bodies acts as an intentionally coherent animate Self, aware 
of itself, and conscious of participating in the world. By a descriptive natural science 
that takes note of how a human person, as an animal, guides his or her actions by an 
intelligent ‘environment expectant’ awareness that grasps environmental affordances 
for what they intend to do – how it feels its acting, and how it imagines the future feel 
of experience and recalls the past with feeling, aesthetically. Finally, we ask how this 
active, aware and imaginative Self shares defined interests with other persons morally, 
with sympathetic affections. How a person expresses their self confidence in language 
or by other means, engaging with human Others who are perceived as persons in their 
living selves full of passions, and as potential cooperative companions or competitors 
in self-conscious and mutually responsive action, feeling and knowing.
Those of us who seek evidence from the way language defines and qualifies its 
messages believe that considerations of the emotional liveliness of the speakers and 
listeners, of the sharers of signs, or of the writers and readers of verbal texts, math-
ematical formulations or musical scores, must be kept as the foundation for any theory 
of how the words and symbols work. We accept Thomas Reid’s distinction between 
natural and artificial signs. Manifestly language is not just a thing; it is something we 
do, and with passionate intention. As a troubled Wittgenstein discovered, when he 
took on the job of teaching children how to talk and think, language is a ‘game’ we play 
(Wittgenstein 1953; Sluga 1996). If the wealth of reference in language is to be shared 
and make sense, its natural motives need to be vitally present. We urge a return not 
only to ordinary everyday ‘first person’ experience of our being and doing in felt move-
ment, but also to the ‘second person’ sociability of understanding that Reid (1764) 
called ‘common sense’, which includes wise distinctions and precisions ‘buried in the 
structure of everyday language’, and which are transmitted richly if we share sympathy 
for one another’s ‘active powers’.
2.   Some history of the controversy over the nature  
of human intelligence and meaning
Voices of the past 150 years give support to our enquiry, providing alternative inter-
pretations to the dualism of the thinking conscious mind in a single head, command-
ing with verbal skill an animal mechanism of senses and muscles, a body with only 
automatic passions that require reasoned regulation in a society of rational persons, 
like unruly children. We may cite Husserl, Mead, Wittgenstein, Bakhtin, Vygotsky, 
Gibson and above all Merleau-Ponty, all of whom believe the Self is intentional in its 
awareness, with emotions that bring us into a community, giving each one of us a sense 
of being in a life time we can share, and a sense that one is a recognized person with 
individual character. In order to present the present volume in a broader historical 
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context, it may be useful to review the thoughts of these and other leading seekers of a 
more vital and sympathetic account of the human condition and the making of mean-
ings under headings that attempt to identify the key topics they chose to elucidate.
2.1  Animal agency and its awareness
In the mid 19th Century, Helmholz, pioneering sensory psychophysics, refused to 
separate mind and body. He explained vision, looking with two eyes while perceiving 
a motionless surround, as a product of an ‘unconscious inference’ needed for guiding 
all actions of a self in the world. By the beginning of the 20th century a physiological 
science of animal intentions, self awareness and feelings of vitality was growing strong, 
transforming psychology. Sherrington (1906) gave a brilliant account of the integra-
tive action of the nervous system, attributing consciousness to a power of knowledge 
inferred though the ‘extero-ceptive’ distance senses to guide movement by an imagi-
native ‘projicience’, which seeks confirmation by use of the ‘proprioception’ of body 
movement, he called this sensing ‘the material Me’ in action. The objects are brought 
to the body for ‘affective appraisal’ by ‘viscero-ceptors’. Research by von Holst (1936) 
on how animals move with awareness proved the crucial role of ‘loosely coupled’ 
intrinsic rhythms of central nervous activity. In 1950, he and Mittelstaedt demon-
strated the “Reafference Principle” by which an organism distinguishes self-generated 
sensations from exafferent (externally generated) stimuli, and the same year Sperry 
showed that an animal’s control of its movements requires a “corollary discharge” of 
nerve energy that anticipates the ‘correct’ sensory feedback from each movement. In 
a paper entitled “Neurology and the mind-brain problem”, opposing the behaviourist 
theory, he maintained that perceptions serve movements rather than cause them – that 
we perceive what we intend (Sperry 1952). Sperry used experiments on the develop-
ment and regeneration of brain circuits to show that fields of neurons are mapped with 
representations of the body’s field of movement and awareness, by a genetically deter-
mined coding of nerve growth patterns (Sperry 1963). This ‘chemospecificity theory’, 
abundantly confirmed by molecular genetics research, affirms that psychological pro-
cesses are innately adapted for awareness of, and movement within, a world perceived 
relative to the form of the body. Drawing conclusions from his work on the different 
mental functions of the human cerebral hemispheres revealed by commissurotomy, 
for which he received the Nobel Prize in 1981, Sperry (1983) also wrote on the cre-
ative and unifying power of a ‘supervening’ consciousness to master the elementary 
processes of awareness and movement. Like Dewey, he insisted that human awareness 
must be imbued with conscious moral purpose.
Gibson’s ecological perception theory (Gibson 1986) relates to insights from von 
Helmholtz, Sherrington and Sperry. From research on practical problems of steering 
vehicles and object recognition, he showed that perceivers “pick up” information to 
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guide their movements with “prospective control”, detecting invariants in the shapes 
and transformations of the visual world related to how their bodies move within it. He 
called the perceived properties “affordances”, and came to reject the cognitivism that 
emerged in the 1960s, on the grounds that perception clearly can “directly” perceive 
the information needed about useable reality without rational intervention. Eleanor 
Gibson, James’ wife, studied perception in infants and young children, demonstrating 
that perceptual learning proceeds from differentiation of innate abilities to detect new 
affordances of spatial arrangements and of the forms of object in the world (Gibson 
1993). Prospective motor control by generation of a ‘motor image’ for the desired 
movement was demonstrated by the Russian physiologist Bernstein and has been 
given a powerful mathematical formulation by Gibson’s student David Lee (1980).
2.2  Affect, or the values of life
Darwin concluded that innate emotional expressions of humans guide the develop-
ment from an affectionate infancy to a cultural life with its learned skills. Modern 
neuroscience of the affective nervous system in animals and humans, with research on 
social signalling in different species, goes some way to dispel philosophical confusions 
about the nature and function of emotions, giving natural emotions in engagement 
between persons a primary creative role in development of human consciousness and 
action (Panksepp 2005; Gallagher 2008, interviewing Panksepp).
But there is still a prevailing idea that emotions are reactive, subordinate to 
psychological states of consciousness and their sharing between us. Lipps, however, 
proposed that emotions in the subconscious mind draw feelings from contemplated 
objects, or persons, colouring their perceived nature aesthetically. He called it Ein-
fühlung. This was translated to English as ‘empathy’, taking a Greek word for a feeling 
‘projected into’ the object of awareness, or, as Gallagher interprets it in this volume, 
‘taken in’ as an “involuntary sensory-motor mirroring” or “kinaesthetic imitation” of 
what is in another person that makes them behave as they do. Lipps’ idea of emo-
tions arising in the subconscious gave a foundation for Freud’s ‘hydraulic’ theory of the 
inner energy forces, how they may regulate experience, and how they may be recruited 
in psychodynamic therapy to combat the dangers of mental illness brought about by 
deeply felt memories of past failures, or of excesses of shared emotion.
Merleau-Ponty enriched the theory of sympathetic and constructive sharing of 
affections as they emerge in social encounters, developing an account that contrasts to 
Lipps’ theory of emotional projection (Zahavi 2005). Research on neonatal imitation 
has shown that there need be no learning for a human being to seek mutual, dialogic 
contact and sharing of affections with another person in full, open sympathy, as Reddy 
explains, and these feelings of relating quickly become a rich resource for building 
intelligent companionship in play with infants.
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With Darwin, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, Scheler (1954) accepted that we 
have direct appreciation of states of affection in others, without any need of conscious 
analysis of expressions. In his romantic conception of sympathy Scheler gave first 
importance to the joy of erotic love, or the threat of anger, to which the spirit or self-
determining ‘life drive’ of another human person responds immediately. By evaluating 
highly the most powerful intimate affects in this way he leaves problematic the more 
subtle moral feelings of pride and shame, or of loyalty and solidarity in companion-
ship, and he fails to recognize the creative dynamics and challenges of fun in play, or 
the need for reflection on the responsibilities of feelings in trusting relationships.
Inspiration for a more open intersubjective psychology, one that appreciates the 
mutual recognition between minds in dialogue and their subtle emotional values, even 
in infancy, comes from the poetic writings of Buber. His distinction between the will-
ing intimacy of an I-Thou or I-You relationship, as an essential foundation for any 
sincere and open affection between persons and for religious sensibility, and the I-It 
relationship that a rational and practical mind can have for use of an object, has taught 
many of us to accept the deep difference between an information-based and a feeling-
based consciousness.
2.3  Animal social agency – ethology, the evolutionary bridge to culture
Von Uexküll, early in the 20th Century, presented a theory of natural agency and social 
collaboration, according to which each animal species exploits a particular niche, per-
ceiving it as an Umwelt or environment by adaptive actions that orient to and test its 
benefits and that guard against its risks (von Uexküll 1957). In acting in its world, an 
animal identifies the signs of ‘pertinent’ objects or situations that it may use to support 
life. These adaptive actions and ‘judgements’ are communicated within a social group 
by special social signs. Thus von Uexküll created his bio-semiotic theory of animal 
communication soon developed by Lorenz, Tinbergen and von Frisch as the science of 
ethology, which describes the signals and instinctive rituals by which animals cooper-
ate in their ‘life world’ in such vital activities as mating, care of offspring and collective 
foraging or defence against predators. By the end of the 19th Century, the natural his-
tory of social communication in animal and human societies was gaining respectful 
attention from leading philosophers.
2.4  The psychology of human will and collaboration
The philosophical observations of Brentano, James and Bergson confirmed the 
intentional, time-making and time-feeling nature of awareness, the ‘felt present’ and 
intuition, within and between persons. James’s monumental Principles of Psychology 
(James 1890/1981) laid the foundations for a unified understanding of both physi-
ological and philosophical aspects of the distinctive mental lives of different persons, 
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their rhythmic and sociable “streams of thought”, at least after they are formed out of 
what he conceived as the “confusion” of infant experience.
Bergson lucidly exposed the limitations of a scientific materialism and a materi-
alistic logic of causes that gives no special place to the life of intuition, the infusion of 
immediate awareness with changing purposes, and the socially shared humour that 
instinctively challenges mechanical simulations of human action. His humanism and 
pragmatism supported James’ psychology and they became friends, and he influenced 
Merleau-Ponty.
Like Darwin and Sherrington, Dewey gave ‘habit’, or the self-aware experience 
of agency, primary importance. He thought that the ‘transactions’ of experience and 
belief, including those of religious beliefs, should be ‘experimental’, not dogmatic, as 
they are developed into negotiable descriptions and explanations and into works of 
art and rituals of practice. He wrote, “Till the Great Society is converted in to a Great 
Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a 
great community” (Dewey 1927: 144).
Mead carried the cause of pragmatism and humanism of James and Dewey into 
an analysis of the wilful sharing of meaning, creating what we now know as social 
science. His theory of “mind, self, and society” explains both ‘mind’ and ‘self ’ as prod-
ucts of the transactions of individuals communicating in society. Infant’s gestures of 
interest, at first unaware, he thought, of their effects on another agent, become sym-
bols when that interest and willingness of the other to respond are acknowledged. He 
believed that only a human being is capable of making such a significant symbol as a 
social act. Mead, with James distinguishes the subjective “I” responding to others, and 
the socially perceived “Me” who is known as a particular kind of person, a target of 
others’ regard and appraisal. There is a perpetual internal dialogue between the “I” and 
the “Me” in oneself. This line of thinking, inspired by Adam Smith’s theory of sympa-
thetic intentions of buying and selling, and his definition of the conscience as a judge of 
one’s actions, has been found of special value to the work of Bråten in his search for an 
understanding of intersubjective mirroring and ‘participation in the act of the other’ 
(Bråten 2009).
Whitehead, after writing the first edition of Principia Mathematica with Bertrand 
Russell, turned to critically examine the philosophy of science in the modern world, 
and then to develop a philosophy of society close to that of Brentano, Dewey and Mead. 
His ‘process philosophy’ conceived each ‘organism’ as a creative agent with adaptations 
to take use of the world and to cooperate with other agents. In later life Whitehead 
developed his highly influential educational philosophy that gave first importance to 
the creative ‘zest’ of the learner, which must be supported by a teacher. Like Dewey, 
but going further in his estimation of the child’s natural enthusiasm, he criticised a too 
formal school instruction, with neglect of creative cultural arts, saying in an address 
on The Aims of Education made in 1916, to the Mathematical  Association of England, 
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“Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling. Scraps 
of information have nothing to do with it.” (Whitehead 1929).
Merleau-Ponty also gave active perception by engagement with the world, and 
particularly perception of people by engagement with their actions, first importance. 
His phenomenology is strongly appreciated by post-cognitive theorists who analyse 
the way an animal body acts to generate a serviceable awareness with inbuilt knowl-
edge of how to grasp and employ the environments affordances efficiently (e. g. Clark 
1999; Dabiri et al. 2006). Self-animacy of an animal moving in the medium for which it 
has evolved proves to be more effective, more ‘intelligent’, than the performance of any 
physical device that lacks prospective control by adaptive projicience, thinking ahead.
2.5  Art and aesthetics: Guiding creativity with affect
Langer, a pupil of Whitehead and admirer of Cassirer, contributed a philosophy of 
active aesthetic experience and the inventions of symbolic, active meaning – in meta-
phor, music and the arts. Like Bakhtin she studied the spontaneous creation or pre-
sentation of meaning in movement (Langer 1953). Her insistence on the vital forms of 
performance and their weaving into narrations of purpose in human experience with 
emotion inspires Stern in his exploration of ‘vitality dynamics’ in development of the 
child’s self and mind, and in the arts (Stern 2010). Langer rejects that music causes 
emotions; musical meaning is symbolic and emotional within the personal experience 
of feeling in body movement – it is made by combinations of the experiences of action 
sensed as Gestalts or forms and narrations, as melodies, not by cognitive assembly or 
sequencing of separately perceived sound elements (Meyer 1956; Kühl 2007).
2.6  Language: How meanings and their objects make sense in dialogue
Many of us find the later philosophy of Wittgenstein to be a source of firm under-
standing for the vitality and human sense of language as a “game” that is motivated 
in “forms of life”. He rejected the view that the Self is all we can really know. Think-
ing must be both social and mental from the start. Wittgenstein’s crucial conversion 
from logical positivism and his interpersonal theory of language came after a retreat 
from philosophy of about ten years, during which he became, with his sister’s help, a 
teacher of young children in Austria. As a school teacher, “his attention was drawn to 
the informal language of everyday life, to the fact that language is primarily a medium 
of communication …. to the way language is learned and more generally to the whole 
process of enculturation.” (Sluga 1996). He became concerned with how the “games” 
of language may mislead thinking, creating of false problems, such as the mind-body 
problem. (Wittgenstein 1953).
The writings of the Russian semiotician and literary theorist Bakhtin on the 
origins of language and thought in dialogue have had a profound influence on 
 Epilogue 459
many human sciences (Bakhtin 1986). He defined language and culture as products 
of human social acts that take the form of dialogical exchange, producing forms 
or ‘genre’ in discourse that have varieties of ethical and political as well as aes-
thetic power. With Mead he asserted we can only find or understand ourselves, 
not in any mirror or photograph, but in received communication with others and 
the collective culture. Each person’s self has a worth that must find its expression 
in dialogue with the motivated actions of other human souls. Bakhtin’s analysis 
of rhetoric makes clear that our opinion of our worth and identity is something 
described by the perception of others who engage themselves with us, with our 
distinctive “voice”, tone and manners toward them, as well as with what we say and 
believe to be “true”. For the polyphony of voices to flourish and make a commu-
nity there must be a celebration of playfulness or “carnival”, as in the exaggerated 
inventions of theatre and literature. Language is not just the exchange of symbols 
with defined meaning. It must be creatively used, and affectively, aesthetically and 
morally appreciated.
Vygotsky, like Wittgenstein, was convinced by his studies of children learning lan-
guage that thinking is first social then a possession of single minds – that talking comes 
before thinking. He saw a child has a gift for agency and a potential for seeking and 
benefitting from intimate engagement with teachers. His social-developmental theory 
(Vygotsky 1978) proposes that ‘intra-mental’ work is an image of the ‘inter-mental’ 
exchange; that overt mutually contrived conversation becomes the ‘inner speech’ of 
thinking and problem solving. Evidently, however, private thinking and social think-
ing exist in corresponding and complementary forms from the start and throughout 
mental life, changing as they grow, but retaining the same rhythms and cycles. Nei-
ther is the source of the other. The crucial element is a purposeful inter-subjectivity 
that allows mental collaboration as well as propositional cognition. Preschool chil-
dren often talk loudly to themselves, assuming roles and relationships, generating and 
attempting to solve or ‘self-regulate’ problems, and so do engrossed adults. And these 
forms of shared or private expressive reasoning may be mediated by gestures as well 
as speaking. Thus young children have difficulty ‘thinking’ mathematical problems if 
they are asked to keep their hands still by sitting on them (Goldin-Meadow 2006). The 
whole expressive body is a tool for thought, as Einstein said it was for his mathematical 
invention (Hadamard 1945).
Vygotsky’s developmental theory led to a new understanding of the role of teacher 
or therapist in aiding the development of a child’s skills. From work with handicapped 
children, he learned that it is necessary to enter cooperatively into the “zone of proxi-
mal development “of the child, where their skills are at the limit and need help to 
be completed. Bruner labeled the helper’s task one of “scaffolding” the learner, but 
Vygotsky’s conception gave strong importance to the child’s will to act and know, and 
the metaphor of scaffolding does not bring that to the fore.
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2.7  Recent advances to a psychology of cultural life, and how it is learned
By the mid 20th Century, the importance of intended and shared life experience for 
the vitality of human culture was gaining recognition in the human sciences, stimulat-
ing new conceptions in anthropology, education and social theory. I mention the work 
of four thinkers whose works have had important academic and social consequences.
Jerome Bruner’s educational psychology, which has guided the work of teachers 
for two generations, depends on a theory of ‘collaborative learning’ by which con-
cepts and skills of cultural meaning, and language, are transmitted (Bruner 1996). He 
describes schools as ‘communities of learners’. Bruner’s students and collaborators 
Rogoff and Greenfield have researched the teaching and learning practices of different 
cultures, and they show how, in societies where there is little or no formal schooling, 
social and technical skills and cultural rituals are passed on by ‘intent participation’ 
of the young with the more expert knowledge and abilities of instructors, by actu-
ally doing and making things of use and value with them (Rogoff 2003; Greenfield 
2004). The knowledge and thinking is not formulated in an abstract written curricu-
lum, and their achievements, products and explanations are appraised aesthetically 
and corrected in action, not assessed by tests. Bruner gives shared imaginative play, 
and performance of narrative rituals to assist recognition of ‘recurrent events’, central 
importance. With Whitehead he views the child as a creative learner. Among cognitive 
psychologists, Bruner’s theory of ‘joint attention’ has come to be the accepted explana-
tion of cultural learning, but with insufficient recognition of the strong intersubjective 
feelings that give his theory more useful application in pedagogy.
With experience of the role of ritual and celebration in African culture, Victor 
Turner & Edward Bruner (1986) proposed an ‘anthropology of experience’, which, in 
contrast to an ethnographical analysis of products, attempts to share the animated aware-
ness of different peoples in their world, and in the celebratory and religious practices. 
Turner (1982) describes the intimacy, equality, solidarity or consensus and spontaneous 
celebration of relations among persons who know each other and who share artistic and 
spiritual affections as ‘communitas’, distinguished from the formal and legislated struc-
ture of ‘societas’. The seriously playful celebrations of communitas recall the ‘carnival’ of 
Bakhtin in which many voices are heard and permitted. The feelings and imaginative 
practices of community may rebel against the disciplined structure of society, leading 
to marginalisation of persons to ‘liminal’ states of exclusion. Turner’s anthropology of 
experience and his analysis of the affections and risk taking of community has an impor-
tant message for the strivings and conflicts, including religious, commercial and politi-
cal conflicts, of societies at any level of complexity and technical achievement.
The social philosopher Jürgen Habermas proposed that a mutuality of under-
standing is possible only by communication of purposes and that “dialogue constituent 
universals” of language generate and describe the intersubjectivity in minds of language 
users, as well as in forms of communication that are independent of speech. At a first 
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level, personal pronouns enable an “interlacing of perspectives” between people by 
which they keep separate their viewpoints and so understand the meaning in surround-
ings they share. This corresponds to the primary intersubjectivity of a protoconversa-
tion with a two-month-old. Habermas’ second level universals are deictic expressions 
that specify time and space, the articles and demonstrative pronouns. These “link the 
levels of intersubjectivity on which the subjects converse and interact reciprocally with 
the levels of objects about which the subjects converse” (Habermas 1970: 141–142). 
This function appears in proto-language at the end of the first year (Halliday 1975) and 
is what we have termed secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & Hubley 1978). The 
third and fourth classes of dialogue constitutive universals are performatory speech 
acts. Speech act theory (Austin 1962) attends to the interpersonal functions or inten-
tions (illocutions) in spoken language (locutions), which are not necessarily expressed 
directly in the propositional content. Bruner (1983), Bates (1979) and Dore (1983) have 
applied speech act theory to holophrases in early language development and in infan-
tile communications which are precursors of speech acts. Habermas’ theory of society 
allows us to relate these essential developmental stages to the practices in the mature 
dynamic structure of a verbal society. Dewey’s political philosophy, as well as Bruner’s 
study of the communications or narrations implemented in legal practice, may be com-
pared to the analysis Habermas made of legal and political processes in modern soci-
ety, and of the restrictive effects of enforced rationalization for efficiency and control 
(Habermas 1987).
Finally, Pierre Bourdieu (1990) portrayed human society as a space of ‘life-styles’ 
where persons with different points of view and develop relationships and roles. 
These define a person’s place within the habitus, the system of classification of the 
practices of their group, and that define the affections, values or ‘tastes’ by which the 
practices of individuals are appreciated and negotiated. He pioneered investigation 
of the functions of social, cultural and symbolic ‘capital’ and of power relations in 
society. We have found his concept of acquired habitus of value in understanding how 
rituals of communication, song, play and reference develop as a ‘proto-habitus’ in the 
intimacy of the life of an infant with its mother and other close companions in the 
family (Gratier & Trevarthen 2008).
3.   The multiplex agency of the self and its (mis) representations  
in language
There is one motive feature of the active human body, surely vital to the rest, that 
is crucial. Juvenile human beings take special delight in the movements of a very 
complex body with several acute and independently mobile senses and collaborating 
eyes, hands, mouth and, eventually, two propulsive feet. A newborn infant appears 
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to have, from early months, a self-conscious pleasure in their ‘consilience’ of move-
ments. Is this ‘feeling how one is doing’ a reflective conscience? Young infants seem 
to record the drift of their activities and their discoveries of the limbs and feelings 
of body and the world, and ponder them – to be able to ‘imagine acting’ harmoni-
ously with multiple movements, either alone or in company, and to be giving their 
animated imaginings ‘affective appraisal’. I believe this ‘thoughtfulness without logic’, 
having in mind projects and problems of action in the self, to be followed through 
and cared about, is an essential part of being ready to become an other-consciousness 
in the ritual humour of play, and that it may experience and express not only pleased 
satisfaction, but ‘pride’ and ‘shame’ about how its inventions and propositions are, 
or may be, received and appreciated by others, from early months. It is ready to be 
a ‘pupil’ of others interests. I do not believe such subtle human morally-regulated 
sociability is learned – it is prepared for by a sense of the several ways a human agent 
may act and interact through experiencing actions in animated life of the body and 
senses, within the Self, and with Others. As the physiologists discover, the brain is 
a theatre of polyrhythms which generate systematic changes in a fusion or constant 
mutual adjustment that reconciles many different oscillators (Buzsáki 2006), making 
an every changing flow of changes in energy and arousal, which Daniel Stern calls 
‘vitality dynamics’ (Stern 2010). And this is the kind of brain that is also adapted to 
be ‘sociable’.
This is perhaps the most revolutionary claim I have to make from my observations 
of infants – that a baby’s mind carries, as an adaptation for using a body with many 
mobile parts, a multiplex consciousness with internal debates between the impulses of 
several agents of moving that may be making assessments between rival purposes. We 
are adapted to engage the world and one another mastering what Merker (2005) has 
called ‘the liabilities of mobility’ with an exceptionally labile consciousness that con-
stantly reconciles between alternatives in action and interest, and that is profoundly 
appreciative of risks and benefits likely to follow, and how well or bad their agency 
might feel.
It is just plainly true, and easily demonstrated with precision recording and 
unprejudiced attention to detail of movements, that the refinement of infants’ actions 
in which hundreds or thousands of local muscle contractions are mutually adjusted 
and sequenced, are products of an economic synthesis and synchrony of excitations 
active throughout the brain. A quiet-alert newborn has an ‘integrated’ self-sensing 
proprioception that is prospectively aware – a realisation, by generation of prospec-
tive ‘motor images of movement’ (Bernstein 1967), of a virtual animate Self, which 
Sherrington (1906) called his ‘felt Me’. Contrary to the presumptions of mature ratio-
nal intelligence that looks only for skilful object directed moves, learned by building 
representations of external reality, the infant’s body is not in chaotic, random motion 
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at the mercy of reflex responses – it generates fast flowing rhythmic purposeful and 
experimental compositions that integrate the acts of the many parts of their bodies and 
their several senses, making narratives of experience in action, and setting up projects 
which may lead to the identification of problems to be solved. This is direct evidence of 
an embodied, articulated, kinesthetically and emotionally regulated agency of a mind, 
albeit an ‘inarticulate’ one (see Figure 1).
The complexity of innate intentionality has the capacity to generate and experi-
mentally elaborate cognitive ‘schemata’ that work for mastering objects outside the 
body, as Piaget demonstrated. In 1967, Papoušek reported the 3 or 4 month old infants 
moved with careful purpose to cause interesting effects, predicting consequences of 
their movements, and that they showed emotions of pleasure when they predicted 
correctly, and displeasure when they made a ‘mistake’ – they were showing ‘human 
feelings’ of responsible agency. But a young infant’s ‘sensori-motor’ intelligence is 
not just interested in physical effects produced on objects or in an apparatus; they 
are selectively receptive to the symptoms of another person’s movements and the 
emotions persons signal from inside their bodies, as Darwin demonstrated. Mary 
Catherine Bateson showed that at 2 months this interpersonal intelligence is most lively 
and ‘organised’ in intimate dialogues or proto-conversations, which she described as 
conducted with ‘delighted ritual courtesy’ (Bateson 1979: 65). Within a few weeks the 
infant expresses his or her vitality in rhythmic action games and musical ‘attunement’ 
of interests and affections with partners in play (Stern 1985, 2010), and in these expec-
tations and deceptions tease one another, stimulating and satisfying both creativity 
and infectious pleasure (Reddy 2008, this volume).
I believe this sociable human creature – the whole of it, body and soul – is the 
“Language Acquisition Device” (LAD) sought for by generative grammar, and that it 
is gifted for all sorts of special cultural projects besides the grammar of language. As 
Jerome Bruner said, the little human creature, while trying to use words to do something 
interesting and meaningful, is looking for the company of an affectionate, and playful, 
teacher who will be a Language Acquisition Support System (LASS) (Bruner 1983). 
Linguistic concepts are first realized in action, and actions become important by being 
shared.
But gaining language is not always gaining understanding. We may be confused 
by words we are led to use by custom in erudite discussion. Words become indispen-
sible tools of shared meaning, but they can be misused, become chipped or dull, and 
choice of the wrong tool can wreck the task. Some become so transformed that their 
original purpose is lost. The metaphorical power of a word, what Fonagy (2001) calls 
‘languages within language’, if they lose their poetic roots and are taken ‘literally’, can 
misguide our view of life and our relations and beliefs in society (Lakoff & Johnson 















































































































































































































































passionately for proper recognition of the primacy of the universal ‘natural language’ 
of human expressive movements of voice, hands and face, and of the importance of 
their emotions for the mastery of the artificial articulations of speech and writing.
I am concerned that there may be deep faults of mis-translation, or serious dis-
tortions of meaning, in three words to which this volume gives special importance: 
motion, emotion, and empathy. I believe changes from older more ‘natural’ meanings of 
these words reflect interpretations of literary authority that have been favoured since 
the 17th Century. They are products of a rational detachment from lived experience.
As Sheets-Johnstone (this volume) reminds us, “movement differs from objects in 
motion in creating its own time and space and in thereby creating a particular spatio- 
temporal kinetic qualitative dynamic.” Rich meanings stored in language, under-
standings of this vital difference, may be found by checking the relationship between 
spelling and grammatical function in forms of the Latin verb movere (as in moveo, 
‘I move’), in contrast with parts corresponding to motus sum (‘I have been moved’). 
All active, present and future tenses of this verb, and the gerundive (about ‘doing 
something’, e. g. by ‘moving’, movendi) begin with mov. All passive and pluperfect 
parts begin in mot. The clear distinction made by the two consonants, ‘v’ and ‘t’, is 
between words for actions in the present or future brought about by will and intention, 
which begin in mov; and those signifying the imposed, done, not longer active as in 
‘had moved’, these words begin in mot. The sounds of the words ‘express’ differences 
in human will or submission. This fits with the meaning of ‘moving’ as intended ani-
mal activity by an agent; and ‘motion’ as a physical displacement of a body that implies 
no intention, and that is perceived as an inanimate, physical event in abstract ‘sci-
entific’ space and time. So, I shall use ‘movement’, and not ‘motion’ when I describe 
actions of animals and people.
As Bloem (this volume) explains, in French, during the past 400 years, a Cartesian 
sense of ‘e-motion’ as a manifest ‘disturbance’ of the rational mind, has taken usage from 
‘passion’ and ‘affect’, which signal recognition of much more vital sources than exter-
nally perceived expressive ‘motion’. I have to qualify the word ‘emotion’, to bring out 
cases where what is expressed is part of an intended and felt state of mind and therefore 
an expressive wilful ‘movement’, that can ‘move’ others’ wills. As Reddy (this volume) 
observes, our state of feeling is profoundly moved by others’ attitudes and manners 
of address toward us, by our sense of their emotions responding to out presence and 
actions.
Also it is important that ‘persons’ know one another as members of a community, 
as proclaimed by Mead, by Turner and by Habermas and Bourdieu, and that ‘subjects’ 
live in a society more or less controlled in their actions by social laws and customs. 
Inter-subjectivity should be about the vital processes that create and regulate that 
belonging and cooperation between people in varying degrees of intimacy. I use ‘com-
munity’ when I want to speak of the willing and affectionate association of people, and 
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‘society’ when I discuss the regulation of activities by laws, taught habits, and precisely 
defined practices and meanings that do ‘work’.
Finally, I perceive a serious change of meaning in the use of the word ‘empathy’, 
which, as mentioned earlier, has displaced ‘sympathy’. ‘Empathy’ is now used to des-
ignate ‘comprehending’ how other persons feel, and, by extension, ‘kindness’, ‘helpful-
ness’, or ‘concern for others’, and any kind of ‘understanding’ of another’s feelings. But, 
the original Greek word empatheia means projecting feeling into an object of contem-
plation or a person perceived with affective ‘judgement’. In modern Greek empatheia, 
retaining its original intention, signifies a vindictive, jealous ‘evil eye’! Sympathy, in 
contrast, is derived from sympatheia meaning ‘feeling with, compassion, liking’. It is 
clearly more inter-subjective and ‘two-way’ than ‘empathy’, which, paradoxically, is 
self-centred. Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) took ‘sympathy’ 
to designate any kind of ‘moving and feeling with’, whether motivated positively or 
negatively, and including posturing and acting in the same expressive way as another’s 
body. He said: “Sympathy… may… , without much impropriety, be made use of to 
denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.” (Smith 1759, Part I – Of the Pro-
priety of Action; Section I – Of the Sense of Propriety, Chapter I – Of Sympathy). From 
its origins, the word ‘sympathy’ clearly conveys best the core sense of intersubjective 
awareness of agency and emotion that works reciprocally between persons. Martin 
Buber (1958) has urged us to acknowledge the fundamental difference between the 
sympathetic ‘I-You’ engagement between persons, and one person’s relationship to an 
inanimate ‘It’. The latter relationship cannot be reciprocal, though Buber allows that 
one can be ‘open’ to sense an I-You relationship with a favoured object.
The rational analysis of bodily feelings and emotional expressions has impover-
ished understanding of sympathy, as well as the deep connections between affections 
and intended movement. The neurochemistry of the affective systems of the reveals a 
natural set of adaptive ways of applying and regulating intended movements or actions 
within the central nervous system, which is common to all higher vertebrates, at least. 
Jaak Panksepp (2005) distinguishes the neurochemical regulatory agents as having dif-
ferent tasks to perform as ‘raw feelings’ in the evaluation and maintenance of both 
individual acts of animacy and social communication, with or without cognitive esti-
mations or judgements.
I have mapped Panksepp’s affects to distinguish appraisals of risk and ben-
efit to the living Self, related to three kinds of motive and sought-for experience: 
toward the body of the Self, toward outside Objects, and toward other Persons, 
with whom one may become involved sympathetically (see Figure 2). All of these 
can be distinguished in the expressive behaviours of infants when they are actively 
attentive and involved. None are just reactions to stimuli (e-motions). They do not 
depend upon cognitive deliberations for their distinct adaptive functions in giv-
ing values to intentions of the Self. More complex but equally innate affections of 
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‘pride’ and ‘shame’, which regulate shared actions, experience and social transac-
tions from infancy, become further adapted by learning to regulate intimate, public, 















































Figure 2. A diagram to explain the three different ways the animated Self (S) of a human per-
son maintains regulation of its actions, with emotional appraisal – for its body, for engagement 
with non loving objects (O), and with other-conscious persons (P). Cultural knowledge and 
skills require positive coordination between technical interests that are rationally and aestheti-
cally appraised, and artful creativity of the community in which relationships are made and 
regulated by sympathetic engagement of moral emotions
4.  Reflections on Moving ourselves and moving others
Here, I offer a brief survey of the rich variety of arguments put forward in this book to 
chart a more active, imaginative and sympathetic interpretation of the human mind, and 
how human minds in human persons, with their expressions of interest and affection, 
share the ever-changing meanings in the culture of their society.
4.1  Part 1: The dependence of consciousness upon moving with emotion
Sheets-Johnstone makes a spirited and clear statement of the powers of animacy, 
the creative purposes, emotions and awareness of moving. These powers are insepa-
rable as the source and synthesis of all that we can accomplish. Research on how 
infants search to ‘make sense’, and how they strive passionately to share it, brings 
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out the dynamic ‘musicality’ of their “kinetic aliveness”. The rhythmic parameters 
of the self-feeling vitality in their bodies become the signals of intersubjective con-
tact in emotional attunement to others’ vitality, and this impulse to share interest 
with affection leads through life to engagements with persons whose intentions and 
feelings are known best, opening the way to cooperation in learned cultural habits, 
including language.
Ellis and Newton agree; an animal agent is an organism that acts with emotion 
and that acquires knowledge of the affordances of the world to satisfy its motives. Evi-
dence from neuroscience and neuropsychology abundantly demonstrates how skilful 
action, every kind of knowledge, and all ‘mirroring’ of the intentions and feelings of 
others, depend on core processes of ‘action imagery’ and specific emotional charge. 
It is also clear that, “the view of representations as intrinsically meaningless symbols, 
manipulated syntactically in order to encode information about the external world, 
is completely inappropriate in the context of enactivism”. And ‘enactivism’ itself must 
allow that one must care about what one is doing, must have an emotional investment 
in the moving and its consciousness, as Panksepp argues.
Both these chapters affirm that ‘understanding’ of projects for knowing and 
doing may be completely intuitive, requiring no articulate ‘interpretation’. And this 
intuitive understanding of purposeful movement may be shared in ‘felt immediacy’ as 
Bråten (2009) says. But moving as the other moves, as a ‘mirror’ agent, is not enough 
to explain intersubjective sharing,– the other’s action has to be felt to be intended 
and knowledgeable, which involves immediately sensing from their movements the 
motivating source of their coherent self-awareness and ‘participating’ in it. And yes, 
motives are felt when one appreciates one’s self being active in imaginary ways, or in 
dreaming. Even an infant has this power self-sensing, as Darwin observed.
Overgaard explores the idea (deriving from Husserl) that all ‘out there’ experience 
in the visual world must be apprehended with reference to the ‘action space’ of poten-
tial movement, which is inscribed in the patterns of nerve circuits as the brain and 
body are formed. This integrated power to move with direction in self-awareness can 
be shared for an animal carried by another mover. Infants look forward or turn when 
they are carried, taking possession of the course of movement of their carrier. Bråten 
has studied such co-orientation in the case where a baby chimpanzee is clinging to the 
mothers back as she moves about, looking where she looks, and were she goes. He says 
it enables ‘mother-centred learning’ (Bråten 2009: Figure 5.2), clearly a talent capable 
of adaptation for learning language, given the unique human powers of vocal expres-
sion and imitation (Merker in press).
Shanker adopts a complementary view of emotion ‘regulation’, a venerable con-
cept, endorsed by the rational philosophers of the Classical Athenian civilization, 
and of course by the Old Testament, which accepts that an experienced authority 
or a subduing function of ‘reasonableness’ is required for guiding a child to mature 
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participation in society from an initial unformed state. Like Ellis and Newton, 
Shanker assumes the infant is too uncoordinated to have self-conscious responsibil-
ity for actions or feelings, and, presumably, no trace of morality. It is claimed that the 
infant only gradually achieves a capacity to maintain a focused state of attention, or 
to calm distress. I believe research on the intentional and communicative capacities 
of young infants requires this view to be modified, and I have cited Darwin’s observa-
tions, as has Sheets-Johnstone, that infants display many complex emotions, including 
subtle ones of pleasurable affection and delight in playful achievement ‘noticed by’ 
companions. Shanker and Greenspan observed the cultural differences in emotional 
‘upbringing’, intended to ensure that the child will act with appropriately modulated 
emotions that are socially approved. Of course, there are considerable differences in 
the regulation of ‘prosocial behaviours’ in different societies. (Bierhoff 2002). And the 
intuitive emotional regulations may be damaged by lack of affectionate support. The 
lamentable effects in many large modern societies of inappropriate rational demands, 
or neglect and abuse, testify to the fragility of the young child’s psyche, but these inhu-
man circumstances do not prove the child is without strong native emotions that can 
serve positively and flourish in more sympathetic families and communities. Shanker 
confirms, “Positive emotions are essential, not only for activating and energizing 
actions, but also for motivating and sustaining the attention necessary for learning to 
occur. Indeed, it is ultimately the child’s motivation, interest, curiosity, and her feeling 
of security and self-worth that enable her to thrive: to experience what the Ancient 
Greeks referred to as eudaimonia, and what we simply refer to today as well-being.” 
These positive emotions of well-being are part of the lively nature of the child, to be 
supported by the affectionate and playful company all young children can enjoy, but 
not made by that company. The Norwegian musicologist Bjørkvold (1992) contrasts 
‘school culture’ with ‘the child’s culture’. He says in the former the child is instructed to 
“Sit still”. The response of the natural child is, “I can if I am interested”.
Reddy takes evidence that children can be moved, in action and in feelings, by 
other persons, and turns it around. She says, “This paper explores the other side of this 
phenomenon: that of wanting to – and trying to – move specific others.” She quotes 
Hegel, Bakhtin, James and Buber, all recognizing that being ‘open’ to the awareness 
and intentions and feelings of the other is essential for self-awareness. She gives a rich 
description of original research which documents the provocative and humorous tal-
ents of infants for engaging companions from birth, how moving others develops, and 
how expressions of self-consciousness may serve to distance persons, or their own 
person in a mirror, whose near approach is felt by the infant to be undesirable or 
too intrusive. She also discusses limitations of this other-engaging behaviour in chil-
dren with autism, which serve to underline its developmental importance of the abil-
ity to take emotional initiative in relating and in sharing meaning, and she describes 
methods of therapy that elicit curiosity about the other’s attitude, to bridge the gap. 
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Elsewhere Reddy has examined how being able to adjust to the quality of reciprocal 
other-awareness is important in engagements between different cultures (Reddy 2008).
4.2   Part 2: Moving and emotion, shared between individuals –  
the powerful intuition of intersubjectivity
Gallagher, tackling the problem of ‘other minds’, concludes that the evidence from 
imitative interactions between infants and adults, and from the brain science of events 
correlated with interpersonal actions and awareness, renders representational social-
cognitive theories, such as Theory of Mind, redundant, and qualifies the motor Simu-
lation Theory derived from ‘mirror neurone’ effects. Natural human interactions and 
brain events that reflect them take place in affective ‘narrations’, phenomena of action 
and awareness that require more than automatic identification with expressions of 
emotion, or with patterns of intention in movement. Emotional engagement, which 
he calls ‘empathy’, after Lipps and Titchner, has an intuitive agency that develops. With 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), Reddy (2008), Rochat (2004) and Zahavi (2008), 
Gallagher supports an Interaction Theory (IT) to explain the shared kinaesthesia and 
affective evaluation of an ‘inner imitation of observed vital activity’ with which we 
perceive one another. Such a sharing of life impulses is required for the acceptance-
seeking, trust-testing and fun-creating engagements described by Reddy. Gallagher’s 
IT is supported not only by 40 years of descriptive research on infant intersubjec-
tive behaviours (Trevarthen 1998), but also by analyses of the ‘musicality’ of narra-
tions created in proto-conversations between mothers and young infants (Malloch & 
Trevarthen 2009). There is an innate impulse to share projects of intention and interest 
and their affective regulations, to share the life time of the mind in intimate meaning-
ful ‘stories’ (Bruner 1990). Developments in the motives of infant intersubjectivity 
are clearly in the direction of creating meaning with willing companions in this way. 
Propositional logics, language and symbolic rituals of explanation depend on this 
natural foundation, as Thomas Reid said.
Fultner examines theories of how human minds share both transactions of the 
pragmatic, usable world but also affects that evaluate relationships – how societies of 
minds create and use collective meaning. She goes beyond Habermas’ theory of the 
negotiation of intentional meanings to bring in understanding of ‘alterocentric partici-
pation’, which requires engagement between subjects as persons in Bråten’s ‘felt imme-
diacy’. She says, “an adequate account of the social nature of linguistic communication 
must do justice not only to the lifeworld as a shared background of intelligibility, but 
also as a background against which differences in point of view are articulated.” She 
reviews what we know about how a child comes to recognize others’ different ‘points of 
view’, evaluating them with ‘emotions of relating’ as well as practical awareness of the 
‘situation’. With Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson she rejects the theory that language 
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is primarily for transmission of ideas and thoughts. She observes that philosophers 
of language have, “paid much less attention than might be expected to ontogeny, and 
they have all but neglected emotional aspects of meaning and the conative dimension 
of social interaction in general.” We are born ready for negotiation of a lifeworld of 
socio-culturally mediated habits and imaginings from the start, some of which may be 
absurd or ‘laughable’ for the ‘comic spirit’ (Bergson 1911), and the companionship is 
regulated by dynamic affections of relating, even in ‘serious’ formal schooling. The lan-
guage learning child is an ‘active agent’, wanting to claim ‘authorship’ in close relation-
ships, all the way. With Dewey, Fultner concludes that such matters have important 
implications for political theory.
Carpendale and Lewis, also, argue that the development of thinking must involve 
emotions, and, in agreement with Mead, that thinking must be shared for self con-
sciousness, or self-awareness, to grow – communicating first and thinking after. The 
social interactive experiences, sought for by the infant and supported by human com-
panions, make language and the sense-making of any symbols, possible. However, the 
evidence is not with Mead that the infant’s first gestures do not ‘intend to commu-
nicate’. They, again like the plover acting a broken wing, are adapted or ‘intended’ as 
animate messages, calling for attention of another. I think this is what Stuart (2010) 
means by the ‘enkinesthesia’ of biosemiotics, moving ‘for attention of the other’. 
Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development is a property of the child that invites support 
and instruction. As Reddy argues, self-other consciousness is manifest early, perhaps 
already in those imitation games with newborns that Kugiumutzakis and Nagy have 
described. The ‘motor helplessness’ of infant humans does not apply to their rich rep-
ertoire of movements that express states of mind, including subtle movements of the 
hands, which open “a new way of being social”. And these sensory-motor capacities are 
adapted to find the appropriate affordances in intimate encounters with other person’s 
expressions. Moral emotions also are developed early for sensing and signaling quali-
ties of intersubjective engagement – they are not just products of social learning, but 
motivate it. Their formation, along with defective temporal patterning of actions and 
awareness, may be at the heart of the problems autistic children have with participat-
ing in meaningful communication. They are powerfully expressed in the reactions of 
infants over 6 months of age to the incomprehension and insensitivity strangers often 
display in response to the infant’s motives to make contact, and they mediate in inter-
actions with peers when adults are absent (Selby & Bradley 2003).
Racine, Wereha and Leavens welcome, “a shift away from conceiving of mental 
capacities as private, individual, simple efficient causes of behaviour to something 
far more complicated and far less in-the-head that has often been theorized.” They 
remind us that we know an animal is alive and mindful if they move with rhyth-
mical passionate rhythm and intensity – stones have no such signs of sensation, 
as Wittgensein observed. Mind in an animal’s behaviour, any intentions, hopes, 
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emotions or awareness they may have, we, or other animals, can only perceive from 
what and how they act. But this ‘common sense’ idea is, “made oddly mysterious 
in much psychological theorizing.” Like genes and ‘mirror neurons’, mind states 
should not be conceived as causes, but as components in a complementary sys-
tem of agencies and effects, that have ‘environment expectant’ potentialities, and 
that change in different circumstances. Thus chimpanzees in the wild do not point 
at food they want, because they can get it by their own actions. In cages, captive 
apes do point, like immobile infants do, to get others to respond by handing them 
desired objects. The ability is a product of the talents for sensing purposes and feel-
ing in others, and of consciousness of a common world. It is a latent skill brought 
out in particular circumstances.
These behaviours show humans need acquire no added special-purpose ‘joint 
attention’ concept, and mechanisms that appear to be essential in the frontal parts 
of the human brain for learning to speak are but one set of players in the ‘system’ of a 
consciously active subject in the world, who has inner and outer experiences that can 
be ‘directly perceived’ by another subject who shares the same capacities in a com-
patible world. We differ from one another, and from other species, in what Margaret 
Donaldson (1992) called ‘loci of concern’, which may also change greatly with develop-
ment and experience. For example, “in order to hope, one must have mastered many 
human abilities, customs and concepts.” The same applies to a capacity for coopera-
tive awareness in the use of objects or ‘secondary intersubjectivity’. For both human 
infants and non-human primates the affective quality of relations with intimate others 
is important in developing more extended loci of concern, or the capacity for imagina-
tive cooperation. This is no ‘theory of mind’. Surely many animals, besides primates, 
are aware of one another’s purposes with no need to attribute articulate intentions, 
but maybe they can ‘think about’ what they are doing, have done, or may do. The 
important thing is that the circumstances and the company enable sharing the ‘time 
and place of life’. Humans, and to some extent apes (and dogs?), are psychologically 
and physically ‘expectant’ of a cultural form of life where objects are shared, but apes’ 
capacities for understanding vocal symbols is very limited. That is a special ability of 
humans, a “dedicated capacity for vocal production learning” shared with some spe-
cies of bird (Merker in press), but it is not a ‘language module’. We are warned not to 
place too much explanatory importance on single metaphors such as ‘mirror neurons’, 
‘motion’ and ‘emotion’, or, for that matter, ‘intersubjectivity’
Frank and I relate the developing intersubjective powers of infants in intimate rela-
tions with their families to the larger socio-cultural picture of how members of a large 
society may share, or fail to share, the benefits of a commonwealth of meanings. To 
interpret the fate of the infant’s innate inter-subjectivity in its social habitat we drew on 
the European scholarship with particular attention to the social science of Bourdieu 
and the social philosophy of Habermas. A young child may become a successful and 
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contented contributor to the work of the community, and, in time, an affectionate 
parent, or the motives for development my lead to the distress of social exclusion or 
to marginalisation in a peripheral counter-culture, and failed family life. It is clear 
that the place a person gains in life activities of the ‘sociosphere’ into which they have 
been born depends on intimate affectionate and communicative relations in ‘self-other 
awareness’ with a few persons who will give consistent companionship through criti-
cal stages of life. That is how the skill in sharing the symbolic meanings of Lotman’s 
‘semiosphere’ is acquired. These same principles of cooperation in intentions and emo-
tions may re-establish social belonging for a person who has lost self-confidence and 
self-respect in relationships with others through misfortune of development. We give 
an example of how a young man with autism was led to happier and more productive 
communication.
Lüdtke closely examines the affective foundations of communication, which she 
shows have been persistently neglected. She finds, “no prominent theory explicitly 
focuses on the importance of emotions in language or in prelinguistic and linguis-
tic development.” Even in interactionist and psychoanalytic theories the role of emo-
tions is ‘hidden’. Yet there is increasing evidence of the power of emotions from recent 
semiolinguistic and neuropsychological research, both of which employ the concept of 
‘intersubjectivity’. In short, she reminds us that we meet and relate to one another with 
intentions, not just to exchange information, but as actors in the intersubjective the-
atre of metaphores with affective charge where the expressive forms that Ivan Fonagy 
(2001) called ‘languages within language’ play their part. We master communication 
with Stern’s ‘vitality dynamics’, by which infant and mother ‘attune’ to one another’s 
impulses for sharing life, and in the playfulness of Bruner’s young child who is learning 
how to talk the language game. Lüdtke traces the stages by which infant and mother 
discover the power of words in affectionate and playful games, accepting emotions of 
self-expression as emotions of relating. She illustrates the interest they discover in one 
another and in the icons and indexes of voice and gesture that they invent together, 
and how they transform these into conventional semiotic and/or linguistic signs that 
refer to events and goals in the more widely shared world. In the process the infant’s 
Virtual Other becomes a real Significant Other, and their companionship of affectively 
charged meanings becomes encoded in words. She recommends for clinical use the 
concept of ‘emotional collaboration’ to diagnose at which level of disturbed language 
development the child is stuck or led astray, and where the will to communicate needs 
to be met to animate his or her zone of proximal development. In effective Relational 
Language Therapy, “the Significant Other has to become the embodiment of a dialogic 
partner who helps to restore dialogicity by creating and offering the relational emo-
tional bases for the intersubjective construction, negotiation and validation of mean-
ing and their verbal and nonverbal expression.” And further, “In contrast to many 
other therapies decisions about therapeutic materials, such as sensory stimuli, picture 
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books, talker or word cards, are here viewed as secondary, because they are deeply 
interrelated or even dependant on the Significant Other.” Lüdtke envisions a future 
of theory, practice and research into brain function where serious attention is given 
to relational emotions in linguistic development, “fully incorporating the concept of 
intersubjectivity”.
4.3   Part 3: How languages may transform the interpersonal  
life of intentions and affections
Foolen takes up the search for a theory of language that includes emotions, classifying 
words (nouns, verbs and prepositions) and phrases that carry intentions of emotional 
meaning. These, he says give an embodied ‘grounding’ for language learning, as for 
its evolution. As cognition affects language, and is affected by language, and emotion 
affects and is affected by cognition, emotion must engage with language. However, the 
role of emotion in the meanings of language will vary, depending on what the emotion 
is about. For example, is it about shared events and objects, or about inner states of the 
person? The role of cognition appears to be to assist ‘conceptualisation’ of emotions, 
and this will depend upon cultural suppositions and customs, as is further explored by 
Zlatev, Blomberg and Magnusson.
Emotion is communicated in how one moves expressively, whether with or with-
out words, and in patterns of rhythm, prosody or melody through time, as in theatre, 
poetry and music. But here Foolen is concerned more with the emotional lexicon of 
text, how it is understood when read, and in reference to a particular place or con-
text of events and actions. In distinguishing names for ‘primary’ emotions, which 
may be named as ‘states’, he notes that languages differ, expressing differences in how 
emotional states are perceived in oneself and in others. Emotional meanings are ‘con-
structed’ in language. Mental verbs take different roles in conveying emotion, identi-
fying emotive events, denoting their expressive movements, or conveying how they 
feel to be changing in the body. Again cultures differ in how they acknowledge the 
different ‘places’ of emotion. Some are more personal, others more objective, and they 
differ in the respect they show for authenticity, for cooperation, or for authority. The 
‘somatisms’ that describe feelings in organs of the body would seem to be fundamen-
tally important in explaining emotions, not as causes but as regulations. The ‘figura-
tive’ expressions are not as dead, or contrived, as the nouns for ‘primary’ emotions. If 
such strongly experienced and powerfully communicated emotions are ‘abstract’ it is 
because they are about alive persons, not objective things. And of course metaphors as 
‘portative’, or ‘important’, forms of speech will be rich in affects.
It is good to know, from recent brain science, that affective activity in the brain can 
benefit cognitive understanding. Clearly moods expressed in language, and perceived 
more strongly in the right hemisphere, assist comprehension. Surely the conclusion is 
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welcome that, “besides motion, a second foundational pillar must be added, namely 
emotion, to get a balanced, solid grounding of the higher functions of cognition and 
language”. On the question of how language evolved, there is both archeological and 
anthropological evidence of the primacy of emotional communication and celebra-
tion of community in embodied displays, leading to the theory that human ancestors 
expressed shared understanding first musically or by a mixture of expressive vocaliza-
tion and gesture before speaking, and that such ‘musicality’ is necessary for language 
to emerge (Darwin 1874; Donald 2001; Mithen 2005; Dissanayake 2009). Foolen 
indicates that the theory that ‘emotions inform language’ has important implications 
for language teaching, psychotherapy, for helping people who cannot talk about their 
emotions, and in facilitating effective business communication. Emotions should no 
longer be neglected in linguistics.
Bloem describes historical changes in the ways emotions have been written about 
since Descartes by a study of the meanings of émouvoir and mouvoir in French theo-
retical and encyclopaedic texts, how the medieval account of the four humours or tem-
peraments inside persons was displaced by a different, more rational or psychological 
description of the emotions in their relationship to thinking. According to Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory, CMT (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) biological bodily experiences, not 
cultural conceptions, ground metaphorical language. However the review of language 
usage between the Old French and the XVIIth Century French shows otherwise. The 
language itself, and reflections upon its use in a changing cultural world, changes 
metaphorical usages. In particular, while mouvoir remains an active or motivated 
verb to denote an event, émouvoir became more psychologised or ‘abstract’ as a cause 
expressed in the tone or intensity of thinking or acting. Descartes changed his “mou-
vements de l’ame” to emotions as “excitations of the soul”. The noun emotion changed 
reference from a public disturbance, to be controlled, to a tumult within the soul or 
psyche. It is interesting that the word ‘control’ derives from the expression contre le 
rôle, the word rôle referring to “a list of articles or persons making up a register as in 
‘payroll’. The controller was the person who checked the register.” (Packard 2006: 205, 
footnote 26). Much of our collective elucidation of emotion and movement relates to 
the vertical of hierarchical regulations of the animal vitality of individuals in ‘civilised’ 
society. Clearly such things become salient in a culture regulated by the powers of edu-
cated persons who rely on texts for their understanding of how to employ the authority 
of reason, of the “thinking substance” of the mind. That may be why emotions became 
more ‘abstract’ (‘ineffectual’?) in the language of modern French, as also in English. We 
can hope that the science of movement and its imaginative and affective regulations 
will help bring the active sense of movere back to life in the psychology of language, as 
also argued by Foolen & Zlatev et al.
Weigand argues for recognition of the full complexity of engagements between body, 
mind, language and emotion. With others she finds the concept of ‘inter-subjectivity’, 
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if it means ‘transferring’ mind functions, goes only part way to understanding how 
meaning flourishes, struggles and changes in the interpersonal dialogues of culture, 
and how actions and emotions are interpreted and changed by language. A Mixed 
Game Model seems to use a notion not unlike Whitehead’s philosophy of ‘processes’ 
in ‘organisms’, which grow and live adaptively by combining powers of creativity and 
cooperation. But Whitehead, like Darwin, would not accept that these processes are 
just ‘probabilistic’ or ‘stochastic’. They are adaptively motivated in advance of func-
tion, with preparations for their actions and ‘affective’ protections against injury and 
conflict, and ‘uncertainties’. Weigand’s ‘new science’ gives hope for acceptance of inten-
tions in movement, but it is not yet a ‘game’ that includes all players. It must follow 
Feinman’s advice to keep the mind attentive to many possibilities, to look between 
disciplines, and between ‘theories of mind’. Weigand lists examples where behavioural 
and mind scientists have failed to attend to this advice and have looked for single 
causes or ‘devices’. She gives many illuminating examples of how ‘adaptable’ and cre-
ative this understanding of talk and text is between us. It is never just joint attention, or 
joint intention, but involves joint aliveness with heartfelt experience, in sympathy with 
movements that show the differences of being. And her conclusion is, “if we want to 
understand human beings’ actions and behaviour, it is of no help to refer to a concept 
of language as a code.”
Günther and Hennies describe the difficulties a large proportion of deaf children 
have learning spoken or written language despite advances in early diagnosis and 
introduction of cochlear implants to enable hearing, and the cognitive and emotional 
problems they suffer. The children’s difficulties are made worse by insistence by some 
medical professionals and special need educators on training in lip reading to help 
them speak, and a belief that sign language, which they can learn readily, will interfere 
with development of speech. All infants are highly expressive with their hands and can 
learn hand sign language from signing parents at the same rate as speech is learned in 
a hearing family. Sign language can serve to facilitate learning to speak. The evidence is 
that poor reading and writing learning follows poor early language learning, so atten-
tion must turn to how deaf infants can be encouraged to acquire symbolic communi-
cation through normal stages from early infancy.
When mothers, deaf or hearing, are encouraged to use sign language in the first 
year this benefits the deaf infants language development in the second year. As has been 
found in studies of the benefits of secure attachment in infancy for subsequent devel-
opment, “a stable social interaction with one’s mother is a necessary precondition for a 
flourishing language acquisition.” We can compare this conclusion with Frank’s work 
to assist communication with a youth suffering from autism and Lüdtke’s account of 
the emotional factors in language development. “Early intervention programs should 
be designed in such a way that they address all aspects of early development instead of 
focusing primarily on spoken language skills and medical procedures.”
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I am surprised however, that Piaget’s theory of the development of praxes and 
cognitive abilities is considered the best model to guide the authors’ recommended 
treatment strategy. Surely the evidence we have of age-related changes of infants’ 
motives and related brain developments, invites us to relate their cognitive object-
related actions and ‘concepts’, such as ‘object permanence’ and ‘playful imitation for 
amusement of the self ’, with the powerful growth of interpersonal and rhythmically 
expressive emotional communications, which Piaget largely ignored. The child is led to 
symbolic functions by strong motives for cooperative play and joint task performance. 
Tomasello’s “joint attentional frame and common ground” lacks the affectionate and 
humorous quality of parent-infant play that leads to flourishing learning of conven-
tions and rituals of cooperation and that sets a foundation for language. Musical- 
dancing forms of communication and rhythmic rituals and narrations combining 
song with gesture, as in normal communication with infants under one year of age, 
are effective in aiding second language learning, and that they, with mediation of com-
munication by touch, are essential in overcoming the isolation of congenitally deaf and 
blind persons (Tønsberg & Hauge 1996; Janssen & Rodbroe 2008). Consciousness is 
polymodal from birth, including all sensations of the moving self and how they may 
collaborate with sensations others’ movements. All of which supports the conclusion 
of the authors that, “a holistic and multisensory early intervention with the option for 
a later bilingual education would rather serve the developmental needs of a deaf child.”
Zlatev, Blomberg and Magnusson classify words that convey ‘motion/emotion’ 
metaphors and compared their functions in four languages. There are, of course, uni-
versal tendencies and experience of human individuals as active persons with feelings, 
which must be respected in language, but there are cultural differences and ‘public 
criteria of correctness’ also. These can transform how affects are spoken about, as has 
been shown for the effects of historical change of word use in French by Bloem, and is 
discussed by Racine, Wereha & Leavens. The purpose of language is to be understood 
in many conscious ways and different social contexts, not only to be sympathised with 
and affirmed in vital, personal, matters, or to seek comprehension in conceptions of 
human embodied awareness (see comment on Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Meta-
phor Theory in Bloem this volume). Linguistic expressions for emotion must deal with 
the ‘inner process’, of being alive, active and caring about it, and the public criteria for 
moving events, especially those between persons. Without the inner process, “words 
denoting mental phenomena would be gutted of their experiential content, and their 
meaning reduced to use”. The spatial or temporal ‘dimensions’ of emotion-charged 
events are perhaps convenient for reference, but they can become ‘gutted’ of signifi-
cance if they lack sincere interest in affective appraisal, as in much political oratory. 
This is the subjectivity/inter-subjectivity dilemma, which can only be resolved by sin-
cerity, trust and tolerance, as James and Dewey said. Language works in both senses, 
to promote common understanding, and to protect personal realities.
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Zlatev, Blomberg and Magnusson found that the European languages were similar 
in having many emotional terms related to active behaviours and to events affecting 
persons. In English there were the largest number of motion-emotion metaphors, the 
majority of these having corresponding expressions in one or more of the other lan-
guages. Most were for ‘caused motion’ expressions inflicted on the subject by other 
agents or events, not just happening to them. The other European languages were 
similar, Swedish and English being, as expected, most alike and Bulgarian somewhat 
distant from them, but Thai was oriented to a quite different use of motion/emotion 
metaphors. Apparently the mores of Thai culture acknowledge more openly the ‘heart-
felt’ feelings of deference and self-restraint. That is how I interpret the prevalent use of 
a single term caj, which apparently denotes a feeling of physical excitement or inten-
sion (of heart or mind), and which is qualified by a verb indicating an action given or 
received (transitively) or a state experienced (intransitively) by the person with the 
feeling.
5.  Conclusions
We differ from other animals in two respects, which give life and emotional meaning 
to language and culture (Aiello 1992; Merker in press).
First, we are the most complex animated organisms, moving on two feet with 
hands, eyes and head free for many concurrent tasks. Correspondingly, our selves 
have more senses. These monitor both the intra-corporal forces of ambitious agency, 
the visceral costs and benefits, including new ways of getting nourishment from the 
environment, and the distant affordances of the spaces, objects and other beings in 
the world we use. And we have a greatly enlarged capacity for retaining ‘episodic 
memories’ in our spherical heads, and a long life in which to learn them. Human 
actions and senses are integrated in a richly imaginative and retentive self-awareness 
and a polyrhythmic sense of subjective time in which we create and retain intricate 
projects of serial action and personal histories, developing an autonoetic or ‘self-
knowing’ consciousness (Tulving 2002).
Second, our self-conscious projects are transformed by an other-awareness that 
seeks confirmation by sight touch and hearing of the intentions and emotions of 
human beings, and new information from them about where to go, what to do, and 
what to notice. We share our lives by oral and gestural mimicry of thoughts, a narra-
tive process that makes possible the accumulation of cultural ideas and artefacts – both 
artistic, serving to celebrate vitality in community, and technical, mastering coopera-
tive exploitation of physical surroundings (Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt 2011). Thus 
a rich and changing socio-noesis or communal consciousness is transmitted through 
generations to make infinite cultural meanings and artefacts (Trevarthen 2007).
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Cultural artefacts include language, encoding endless subtle discriminations into 
rational and poetic stories. Culture produces money, luxury goods, prepared foods, 
buildings, cities and whole national and international ‘infra-structures’ – a symbolic 
wealth of objects that have transactional value. The complexities of social life in culture 
require legal and political ‘managements’ that regulate behaviour of individuals and of 
organizations and institutions.
Such features of our extraordinary collective experience are alive in the play and 
eager learning of three-year-olds, in every human community. Because we have big 
hungry brains, our mothers need help with birth, and we are born immature and in 
long dependence on maternal care (Hrdy 1999). But we come with imaginative con-
sciousness, wanting to meet an affectionate and playful partner who gives her imagi-
native intelligence to our nascent thoughtfulness and sociability in a musical language 
we eagerly respond to. She and other intimate companions invite an apprenticeship in 
the cultural awareness of a larger community and its past, and we are keen to attend.
It is hopeless to expect to explain what we sophisticated scholars believe about the 
human condition without accepting that we depend upon natural inclinations to share 
intentions with emotion. Mere logic of facts will not do.
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The close relationship between motion (bodily movement) and emotion 
(feelings) is not an etymological coincidence. While moving ourselves, 
we move others; in observing others move – we are moved ourselves. 
The fundamentally interpersonal nature of mind and language 
has recently received due attention, but the key role of (e)motion 
in this context has remained something of a blind spot. The present book 
rectiies this gap by gathering contributions from leading philosophers, 
psychologists and linguists working in the area. Framed by an introducing 
prologue and a summarizing epilogue (written by Colwyn Trevarthen, 
who brought the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity to a wider 
audience some 30 years ago) the volume elaborates a dynamical, 
active view of emotion, along with an afect-laden view of motion – 
and explores their signiicance for consciousness, intersubjectivity, 
and language. As such, it contributes to the emerging interdisciplinary 
ield of mind science, transcending hitherto dominant computationalist 
and cognitivist approaches.
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